1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
63 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72 #include "internal/x509_int.h"
75 /* CRL score values */
77 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
79 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
81 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
83 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
87 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
89 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
91 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
93 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
95 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
97 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
99 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
101 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
103 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
105 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
107 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
109 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
111 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
113 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
114 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
115 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
116 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
117 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
118 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
119 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
120 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
121 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
122 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
123 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
125 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
126 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
127 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
128 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
129 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
130 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
131 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
132 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
134 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
135 unsigned int *preasons
);
136 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
137 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
138 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
139 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
141 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
143 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
148 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
149 static int cert_self_signed(X509
*x
)
151 X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0);
152 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
)
158 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
160 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
162 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
165 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
166 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
169 /* Look for exact match */
170 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
171 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
172 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
175 if (i
< sk_X509_num(certs
))
179 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
183 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
185 X509
*x
, *xtmp
, *xtmp2
, *chain_ss
= NULL
;
187 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
= ctx
->param
;
188 int depth
, i
, ok
= 0;
190 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
191 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
192 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
193 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
196 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
198 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
199 * cannot do another one.
201 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
208 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
209 * the first entry is in place
211 if (((ctx
->chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
212 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
))) {
213 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
216 X509_up_ref(ctx
->cert
);
217 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 1;
219 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
220 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
221 && (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
222 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
226 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
227 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
228 depth
= param
->depth
;
231 /* If we have enough, we break */
233 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
234 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
235 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
238 /* If we are self signed, we break */
239 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
242 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
244 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
) {
245 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
249 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
258 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
259 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) {
260 xtmp
= find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
262 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, xtmp
)) {
263 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
267 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, xtmp
);
268 ctx
->last_untrusted
++;
272 * reparse the full chain for the next one
280 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
283 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
284 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
290 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
292 i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
293 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1);
294 if (cert_self_signed(x
)) {
295 /* we have a self signed certificate */
296 if (sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1) {
298 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
299 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
300 * possible impersonation.
302 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
303 if ((ok
<= 0) || X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
)) {
304 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
;
305 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
306 ctx
->error_depth
= i
- 1;
315 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
316 * version so we get any trust settings.
320 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1, x
);
321 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
325 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
327 chain_ss
= sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
328 ctx
->last_untrusted
--;
331 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
334 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
336 /* If we have enough, we break */
339 /* If we are self signed, we break */
340 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
342 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
349 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
)) {
351 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
358 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
359 i
= check_trust(ctx
);
361 /* If explicitly rejected error */
362 if (i
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
365 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
366 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
367 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
371 if (i
!= X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
372 && !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
373 && !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
)) {
375 STACK_OF(X509
) *chtmp
= ctx
->chain
;
376 xtmp2
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
- 1);
378 * Temporarily set chain to NULL so we don't discount
379 * duplicates: the same certificate could be an untrusted
380 * CA found in the trusted store.
383 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, xtmp2
);
387 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
390 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
395 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
399 xtmp
= sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
403 ctx
->last_untrusted
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
412 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
413 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
414 * and set bad_chain == 1
416 if (i
!= X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
&& !bad_chain
) {
417 if ((chain_ss
== NULL
) || !ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, chain_ss
)) {
418 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
>= num
)
419 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
;
421 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
;
422 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
425 sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, chain_ss
);
427 ctx
->last_untrusted
= num
;
428 ctx
->current_cert
= chain_ss
;
429 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
;
433 ctx
->error_depth
= num
- 1;
440 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
441 ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
);
446 /* Check name constraints */
448 ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
);
458 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
459 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
462 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
463 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
466 ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
);
470 i
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
472 if (i
!= X509_V_OK
) {
474 ctx
->current_cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->error_depth
);
480 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
481 if (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
)
482 ok
= ctx
->verify(ctx
);
484 ok
= internal_verify(ctx
);
488 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
489 ok
= v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
);
492 ok
= v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
);
496 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
497 if (!bad_chain
&& (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
))
498 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
503 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
511 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
514 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
517 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;;
518 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
519 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
520 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)) {
522 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, rv
, 1))
529 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
531 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
535 return cert_self_signed(x
);
536 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
537 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
) {
540 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
541 if (cert_self_signed(x
) && sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
543 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
544 ch
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
545 if (ch
== issuer
|| !X509_cmp(ch
, issuer
)) {
546 ret
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP
;
552 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
)
554 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
555 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK
))
559 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
560 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
561 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
564 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
566 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
568 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
570 X509_up_ref(*issuer
);
577 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
581 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
583 int i
, ok
= 0, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
585 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
586 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
588 int allow_proxy_certs
;
592 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
593 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
594 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
595 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
596 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
597 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
598 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
602 /* CRL path validation */
604 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
605 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
608 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
610 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
613 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
614 allow_proxy_certs
= 1;
615 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
618 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
619 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
++) {
621 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
622 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
623 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
624 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
;
625 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
626 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
631 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
632 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
;
633 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
634 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
639 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
640 switch (must_be_ca
) {
642 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
643 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
645 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
652 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
658 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
661 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
667 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
668 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
673 if (ctx
->param
->purpose
> 0) {
674 ret
= X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0);
676 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
678 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
