2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
16 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
17 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
18 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
23 #include <openssl/objects.h>
24 #include <internal/dane.h>
25 #include <internal/x509_int.h>
28 /* CRL score values */
30 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
32 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
34 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
36 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
40 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
42 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
44 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
46 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
48 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
50 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
52 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
54 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
56 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
58 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
60 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
62 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
64 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
66 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
67 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
68 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
69 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
70 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
71 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
72 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
73 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
74 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
75 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
);
76 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
77 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
78 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
79 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
80 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
);
81 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
82 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
84 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
85 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
86 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
87 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
88 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
89 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
90 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
91 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
93 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
94 unsigned int *preasons
);
95 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
96 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
97 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
98 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
100 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
102 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
107 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
108 static int cert_self_signed(X509
*x
)
111 * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
112 * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
113 * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
115 X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0);
116 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
)
122 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
124 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
126 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
129 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
130 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
133 /* Look for exact match */
134 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
135 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
136 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
139 if (i
< sk_X509_num(certs
))
143 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
148 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
149 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
151 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
152 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
154 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
156 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
, int err
)
158 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
159 ctx
->current_cert
= (x
!= NULL
) ? x
: sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
160 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
)
162 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
166 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
167 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
170 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
172 static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
175 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
178 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
181 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
183 if (ctx
->param
->auth_level
<= 0)
186 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; ++i
) {
187 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
190 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
191 * check the security of issuer keys.
193 if (i
> 0 && !check_key_level(ctx
, cert
) &&
194 verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
) == 0)
197 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
198 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
200 if (i
< num
- 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx
, cert
) &&
201 verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
) == 0)
207 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
213 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
214 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
216 if ((ok
= build_chain(ctx
)) == 0 ||
217 (ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
)) == 0 ||
218 (ok
= check_auth_level(ctx
)) == 0 ||
219 (ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
)) == 0 ||
220 (ok
= check_id(ctx
)) == 0 || 1)
221 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
222 if (ok
== 0 || (ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
)) == 0)
225 err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
227 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
) {
228 if ((ok
= verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, ctx
->error_depth
, err
)) == 0)
232 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
233 ok
= (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
) ? ctx
->verify(ctx
) : internal_verify(ctx
);
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
238 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
239 if ((ok
= X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
241 if ((ok
= X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
)) == 0)
245 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
246 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
)
247 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
251 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
253 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
256 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
257 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
258 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
262 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
264 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
265 * cannot do another one.
267 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
268 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
273 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
274 * the first entry is in place
276 if (((ctx
->chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
277 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
))) {
278 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
279 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
282 X509_up_ref(ctx
->cert
);
283 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 1;
285 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
286 if (!check_key_level(ctx
, ctx
->cert
) &&
287 !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
))
290 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
291 ret
= dane_verify(ctx
);
293 ret
= verify_chain(ctx
);
296 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
297 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
298 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
300 if (ret
<= 0 && ctx
->error
== X509_V_OK
)
301 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
306 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
308 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
311 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;
313 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
314 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
315 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)) {
317 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, rv
, -1))
324 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
326 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
330 return cert_self_signed(x
);
331 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
332 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
) {
335 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
336 if (cert_self_signed(x
) && sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
338 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
339 ch
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
340 if (ch
== issuer
|| !X509_cmp(ch
, issuer
)) {
341 ret
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP
;
347 return (ret
== X509_V_OK
);
350 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
352 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
354 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
356 X509_up_ref(*issuer
);
362 static STACK_OF(X509
) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_NAME
*nm
)
364 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
367 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->other_ctx
); i
++) {
368 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->other_ctx
, i
);
369 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0) {
371 sk
= sk_X509_new_null();
372 if (sk
== NULL
|| sk_X509_push(sk
, x
) == 0) {
373 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
383 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
384 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
386 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int purpose
, int depth
,
389 int tr_ok
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
392 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
393 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
395 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
396 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
397 * ctx->param->purpose!
