2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "crypto/ctype.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
23 #include <openssl/objects.h>
24 #include "internal/dane.h"
25 #include "crypto/x509.h"
26 #include "x509_local.h"
28 /* CRL score values */
30 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
32 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
34 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
36 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
40 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
42 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
44 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
46 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
48 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
50 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
52 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
54 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
56 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
58 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
60 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
62 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
64 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
66 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
67 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
68 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
69 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
70 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
71 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
72 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
73 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
74 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
75 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
);
76 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
77 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
78 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
79 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
80 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
);
81 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
82 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
84 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
85 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
86 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
87 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
88 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
89 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
90 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
91 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
93 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
94 unsigned int *preasons
);
95 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
96 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
97 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
98 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
100 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
102 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
108 * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not, or -1 on error.
109 * This actually verifies self-signedness only if requested.
110 * It calls X509v3_cache_extensions()
111 * to match issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any
112 * present authority key identifier to match the subject key identifier, etc.
114 int X509_self_signed(X509
*cert
, int verify_signature
)
118 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
)) == NULL
) { /* handles cert == NULL */
119 X509err(0, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
122 if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert
))
124 if ((cert
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
) == 0)
126 if (!verify_signature
)
128 return X509_verify(cert
, pkey
);
131 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
132 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
134 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
137 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
138 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
141 /* Look for exact match */
142 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
143 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
144 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
148 if (xtmp
!= NULL
&& !X509_up_ref(xtmp
))
150 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
155 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
156 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
158 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
159 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
161 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
163 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
, int err
)
165 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
166 ctx
->current_cert
= (x
!= NULL
) ? x
: sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
167 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
)
169 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
173 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
174 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
177 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
179 static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
182 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
185 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
188 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
190 if (ctx
->param
->auth_level
<= 0)
193 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; ++i
) {
194 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
197 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
198 * check the security of issuer keys.
200 if (i
> 0 && !check_key_level(ctx
, cert
) &&
201 verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
) == 0)
204 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
205 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
207 if (i
< num
- 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx
, cert
) &&
208 verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
) == 0)
214 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
220 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
221 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
223 if ((ok
= build_chain(ctx
)) == 0 ||
224 (ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
)) == 0 ||
225 (ok
= check_auth_level(ctx
)) == 0 ||
226 (ok
= check_id(ctx
)) == 0 || 1)
227 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
228 if (ok
== 0 || (ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
)) == 0)
231 err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
233 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
) {
234 if ((ok
= verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, ctx
->error_depth
, err
)) == 0)
238 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
239 ok
= (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
) ? ctx
->verify(ctx
) : internal_verify(ctx
);
243 if ((ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
)) == 0)
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
247 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
248 if ((ok
= X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
250 if ((ok
= X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
254 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
255 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
)
256 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
260 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
262 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
265 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
266 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
267 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
271 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
273 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
274 * cannot do another one.
276 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
277 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
281 if (!X509_add_cert_new(&ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
)) {
282 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
285 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 1;
287 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
288 if (!check_key_level(ctx
, ctx
->cert
) &&
289 !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
))
292 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
293 ret
= dane_verify(ctx
);
295 ret
= verify_chain(ctx
);
298 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
299 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
300 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
302 if (ret
<= 0 && ctx
->error
== X509_V_OK
)
303 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
308 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
310 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
313 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;
315 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
316 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
318 * Below check 'issuer != x' is an optimization and safety precaution:
319 * Candidate issuer cert cannot be the same as the subject cert 'x'.
321 if (issuer
!= x
&& ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)) {
323 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, rv
, -1))
331 * Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer'
332 * and the issuer is not yet in ctx->chain, where the exceptional case
333 * that 'x' is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed.
335 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
337 if (x509_likely_issued(issuer
, x
) != X509_V_OK
)
339 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) == 0 || sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) != 1) {
343 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
344 ch
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
345 if (ch
== issuer
|| X509_cmp(ch
, issuer
) == 0)
352 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
353 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
355 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
357 if (*issuer
== NULL
|| !X509_up_ref(*issuer
))
367 static STACK_OF(X509
) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
370 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
374 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->other_ctx
); i
++) {
375 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->other_ctx
, i
);
376 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0) {
377 if (!X509_add_cert_new(&sk
, x
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
)) {
378 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
379 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
388 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
389 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
391 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int purpose
, int depth
,
394 int tr_ok
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
397 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
398 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
400 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
401 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
402 * ctx->param->purpose!