;
679 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
680 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
686 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
687 if ((i
> 1) && !(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
)
688 && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
689 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
+ 1))) {
690 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
691 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
692 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
697 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
698 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
701 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
702 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
703 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
705 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
706 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1 && i
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
707 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
708 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
709 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
724 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
728 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
729 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
730 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
731 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
732 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
735 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
736 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
737 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
740 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
741 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
743 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
744 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
746 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
747 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
748 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
757 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
759 ctx
->error
= errcode
;
760 ctx
->current_cert
= ctx
->cert
;
761 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
762 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
765 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
)
768 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id
->hosts
);
771 if (id
->peername
!= NULL
) {
772 OPENSSL_free(id
->peername
);
775 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
776 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id
->hosts
, i
);
777 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, id
->hostflags
, &id
->peername
) > 0)
783 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
785 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
786 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
= vpm
->id
;
788 if (id
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, id
) <= 0) {
789 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
792 if (id
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, id
->email
, id
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
793 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
796 if (id
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, id
->ip
, id
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
797 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
803 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
807 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
809 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
810 for (i
= ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
811 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
812 ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
813 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
814 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
815 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
817 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
820 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
821 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
822 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
823 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
;
826 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
830 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
833 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
835 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
))
836 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
837 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, 0);
838 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
840 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
842 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
843 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
848 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
849 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
851 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
854 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
856 int i
= 0, last
= 0, ok
= 0;
857 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
859 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
860 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
862 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
867 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
868 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
869 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
876 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
878 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
880 int ok
= 0, cnum
= 0;
881 unsigned int last_reasons
= 0;
882 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
883 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
884 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
885 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
886 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
887 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
888 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
889 last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
890 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
892 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
894 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
896 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
899 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
900 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
903 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
904 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
909 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
912 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
918 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
920 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
930 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
933 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
934 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
935 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
943 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
948 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
950 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
955 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
956 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
957 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
961 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
965 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
;
966 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
973 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
;
974 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
978 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
979 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
984 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
;
985 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
988 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
989 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
992 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
;
993 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
999 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
1004 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
1005 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
1006 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1008 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
1009 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
1010 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
1011 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
1012 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1014 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1015 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1016 reasons
= *preasons
;
1017 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
1019 if (crl_score
> best_score
) {
1021 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
1022 best_score
= crl_score
;
1023 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1028 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1030 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1031 *pscore
= best_score
;
1032 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1033 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl
);
1034 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1036 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1039 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1046 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1047 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1050 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1052 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
1054 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1056 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1057 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1059 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1063 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1067 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1069 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1079 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
1085 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1087 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1089 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1090 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
1092 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1093 if (!base
->crl_number
)
1095 /* Issuer names must match */
1096 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
1098 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1099 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1101 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1103 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1104 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1106 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1107 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1113 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1114 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1117 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1118 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1122 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1124 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1126 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1127 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1128 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1129 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1130 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1131 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta
);
1140 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1141 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1142 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1143 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1144 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1147 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1148 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1152 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1154 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1156 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1157 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1159 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1160 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1161 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1163 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1164 /* If no new reasons reject */
1165 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1168 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1169 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1171 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1172 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1173 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1176 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1178 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1179 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1182 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1183 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1185 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1186 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1188 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1190 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1193 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1195 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1196 /* If no new reasons reject */
1197 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1199 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1200 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1203 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1209 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1210 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1212 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1213 X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1214 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1217 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1220 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1222 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1223 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1224 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1225 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1230 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1231 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1232 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1234 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1235 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1236 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1241 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1243 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1247 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1248 * untrusted certificates.
