1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
63 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72 #include <internal/dane.h>
73 #include <internal/x509_int.h>
76 /* CRL score values */
78 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
80 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
82 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
84 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
88 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
90 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
92 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
94 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
96 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
98 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
100 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
102 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
104 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
106 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
108 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
110 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
112 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
114 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
115 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
116 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
117 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
118 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
119 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
120 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
121 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
122 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
123 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
);
124 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
125 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
126 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
127 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
128 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
);
130 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
131 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
132 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
133 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
134 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
135 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
136 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
137 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
139 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
140 unsigned int *preasons
);
141 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
142 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
143 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
144 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
146 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
148 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509
*x
)
157 * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
158 * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
159 * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
161 X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0);
162 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
)
168 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
170 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
172 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
175 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
176 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
179 /* Look for exact match */
180 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
181 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
182 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
185 if (i
< sk_X509_num(certs
))
189 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
193 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
199 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
200 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
202 if ((ok
= build_chain(ctx
)) == 0 ||
203 (ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
)) == 0 ||
204 (ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
)) == 0 ||
205 (ok
= check_id(ctx
)) == 0 || 1)
206 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
207 if (ok
== 0 || (ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
)) == 0)
210 err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
212 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
) {
214 ctx
->current_cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->error_depth
);
215 if ((ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
)) == 0)
219 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
220 ok
= (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
) ? ctx
->verify(ctx
) : internal_verify(ctx
);
224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
225 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
226 if ((ok
= v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
228 if ((ok
= v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
232 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
233 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
)
234 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
238 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
240 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
242 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
243 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
247 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
249 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
250 * cannot do another one.
252 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
257 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
258 * the first entry is in place
260 if (((ctx
->chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
261 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
))) {
262 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
265 X509_up_ref(ctx
->cert
);
266 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 1;
269 * If dane->trecs is an empty stack, we'll fail, since the user enabled
270 * DANE. If none of the TLSA records were usable, and it makes sense to
271 * keep going with an unauthenticated handshake, they can handle that in
272 * the verify callback, or not set SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
274 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
275 return dane_verify(ctx
);
276 return verify_chain(ctx
);
280 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
283 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
286 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;;
287 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
288 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
289 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)) {
291 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, rv
, 1))
298 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
300 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
304 return cert_self_signed(x
);
305 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
306 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
) {
309 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
310 if (cert_self_signed(x
) && sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
312 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
313 ch
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
314 if (ch
== issuer
|| !X509_cmp(ch
, issuer
)) {
315 ret
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP
;
321 return (ret
== X509_V_OK
);
324 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
326 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
328 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
330 X509_up_ref(*issuer
);
336 static STACK_OF(X509
) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_NAME
*nm
)
338 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
341 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->other_ctx
); i
++) {
342 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->other_ctx
, i
);
343 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0) {
345 sk
= sk_X509_new_null();
346 if (sk
== NULL
|| sk_X509_push(sk
, x
) == 0) {
347 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
357 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
358 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
360 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int purpose
, int depth
,
363 int tr_ok
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
366 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
367 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
369 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
370 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
371 * ctx->param->purpose!