404 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
405 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
406 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
407 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
408 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
410 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
411 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
414 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
&& purpose
== ctx
->param
->purpose
)
415 tr_ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT
);
418 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
420 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
423 switch (X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0)) {
429 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) == 0)
435 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
);
439 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
443 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
445 int i
, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
447 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
449 int allow_proxy_certs
;
450 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
453 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
454 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
455 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
456 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
457 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
458 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
459 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
463 /* CRL path validation */
465 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
466 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
469 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
470 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
473 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
476 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
477 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
478 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
479 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
480 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
))
483 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
484 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
485 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
))
488 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
489 switch (must_be_ca
) {
491 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
492 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
494 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
501 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
506 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
508 || ((i
+ 1 < num
|| ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
511 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
517 * Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requrested
518 * and not for self-issued (including self-signed) EE (non-CA) certs
519 * because RFC 5280 does not apply to them according RFC 6818 section 2.
521 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) != 0
524 * !(i == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
525 * && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0)
527 /* Check Basic Constraints according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.9 */
528 if (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1) {
529 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) == 0)
530 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA
;
531 if ((x
->ex_kusage
& KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
) == 0)
532 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
;
534 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0
535 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_BCONS
) != 0
536 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL
) == 0)
537 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL
;
538 /* Check Key Usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */
539 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0) {
540 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) == 0)
541 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE
;
543 if ((x
->ex_kusage
& KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
) != 0)
544 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA
;
546 /* Check issuer is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.4 */
547 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x
)) == 0)
548 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY
;
549 /* Check subject is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6 */
550 if (((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0
551 || (x
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
) != 0
552 || x
->altname
== NULL
553 ) && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0)
554 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY
;
555 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0
556 && x
->altname
!= NULL
557 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL
) == 0)
558 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL
;
559 /* Check SAN is non-empty according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 */
560 if (x
->altname
!= NULL
&& sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x
->altname
) <= 0)
561 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
;
562 /* TODO add more checks on SAN entries */
563 /* Check sig alg consistency acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.1.2 */
564 if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x
->sig_alg
, &x
->cert_info
.signature
) != 0)
565 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY
;
566 if (x
->akid
!= NULL
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL
) != 0)
567 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL
;
568 if (x
->skid
!= NULL
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL
) != 0)
569 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL
;
570 if (X509_get_version(x
) >= 2) { /* at least X.509v3 */
571 /* Check AKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.1 */
573 * this means not last cert in chain,
574 * taken as "generated by conforming CAs"
576 && (x
->akid
== NULL
|| x
->akid
->keyid
== NULL
))
577 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER
;
578 /* Check SKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2 */
579 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0 && x
->skid
== NULL
)
580 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER
;
582 if (sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x
)) > 0)
583 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3
;
586 if (ctx
->error
!= X509_V_OK
)
588 if (ret
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_OK
))
590 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
591 if (purpose
> 0 && !check_purpose(ctx
, x
, purpose
, i
, must_be_ca
))
594 if ((i
> 1) && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
595 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
))) {
596 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
))
599 /* Increment path length if not a self-issued intermediate CA */
600 if (i
> 0 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) == 0)
603 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
604 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
605 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
607 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
609 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
610 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
611 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
612 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
614 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
615 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
616 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
617 * increment proxy_path_length.
619 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1) {
620 if (proxy_path_length
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
621 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
622 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
))
625 proxy_path_length
= x
->ex_pcpathlen
;
635 static int has_san_id(X509
*x
, int gtype
)
639 GENERAL_NAMES
*gs
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_subject_alt_name
, NULL
, NULL
);
644 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs
); i
++) {
645 GENERAL_NAME
*g
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs
, i
);
647 if (g
->type
== gtype
) {
652 GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs
);
656 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
660 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
661 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
662 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
665 /* Ignore self-issued certs unless last in chain */
666 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
670 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
671 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
673 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
675 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
676 X509_NAME
*tmpsubject
= X509_get_subject_name(x
);
677 X509_NAME
*tmpissuer
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
678 X509_NAME_ENTRY
*tmpentry
= NULL
;
679 int last_object_nid
= 0;
681 int last_object_loc
= X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
) - 1;
683 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
684 if (last_object_loc
< 1) {
685 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
686 goto proxy_name_done
;
690 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
691 * there is in issuer.