399 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
400 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
401 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
402 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
403 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
405 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
406 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
409 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
&& purpose
== ctx
->param
->purpose
)
410 tr_ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT
);
413 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
415 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
418 switch (X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0)) {
424 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) == 0)
430 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
);
434 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
438 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
440 int i
, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
442 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
444 int allow_proxy_certs
;
445 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
448 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
449 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
450 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
451 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
452 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
453 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
454 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
458 /* CRL path validation */
460 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
461 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
464 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
465 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
468 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
470 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
471 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
472 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
473 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
474 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
))
477 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
478 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
479 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
))
482 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
483 switch (must_be_ca
) {
485 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
486 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
488 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
495 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
500 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
502 || ((i
+ 1 < num
|| ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
505 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
510 if (ret
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_OK
))
512 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
513 if (purpose
> 0 && !check_purpose(ctx
, x
, purpose
, i
, must_be_ca
))
515 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
516 if ((i
> 1) && !(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
)
517 && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
518 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
+ 1))) {
519 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
))
522 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
523 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
526 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
527 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
528 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
530 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
532 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
533 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
534 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
535 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
537 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
538 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
539 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
540 * increment proxy_path_length.
542 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1) {
543 if (proxy_path_length
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
544 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
545 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
))
548 proxy_path_length
= x
->ex_pcpathlen
;
558 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
562 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
563 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
564 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
567 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
568 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
572 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
573 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
575 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
577 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
578 X509_NAME
*tmpsubject
= X509_get_subject_name(x
);
579 X509_NAME
*tmpissuer
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
580 X509_NAME_ENTRY
*tmpentry
= NULL
;
581 int last_object_nid
= 0;
583 int last_object_loc
= X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
) - 1;
585 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
586 if (last_object_loc
< 1) {
587 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
588 goto proxy_name_done
;
592 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
593 * there is in issuer.
595 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
)
596 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer
) + 1) {
597 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
598 goto proxy_name_done
;
602 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
605 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
607 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
608 last_object_loc
- 1))) {
609 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
610 goto proxy_name_done
;
614 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
615 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
617 tmpsubject
= X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject
);
618 if (tmpsubject
== NULL
) {
619 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
620 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
625 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject
, last_object_loc
);
627 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry
));
629 if (last_object_nid
!= NID_commonName
630 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject
, tmpissuer
) != 0) {
631 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
634 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry
);
635 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject
);
639 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, err
))
644 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
645 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
646 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
649 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
650 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
653 int rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
655 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
656 if (rv
== X509_V_OK
&& i
== 0)
657 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x
, nc
);
662 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
665 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, rv
))
675 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
677 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, errcode
);
680 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
)
683 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm
->hosts
);
686 if (vpm
->peername
!= NULL
) {
687 OPENSSL_free(vpm
->peername
);
688 vpm
->peername
= NULL
;
690 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
691 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm
->hosts
, i
);
692 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, vpm
->hostflags
, &vpm
->peername
) > 0)
698 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
700 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
702 if (vpm
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, vpm
) <= 0) {
703 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
706 if (vpm
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, vpm
->email
, vpm
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
707 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
710 if (vpm
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, vpm
->ip
, vpm
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
711 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
717 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
)
722 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
723 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
727 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
728 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
730 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && num_untrusted
> 0 && num_untrusted
< num
) {
731 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, num_untrusted
)) {
732 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
733 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
739 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
740 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
741 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
742 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
744 for (i
= num_untrusted
; i
< num
; i
++) {
745 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
746 trust
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
747 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
748 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
750 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
755 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
756 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
758 if (num_untrusted
< num
) {
759 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
)
761 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
764 if (num_untrusted
== num
&& ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
766 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
767 * for a direct trust store match.
