2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "crypto/ctype.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
23 #include <openssl/objects.h>
24 #include "internal/dane.h"
25 #include "crypto/x509.h"
26 #include "x509_local.h"
29 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
)
30 DEFINE_STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME
)
31 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_CRL
)
32 DEFINE_STACK_OF(DIST_POINT
)
33 DEFINE_STACK_OF_STRING()
35 /* CRL score values */
37 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
39 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
41 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
43 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
47 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
49 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
51 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
53 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
55 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
57 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
59 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
61 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
63 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
65 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
67 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
69 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
71 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
73 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
74 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
75 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
76 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
77 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
78 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
79 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
80 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
81 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
82 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
);
83 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
84 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
85 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
86 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
87 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
);
88 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
89 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
91 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
92 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
93 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
94 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
95 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
96 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
97 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
98 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
100 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
101 unsigned int *preasons
);
102 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
103 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
104 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
105 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
107 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
109 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
114 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed, 0 if not, or -1 on error */
115 static int cert_self_signed(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
117 if (!X509v3_cache_extensions(x
, ctx
->libctx
, ctx
->propq
))
120 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
)
126 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
128 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
130 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
133 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
134 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
137 /* Look for exact match */
138 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
139 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
140 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
143 if (i
< sk_X509_num(certs
))
147 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
152 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
153 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
155 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
156 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
158 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
160 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
, int err
)
162 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
163 ctx
->current_cert
= (x
!= NULL
) ? x
: sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
164 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
)
166 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
170 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
171 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
174 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
176 static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
179 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
182 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
185 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
187 if (ctx
->param
->auth_level
<= 0)
190 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; ++i
) {
191 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
194 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
195 * check the security of issuer keys.
197 if (i
> 0 && !check_key_level(ctx
, cert
) &&
198 verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
) == 0)
201 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
202 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
204 if (i
< num
- 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx
, cert
) &&
205 verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
) == 0)
211 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
217 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
218 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
220 if ((ok
= build_chain(ctx
)) == 0 ||
221 (ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
)) == 0 ||
222 (ok
= check_auth_level(ctx
)) == 0 ||
223 (ok
= check_id(ctx
)) == 0 || 1)
224 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
225 if (ok
== 0 || (ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
)) == 0)
228 err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
230 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
) {
231 if ((ok
= verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, ctx
->error_depth
, err
)) == 0)
235 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
236 ok
= (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
) ? ctx
->verify(ctx
) : internal_verify(ctx
);
240 if ((ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
)) == 0)
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
244 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
245 if ((ok
= X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
247 if ((ok
= X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
251 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
252 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
)
253 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
257 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
259 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
262 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
263 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
264 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
268 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
270 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
271 * cannot do another one.
273 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
274 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
279 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
280 * the first entry is in place
282 if (((ctx
->chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
283 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
))) {
284 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
285 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
288 X509_up_ref(ctx
->cert
);
289 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 1;
291 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
292 if (!check_key_level(ctx
, ctx
->cert
) &&
293 !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
))
296 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
297 ret
= dane_verify(ctx
);
299 ret
= verify_chain(ctx
);
302 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
303 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
304 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
306 if (ret
<= 0 && ctx
->error
== X509_V_OK
)
307 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
312 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
314 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
317 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;
319 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
320 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
321 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)) {
323 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, rv
, -1))
330 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
332 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
338 ss
= cert_self_signed(ctx
, x
);
344 ret
= x509_check_issued_int(issuer
, x
, ctx
->libctx
, ctx
->propq
);
345 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
) {
349 ss
= cert_self_signed(ctx
, x
);
353 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
354 if (ss
> 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
356 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
357 ch
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
358 if (ch
== issuer
|| !X509_cmp(ch
, issuer
)) {
359 ret
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP
;
365 return (ret
== X509_V_OK
);
368 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
370 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
372 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
374 X509_up_ref(*issuer
);
380 static STACK_OF(X509
) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
383 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
387 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->other_ctx
); i
++) {
388 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->other_ctx
, i
);
389 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0) {
391 sk
= sk_X509_new_null();
392 if (sk
== NULL
|| sk_X509_push(sk
, x
) == 0) {
393 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
394 X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
395 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
405 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
406 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
408 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int purpose
, int depth
,
411 int tr_ok
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
414 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
415 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
417 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
418 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
419 * ctx->param->purpose!
