1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
114 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
122 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
124 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
125 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
127 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
129 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
130 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
131 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
133 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
134 unsigned int *preasons
);
135 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
136 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
137 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
138 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
140 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
141 const char X509_version
[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT
;
143 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
149 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509
**a
, X509
**b
)
151 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a
, *b
);
154 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
155 static int cert_self_signed(X509
*x
)
157 X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0);
158 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
)
164 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
166 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
168 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
171 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
172 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
175 /* Look for exact match */
176 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
177 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
178 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
181 if (i
< sk_X509_num(certs
))
182 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
185 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
189 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
191 X509
*x
, *xtmp
, *chain_ss
= NULL
;
193 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
= ctx
->param
;
194 int depth
, i
, ok
= 0;
196 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
197 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
198 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
199 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
206 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
207 * the first entry is in place
209 if (ctx
->chain
== NULL
) {
210 if (((ctx
->chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
211 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
))) {
212 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
215 CRYPTO_add(&ctx
->cert
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
216 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 1;
219 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
220 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
221 && (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
222 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
226 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
227 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
228 depth
= param
->depth
;
231 /* If we have enough, we break */
233 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
234 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
235 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
238 /* If we are self signed, we break */
239 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
242 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
244 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
) {
245 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
249 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
258 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
259 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) {
260 xtmp
= find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
262 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, xtmp
)) {
263 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
266 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
267 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, xtmp
);
268 ctx
->last_untrusted
++;
272 * reparse the full chain for the next one
281 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
282 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
287 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
290 i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
291 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1);
292 if (cert_self_signed(x
)) {
293 /* we have a self signed certificate */
294 if (sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1) {
296 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can find
297 * it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid possible
300 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
301 if ((ok
<= 0) || X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
)) {
302 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
;
303 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
304 ctx
->error_depth
= i
- 1;
313 * We have a match: replace certificate with store version so
314 * we get any trust settings.
318 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1, x
);
319 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
323 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
325 chain_ss
= sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
326 ctx
->last_untrusted
--;
328 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
332 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
334 /* If we have enough, we break */
338 /* If we are self signed, we break */
339 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
342 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
350 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
)) {
352 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
358 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
360 i
= check_trust(ctx
);
362 /* If explicitly rejected error */
363 if (i
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
366 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
367 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
368 * and set bad_chain == 1
370 if (i
!= X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
&& !bad_chain
) {
371 if ((chain_ss
== NULL
) || !ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, chain_ss
)) {
372 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
>= num
)
373 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
;
375 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
;
376 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
379 sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, chain_ss
);
381 ctx
->last_untrusted
= num
;
382 ctx
->current_cert
= chain_ss
;
383 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
;
387 ctx
->error_depth
= num
- 1;
394 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
395 ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
);
400 /* Check name constraints */
402 ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
);
412 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
413 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
416 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
417 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
420 ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
);
424 i
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
426 if (i
!= X509_V_OK
) {
428 ctx
->current_cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->error_depth
);
434 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
435 if (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
)
436 ok
= ctx
->verify(ctx
);
438 ok
= internal_verify(ctx
);
442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
443 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
444 ok
= v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
);
447 ok
= v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
);
452 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
453 if (!bad_chain
&& (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
))
454 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
459 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
463 if (chain_ss
!= NULL
)
469 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
472 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
475 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;;
476 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
477 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
478 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)) {
480 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, rv
, 1))
487 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
489 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
493 return cert_self_signed(x
);
494 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
495 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
) {
498 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
499 if (cert_self_signed(x
) && sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
501 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
502 ch
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
503 if (ch
== issuer
|| !X509_cmp(ch
, issuer
)) {
504 ret
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP
;
510 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
)
512 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
513 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK
))
517 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
518 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
519 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
522 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
524 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
526 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
528 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer
)->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
535 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
539 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
541 int i
, ok
= 0, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
543 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
544 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
546 int allow_proxy_certs
;
550 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
551 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
552 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
553 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
554 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
555 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
556 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
560 /* CRL path validation */
562 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
563 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
566 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
568 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
571 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
572 allow_proxy_certs
= 1;
573 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
576 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
577 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
++) {
579 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
580 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
581 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
582 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
;
583 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
584 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
589 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
590 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
;
591 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
592 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
597 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
598 switch (must_be_ca
) {
600 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
601 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
603 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
610 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
616 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
619 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
625 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
626 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
631 if (ctx
->param
->purpose
> 0) {
632 ret
= X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0);
634 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
636 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
;
637 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
638 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
644 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
645 if ((i
> 1) && !(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
)
646 && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
647 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
+ 1))) {
648 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
649 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
650 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
655 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
656 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
659 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
660 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
661 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
663 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
664 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1 && i
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
665 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