693 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
)
694 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer
) + 1) {
695 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
696 goto proxy_name_done
;
700 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
703 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
705 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
706 last_object_loc
- 1))) {
707 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
708 goto proxy_name_done
;
712 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
713 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
715 tmpsubject
= X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject
);
716 if (tmpsubject
== NULL
) {
717 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
718 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
723 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject
, last_object_loc
);
725 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry
));
727 if (last_object_nid
!= NID_commonName
728 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject
, tmpissuer
) != 0) {
729 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
732 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry
);
733 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject
);
737 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, err
))
742 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
743 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
744 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
747 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
748 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
751 int rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
753 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
754 if (rv
== X509_V_OK
&& i
== 0
755 && (ctx
->param
->hostflags
756 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT
) == 0
757 && ((ctx
->param
->hostflags
758 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT
) != 0
759 || !has_san_id(x
, GEN_DNS
)))
760 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x
, nc
);
765 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
768 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, rv
))
778 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
780 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, errcode
);
783 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
)
786 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm
->hosts
);
789 if (vpm
->peername
!= NULL
) {
790 OPENSSL_free(vpm
->peername
);
791 vpm
->peername
= NULL
;
793 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
794 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm
->hosts
, i
);
795 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, vpm
->hostflags
, &vpm
->peername
) > 0)
801 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
803 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
805 if (vpm
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, vpm
) <= 0) {
806 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
809 if (vpm
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, vpm
->email
, vpm
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
810 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
813 if (vpm
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, vpm
->ip
, vpm
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
814 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
820 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
)
825 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
826 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
830 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
831 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
833 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && num_untrusted
> 0 && num_untrusted
< num
) {
834 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, num_untrusted
)) {
835 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
836 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
842 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
843 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
844 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
845 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
847 for (i
= num_untrusted
; i
< num
; i
++) {
848 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
849 trust
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
850 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
851 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
853 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
858 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
859 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
861 if (num_untrusted
< num
) {
862 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
)
864 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
867 if (num_untrusted
== num
&& ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
869 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
870 * for a direct trust store match.
873 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
874 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
876 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
879 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
880 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
882 trust
= X509_check_trust(mx
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
883 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
888 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
889 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
891 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
896 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
897 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
899 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
902 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
))
903 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
904 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
907 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
908 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
910 dane
->pdpth
= num_untrusted
;
911 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
912 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
913 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
914 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
917 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
919 int i
= 0, last
= 0, ok
= 0;
920 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
922 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
923 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
925 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
930 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
931 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
932 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
939 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
941 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
943 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
944 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
946 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
947 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
948 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
949 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
951 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)
954 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
955 unsigned int last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
957 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
959 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
961 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
963 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
966 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
969 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
970 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
975 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
978 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
984 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
986 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
996 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
999 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
1000 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
1006 X509_CRL_free(dcrl
);
1008 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
1012 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1014 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
1020 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
1021 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1022 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1023 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
1028 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
1032 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
))
1039 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
))
1043 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
1044 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
1049 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
))
1052 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1053 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
1056 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
))
1062 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
1067 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
1068 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
1069 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1071 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
1072 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
1073 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
1074 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
1075 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1077 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1078 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1079 reasons
= *preasons
;
1080 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
1081 if (crl_score
< best_score
|| crl_score
== 0)
1083 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1084 if (crl_score
== best_score
&& best_crl
!= NULL
) {
1086 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl
),
1087 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
)) == 0)
1090 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1093 if (day
<= 0 && sec
<= 0)
1097 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
1098 best_score
= crl_score
;
1099 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1103 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1105 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1106 *pscore
= best_score
;
1107 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1108 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl
);
1109 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1111 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1114 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1121 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1122 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1125 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1127 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
1129 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1131 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1132 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1134 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1138 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1142 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1144 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1154 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
1160 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1162 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1164 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1165 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
1167 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1168 if (!base
->crl_number
)
1170 /* Issuer names must match */
1171 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
1173 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1174 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1176 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1178 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1179 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1181 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1182 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1188 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1189 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1192 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1193 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1197 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1199 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1201 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1202 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1203 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1204 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1205 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1206 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta
);
1215 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1216 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1217 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1218 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1219 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1222 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1223 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1227 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1229 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1231 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1232 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1234 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1235 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1236 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1238 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1239 /* If no new reasons reject */
1240 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1243 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1244 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1246 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1247 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1248 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1251 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1253 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1254 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1257 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1258 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1260 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1261 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1263 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1265 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1268 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1270 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1271 /* If no new reasons reject */
1272 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1274 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1275 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1278 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1284 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1285 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1287 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1288 const X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1289 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1292 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1295 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1297 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1298 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1299 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1300 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1305 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1306 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1307 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1309 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1310 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1311 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1316 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1318 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1322 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1323 * untrusted certificates.