421 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
422 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
423 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
424 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
425 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
427 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
428 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
431 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
&& purpose
== ctx
->param
->purpose
)
432 tr_ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT
);
435 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
437 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
440 switch (X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0)) {
446 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) == 0)
452 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
);
456 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
460 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
462 int i
, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
464 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
466 int allow_proxy_certs
;
467 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
470 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
471 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
472 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
473 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
474 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
475 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
476 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
480 /* CRL path validation */
482 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
483 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
486 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
487 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
490 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
492 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
493 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
494 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
495 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
496 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
))
499 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
500 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
501 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
))
504 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
505 switch (must_be_ca
) {
507 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
508 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
510 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
517 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
522 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
524 || ((i
+ 1 < num
|| ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
527 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
532 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) == 0
533 && x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1
534 && (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)) {
535 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
538 if (ret
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_OK
))
540 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
541 if (purpose
> 0 && !check_purpose(ctx
, x
, purpose
, i
, must_be_ca
))
544 if ((i
> 1) && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
545 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
))) {
546 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
))
549 /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */
550 if (i
> 0 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) == 0)
553 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
554 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
555 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
557 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
559 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
560 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
561 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
562 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
564 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
565 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
566 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
567 * increment proxy_path_length.
569 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1) {
570 if (proxy_path_length
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
571 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
572 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
))
575 proxy_path_length
= x
->ex_pcpathlen
;
585 static int has_san_id(X509
*x
, int gtype
)
589 GENERAL_NAMES
*gs
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_subject_alt_name
, NULL
, NULL
);
594 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs
); i
++) {
595 GENERAL_NAME
*g
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs
, i
);
597 if (g
->type
== gtype
) {
602 GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs
);
606 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
610 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
611 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
612 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
615 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
616 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
620 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
621 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
623 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
625 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
626 X509_NAME
*tmpsubject
= X509_get_subject_name(x
);
627 X509_NAME
*tmpissuer
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
628 X509_NAME_ENTRY
*tmpentry
= NULL
;
629 int last_object_nid
= 0;
631 int last_object_loc
= X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
) - 1;
633 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
634 if (last_object_loc
< 1) {
635 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
636 goto proxy_name_done
;
640 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
641 * there is in issuer.
643 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
)
644 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer
) + 1) {
645 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
646 goto proxy_name_done
;
650 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
653 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
655 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
656 last_object_loc
- 1))) {
657 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
658 goto proxy_name_done
;
662 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
663 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
665 tmpsubject
= X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject
);
666 if (tmpsubject
== NULL
) {
667 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
668 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
673 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject
, last_object_loc
);
675 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry
));
677 if (last_object_nid
!= NID_commonName
678 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject
, tmpissuer
) != 0) {
679 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
682 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry
);
683 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject
);
687 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, err
))
692 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
693 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
694 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
697 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
698 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
701 int rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
703 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
704 if (rv
== X509_V_OK
&& i
== 0
705 && (ctx
->param
->hostflags
706 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT
) == 0
707 && ((ctx
->param
->hostflags
708 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT
) != 0
709 || !has_san_id(x
, GEN_DNS
)))
710 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x
, nc
);
715 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
718 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, rv
))
728 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
730 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, errcode
);
733 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
)
736 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm
->hosts
);
739 if (vpm
->peername
!= NULL
) {
740 OPENSSL_free(vpm
->peername
);
741 vpm
->peername
= NULL
;
743 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
744 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm
->hosts
, i
);
745 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, vpm
->hostflags
, &vpm
->peername
) > 0)
751 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
753 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
755 if (vpm
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, vpm
) <= 0) {
756 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
759 if (vpm
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, vpm
->email
, vpm
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
760 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
763 if (vpm
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, vpm
->ip
, vpm
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
764 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
770 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
)
775 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
776 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
780 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
781 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
783 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && num_untrusted
> 0 && num_untrusted
< num
) {
784 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, num_untrusted
)) {
785 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
786 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
792 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
793 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
794 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
795 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
797 for (i
= num_untrusted
; i
< num
; i
++) {
798 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
799 trust
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
800 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
801 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
803 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
808 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
809 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
811 if (num_untrusted
< num
) {
812 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
)
814 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
817 if (num_untrusted
== num
&& ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
819 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
820 * for a direct trust store match.