770 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
771 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
773 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
776 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
777 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
779 trust
= X509_check_trust(mx
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
780 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
785 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
786 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
788 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
793 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
794 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
796 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
799 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
))
800 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
801 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
804 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
805 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
807 dane
->pdpth
= num_untrusted
;
808 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
809 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
810 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
811 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
814 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
816 int i
= 0, last
= 0, ok
= 0;
817 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
819 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
820 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
822 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
827 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
828 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
829 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
836 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
838 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
840 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
841 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
843 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
844 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
845 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
846 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
848 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)
851 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
852 unsigned int last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
854 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
856 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
858 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
860 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
863 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
866 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
867 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
872 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
875 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
881 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
883 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
893 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
896 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
897 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
905 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
909 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
911 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
917 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
918 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
919 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
920 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
925 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
929 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
))
936 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
))
940 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
941 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
946 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
))
949 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
950 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
953 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
))
959 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
964 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
965 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
966 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
968 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
969 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
970 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
971 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
972 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
974 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
975 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
977 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
978 if (crl_score
< best_score
|| crl_score
== 0)
980 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
981 if (crl_score
== best_score
&& best_crl
!= NULL
) {
983 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl
),
984 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
)) == 0)
987 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
990 if (day
<= 0 && sec
<= 0)
994 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
995 best_score
= crl_score
;
996 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1000 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1002 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1003 *pscore
= best_score
;
1004 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1005 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl
);
1006 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1008 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1011 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1018 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1019 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1022 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1024 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
1026 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1028 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1029 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1031 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1035 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1039 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1041 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1051 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
1057 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1059 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1061 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1062 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
1064 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1065 if (!base
->crl_number
)
1067 /* Issuer names must match */
1068 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
1070 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1071 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1073 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1075 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1076 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1078 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1079 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1085 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1086 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1089 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1090 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1094 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1096 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1098 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1099 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1100 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1101 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1102 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1103 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta
);
1112 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1113 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1114 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1115 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1116 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1119 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1120 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1124 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1126 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1128 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1129 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1131 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1132 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1133 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1135 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1136 /* If no new reasons reject */
1137 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1140 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1141 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1143 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1144 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1145 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1148 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1150 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1151 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1154 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1155 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1157 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1158 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1160 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1162 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1165 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1167 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1168 /* If no new reasons reject */
1169 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1171 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1172 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1175 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1181 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1182 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1184 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1185 X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1186 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1189 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1192 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1194 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1195 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1196 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1197 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1202 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1203 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1204 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1206 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1207 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1208 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1213 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1215 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1219 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1220 * untrusted certificates.
1222 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1223 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1224 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1226 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1227 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1228 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1235 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1236 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1237 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1238 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1241 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1243 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1246 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1249 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->ctx
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1252 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1253 /* Copy verify params across */
1254 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1256 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1257 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1259 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1260 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1264 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1265 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1267 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1272 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1273 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1274 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1275 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1276 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1280 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1281 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1282 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1284 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1285 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1286 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1287 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1293 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1294 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1295 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1296 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1297 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1300 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1302 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1303 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1304 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1311 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1315 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1320 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1322 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1323 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1326 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1327 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1331 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1333 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1334 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1335 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1337 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1343 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1345 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1346 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1347 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1348 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1349 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1358 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1361 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1362 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1364 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1365 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1366 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1367 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1369 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1375 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1377 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1378 unsigned int *preasons
)
1381 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1383 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1384 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1387 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1390 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1391 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1392 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1393 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1394 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1395 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1400 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1401 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1407 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1408 * to find a delta CRL too
1411 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1412 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1415 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1417 unsigned int reasons
;
1418 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1419 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1420 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1422 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1423 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1424 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1428 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1430 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1432 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1436 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1438 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1441 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1443 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1444 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1445 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1453 /* Check CRL validity */
1454 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1456 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1457 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1458 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1459 int chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1461 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1462 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1463 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1465 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1466 * certificate in chain.