373 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
374 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
375 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
376 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
377 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
379 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
380 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
383 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
&& purpose
== ctx
->param
->purpose
)
384 tr_ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT
);
387 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
389 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
392 switch (X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0)) {
398 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) == 0)
404 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
;
405 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
406 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
407 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
411 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
415 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
417 int i
, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
419 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
421 int allow_proxy_certs
;
422 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
425 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
426 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
427 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
428 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
429 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
430 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
431 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
435 /* CRL path validation */
437 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
438 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
441 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
443 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
446 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
447 allow_proxy_certs
= 1;
448 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
451 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
453 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
454 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
455 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
456 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
;
457 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
458 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
459 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
462 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
463 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
;
464 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
465 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
466 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
469 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
470 switch (must_be_ca
) {
472 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
473 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
475 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
482 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
488 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
491 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
497 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
498 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
499 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
503 if (!check_purpose(ctx
, x
, purpose
, i
, must_be_ca
))
506 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
507 if ((i
> 1) && !(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
)
508 && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
509 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
+ 1))) {
510 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
511 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
512 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
513 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
516 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
517 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
520 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
521 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
522 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
524 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
525 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1 && i
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
526 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
527 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
528 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
529 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
540 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
544 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
545 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
546 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
547 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
548 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
551 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
552 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
553 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
556 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
557 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
559 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
560 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
562 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
563 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
564 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
573 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
575 ctx
->error
= errcode
;
576 ctx
->current_cert
= ctx
->cert
;
577 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
578 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
581 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
)
584 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm
->hosts
);
587 if (vpm
->peername
!= NULL
) {
588 OPENSSL_free(vpm
->peername
);
589 vpm
->peername
= NULL
;
591 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
592 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm
->hosts
, i
);
593 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, vpm
->hostflags
, &vpm
->peername
) > 0)
599 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
601 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
603 if (vpm
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, vpm
) <= 0) {
604 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
607 if (vpm
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, vpm
->email
, vpm
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
608 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
611 if (vpm
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, vpm
->ip
, vpm
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
612 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
618 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
)
623 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
624 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
628 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
629 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
631 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && num_untrusted
> 0 && num_untrusted
< num
) {
632 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, num_untrusted
)) {
633 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
634 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
640 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
641 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
642 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
643 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
645 for (i
= num_untrusted
; i
< num
; i
++) {
646 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
647 trust
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
648 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
649 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
651 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
656 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
657 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
659 if (num_untrusted
< num
) {
660 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
)
662 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
665 if (num_untrusted
== num
&& ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
667 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
668 * for a direct trust store match.
671 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
672 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
674 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
677 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
678 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
680 trust
= X509_check_trust(mx
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
681 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
686 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
687 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
689 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
694 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
695 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
697 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
700 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
701 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
702 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
;
703 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
705 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
706 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
709 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
710 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
712 dane
->pdpth
= num_untrusted
;
713 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
714 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
715 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
716 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
719 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
721 int i
= 0, last
= 0, ok
= 0;
722 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
724 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
725 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
727 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
732 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
733 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
734 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
741 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
743 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
745 int ok
= 0, cnum
= 0;
746 unsigned int last_reasons
= 0;
747 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
748 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
749 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
750 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
751 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
752 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
753 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
754 last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
755 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
757 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
759 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
761 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
764 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
765 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
768 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
769 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
774 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
777 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
783 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
785 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
795 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
798 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
799 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
800 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
808 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
813 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
815 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
820 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
821 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
822 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
823 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
828 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
832 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
;
833 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
840 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
;
841 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
845 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
846 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
851 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
;
852 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
855 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
856 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
859 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
;
860 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
866 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
871 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
872 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
873 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
875 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
876 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
877 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
878 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
879 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
881 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
882 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
884 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
886 if (crl_score
> best_score
) {
888 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
889 best_score
= crl_score
;
890 best_reasons
= reasons
;
895 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
897 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
898 *pscore
= best_score
;
899 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
900 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl
);
901 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
903 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
906 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
913 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
914 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
917 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
919 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
921 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
923 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
924 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
926 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
930 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
934 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
936 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
946 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
952 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
954 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
956 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
957 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
959 /* Base must have a CRL number */
960 if (!base
->crl_number
)
962 /* Issuer names must match */
963 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
965 /* AKID and IDP must match */
966 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
968 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
970 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
971 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
973 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
974 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
980 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
981 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
984 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
985 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
989 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
991 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
993 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
994 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
995 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
996 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
997 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
998 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta
);
1007 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1008 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1009 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1010 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1011 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1014 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1015 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1019 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1021 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1023 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1024 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1026 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1027 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1028 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1030 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1031 /* If no new reasons reject */
1032 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1035 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1036 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1038 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1039 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1040 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1043 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1045 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1046 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1049 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1050 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1052 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1053 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1055 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1057 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1060 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1062 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1063 /* If no new reasons reject */
1064 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1066 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1067 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1070 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1076 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1077 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1079 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1080 X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1081 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1084 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1087 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1089 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1090 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1091 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1092 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1097 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1098 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1099 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1101 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1102 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1103 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1108 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1110 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1114 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1115 * untrusted certificates.