1325 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1326 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1327 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1329 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1330 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1331 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1338 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1339 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1340 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1341 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1344 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1346 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1349 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1352 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->store
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1355 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1356 /* Copy verify params across */
1357 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1359 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1360 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1362 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1363 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1367 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1368 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1370 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1375 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1376 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1377 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1378 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1379 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1383 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1384 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1385 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1387 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1388 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1389 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1390 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1396 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1397 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1398 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1399 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1400 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1403 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1405 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1406 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1407 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1414 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1418 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1423 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1425 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1426 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1429 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1430 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1434 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1436 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1437 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1438 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1440 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1446 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1448 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1449 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1450 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1451 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1452 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1461 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1464 const X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1465 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1467 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1468 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1469 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1470 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1472 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1478 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1480 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1481 unsigned int *preasons
)
1484 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1486 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1487 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1490 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1493 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1494 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1495 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1496 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1497 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1498 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1503 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1504 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1510 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1511 * to find a delta CRL too
1514 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1515 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1518 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1520 unsigned int reasons
;
1521 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1522 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1523 const X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1525 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1526 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1527 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1531 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1533 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1535 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1539 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1541 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1544 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1546 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1547 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1548 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1556 /* Check CRL validity */
1557 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1559 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1560 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1561 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1562 int chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1564 /* If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1565 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1566 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1568 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1569 * certificate in chain.
1571 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1572 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1574 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1575 /* If not self-issued, can't check signature */
1576 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
) &&
1577 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
))
1585 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1587 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1588 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1589 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1590 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
) &&
1591 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
))
1594 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
) &&
1595 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
))
1598 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
) &&
1599 check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0 &&
1600 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
))
1603 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) &&
1604 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
))
1608 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
) &&
1609 !check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1))
1612 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1613 ikey
= X509_get0_pubkey(issuer
);
1616 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
))
1620 int rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1622 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
&& !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, rv
))
1624 /* Verify CRL signature */
1625 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0 &&
1626 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
))
1632 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1633 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1638 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1639 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1640 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1641 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1643 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1644 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) &&
1645 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
))
1648 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1649 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1651 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1652 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1654 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
))
1661 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1668 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1669 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1670 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1671 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1672 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1673 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1674 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1675 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1676 * X509_policy_check() call.
1678 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
&& !sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, NULL
)) {
1679 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1680 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1683 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1684 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1685 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
)
1686 (void)sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
1688 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL
) {
1689 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1690 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1693 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1694 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID
) {
1697 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1698 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1699 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1701 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1703 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
1704 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
))
1709 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE
) {
1710 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1711 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1712 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1714 if (ret
!= X509_PCY_TREE_VALID
) {
1715 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1719 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1720 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1722 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1723 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1724 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1725 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1727 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1735 * Check certificate validity times.
1736 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1737 * the validation status.
1739 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1741 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
)
1746 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1747 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1748 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
1753 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1754 if (i
>= 0 && depth
< 0)
1756 if (i
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
,
1757 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
))
1759 if (i
> 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
))
1762 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1763 if (i
<= 0 && depth
< 0)
1765 if (i
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
,
1766 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
))
1768 if (i
< 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
))
1773 /* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */
1774 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1776 int n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1777 X509
*xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1781 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1782 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1783 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1785 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
) {
1788 goto check_cert_time
;
1791 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1792 xs
= xi
; /* the typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */
1794 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1796 goto check_cert_time
;
1799 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xi
, 0,
1800 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
);
1802 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1803 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1807 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1808 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1812 * For each iteration of this loop:
1813 * n is the subject depth
1814 * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
1815 * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
1816 * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued.
1818 * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly
1819 * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time.