1468 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1469 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1471 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1472 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1473 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
) &&
1474 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
))
1482 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1484 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1485 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1486 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1487 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
) &&
1488 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
))
1491 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
) &&
1492 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
))
1495 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
) &&
1496 check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0 &&
1497 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
))
1500 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) &&
1501 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
))
1505 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
) &&
1506 !check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1))
1509 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1510 ikey
= X509_get0_pubkey(issuer
);
1513 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
))
1517 int rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1519 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
&& !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, rv
))
1521 /* Verify CRL signature */
1522 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0 &&
1523 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
))
1529 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1530 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1535 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1536 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1537 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1538 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1540 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1541 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) &&
1542 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
))
1545 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1546 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1548 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1549 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1551 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
))
1558 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1565 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1566 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1567 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1568 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1569 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1570 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1571 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1572 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1573 * X509_policy_check() call.
1575 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
&& !sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, NULL
)) {
1576 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1577 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1580 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1581 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1582 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
)
1583 sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
1585 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL
) {
1586 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1587 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1590 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1591 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID
) {
1594 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1595 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1596 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1598 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1600 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
,
1601 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
))
1606 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE
) {
1607 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1608 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1609 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1611 if (ret
!= X509_PCY_TREE_VALID
) {
1612 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1616 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1617 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1619 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1620 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1621 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1622 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1624 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1632 * Check certificate validity times.
1633 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1634 * the validation status.
1636 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1638 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
)
1643 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1644 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1645 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
1650 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1651 if (i
>= 0 && depth
< 0)
1653 if (i
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
,
1654 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
))
1656 if (i
> 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
))
1659 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1660 if (i
<= 0 && depth
< 0)
1662 if (i
== 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
,
1663 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
))
1665 if (i
< 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
))
1670 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1672 int n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1673 X509
*xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1677 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1678 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1679 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1681 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
) {
1687 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1690 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1695 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xi
, 0,
1696 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
);
1698 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1699 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1703 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1704 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1710 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
1711 * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If
1712 * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
1713 * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
1715 if (xs
!= xi
|| (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
)) {
1716 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1717 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xi
, xi
!= xs
? n
+1 : n
,
1718 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
))
1720 } else if (X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1721 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx
, xs
, n
,
1722 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
))
1728 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1729 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, n
))
1733 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1736 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1737 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1738 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1739 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
))
1744 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1750 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1752 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1755 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1760 char buff1
[24], buff2
[24], *p
;
1761 int i
, j
, remaining
;
1764 remaining
= ctm
->length
;
1765 str
= (char *)ctm
->data
;
1767 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1768 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1769 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1770 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1772 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1773 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1774 int min_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1775 int max_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1776 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1783 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1784 int min_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1785 int max_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1786 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1794 if ((*str
== 'Z') || (*str
== '-') || (*str
== '+')) {
1805 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1806 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1807 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1809 if (remaining
&& *str
== '.') {
1812 for (i
= 0; i
< 3 && remaining
; i
++, str
++, remaining
--) {
1813 if (*str
< '0' || *str
> '9')
1822 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1831 if ((*str
!= '+') && (*str
!= '-'))
1833 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1836 if (str
[1] < '0' || str
[1] > '9' || str
[2] < '0' || str
[2] > '9' ||
1837 str
[3] < '0' || str
[3] > '9' || str
[4] < '0' || str
[4] > '9')
1839 offset
= ((str
[1] - '0') * 10 + (str
[2] - '0')) * 60;
1840 offset
+= (str
[3] - '0') * 10 + (str
[4] - '0');
1844 atm
.type
= ctm
->type
;
1846 atm
.length
= sizeof(buff2
);
1847 atm
.data
= (unsigned char *)buff2
;
1849 if (X509_time_adj(&atm
, offset
* 60, cmp_time
) == NULL
)
1852 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1853 i
= (buff1
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1
[1] - '0');
1855 i
+= 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1856 j
= (buff2
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2
[1] - '0');
1865 i
= strcmp(buff1
, buff2
);
1866 if (i
== 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1872 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1874 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1877 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1879 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1882 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1883 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1892 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1893 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1894 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1895 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1896 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1898 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1901 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1903 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1906 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1909 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1910 ktmp
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1912 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1913 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1916 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1920 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1921 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1925 /* first, populate the other certs */
1926 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1927 ktmp2
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1928 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1932 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1936 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1938 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
1939 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
1941 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
1943 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
1944 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1945 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
1946 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
1949 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1950 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
1951 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
1954 /* Issuer names must match */
1955 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
1956 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
1959 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1960 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
1961 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
1964 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
1965 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
1968 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1969 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
1970 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
1973 /* CRLs must verify */
1974 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
1975 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
1976 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
1979 /* Create new CRL */
1980 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
1981 if (crl
== NULL
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
1983 /* Set issuer name */
1984 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
1987 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer
)))
1989 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer
)))
1992 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1994 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
1998 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1999 * number to correct value too.