823 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
824 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
826 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
829 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
830 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
832 trust
= X509_check_trust(mx
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
833 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
838 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
839 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
841 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
846 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
847 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
849 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
852 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
))
853 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
854 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
857 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
858 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
860 dane
->pdpth
= num_untrusted
;
861 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
862 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
863 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
864 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
867 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
869 int i
= 0, last
= 0, ok
= 0;
870 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
872 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
873 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
875 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
880 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
881 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
882 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
889 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
891 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
893 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
894 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
896 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
897 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
898 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
899 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
901 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)
904 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
905 unsigned int last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
907 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
909 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
911 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
913 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
916 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
919 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
920 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
925 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
928 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
934 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
936 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
946 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
949 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
950 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
958 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
962 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
964 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
970 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
971 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
972 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
973 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
978 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
982 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
))
989 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
))
993 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
994 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
999 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
))
1002 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1003 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
1006 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
))
1012 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
1017 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
1018 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
1019 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1021 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
1022 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
1023 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
1024 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
1025 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1027 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1028 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1029 reasons
= *preasons
;
1030 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
1031 if (crl_score
< best_score
|| crl_score
== 0)
1033 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1034 if (crl_score
== best_score
&& best_crl
!= NULL
) {
1036 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl
),
1037 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
)) == 0)
1040 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1043 if (day
<= 0 && sec
<= 0)
1047 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
1048 best_score
= crl_score
;
1049 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1053 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1055 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1056 *pscore
= best_score
;
1057 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1058 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl
);
1059 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1061 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1064 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1071 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1072 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1075 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1077 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
1079 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1081 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1082 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1084 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1088 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1092 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1094 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1104 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
1110 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1112 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1114 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1115 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
1117 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1118 if (!base
->crl_number
)
1120 /* Issuer names must match */
1121 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
1123 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1124 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1126 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1128 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1129 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1131 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1132 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1138 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1139 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1142 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1143 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1147 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1149 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1151 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1152 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1153 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1154 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1155 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1156 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta
);
1165 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1166 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1167 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1168 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1169 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1172 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1173 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1177 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1179 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1181 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1182 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1184 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1185 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1186 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1188 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1189 /* If no new reasons reject */
1190 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1193 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1194 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1196 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1197 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1198 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1201 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1203 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1204 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1207 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1208 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1210 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1211 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1213 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1215 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1218 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1220 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1221 /* If no new reasons reject */
1222 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1224 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1225 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1228 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1234 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1235 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1237 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1238 const X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1239 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1242 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1245 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1247 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1248 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1249 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1250 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1255 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1256 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1257 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1259 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1260 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1261 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1266 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1268 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1272 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1273 * untrusted certificates.