1821 if (xs
!= xi
|| ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
)
1822 && (xi
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)) {
1825 * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage
1826 * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer
1827 * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject).
1829 int issuer_depth
= n
+ (xs
== xi
? 0 : 1);
1831 * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4
1832 * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert
1833 * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it.
1834 * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
1835 * we must not verify a certifiate signature if the key usage of the
1836 * CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
1837 * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is
1838 * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e.,
1839 * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply
1840 * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus
1841 * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs.
1843 int ret
= xs
== xi
&& (xi
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) == 0
1844 ? X509_V_OK
: x509_signing_allowed(xi
, xs
);
1846 if (ret
!= X509_V_OK
&& !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xi
, issuer_depth
, ret
))
1848 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1849 ret
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1850 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xi
, issuer_depth
, ret
))
1852 } else if (X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1853 ret
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1854 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xs
, n
, ret
))
1860 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1861 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, n
))
1865 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1868 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1869 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1870 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1871 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
))
1876 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1882 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1884 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1887 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1889 static const size_t utctime_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1890 static const size_t generalizedtime_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1891 ASN1_TIME
*asn1_cmp_time
= NULL
;
1892 int i
, day
, sec
, ret
= 0;
1893 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
1894 const char upper_z
= 0x5A;
1896 const char upper_z
= 'Z';
1899 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1900 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1901 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1902 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1904 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1905 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1906 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1907 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1909 switch (ctm
->type
) {
1910 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME
:
1911 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(utctime_length
))
1914 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
:
1915 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(generalizedtime_length
))
1923 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1924 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1925 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1927 for (i
= 0; i
< ctm
->length
- 1; i
++) {
1928 if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm
->data
[i
]))
1931 if (ctm
->data
[ctm
->length
- 1] != upper_z
)
1935 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1936 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1937 * so we go through ASN.1
1939 asn1_cmp_time
= X509_time_adj(NULL
, 0, cmp_time
);
1940 if (asn1_cmp_time
== NULL
)
1942 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, ctm
, asn1_cmp_time
))
1946 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1947 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1949 ret
= (day
>= 0 && sec
>= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1952 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time
);
1957 * Return 0 if time should not be checked or reference time is in range,
1958 * or else 1 if it is past the end, or -1 if it is before the start
1960 int X509_cmp_timeframe(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
,
1961 const ASN1_TIME
*start
, const ASN1_TIME
*end
)
1964 time_t *time
= NULL
;
1965 unsigned long flags
= vpm
== NULL
? 0 : X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(vpm
);
1967 if ((flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
) != 0) {
1968 ref_time
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(vpm
);
1970 } else if ((flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
) != 0) {
1971 return 0; /* this means ok */
1972 } /* else reference time is the current time */
1974 if (end
!= NULL
&& X509_cmp_time(end
, time
) < 0)
1976 if (start
!= NULL
&& X509_cmp_time(start
, time
) > 0)
1981 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1983 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1986 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1988 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1991 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1992 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
2001 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
2002 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
2003 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
2004 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
2005 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
2007 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
2010 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2012 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
2015 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
2018 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2019 ktmp
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
2021 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
2022 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
2025 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
2029 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
2030 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
2034 /* first, populate the other certs */
2035 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
2036 ktmp2
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
2037 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
2041 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
2045 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2047 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
2048 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
2050 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
2052 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
2053 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2054 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
2055 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
2058 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2059 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
2060 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
2063 /* Issuer names must match */
2064 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
2065 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
2068 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2069 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
2070 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
2073 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
2074 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
2077 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2078 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
2079 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
2082 /* CRLs must verify */
2083 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
2084 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
2085 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
2088 /* Create new CRL */
2089 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
2090 if (crl
== NULL
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
2092 /* Set issuer name */
2093 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
2096 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer
)))
2098 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer
)))
2101 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2103 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
2107 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2108 * number to correct value too.