1250 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1251 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1252 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1254 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1255 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1256 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1263 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1264 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1265 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1266 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1269 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1271 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1273 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1276 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->ctx
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1279 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1280 /* Copy verify params across */
1281 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1283 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1284 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1286 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1287 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1292 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1294 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1296 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1301 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1302 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1303 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1304 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1305 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1309 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1310 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1311 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1313 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1314 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1315 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1316 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1322 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1323 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1324 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1325 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1326 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1329 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1331 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1332 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1333 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1340 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1344 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1349 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1351 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1352 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1355 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1356 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1360 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1362 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1363 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1364 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1366 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1372 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1374 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1375 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1376 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1377 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1378 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1387 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1390 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1391 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1393 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1394 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1395 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1396 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1398 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1404 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1406 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1407 unsigned int *preasons
)
1410 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1412 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1413 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1416 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1419 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1420 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1421 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1422 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1423 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1424 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1429 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1430 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1436 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1437 * to find a delta CRL too
1440 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1441 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1444 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1446 unsigned int reasons
;
1447 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1448 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1449 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1450 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1451 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1452 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1457 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1459 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1461 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1465 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1467 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1471 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1473 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1474 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1475 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1484 /* Check CRL validity */
1485 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1487 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1488 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1489 int ok
= 0, chnum
, cnum
;
1490 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1491 chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1492 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1493 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1494 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1497 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1498 * certificate in chain.
1500 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1501 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1503 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1504 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1505 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
)) {
1506 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
;
1507 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1515 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1517 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1518 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1519 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1520 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
)) {
1521 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
;
1522 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1527 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
)) {
1528 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
;
1529 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1534 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
)) {
1535 if (check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0) {
1536 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
;
1537 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1543 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) {
1544 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1545 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1552 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
)) {
1553 ok
= check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1);
1558 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1559 ikey
= X509_get_pubkey(issuer
);
1562 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1563 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1568 rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1569 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
1571 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1575 /* Verify CRL signature */
1576 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0) {
1577 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1578 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1588 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey
);
1592 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1593 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1598 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1599 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1600 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1601 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1603 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1604 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
1605 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
;
1606 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1611 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1612 * is not removeFromCRL.
1614 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1615 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1617 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
;
1618 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1626 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1631 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1632 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1634 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1637 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1640 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1644 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1645 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1646 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1648 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1649 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
;
1650 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1656 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1657 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1658 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1661 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1662 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1663 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
1664 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1671 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int quiet
)
1676 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1677 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1681 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1685 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
;
1686 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1687 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1694 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
;
1695 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1696 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1700 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1704 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
;
1705 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1706 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1713 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
;
1714 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1715 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1722 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1726 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1727 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
1729 cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1731 n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
1732 ctx
->error_depth
= n
- 1;
1734 xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1736 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1739 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1744 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
;
1745 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1750 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1751 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1755 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1757 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1760 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1761 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1766 || (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
))) {
1767 if ((pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1768 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1769 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1770 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1773 } else if (X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1774 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1775 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1776 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1778 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1782 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1789 ok
= x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, 0);
1793 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1794 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1795 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1796 ok
= (*cb
) (1, ctx
);
1803 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1811 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1813 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1816 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1821 char buff1
[24], buff2
[24], *p
;
1822 int i
, j
, remaining
;
1825 remaining
= ctm
->length
;
1826 str
= (char *)ctm
->data
;
1828 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1829 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1830 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1831 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1833 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1834 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1835 int min_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1836 int max_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1837 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1844 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1845 int min_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1846 int max_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1847 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1855 if ((*str
== 'Z') || (*str
== '-') || (*str
== '+')) {