1275 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1276 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1277 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1279 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1280 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1281 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1288 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1289 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1290 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1291 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1294 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1296 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1299 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1302 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->store
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1305 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1306 /* Copy verify params across */
1307 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1309 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1310 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1312 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1313 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1317 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1318 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1320 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1325 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1326 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1327 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1328 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1329 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1333 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1334 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1335 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1337 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1338 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1339 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1340 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1346 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1347 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1348 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1349 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1350 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1353 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1355 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1356 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1357 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1364 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1368 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1373 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1375 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1376 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1379 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1380 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1384 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1386 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1387 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1388 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1390 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1396 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1398 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1399 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1400 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1401 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1402 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1411 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1414 const X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1415 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1417 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1418 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1419 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1420 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1422 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1428 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1430 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1431 unsigned int *preasons
)
1434 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1436 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1437 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1440 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1443 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1444 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1445 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1446 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1447 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1448 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1453 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1454 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1460 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1461 * to find a delta CRL too
1464 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1465 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1468 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1470 unsigned int reasons
;
1471 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1472 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1473 const X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1475 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1476 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1477 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1481 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1483 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1485 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1489 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1491 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1494 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1496 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1497 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1498 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1506 /* Check CRL validity */
1507 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1509 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1510 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1511 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1512 int chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1514 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1515 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1516 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1518 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1519 * certificate in chain.
1521 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1522 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1524 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1525 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1526 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
) &&
1527 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
))
1535 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1537 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1538 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1539 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1540 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
) &&
1541 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
))
1544 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
) &&
1545 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
))
1548 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
) &&
1549 check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0 &&
1550 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
))
1553 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) &&
1554 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
))
1558 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
) &&
1559 !check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1))
1562 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1563 ikey
= X509_get0_pubkey(issuer
);
1566 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
))
1570 int rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1572 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
&& !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, rv
))
1574 /* Verify CRL signature */
1575 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0 &&
1576 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
))
1582 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1583 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1588 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1589 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1590 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1591 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1593 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1594 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) &&
1595 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
))
1598 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1599 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1601 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1602 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1604 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
))
1611 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1618 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1619 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1620 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1621 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1622 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1623 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1624 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1625 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1626 * X509_policy_check() call.
1628 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
&& !sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, NULL
)) {
1629 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1630 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1633 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1634 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1635 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
)
1636 sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
1638 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL
) {
1639 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1640 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1643 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1644 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID
) {
1647 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1648 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1649 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1651 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1653 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
1654 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
))
1659 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE
) {
1660 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1661 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1662 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1664 if (ret
!= X509_PCY_TREE_VALID
) {
1665 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1669 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1670 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1672 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1673 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1674 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1675 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1677 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1685 * Check certificate validity times.
1686 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1687 * the validation status.
1689 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1691 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
)
1696 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1697 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1698 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
1703 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1704 if (i
>= 0 && depth
< 0)
1706 if (i
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
,
1707 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
))
1709 if (i
> 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
))
1712 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1713 if (i
<= 0 && depth
< 0)
1715 if (i
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
,
1716 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
))
1718 if (i
< 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
))
1723 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1725 int n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1726 X509
*xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1730 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1731 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1732 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1734 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
) {
1740 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1743 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1748 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xi
, 0,
1749 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
);
1751 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1752 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1756 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1757 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1763 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
1764 * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If
1765 * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
1766 * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
1768 if (xs
!= xi
|| (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
)) {
1769 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1770 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xi
, xi
!= xs
? n
+1 : n
,
1771 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
))
1773 } else if (X509_verify_ex(xs
, pkey
, ctx
->libctx
, ctx
->propq
) <= 0) {
1774 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xs
, n
,
1775 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
))
1781 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1782 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, n
))
1786 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1789 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1790 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1791 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1792 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
))
1797 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1803 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1805 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1808 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1810 static const size_t utctime_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1811 static const size_t generalizedtime_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1812 ASN1_TIME
*asn1_cmp_time
= NULL
;
1813 int i
, day
, sec
, ret
= 0;
1814 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
1815 const char upper_z
= 0x5A;
1817 const char upper_z
= 'Z';
1820 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1821 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1822 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1823 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1825 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1826 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1827 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1828 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1830 switch (ctm
->type
) {
1831 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME
:
1832 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(utctime_length
))
1835 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
:
1836 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(generalizedtime_length
))
1844 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1845 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1846 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1848 for (i
= 0; i
< ctm
->length
- 1; i
++) {
1849 if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm
->data
[i
]))
1852 if (ctm
->data
[ctm
->length
- 1] != upper_z
)
1856 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1857 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1858 * so we go through ASN.1
1860 asn1_cmp_time
= X509_time_adj(NULL
, 0, cmp_time
);
1861 if (asn1_cmp_time
== NULL
)
1863 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, ctm
, asn1_cmp_time
))
1867 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1868 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1870 ret
= (day
>= 0 && sec
>= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1873 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time
);
1878 * Return 0 if time should not be checked or reference time is in range,
1879 * or else 1 if it is past the end, or -1 if it is before the start
1881 int X509_cmp_timeframe(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
,
1882 const ASN1_TIME
*start
, const ASN1_TIME
*end
)
1885 time_t *time
= NULL
;
1886 unsigned long flags
= vpm
== NULL
? 0 : X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(vpm
);
1888 if ((flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
) != 0) {
1889 ref_time
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(vpm
);
1891 } else if ((flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
) != 0) {
1892 return 0; /* this means ok */
1893 } /* else reference time is the current time */
1895 if (end
!= NULL
&& X509_cmp_time(end
, time
) < 0)
1897 if (start
!= NULL
&& X509_cmp_time(start
, time
) > 0)
1902 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1904 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1907 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1909 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1912 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1913 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1922 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1923 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1924 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1925 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1926 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1928 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1931 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1933 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1936 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1939 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1940 ktmp
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1942 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1943 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1946 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1950 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1951 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1955 /* first, populate the other certs */
1956 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1957 ktmp2
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1958 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1962 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1966 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1968 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
1969 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
1971 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
1973 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
1974 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1975 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
1976 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
1979 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1980 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
1981 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
1984 /* Issuer names must match */
1985 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
1986 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
1989 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1990 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
1991 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
1994 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
1995 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
1998 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1999 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
2000 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
2003 /* CRLs must verify */
2004 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
2005 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
2006 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
2009 /* Create new CRL */
2010 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
2011 if (crl
== NULL
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
2013 /* Set issuer name */
2014 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
2017 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer
)))
2019 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer
)))
2022 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2024 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
2028 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2029 * number to correct value too.
2032 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
2033 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
2034 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
2035 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
2039 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2041 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2043 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2044 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2045 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2047 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2048 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2050 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, &rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2051 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2054 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2055 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2060 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2062 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2068 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2073 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2075 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2078 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2080 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2083 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2088 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2093 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2095 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2098 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2100 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
2103 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2105 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2108 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2110 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
2113 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2118 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2122 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2125 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2127 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2130 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2132 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2135 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2140 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2145 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2150 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2153 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2154 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2155 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2157 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2160 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2163 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2164 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2166 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2170 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2171 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2172 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2173 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2174 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2175 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2176 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2180 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2181 int purpose
, int trust
)
2184 /* If purpose not set use default */
2186 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2187 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2190 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2192 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2193 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2196 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2197 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2198 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2200 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2201 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2202 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2205 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2206 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2209 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2211 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2213 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2216 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2218 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2219 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2224 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2225 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2226 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2227 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2231 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new_with_libctx(OPENSSL_CTX
*libctx
,
2234 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx
));
2237 X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2241 ctx
->libctx
= libctx
;
2242 if (propq
!= NULL
) {
2243 ctx
->propq
= OPENSSL_strdup(propq
);
2244 if (ctx
->propq
== NULL
) {
2246 X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2254 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2256 return X509_STORE_CTX_new_with_libctx(NULL
, NULL
);
2260 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2265 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2267 /* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */
2268 OPENSSL_free(ctx
->propq
);
2273 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2274 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2280 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2282 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
2283 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2287 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2288 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2289 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2290 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2291 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2292 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2293 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2297 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 0;
2298 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2299 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2301 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2303 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2307 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2308 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2310 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2312 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2313 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2315 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2317 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2318 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2320 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2322 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2323 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2325 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2327 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2328 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2330 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2332 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2333 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2335 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2337 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2338 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2340 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2342 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2343 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2345 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2347 if (store
&& store
->check_policy
)
2348 ctx
->check_policy
= store
->check_policy
;
2350 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2352 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2353 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2355 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs
;
2357 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2358 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2360 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls
;
2362 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2363 if (ctx
->param
== NULL
) {
2364 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2369 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2372 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2374 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2377 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2378 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2381 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2386 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2387 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2389 if (ctx
->param
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2390 int idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx
->param
->purpose
);
2391 X509_PURPOSE
*xp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2394 ctx
->param
->trust
= X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp
);
2397 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2400 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2404 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2405 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2407 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2412 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2413 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2415 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2417 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2418 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2419 ctx
->lookup_certs
= lookup_certs_sk
;
2422 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2425 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2426 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2427 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2428 * pointers below after they're freed!