2111 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
2112 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
2113 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
2114 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
2118 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2120 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2122 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2123 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2124 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2126 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2127 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2129 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, &rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2130 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2133 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2134 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2139 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2141 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2147 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2152 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2154 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2157 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2159 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2162 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2167 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2172 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2174 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2177 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2179 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
2182 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2184 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2187 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2189 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
2192 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2197 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2201 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2204 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2206 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2209 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2211 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2214 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2219 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2224 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2229 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2232 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2233 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2234 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2236 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2239 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2242 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2243 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2245 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2249 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2250 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2251 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2252 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2253 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2254 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2255 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2259 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2260 int purpose
, int trust
)
2263 /* If purpose not set use default */
2265 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2266 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2269 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2271 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2272 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2275 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2276 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2277 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2279 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2280 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2281 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2284 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2285 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2288 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2290 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2292 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2295 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2297 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2298 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2303 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2304 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2305 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2306 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2310 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new_with_libctx(OPENSSL_CTX
*libctx
,
2313 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx
));
2316 X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2320 ctx
->libctx
= libctx
;
2321 if (propq
!= NULL
) {
2322 ctx
->propq
= OPENSSL_strdup(propq
);
2323 if (ctx
->propq
== NULL
) {
2325 X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2333 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2335 return X509_STORE_CTX_new_with_libctx(NULL
, NULL
);
2339 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2344 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2346 /* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */
2347 OPENSSL_free(ctx
->propq
);
2352 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2353 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2359 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2361 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
2362 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2366 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2367 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2368 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2369 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2370 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2371 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2372 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2376 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 0;
2377 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2378 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2380 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2382 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2386 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2387 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2389 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2391 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2392 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2394 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2396 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2397 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2399 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2401 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2402 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2404 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2406 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2407 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2409 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2411 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2412 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2414 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2416 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2417 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2419 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2421 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2422 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2424 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2426 if (store
&& store
->check_policy
)
2427 ctx
->check_policy
= store
->check_policy
;
2429 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2431 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2432 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2434 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs
;
2436 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2437 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2439 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls
;
2441 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2442 if (ctx
->param
== NULL
) {
2443 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2448 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2451 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2453 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2456 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2457 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2460 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2465 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2466 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2468 if (ctx
->param
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2469 int idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx
->param
->purpose
);
2470 X509_PURPOSE
*xp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2473 ctx
->param
->trust
= X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp
);
2476 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2479 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2483 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2484 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2486 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2491 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2492 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2494 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2496 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2497 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2498 ctx
->lookup_certs
= lookup_certs_sk
;
2501 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2504 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2505 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2506 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2507 * pointers below after they're freed!
2509 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2510 if (ctx
->cleanup
!= NULL
) {
2512 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2514 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2515 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2516 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2519 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2521 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2523 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2524 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2527 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2529 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2532 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2534 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2537 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2540 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2543 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2548 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2550 return ctx
->untrusted
;
2553 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2555 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2558 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2560 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2564 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2565 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb
)
2567 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2570 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2572 return ctx
->verify_cb
;
2575 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2576 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify
)
2578 ctx
->verify
= verify
;
2581 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2586 X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2588 return ctx
->get_issuer
;
2591 X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
2592 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2594 return ctx
->check_issued
;
2597 X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn
2598 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2600 return ctx
->check_revocation
;
2603 X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2605 return ctx
->get_crl
;
2608 X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2610 return ctx
->check_crl
;
2613 X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2615 return ctx
->cert_crl
;
2618 X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn
2619 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2621 return ctx
->check_policy
;
2624 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn
2625 X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2627 return ctx
->lookup_certs
;
2630 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn
2631 X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2633 return ctx
->lookup_crls
;
2636 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2638 return ctx
->cleanup
;
2641 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2646 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2648 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2651 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2653 return ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2656 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2658 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2660 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2663 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2666 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2671 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2673 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2677 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2682 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2685 unsigned int *i2dlen
)
2687 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
2691 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2694 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT
:
2695 len
= i2d_X509(cert
, &buf
);
2697 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
:
2698 len
= i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert
), &buf
);
2701 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR
);
2705 if (len
< 0 || buf
== NULL
) {
2706 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2710 *i2dlen
= (unsigned int)len
;
2714 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2716 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
, int depth
)
2718 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2719 unsigned usage
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2720 unsigned selector
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2721 unsigned ordinal
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2722 unsigned mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2723 unsigned char *i2dbuf
= NULL
;
2724 unsigned int i2dlen
= 0;
2725 unsigned char mdbuf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2726 unsigned char *cmpbuf
= NULL
;
2727 unsigned int cmplen
= 0;
2731 danetls_record
*t
= NULL
;
2734 mask
= (depth
== 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK
: DANETLS_TA_MASK
;
2737 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2739 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
2740 mask
&= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2743 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2744 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2745 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2747 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
2748 mask
&= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2751 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2752 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2753 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2754 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2756 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2757 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2758 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2759 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2761 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2762 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2763 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2765 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2766 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2767 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2768 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2769 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2770 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2771 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2773 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2774 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2775 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2776 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2778 recnum
= (dane
->umask
& mask
) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
) : 0;
2779 for (i
= 0; matched
== 0 && i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2780 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2781 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t
->usage
) & mask
) == 0)
2783 if (t
->usage
!= usage
) {
2786 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2787 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2788 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2790 if (t
->selector
!= selector
) {
2791 selector
= t
->selector
;
2793 /* Update per-selector state */
2794 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2795 i2dbuf
= dane_i2d(cert
, selector
, &i2dlen
);
2799 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2800 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2801 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2802 } else if (t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
) {
2806 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2808 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2809 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2810 * other than "Full".