666 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
667 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
682 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
686 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
687 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
688 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
689 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
690 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
693 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
694 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
695 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
698 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
699 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
701 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
702 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
704 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
705 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
706 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
715 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
717 ctx
->error
= errcode
;
718 ctx
->current_cert
= ctx
->cert
;
719 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
720 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
723 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
)
726 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id
->hosts
);
729 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
730 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id
->hosts
, i
);
731 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, id
->hostflags
, &id
->peername
) > 0)
737 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
739 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
740 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
= vpm
->id
;
742 if (id
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, id
) <= 0) {
743 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
746 if (id
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, id
->email
, id
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
747 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
750 if (id
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, id
->ip
, id
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
751 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
757 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
761 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
763 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
764 for (i
= ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
765 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
766 ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
767 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
768 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
769 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
771 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
774 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
775 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
776 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
777 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
;
780 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
784 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
787 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
789 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
))
790 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
791 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, 0);
792 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
794 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
796 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
797 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
802 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
803 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
805 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
808 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
811 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
813 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
814 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
816 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
821 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
822 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
823 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
830 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
832 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
835 unsigned int last_reasons
;
836 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
837 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
838 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
839 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
840 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
841 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
842 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
843 last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
844 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
846 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
848 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
850 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
853 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
854 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
857 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
858 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
863 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
866 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
872 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
874 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
884 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
887 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
888 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
889 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
897 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
902 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
904 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
909 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
910 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
911 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
915 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
919 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
;
920 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
927 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
;
928 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
932 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
933 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
938 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
;
939 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
942 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
943 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
946 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
;
947 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
953 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
958 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
959 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
960 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
962 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
963 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
964 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
965 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
966 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
968 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
969 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
971 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
973 if (crl_score
> best_score
) {
975 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
976 best_score
= crl_score
;
977 best_reasons
= reasons
;
983 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
985 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
986 *pscore
= best_score
;
987 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
988 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
990 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
993 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
996 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1003 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1004 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1007 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1009 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
1011 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1013 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1014 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1016 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1020 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1024 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1026 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1036 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
1042 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1044 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1046 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1047 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
1049 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1050 if (!base
->crl_number
)
1052 /* Issuer names must match */
1053 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
1055 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1056 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1058 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1060 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1061 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1063 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1064 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1070 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1071 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1074 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1075 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1079 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1081 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1083 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1084 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1085 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1086 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1087 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1088 CRYPTO_add(&delta
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
1097 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1098 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1099 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1100 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1101 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1104 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1105 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1109 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1111 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1113 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1114 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1116 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1117 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1118 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1120 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1121 /* If no new reasons reject */
1122 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1125 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1126 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1128 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1129 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1130 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1133 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1135 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1136 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1139 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1140 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1142 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1143 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1145 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1147 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1150 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1152 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1153 /* If no new reasons reject */
1154 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1156 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1157 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1160 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1166 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1167 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1169 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1170 X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1171 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1174 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1177 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1179 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1180 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1181 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1182 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1187 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1188 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1189 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1191 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1192 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1193 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1198 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1200 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1204 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1205 * untrusted certificates.