1866 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1867 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1868 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1870 if (remaining
&& *str
== '.') {
1873 for (i
= 0; i
< 3 && remaining
; i
++, str
++, remaining
--) {
1874 if (*str
< '0' || *str
> '9')
1883 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1892 if ((*str
!= '+') && (*str
!= '-'))
1894 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1897 if (str
[1] < '0' || str
[1] > '9' || str
[2] < '0' || str
[2] > '9' ||
1898 str
[3] < '0' || str
[3] > '9' || str
[4] < '0' || str
[4] > '9')
1900 offset
= ((str
[1] - '0') * 10 + (str
[2] - '0')) * 60;
1901 offset
+= (str
[3] - '0') * 10 + (str
[4] - '0');
1905 atm
.type
= ctm
->type
;
1907 atm
.length
= sizeof(buff2
);
1908 atm
.data
= (unsigned char *)buff2
;
1910 if (X509_time_adj(&atm
, offset
* 60, cmp_time
) == NULL
)
1913 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1914 i
= (buff1
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1
[1] - '0');
1916 i
+= 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1917 j
= (buff2
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2
[1] - '0');
1926 i
= strcmp(buff1
, buff2
);
1927 if (i
== 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1933 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1935 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1938 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1940 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1943 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1944 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1953 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1954 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1955 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1956 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1957 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1959 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1962 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1964 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1967 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1970 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1971 ktmp
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1973 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1974 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1977 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1979 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1983 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1984 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1988 /* first, populate the other certs */
1989 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1990 ktmp2
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1991 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1992 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2
);
1996 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1997 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
2001 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2003 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
2004 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
2006 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
2008 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
2009 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2010 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
2011 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
2014 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2015 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
2016 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
2019 /* Issuer names must match */
2020 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
2021 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
2024 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2025 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
2026 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
2029 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
2030 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
2033 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2034 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
2035 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
2038 /* CRLs must verify */
2039 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
2040 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
2041 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
2044 /* Create new CRL */
2045 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
2046 if (!crl
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
2048 /* Set issuer name */
2049 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
2052 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer
)))
2054 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer
)))
2057 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2059 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
2063 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2064 * number to correct value too.
2067 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
2068 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
2069 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
2070 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
2074 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2076 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2078 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2079 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2080 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2082 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2083 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2085 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2086 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2089 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2090 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2095 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2097 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2103 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2108 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl
, void *argp
,
2109 CRYPTO_EX_new
*new_func
,
2110 CRYPTO_EX_dup
*dup_func
,
2111 CRYPTO_EX_free
*free_func
)
2114 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2115 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2117 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, argl
, argp
,
2118 new_func
, dup_func
, free_func
);
2121 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2123 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2126 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2128 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2131 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2136 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2141 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2143 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2146 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2148 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2151 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2156 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2160 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2163 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2165 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2168 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2170 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2173 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2178 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2183 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2185 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2188 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2193 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2195 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2198 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2200 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2204 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2205 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2206 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2207 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2208 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2209 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2210 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2214 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2215 int purpose
, int trust
)
2218 /* If purpose not set use default */
2220 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2221 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2224 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2226 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2227 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2230 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2231 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2232 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2234 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2235 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2238 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2240 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2242 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2245 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2247 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2248 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2253 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2254 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2255 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2256 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2260 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2262 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx
));
2265 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2271 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2275 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2279 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2280 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2284 ctx
->current_method
= 0;
2286 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2288 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
2289 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2293 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2294 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2295 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2296 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2297 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2298 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2299 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2303 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2306 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2311 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2315 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2317 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2320 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2321 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2326 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2327 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2330 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2334 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2335 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2337 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2339 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2340 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2342 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2344 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2345 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2347 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2349 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2350 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2352 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2354 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2355 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2357 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2359 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2360 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2362 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2364 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2365 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2367 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2369 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2370 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2372 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2374 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2375 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2377 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_get1_certs
;
2379 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2380 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2382 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_get1_crls
;
2384 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2387 * Since X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we
2388 * put a corresponding "new" here.
2390 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2393 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2400 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2401 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2404 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2406 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2407 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2410 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2414 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2415 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2416 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2419 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2421 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2423 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2424 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2427 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2429 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2432 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2434 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2437 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2440 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2443 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2444 int (*verify_cb
) (int, X509_STORE_CTX
*))
2446 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2449 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2454 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2456 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2459 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2461 return ctx
->last_untrusted
;
2464 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2466 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2467 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2470 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2473 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2478 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2480 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);