2002 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
2003 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
2004 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
2005 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
2009 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2011 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2013 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2014 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2015 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2017 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2018 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2020 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, &rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2021 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2024 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2025 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2030 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2032 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2038 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2043 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2045 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2048 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2050 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2053 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2058 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2063 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2065 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2068 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2070 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
2073 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2075 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2078 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2080 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
2083 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2088 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2092 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2095 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2097 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2100 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2102 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2105 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2110 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2115 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2120 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2123 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2124 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2125 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2127 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2130 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2133 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2134 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2136 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2140 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2141 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2142 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2143 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2144 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2145 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2146 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2150 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2151 int purpose
, int trust
)
2154 /* If purpose not set use default */
2156 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2157 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2160 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2162 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2163 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2166 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2167 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2168 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2170 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2171 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2172 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2175 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2176 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2179 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2181 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2183 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2186 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2188 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2189 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2194 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2195 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2196 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2197 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2201 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2203 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx
));
2206 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2212 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2217 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2221 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2222 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2228 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2230 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
2231 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2235 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2236 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2237 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2238 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2239 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2240 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2241 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2245 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 0;
2246 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2247 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2249 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2251 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2255 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2256 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2258 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2260 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2261 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2263 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2265 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2266 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2268 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2270 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2271 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2273 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2275 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2276 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2278 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2280 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2281 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2283 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2285 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2286 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2288 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2290 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2291 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2293 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2295 if (store
&& store
->check_policy
)
2296 ctx
->check_policy
= store
->check_policy
;
2298 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2300 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2301 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2303 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs
;
2305 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2306 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2308 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls
;
2310 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2311 if (ctx
->param
== NULL
) {
2312 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2317 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2320 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2322 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2325 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2326 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2329 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2334 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2335 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2337 if (ctx
->param
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2338 int idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx
->param
->purpose
);
2339 X509_PURPOSE
*xp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2342 ctx
->param
->trust
= X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp
);
2345 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2348 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2352 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2353 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2355 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2360 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2361 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2363 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2365 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2366 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2367 ctx
->lookup_certs
= lookup_certs_sk
;
2370 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2373 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2374 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2375 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2376 * pointers below after they're freed!
2378 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2379 if (ctx
->cleanup
!= NULL
) {
2381 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2383 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2384 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2385 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2388 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2390 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2392 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2393 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2396 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2398 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2401 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2403 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2406 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2409 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2412 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2417 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2419 return ctx
->untrusted
;
2422 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2424 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2427 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2429 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2433 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2434 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb
)
2436 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2439 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2441 return ctx
->verify_cb
;
2444 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2445 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify
)
2447 ctx
->verify
= verify
;
2450 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2455 X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2457 return ctx
->get_issuer
;
2460 X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2462 return ctx
->check_issued
;
2465 X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2467 return ctx
->check_revocation
;
2470 X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2472 return ctx
->get_crl
;
2475 X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2477 return ctx
->check_crl
;
2480 X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2482 return ctx
->cert_crl
;
2485 X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2487 return ctx
->check_policy
;
2490 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2492 return ctx
->lookup_certs
;
2495 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2497 return ctx
->lookup_crls
;
2500 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2502 return ctx
->cleanup
;
2505 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2510 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2512 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2515 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2517 return ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2520 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2522 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2523 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2526 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2529 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2534 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2536 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2540 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2545 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2548 unsigned int *i2dlen
)
2550 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
2554 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2557 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT
:
2558 len
= i2d_X509(cert
, &buf
);
2560 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
:
2561 len
= i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert
), &buf
);
2564 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR
);
2568 if (len
< 0 || buf
== NULL
) {
2569 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2573 *i2dlen
= (unsigned int)len
;
2577 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2579 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
, int depth
)
2581 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2582 unsigned usage
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2583 unsigned selector
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2584 unsigned ordinal
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2585 unsigned mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2586 unsigned char *i2dbuf
= NULL
;
2587 unsigned int i2dlen
= 0;
2588 unsigned char mdbuf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2589 unsigned char *cmpbuf
= NULL
;
2590 unsigned int cmplen
= 0;
2594 danetls_record
*t
= NULL
;
2597 mask
= (depth
== 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK
: DANETLS_TA_MASK
;
2600 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2602 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
2603 mask
&= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2606 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2607 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2608 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2610 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
2611 mask
&= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2614 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2615 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2616 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2617 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2619 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2620 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2621 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2622 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2624 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2625 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2626 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2628 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2629 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2630 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2631 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2632 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2633 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2634 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2636 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2637 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2638 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2639 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2641 recnum
= (dane
->umask
& mask
) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
) : 0;
2642 for (i
= 0; matched
== 0 && i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2643 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2644 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t
->usage
) & mask
) == 0)
2646 if (t
->usage
!= usage
) {
2649 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2650 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2651 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2653 if (t
->selector
!= selector
) {
2654 selector
= t
->selector
;
2656 /* Update per-selector state */
2657 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2658 i2dbuf
= dane_i2d(cert
, selector
, &i2dlen
);
2662 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2663 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2664 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2665 } else if (t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
) {
2669 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2671 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2672 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2673 * other than "Full".
2675 if (dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
] < ordinal
)
2680 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2681 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2683 if (t
->mtype
!= mtype
) {
2684 const EVP_MD
*md
= dane
->dctx
->mdevp
[mtype
= t
->mtype
];
2690 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf
, i2dlen
, cmpbuf
, &cmplen
, md
, 0)) {
2698 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2699 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2702 if (cmplen
== t
->dlen
&&
2703 memcmp(cmpbuf
, t
->data
, cmplen
) == 0) {
2704 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage
) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK
)
2706 if (matched
|| dane
->mdpth
< 0) {
2707 dane
->mdpth
= depth
;
2709 OPENSSL_free(dane
->mcert
);
2717 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2718 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2722 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2724 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2728 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) || depth
== 0)
2729 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2732 * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2733 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2734 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2736 cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
2737 if (cert
!= NULL
&& (matched
= dane_match(ctx
, cert
, depth
)) < 0)
2738 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
2740 ctx
->num_untrusted
= depth
- 1;
2741 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2744 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2747 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2749 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2751 int num
= ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2752 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2753 int recnum
= sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
);
2756 for (i
= 0; i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2757 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2758 if (t
->usage
!= DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA
||
2759 t
->selector
!= DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
||
2760 t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
||
2761 X509_verify(cert
, t
->spki
) <= 0)
2764 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2765 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2768 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2769 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 1;
2770 dane
->mdpth
= num
- 1;
2773 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2774 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2775 for (; num
> ctx
->num_untrusted
; --num
)
2776 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
2778 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2781 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2784 static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2787 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2789 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2796 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2798 int err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, cert
, NULL
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
2800 if (err
== X509_V_OK
)
2802 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, 0, err
);
2805 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2807 X509
*cert
= ctx
->cert
;
2808 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2815 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2816 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2817 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2818 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2819 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2821 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2822 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2823 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2824 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2826 matched
= dane_match(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0);
2827 done
= matched
!= 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && dane
->mdpth
< 0);
2830 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
2833 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2834 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2836 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2837 if ((dane