1207 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1208 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1209 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1211 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1212 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1213 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1220 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1221 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1222 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1223 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1226 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1228 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1230 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1233 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->ctx
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1236 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1237 /* Copy verify params across */
1238 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1240 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1241 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1243 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1244 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1249 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1251 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1253 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1258 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1259 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1260 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1261 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1262 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1266 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1267 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1268 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1270 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1271 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1272 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1273 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1279 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1280 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1281 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1282 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1283 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1286 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1288 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1289 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1290 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1297 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1301 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1306 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1308 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1309 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1312 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1313 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1317 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1319 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1320 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1321 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1323 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1329 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1331 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1332 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1333 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1334 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1335 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1344 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1347 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1348 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1350 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1351 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1352 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1353 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1355 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1361 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1363 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1364 unsigned int *preasons
)
1367 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1369 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1370 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1373 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1376 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1377 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1378 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1379 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1380 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1381 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1386 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1387 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1393 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1394 * to find a delta CRL too
1397 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1398 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1401 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1403 unsigned int reasons
;
1404 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1405 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1406 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1407 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1408 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1409 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1414 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1416 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1418 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1422 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1424 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1428 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1430 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1431 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1432 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1441 /* Check CRL validity */
1442 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1444 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1445 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1446 int ok
= 0, chnum
, cnum
;
1447 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1448 chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1449 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1450 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1451 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1454 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1455 * certificate in chain.
1457 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1458 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1460 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1461 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1462 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
)) {
1463 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
;
1464 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1472 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1474 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1475 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1476 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1477 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
)) {
1478 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
;
1479 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1484 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
)) {
1485 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
;
1486 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1491 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
)) {
1492 if (check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0) {
1493 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
;
1494 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1500 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) {
1501 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1502 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1509 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
)) {
1510 ok
= check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1);
1515 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1516 ikey
= X509_get_pubkey(issuer
);
1519 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1520 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1525 rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1526 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
1528 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1532 /* Verify CRL signature */
1533 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0) {
1534 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1535 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1545 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey
);
1549 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1550 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1555 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1556 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1557 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1558 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1560 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1561 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
1562 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
;
1563 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1568 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1569 * is not removeFromCRL.
1571 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1572 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1574 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
;
1575 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1583 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1588 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1589 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1591 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1594 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1597 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1601 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1602 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1603 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1605 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1606 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
;
1607 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1613 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1614 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1615 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1618 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1619 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1620 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
1621 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1628 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int quiet
)
1633 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1634 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1638 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1642 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
;
1643 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1644 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1651 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
;
1652 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1653 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1657 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1661 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
;
1662 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1663 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1670 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
;
1671 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1672 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1679 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1683 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1684 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
1686 cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1688 n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
1689 ctx
->error_depth
= n
- 1;
1691 xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1693 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1696 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1701 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
;
1702 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1707 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1708 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1712 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1714 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1717 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1718 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1723 || (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
))) {
1724 if ((pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1725 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1726 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1727 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1730 } else if (X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1731 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1732 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1733 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1735 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1739 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1746 ok
= x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, 0);
1750 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1751 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1752 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1753 ok
= (*cb
) (1, ctx
);
1760 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1768 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1770 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1773 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1778 char buff1
[24], buff2
[24], *p
;
1783 str
= (char *)ctm
->data
;
1784 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1785 if ((i
< 11) || (i
> 17))
1798 if ((*str
== 'Z') || (*str
== '-') || (*str
== '+')) {
1804 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1807 while ((*str
>= '0') && (*str
<= '9'))
1818 if ((*str
!= '+') && (*str
!= '-'))
1820 offset
= ((str
[1] - '0') * 10 + (str
[2] - '0')) * 60;
1821 offset
+= (str
[3] - '0') * 10 + (str
[4] - '0');
1825 atm
.type
= ctm
->type
;
1827 atm
.length
= sizeof(buff2
);
1828 atm
.data
= (unsigned char *)buff2
;
1830 if (X509_time_adj(&atm
, offset
* 60, cmp_time
) == NULL
)
1833 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1834 i
= (buff1