1117 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1118 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1119 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1121 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1122 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1123 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1130 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1131 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1132 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1133 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1136 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1138 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1140 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1143 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->ctx
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1146 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1147 /* Copy verify params across */
1148 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1150 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1151 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1153 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1154 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1159 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1161 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1163 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1168 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1169 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1170 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1171 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1172 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1176 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1177 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1178 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1180 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1181 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1182 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1183 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1189 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1190 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1191 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1192 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1193 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1196 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1198 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1199 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1200 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1207 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1211 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1216 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1218 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1219 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1222 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1223 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1227 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1229 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1230 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1231 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1233 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1239 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1241 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1242 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1243 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1244 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1245 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1254 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1257 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1258 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1260 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1261 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1262 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1263 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1265 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1271 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1273 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1274 unsigned int *preasons
)
1277 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1279 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1280 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1283 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1286 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1287 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1288 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1289 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1290 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1291 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1296 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1297 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1303 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1304 * to find a delta CRL too
1307 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1308 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1311 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1313 unsigned int reasons
;
1314 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1315 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1316 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1317 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1318 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1319 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1324 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1326 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1328 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1332 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1334 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1338 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1340 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1341 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1342 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1351 /* Check CRL validity */
1352 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1354 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1355 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1356 int ok
= 0, chnum
, cnum
;
1357 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1358 chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1359 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1360 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1361 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1364 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1365 * certificate in chain.
1367 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1368 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1370 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1371 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1372 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
)) {
1373 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
;
1374 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1382 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1384 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1385 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1386 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1387 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
)) {
1388 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
;
1389 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1394 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
)) {
1395 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
;
1396 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1401 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
)) {
1402 if (check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0) {
1403 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
;
1404 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1410 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) {
1411 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1412 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1419 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
)) {
1420 ok
= check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1);
1425 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1426 ikey
= X509_get0_pubkey(issuer
);
1429 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1430 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1435 rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1436 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
1438 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1442 /* Verify CRL signature */
1443 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0) {
1444 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1445 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1458 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1459 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1464 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1465 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1466 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1467 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1469 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1470 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
1471 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
;
1472 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1477 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1478 * is not removeFromCRL.
1480 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1481 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1483 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
;
1484 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1492 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1499 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1500 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1501 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1502 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1503 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1504 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1505 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1506 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1507 * X509_policy_check() call.
1509 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
&& !sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, NULL
)) {
1510 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1513 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1514 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1515 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
)
1516 sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
1518 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL
) {
1519 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1522 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1523 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID
) {
1525 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1529 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1530 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1531 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1533 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1534 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
;
1535 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1540 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE
) {
1541 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1542 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1543 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1545 if (ret
!= X509_PCY_TREE_VALID
) {
1546 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1550 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1551 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1552 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
1553 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1560 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int quiet
)
1565 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1566 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1567 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
1572 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1576 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
;
1577 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1578 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1585 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
;
1586 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1587 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1591 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1595 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
;
1596 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1597 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1604 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
;
1605 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1606 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1613 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1617 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1619 n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1620 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1621 xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1624 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1625 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1626 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1628 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
) {
1634 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1637 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1642 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
;
1643 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1644 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1648 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1649 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1654 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1655 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1658 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1661 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1662 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1665 if (xs
!= xi
|| (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
)) {
1666 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1667 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1668 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1669 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1672 } else if (X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1673 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1674 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1675 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1682 ok
= x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, 0);
1686 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1687 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1688 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1689 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
);
1696 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1704 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1706 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1709 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1714 char buff1
[24], buff2
[24], *p
;
1715 int i
, j
, remaining
;
1718 remaining
= ctm
->length
;
1719 str
= (char *)ctm
->data