2430 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2431 if (ctx
->cleanup
!= NULL
) {
2433 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2435 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2436 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2437 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2440 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2442 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2444 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2445 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2448 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2450 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2453 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2455 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2458 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2461 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2464 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2469 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2471 return ctx
->untrusted
;
2474 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2476 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2479 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2481 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2485 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2486 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb
)
2488 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2491 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2493 return ctx
->verify_cb
;
2496 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2497 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify
)
2499 ctx
->verify
= verify
;
2502 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2507 X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2509 return ctx
->get_issuer
;
2512 X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
2513 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2515 return ctx
->check_issued
;
2518 X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn
2519 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2521 return ctx
->check_revocation
;
2524 X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2526 return ctx
->get_crl
;
2529 X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2531 return ctx
->check_crl
;
2534 X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2536 return ctx
->cert_crl
;
2539 X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn
2540 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2542 return ctx
->check_policy
;
2545 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn
2546 X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2548 return ctx
->lookup_certs
;
2551 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn
2552 X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2554 return ctx
->lookup_crls
;
2557 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2559 return ctx
->cleanup
;
2562 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2567 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2569 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2572 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2574 return ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2577 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2579 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2581 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2584 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2587 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2592 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2594 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2598 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2603 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2606 unsigned int *i2dlen
)
2608 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
2612 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2615 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT
:
2616 len
= i2d_X509(cert
, &buf
);
2618 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
:
2619 len
= i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert
), &buf
);
2622 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR
);
2626 if (len
< 0 || buf
== NULL
) {
2627 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2631 *i2dlen
= (unsigned int)len
;
2635 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2637 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
, int depth
)
2639 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2640 unsigned usage
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2641 unsigned selector
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2642 unsigned ordinal
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2643 unsigned mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2644 unsigned char *i2dbuf
= NULL
;
2645 unsigned int i2dlen
= 0;
2646 unsigned char mdbuf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2647 unsigned char *cmpbuf
= NULL
;
2648 unsigned int cmplen
= 0;
2652 danetls_record
*t
= NULL
;
2655 mask
= (depth
== 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK
: DANETLS_TA_MASK
;
2658 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2660 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
2661 mask
&= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2664 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2665 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2666 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2668 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
2669 mask
&= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2672 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2673 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2674 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2675 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2677 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2678 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2679 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2680 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2682 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2683 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2684 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2686 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2687 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2688 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2689 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2690 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2691 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2692 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2694 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2695 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2696 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2697 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2699 recnum
= (dane
->umask
& mask
) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
) : 0;
2700 for (i
= 0; matched
== 0 && i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2701 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2702 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t
->usage
) & mask
) == 0)
2704 if (t
->usage
!= usage
) {
2707 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2708 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2709 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2711 if (t
->selector
!= selector
) {
2712 selector
= t
->selector
;
2714 /* Update per-selector state */
2715 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2716 i2dbuf
= dane_i2d(cert
, selector
, &i2dlen
);
2720 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2721 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2722 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2723 } else if (t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
) {
2727 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2729 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2730 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2731 * other than "Full".