2812 if (dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
] < ordinal
)
2817 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2818 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2820 if (t
->mtype
!= mtype
) {
2821 const EVP_MD
*md
= dane
->dctx
->mdevp
[mtype
= t
->mtype
];
2827 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf
, i2dlen
, cmpbuf
, &cmplen
, md
, 0)) {
2835 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2836 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2839 if (cmplen
== t
->dlen
&&
2840 memcmp(cmpbuf
, t
->data
, cmplen
) == 0) {
2841 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage
) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK
)
2843 if (matched
|| dane
->mdpth
< 0) {
2844 dane
->mdpth
= depth
;
2846 OPENSSL_free(dane
->mcert
);
2854 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2855 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2859 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2861 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2865 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) || depth
== 0)
2866 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2869 * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2870 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2871 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2873 cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
2874 if (cert
!= NULL
&& (matched
= dane_match(ctx
, cert
, depth
)) < 0)
2875 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2877 ctx
->num_untrusted
= depth
- 1;
2878 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2881 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2884 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2886 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2888 int num
= ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2889 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2890 int recnum
= sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
);
2893 for (i
= 0; i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2894 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2895 if (t
->usage
!= DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA
||
2896 t
->selector
!= DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
||
2897 t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
||
2898 X509_verify(cert
, t
->spki
) <= 0)
2901 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2902 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2905 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2906 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 1;
2907 dane
->mdpth
= num
- 1;
2910 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2911 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2912 for (; num
> ctx
->num_untrusted
; --num
)
2913 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
2915 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2918 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2921 static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2924 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2926 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2933 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2935 int err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, cert
, NULL
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
2937 if (err
== X509_V_OK
)
2939 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, 0, err
);
2942 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2944 X509
*cert
= ctx
->cert
;
2945 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2952 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2953 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2954 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2955 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust anchor.
2956 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2958 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2959 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2960 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2961 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2963 matched
= dane_match(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0);
2964 done
= matched
!= 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && dane
->mdpth
< 0);
2967 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
2970 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2971 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2973 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2974 if ((dane
->flags
& DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS
) == 0 &&
2977 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2978 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2979 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2980 return ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
);
2984 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2985 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2986 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2991 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2992 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2994 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
2998 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2999 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
3001 return verify_chain(ctx
);
3004 /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
3005 static int get_issuer(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3007 STACK_OF(X509
) *saved_chain
= ctx
->chain
;
3011 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(issuer
, ctx
, cert
);
3012 ctx
->chain
= saved_chain
;
3017 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
3019 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
3020 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3021 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
3023 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
3024 unsigned int search
;
3025 int may_trusted
= 0;
3026 int may_alternate
= 0;
3027 int trust
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
3028 int alt_untrusted
= 0;
3033 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
3034 if (!ossl_assert(num
== 1 && ctx
->num_untrusted
== num
)) {
3035 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3036 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3040 self_signed
= X509_self_signed(cert
, 0);
3041 if (self_signed
< 0) {
3042 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3046 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
3047 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
3048 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
3050 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
3051 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
3052 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
3053 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
3054 * if no luck with untrusted first.
3056 search
= (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED
: 0;
3057 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane
)) {
3058 if (search
== 0 || ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
3059 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
3060 else if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
))
3066 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
3067 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
3068 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
3070 if (ctx
->untrusted
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
3071 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3072 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3077 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust anchors from DNS, add
3078 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
3079 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
3080 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
3081 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
3082 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
3083 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
3086 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) && dane
->certs
!= NULL
) {
3087 if (sktmp
== NULL
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3088 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3089 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3092 if (!X509_add_certs(sktmp
, dane
->certs
, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT
)) {
3093 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3094 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3100 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
3101 * might be reasonable.