;
1721 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1722 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1723 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1724 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1726 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1727 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1728 int min_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1729 int max_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1730 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1737 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1738 int min_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1739 int max_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1740 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1748 if ((*str
== 'Z') || (*str
== '-') || (*str
== '+')) {
1759 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1760 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1761 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1763 if (remaining
&& *str
== '.') {
1766 for (i
= 0; i
< 3 && remaining
; i
++, str
++, remaining
--) {
1767 if (*str
< '0' || *str
> '9')
1776 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1785 if ((*str
!= '+') && (*str
!= '-'))
1787 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1790 if (str
[1] < '0' || str
[1] > '9' || str
[2] < '0' || str
[2] > '9' ||
1791 str
[3] < '0' || str
[3] > '9' || str
[4] < '0' || str
[4] > '9')
1793 offset
= ((str
[1] - '0') * 10 + (str
[2] - '0')) * 60;
1794 offset
+= (str
[3] - '0') * 10 + (str
[4] - '0');
1798 atm
.type
= ctm
->type
;
1800 atm
.length
= sizeof(buff2
);
1801 atm
.data
= (unsigned char *)buff2
;
1803 if (X509_time_adj(&atm
, offset
* 60, cmp_time
) == NULL
)
1806 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1807 i
= (buff1
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1
[1] - '0');
1809 i
+= 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1810 j
= (buff2
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2
[1] - '0');
1819 i
= strcmp(buff1
, buff2
);
1820 if (i
== 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1826 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1828 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1831 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1833 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1836 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1837 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1846 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1847 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1848 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1849 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1850 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1852 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1855 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1857 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1860 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1863 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1864 ktmp
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1866 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1867 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1870 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1874 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1875 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1879 /* first, populate the other certs */
1880 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1881 ktmp2
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1882 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1886 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1890 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1892 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
1893 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
1895 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
1897 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
1898 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1899 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
1900 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
1903 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1904 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
1905 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
1908 /* Issuer names must match */
1909 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
1910 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
1913 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1914 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
1915 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
1918 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
1919 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
1922 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1923 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
1924 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
1927 /* CRLs must verify */
1928 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
1929 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
1930 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
1933 /* Create new CRL */
1934 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
1935 if (crl
== NULL
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
1937 /* Set issuer name */
1938 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
1941 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer
)))
1943 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer
)))
1946 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1948 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
1952 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1953 * number to correct value too.
1956 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
1957 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
1958 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
1959 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
1963 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
1965 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
1967 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
1968 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
1969 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
1971 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
1972 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
1974 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, &rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
1975 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
1978 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
1979 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
1984 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
1986 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
1992 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1997 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
1999 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2002 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2004 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2007 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2012 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2017 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2019 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2022 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2024 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2027 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2032 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2036 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2039 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2041 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2044 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2046 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2049 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2054 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2059 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2061 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2064 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2069 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2072 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2073 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2074 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2076 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2079 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2082 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2083 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2085 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2089 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2090 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2091 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2092 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2093 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2094 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2095 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2099 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2100 int purpose
, int trust
)
2103 /* If purpose not set use default */
2105 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2106 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2109 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2111 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2112 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2115 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2116 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2117 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2119 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2120 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2121 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2124 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2125 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2128 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2130 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2132 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2135 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2137 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2138 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2143 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2144 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2145 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2146 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2150 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2152 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx
));
2155 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2161 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2166 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2170 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2171 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2176 ctx
->current_method
= 0;
2178 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2180 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
2181 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2185 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2186 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2187 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2188 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2189 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2190 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2191 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2195 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 0;
2196 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2197 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2200 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2201 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
2202 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2206 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2207 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2209 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2211 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2212 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2214 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2216 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2217 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2219 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2221 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2222 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2224 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2226 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2227 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2229 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2231 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2232 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2234 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2236 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2237 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2239 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2241 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2242 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2244 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2246 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2247 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2249 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_get1_certs
;
2251 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2252 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2254 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_get1_crls
;
2256 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2258 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2259 if (ctx
->param
== NULL
) {
2260 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2265 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2268 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2270 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2273 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2274 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2277 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2282 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2283 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2285 if (ctx
->param
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2286 int idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx
->param
->purpose
);
2287 X509_PURPOSE
*xp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2290 ctx
->param
->trust
= X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp
);
2293 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2296 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2300 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2301 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2303 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2308 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2309 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2312 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2314 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2315 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2316 ctx
->lookup_certs
= lookup_certs_sk
;
2319 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2322 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2323 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2324 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2325 * pointers below after they're freed!