2733 if (dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
] < ordinal
)
2738 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2739 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2741 if (t
->mtype
!= mtype
) {
2742 const EVP_MD
*md
= dane
->dctx
->mdevp
[mtype
= t
->mtype
];
2748 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf
, i2dlen
, cmpbuf
, &cmplen
, md
, 0)) {
2756 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2757 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2760 if (cmplen
== t
->dlen
&&
2761 memcmp(cmpbuf
, t
->data
, cmplen
) == 0) {
2762 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage
) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK
)
2764 if (matched
|| dane
->mdpth
< 0) {
2765 dane
->mdpth
= depth
;
2767 OPENSSL_free(dane
->mcert
);
2775 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2776 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2780 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2782 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2786 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) || depth
== 0)
2787 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2790 * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2791 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2792 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2794 cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
2795 if (cert
!= NULL
&& (matched
= dane_match(ctx
, cert
, depth
)) < 0)
2796 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2798 ctx
->num_untrusted
= depth
- 1;
2799 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2802 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2805 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2807 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2809 int num
= ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2810 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2811 int recnum
= sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
);
2814 for (i
= 0; i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2815 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2816 if (t
->usage
!= DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA
||
2817 t
->selector
!= DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
||
2818 t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
||
2819 X509_verify_ex(cert
, t
->spki
, ctx
->libctx
, ctx
->propq
) <= 0)
2822 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2823 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2826 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2827 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 1;
2828 dane
->mdpth
= num
- 1;
2831 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2832 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2833 for (; num
> ctx
->num_untrusted
; --num
)
2834 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
2836 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2839 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2842 static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2845 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2847 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2854 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2856 int err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, cert
, NULL
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
2858 if (err
== X509_V_OK
)
2860 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, 0, err
);
2863 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2865 X509
*cert
= ctx
->cert
;
2866 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2873 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2874 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2875 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2876 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2877 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2879 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2880 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2881 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2882 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2884 matched
= dane_match(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0);
2885 done
= matched
!= 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && dane
->mdpth
< 0);
2888 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
2891 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2892 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2894 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2895 if ((dane
->flags
& DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS
) == 0 &&
2898 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2899 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2900 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2901 return ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
);
2905 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2906 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2907 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2912 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2913 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2915 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
2919 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2920 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2922 return verify_chain(ctx
);
2925 /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2926 static int get_issuer(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2928 STACK_OF(X509
) *saved_chain
= ctx
->chain
;
2932 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(issuer
, ctx
, cert
);
2933 ctx
->chain
= saved_chain
;
2938 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2940 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2941 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2942 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2944 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
2945 unsigned int search
;
2946 int may_trusted
= 0;
2947 int may_alternate
= 0;
2948 int trust
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2949 int alt_untrusted
= 0;
2954 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2955 if (!ossl_assert(num
== 1 && ctx
->num_untrusted
== num
)) {
2956 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2957 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
2961 ss
= cert_self_signed(ctx
, cert
);
2963 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2964 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
2968 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2969 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2970 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2972 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2973 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2974 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2975 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2976 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2978 search
= (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED
: 0;
2979 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane
)) {
2980 if (search
== 0 || ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
2981 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
2982 else if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
))
2988 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2989 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2990 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2992 if (ctx
->untrusted
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
2993 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2994 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2999 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add
3000 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
3001 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
3002 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
3003 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
3004 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
3005 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
3008 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) && dane
->certs
!= NULL
) {
3009 if (sktmp
== NULL
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3010 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3011 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3014 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(dane
->certs
); ++i
) {
3015 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp
, sk_X509_value(dane
->certs
, i
))) {
3016 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3017 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3018 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3025 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
3026 * might be reasonable.