3103 if (ctx
->param
->depth
> INT_MAX
/2)
3104 ctx
->param
->depth
= INT_MAX
/2;
3107 * Try to extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
3108 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
3109 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
3111 depth
= ctx
->param
->depth
+ 1;
3113 while (search
!= 0) {
3118 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
3119 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
3120 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
3121 * we've not found a trust anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
3123 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
3124 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
3125 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
3126 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
3127 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
3128 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
3129 * would be a-priori too long.
3131 if ((search
& S_DOTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3132 i
= num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3133 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3135 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
3136 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
3137 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
3138 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
3139 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
3140 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
3141 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
3142 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
3143 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
3144 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3146 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3147 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3151 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
-1);
3153 ok
= (depth
< num
) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
3156 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3157 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
;
3164 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3165 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
3166 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
3167 * that despite the current trust store match we might still
3168 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust anchor, in which
3169 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3170 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3171 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3173 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3174 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
3175 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3177 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3178 if (!ossl_assert(num
> i
&& i
> 0 && !self_signed
)) {
3179 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3181 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3182 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3186 search
&= ~S_DOALTERNATE
;
3187 for (; num
> i
; --num
)
3188 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
3189 ctx
->num_untrusted
= num
;
3191 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3192 dane
->mdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3194 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
3197 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3198 dane
->pdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3203 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3204 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3207 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
= xtmp
)) {
3209 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3210 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3211 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3215 self_signed
= X509_self_signed(x
, 0);
3216 if (self_signed
< 0) {
3217 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3218 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3221 } else if (num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3223 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3224 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3225 * a trust anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3226 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3228 if (X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
) != 0) {
3229 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3234 ctx
->num_untrusted
= --num
;
3235 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, num
, x
= xtmp
);
3240 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3241 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3242 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3243 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3245 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3246 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3247 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3248 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3249 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3250 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3253 if (!ossl_assert(ctx
->num_untrusted
<= num
)) {
3254 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3255 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3256 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3260 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3261 switch (trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
)) {
3262 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3263 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3273 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3274 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3275 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3276 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3278 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) == 0) {
3279 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3280 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 && --alt_untrusted
> 0)
3282 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3283 if (!may_alternate
|| (search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 ||
3284 ctx
->num_untrusted
< 2)
3286 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3287 search
|= S_DOALTERNATE
;
3288 alt_untrusted
= ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1;
3294 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3296 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3297 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3298 if (!ossl_assert(num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)) {
3299 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3300 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3301 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3305 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
-1);
3308 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3309 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3311 xtmp
= (self_signed
|| depth
< num
) ? NULL
3312 : find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
3314 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3316 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
3320 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3321 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, xtmp
);
3323 if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp
)) {
3324 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3325 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3326 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3331 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, xtmp
)) {
3333 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3334 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3335 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3341 ++ctx
->num_untrusted
;
3342 self_signed
= X509_self_signed(xtmp
, 0);
3343 if (self_signed
< 0) {
3344 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3345 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3350 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3352 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1)) {
3353 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3354 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3360 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3363 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3364 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3366 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3368 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane
))
3369 trust
= check_dane_pkeys(ctx
);
3370 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3371 trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
);
3375 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3377 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3378 /* Callback already issued */
3380 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
:
3382 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3384 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3385 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
);
3386 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3387 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || dane
->pdpth
>= 0))
3388 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
3389 if (self_signed
&& sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
3390 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3391 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
);
3393 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3394 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
);
3395 if (ctx
->num_untrusted
< num
)
3396 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3397 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
);
3398 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3399 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
);
3403 static const int minbits_table
[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3404 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
= OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table
);
3407 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3410 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3412 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3414 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
);
3415 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3418 * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
3419 * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the
3420 * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
3426 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3430 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3431 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3433 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
) >= minbits_table
[level
- 1];
3437 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3438 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3439 * self-signed or otherwise).
3441 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3443 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3446 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3450 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3451 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3453 if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert
, NULL
, NULL
, &secbits
, NULL
))
3456 return secbits
>= minbits_table
[level
- 1];