2327 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2328 if (ctx
->cleanup
!= NULL
) {
2330 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2332 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2333 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2334 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2337 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2339 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2341 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2342 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2345 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2347 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2350 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2352 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2355 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2358 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2361 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2362 int (*verify_cb
) (int, X509_STORE_CTX
*))
2364 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2367 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2372 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2374 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2377 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2379 return ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2382 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2384 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2385 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2388 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2391 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2396 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2398 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2402 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, struct dane_st
*dane
)
2407 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2410 unsigned int *i2dlen
)
2412 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
2416 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2419 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT
:
2420 len
= i2d_X509(cert
, &buf
);
2422 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
:
2423 len
= i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert
), &buf
);
2426 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR
);
2430 if (len
< 0 || buf
== NULL
) {
2431 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2435 *i2dlen
= (unsigned int)len
;
2439 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2441 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
, int depth
)
2443 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
2444 unsigned usage
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2445 unsigned selector
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2446 unsigned ordinal
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2447 unsigned mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2448 unsigned char *i2dbuf
= NULL
;
2449 unsigned int i2dlen
= 0;
2450 unsigned char mdbuf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2451 unsigned char *cmpbuf
= NULL
;
2452 unsigned int cmplen
= 0;
2456 danetls_record
*t
= NULL
;
2459 mask
= (depth
== 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK
: DANETLS_TA_MASK
;
2462 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2464 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
2465 mask
&= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2468 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2469 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2470 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2472 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
2473 mask
&= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2476 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2477 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2478 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2479 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2481 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2482 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2483 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2484 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2486 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2487 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2488 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2490 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2491 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2492 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2493 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2494 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2495 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2496 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2498 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2499 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2500 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2501 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2503 recnum
= (dane
->umask
& mask
) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
) : 0;
2504 for (i
= 0; matched
== 0 && i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2505 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2506 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t
->usage
) & mask
) == 0)
2508 if (t
->usage
!= usage
) {
2511 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2512 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2513 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2515 if (t
->selector
!= selector
) {
2516 selector
= t
->selector
;
2518 /* Update per-selector state */
2519 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2520 i2dbuf
= dane_i2d(cert
, selector
, &i2dlen
);
2524 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2525 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2526 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2527 } else if (t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
) {
2531 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2533 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2534 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2535 * other than "Full".
2537 if (dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
] < ordinal
)
2542 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2543 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2545 if (t
->mtype
!= mtype
) {
2546 const EVP_MD
*md
= dane
->dctx
->mdevp
[mtype
= t
->mtype
];
2552 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf
, i2dlen
, cmpbuf
, &cmplen
, md
, 0)) {
2560 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2561 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2564 if (cmplen
== t
->dlen
&&
2565 memcmp(cmpbuf
, t
->data
, cmplen
) == 0) {
2566 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage
) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK
)
2568 if (matched
|| dane
->mdpth
< 0) {
2569 dane
->mdpth
= depth
;
2571 OPENSSL_free(dane
->mcert
);
2579 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2580 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2584 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2586 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
2590 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) || depth
== 0)
2591 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2594 * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2595 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2596 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2598 cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
2599 if (cert
!= NULL
&& (matched
= dane_match(ctx
, cert
, depth
)) < 0)
2600 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2602 ctx
->num_untrusted
= depth
- 1;
2603 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2606 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2609 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2611 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
2613 int num
= ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2614 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2615 int recnum
= sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
);
2618 for (i
= 0; i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2619 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2620 if (t
->usage
!= DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA
||
2621 t
->selector
!= DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
||
2622 t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
||
2623 X509_verify(cert
, t
->spki
) <= 0)
2626 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2627 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2630 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2631 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 1;
2632 dane
->mdpth
= num
- 1;
2635 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2636 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2637 for (; num
> ctx
->num_untrusted
; --num
)
2638 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
2640 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2643 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2646 static void dane_reset(struct dane_st
*dane
)
2649 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2651 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2658 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2660 int err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, cert
, NULL
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
2662 if (err
== X509_V_OK
)
2664 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2665 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2667 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
2670 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2672 X509
*cert
= ctx
->cert
;
2673 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
2679 matched
= dane_match(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0);
2680 done
= matched
!= 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && dane
->mdpth
< 0);
2683 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
2686 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2688 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2689 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2690 return ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
);
2694 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2695 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2696 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2701 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2702 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2704 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2705 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2706 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
;
2707 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
2711 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2712 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2714 return verify_chain(ctx
);
2717 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2719 struct dane_st
*dane
= (struct dane_st
*)ctx
->dane
;
2720 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2721 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2722 int ss
= cert_self_signed(cert
);
2723 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
2724 unsigned int search
;
2725 int may_trusted
= 0;
2726 int may_alternate
= 0;
2727 int trust
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2728 int alt_untrusted
= 0;
2733 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2734 OPENSSL_assert(num
== 1 && ctx
->num_untrusted
== num
);
2736 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2737 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2738 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2740 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2741 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2742 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2743 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2744 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2746 search
= (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED
: 0;
2747 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane
)) {
2748 if (search
== 0 || ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
2749 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
2750 else if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
))
2756 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2757 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2758 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2760 if (ctx
->untrusted
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
2761 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2765 /* Include any untrusted full certificates from DNS */
2766 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) && dane
->certs
!= NULL
) {
2767 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(dane
->certs
); ++i
) {
2768 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp
, sk_X509_value(dane
->certs
, i
))) {
2769 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
2770 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2777 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
2778 * might be reasonable.