3028 if (ctx
->param
->depth
> INT_MAX
/2)
3029 ctx
->param
->depth
= INT_MAX
/2;
3032 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
3033 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
3034 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
3036 depth
= ctx
->param
->depth
+ 1;
3038 while (search
!= 0) {
3043 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
3044 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
3045 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
3046 * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
3048 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
3049 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
3050 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
3051 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
3052 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
3053 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
3054 * would be a-priori too long.
3056 if ((search
& S_DOTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3057 i
= num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3058 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3060 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
3061 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
3062 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
3063 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
3064 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
3065 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
3066 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
3067 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
3068 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
3069 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3071 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3072 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3076 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
-1);
3078 ok
= (depth
< num
) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
3081 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3082 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
;
3089 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3090 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
3091 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
3092 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
3093 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
3094 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3095 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3096 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3098 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3099 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
3100 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3102 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3103 if (!ossl_assert(num
> i
&& i
> 0 && ss
== 0)) {
3104 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3106 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3107 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3111 search
&= ~S_DOALTERNATE
;
3112 for (; num
> i
; --num
)
3113 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
3114 ctx
->num_untrusted
= num
;
3116 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3117 dane
->mdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3119 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
3122 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3123 dane
->pdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3128 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3129 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3132 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
= xtmp
)) {
3134 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3135 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3136 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3140 ss
= cert_self_signed(ctx
, x
);
3142 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3143 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3146 } else if (num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3148 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3149 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3150 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3151 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3153 if (X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
) != 0) {
3154 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3159 ctx
->num_untrusted
= --num
;
3160 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, num
, x
= xtmp
);
3165 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3166 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3167 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3168 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3170 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3171 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3172 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3173 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3174 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3175 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3178 if (!ossl_assert(ctx
->num_untrusted
<= num
)) {
3179 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3180 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3181 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3185 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3186 switch (trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
)) {
3187 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3188 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3198 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3199 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3200 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3201 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3203 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) == 0) {
3204 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3205 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 && --alt_untrusted
> 0)
3207 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3208 if (!may_alternate
|| (search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 ||
3209 ctx
->num_untrusted
< 2)
3211 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3212 search
|= S_DOALTERNATE
;
3213 alt_untrusted
= ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1;
3219 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3221 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3222 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3223 if (!ossl_assert(num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)) {
3224 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3225 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3226 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3230 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
-1);
3233 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3234 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3236 xtmp
= (ss
|| depth
< num
) ? NULL
: find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
3238 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3240 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
3244 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3245 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, xtmp
);
3247 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, xtmp
)) {
3248 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3249 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3250 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3255 X509_up_ref(x
= xtmp
);
3256 ++ctx
->num_untrusted
;
3257 ss
= cert_self_signed(ctx
, xtmp
);
3259 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3260 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3265 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3267 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1)) {
3268 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3269 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3275 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3278 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3279 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3281 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3283 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane
))
3284 trust
= check_dane_pkeys(ctx
);
3285 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3286 trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
);
3290 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3292 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3293 /* Callback already issued */
3295 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
:
3297 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3299 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3300 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
);
3301 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3302 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || dane
->pdpth
>= 0))
3303 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
3304 if (ss
&& sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
3305 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3306 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
);
3308 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3309 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
);
3310 if (ctx
->num_untrusted
< num
)
3311 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3312 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
);
3313 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3314 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
);
3318 static const int minbits_table
[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3319 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
= OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table
);
3322 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3325 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3327 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3329 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
);
3330 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3333 * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
3334 * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the
3335 * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
3341 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3345 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3346 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3348 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
) >= minbits_table
[level
- 1];
3352 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3353 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3354 * self-signed or otherwise).
3356 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3358 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3361 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3365 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3366 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3368 if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert
, NULL
, NULL
, &secbits
, NULL
))
3371 return secbits
>= minbits_table
[level
- 1];