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1
[1] - '0');
1836 i
+= 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1837 j
= (buff2
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2
[1] - '0');
1846 i
= strcmp(buff1
, buff2
);
1847 if (i
== 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1853 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1855 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1858 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1860 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1863 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1864 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1873 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1874 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1875 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1876 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1877 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1879 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1882 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1884 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1887 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1890 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1891 ktmp
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1893 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1894 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1897 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1900 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1905 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1906 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1910 /* first, populate the other certs */
1911 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1912 ktmp2
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1913 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1914 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2
);
1918 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1919 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1923 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1925 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
1926 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
1928 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
1930 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
1931 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1932 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
1933 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
1936 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1937 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
1938 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
1941 /* Issuer names must match */
1942 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
1943 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
1946 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1947 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
1948 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
1951 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
1952 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
1955 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1956 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
1957 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
1960 /* CRLs must verify */
1961 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
1962 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
1963 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
1966 /* Create new CRL */
1967 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
1968 if (!crl
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
1970 /* Set issuer name */
1971 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
1974 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer
)))
1976 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer
)))
1979 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1981 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
1985 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1986 * number to correct value too.
1989 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
1990 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
1991 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
1992 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
1996 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
1998 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2000 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2001 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2002 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2004 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2005 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2007 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2008 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2011 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2012 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2017 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2019 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2025 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2031 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl
, void *argp
,
2032 CRYPTO_EX_new
*new_func
,
2033 CRYPTO_EX_dup
*dup_func
,
2034 CRYPTO_EX_free
*free_func
)
2037 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2038 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2040 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, argl
, argp
,
2041 new_func
, dup_func
, free_func
);
2044 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2046 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2049 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2051 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2054 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2059 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2064 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2066 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2069 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2071 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2074 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2079 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2083 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2086 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2088 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2091 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2093 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2096 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2101 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2106 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2108 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2111 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2116 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2118 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2121 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2123 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2127 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2128 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2129 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2130 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2131 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2132 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2133 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2137 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2138 int purpose
, int trust
)
2141 /* If purpose not set use default */
2143 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2144 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2147 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2149 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2150 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2153 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2154 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2155 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2157 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2158 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2161 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2163 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2165 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2168 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2170 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2171 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2176 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2177 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2178 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2179 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2183 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2185 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
;
2186 ctx
= (X509_STORE_CTX
*)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
2188 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2191 memset(ctx
, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
2195 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2197 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2201 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2202 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2206 ctx
->current_method
= 0;
2208 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2210 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
2211 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2215 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2216 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2217 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2218 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2219 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2220 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2221 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2225 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2228 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2233 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2237 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2239 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2242 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2243 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2248 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2249 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2252 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2256 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2257 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2259 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2261 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2262 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2264 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2266 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2267 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2269 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2271 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2272 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2274 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2276 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2277 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2279 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2281 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2282 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2284 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2286 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2287 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2289 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2291 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2292 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2294 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2296 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2297 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2299 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_get1_certs
;
2301 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2302 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2304 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_get1_crls
;
2306 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2309 * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2310 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2311 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
2313 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2314 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2317 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2324 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2325 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2328 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2330 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2331 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2334 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2338 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2339 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2340 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2343 if (ctx
->tree
!= NULL
) {
2344 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2347 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
2348 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2351 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2352 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA
));
2355 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2357 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2360 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2362 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2365 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2368 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2371 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2372 int (*verify_cb
) (int, X509_STORE_CTX
*))
2374 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2377 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2382 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2384 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2387 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2389 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2390 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2393 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2396 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2401 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2404 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2408 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509
)
2410 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509
)
2412 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME
)
2414 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)
2416 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)