2780 if (ctx
->param
->depth
> INT_MAX
/2)
2781 ctx
->param
->depth
= INT_MAX
/2;
2784 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
2785 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
2786 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
2788 depth
= ctx
->param
->depth
+ 1;
2790 while (search
!= 0) {
2795 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
2796 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When
2797 * we exceed the depth limit, we simulate absence of a match.
2799 if ((search
& S_DOTRUSTED
) != 0) {
2800 STACK_OF(X509
) *hide
= ctx
->chain
;
2802 i
= num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2803 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
2805 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
2806 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
2807 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
2808 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
2809 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
2810 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
2811 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
2812 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
2813 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
2814 * ctx->num_untrusted.
2816 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
2817 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
2821 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
-1);
2823 /* Suppress duplicate suppression */
2825 ok
= (depth
< num
) ? 0 : ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
2829 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2836 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
2837 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
2838 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
2839 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
2840 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
2841 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
2842 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
2843 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
2845 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
2846 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
2847 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
2849 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
2850 OPENSSL_assert(num
> i
&& i
> 0 && ss
== 0);
2851 search
&= ~S_DOALTERNATE
;
2852 for (; num
> i
; --num
)
2853 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
2854 ctx
->num_untrusted
= num
;
2856 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
2857 dane
->mdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
2859 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2862 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
2863 dane
->pdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
2868 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
2869 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
2872 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
= xtmp
)) {
2874 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2875 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2879 ss
= cert_self_signed(x
);
2880 } else if (num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
2882 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
2883 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
2884 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
2885 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
2887 if (X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
) != 0) {
2888 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
2893 ctx
->num_untrusted
= --num
;
2894 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, num
, x
= xtmp
);
2899 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
2900 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
2901 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
2902 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
2904 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
2905 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
2906 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
2907 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
2908 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
2909 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
2912 OPENSSL_assert(ctx
->num_untrusted
<= num
);
2913 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
2914 switch (trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
)) {
2915 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
2916 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
2926 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
2927 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
2928 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
2929 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
2931 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) == 0) {
2932 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
2933 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 && --alt_untrusted
> 0)
2935 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
2936 if (!may_alternate
|| (search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 ||
2937 ctx
->num_untrusted
< 2)
2939 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
2940 search
|= S_DOALTERNATE
;
2941 alt_untrusted
= ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1;
2947 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
2949 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) != 0) {
2950 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2951 OPENSSL_assert(num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
);
2952 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
-1);
2953 xtmp
= (depth
< num
) ? NULL
: find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
2956 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
2957 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
2960 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
2962 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
2966 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
= xtmp
)) {
2967 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2968 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2973 ++ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2974 ss
= cert_self_signed(xtmp
);
2977 * Not strictly necessary, but saves cycles looking at the same
2978 * certificates over and over.
2980 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, x
);
2983 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
2985 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1)) {
2986 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
2987 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
2993 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
2996 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
2997 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
2999 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3001 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane
))
3002 trust
= check_dane_pkeys(ctx
);
3003 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3004 trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
);
3008 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3010 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3012 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
:
3014 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3015 ctx
->current_cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
3016 ctx
->error_depth
= num
-1;
3018 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
;
3019 else if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3020 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || dane
->pdpth
>= 0))
3021 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
;
3022 else if (ss
&& sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
3023 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
;
3025 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
;
3026 else if (ctx
->num_untrusted
== num
)
3027 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
;
3029 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
;
3030 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);