->flags
& DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS
) == 0 &&
2840 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2841 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2842 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2843 return ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
);
2847 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2848 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2849 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2854 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2855 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2857 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
2861 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2862 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2864 return verify_chain(ctx
);
2867 /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2868 static int get_issuer(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2870 STACK_OF(X509
) *saved_chain
= ctx
->chain
;
2874 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(issuer
, ctx
, cert
);
2875 ctx
->chain
= saved_chain
;
2880 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2882 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2883 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2884 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2885 int ss
= cert_self_signed(cert
);
2886 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
2887 unsigned int search
;
2888 int may_trusted
= 0;
2889 int may_alternate
= 0;
2890 int trust
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2891 int alt_untrusted
= 0;
2896 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2897 OPENSSL_assert(num
== 1 && ctx
->num_untrusted
== num
);
2899 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2900 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2901 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2903 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2904 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2905 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2906 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2907 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2909 search
= (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED
: 0;
2910 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane
)) {
2911 if (search
== 0 || ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
2912 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
2913 else if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
))
2919 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2920 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2921 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2923 if (ctx
->untrusted
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
2924 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2925 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2930 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add
2931 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
2932 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
2933 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
2934 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
2935 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
2936 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
2939 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) && dane
->certs
!= NULL
) {
2940 if (sktmp
== NULL
&& (sktmp
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
2941 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2942 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2945 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(dane
->certs
); ++i
) {
2946 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp
, sk_X509_value(dane
->certs
, i
))) {
2947 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
2948 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2949 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2956 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
2957 * might be reasonable.
2959 if (ctx
->param
->depth
> INT_MAX
/2)
2960 ctx
->param
->depth
= INT_MAX
/2;
2963 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
2964 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
2965 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
2967 depth
= ctx
->param
->depth
+ 1;
2969 while (search
!= 0) {
2974 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
2975 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
2976 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
2977 * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
2979 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
2980 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
2981 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
2982 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
2983 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
2984 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
2985 * would be a-priori too long.
2987 if ((search
& S_DOTRUSTED
) != 0) {
2988 i
= num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2989 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
2991 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
2992 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
2993 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
2994 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
2995 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
2996 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
2997 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
2998 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
2999 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
3000 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3002 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3003 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3007 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
-1);
3009 ok
= (depth
< num
) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
3012 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3013 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
;
3020 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3021 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
3022 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
3023 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
3024 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
3025 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3026 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3027 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3029 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3030 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
3031 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3033 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3034 OPENSSL_assert(num
> i
&& i
> 0 && ss
== 0);
3035 search
&= ~S_DOALTERNATE
;
3036 for (; num
> i
; --num
)
3037 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
3038 ctx
->num_untrusted
= num
;
3040 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3041 dane
->mdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3043 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
3046 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3047 dane
->pdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3052 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3053 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3056 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
= xtmp
)) {
3058 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3059 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3060 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3064 ss
= cert_self_signed(x
);
3065 } else if (num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3067 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3068 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3069 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3070 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3072 if (X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
) != 0) {
3073 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3078 ctx
->num_untrusted
= --num
;
3079 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, num
, x
= xtmp
);
3084 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3085 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3086 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3087 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3089 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3090 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3091 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3092 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3093 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3094 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3097 OPENSSL_assert(ctx
->num_untrusted
<= num
);
3098 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3099 switch (trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
)) {
3100 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3101 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3111 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3112 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3113 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3114 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3116 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) == 0) {
3117 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3118 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 && --alt_untrusted
> 0)
3120 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3121 if (!may_alternate
|| (search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 ||
3122 ctx
->num_untrusted
< 2)
3124 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3125 search
|= S_DOALTERNATE
;
3126 alt_untrusted
= ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1;
3132 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3134 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3135 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3136 OPENSSL_assert(num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
);
3137 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
-1);
3140 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3141 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3143 xtmp
= (ss
|| depth
< num
) ? NULL
: find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
3145 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3147 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
3151 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3152 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, xtmp
);
3154 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, xtmp
)) {
3155 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3156 trust
= X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
3157 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3162 X509_up_ref(x
= xtmp
);
3163 ++ctx
->num_untrusted
;
3164 ss
= cert_self_signed(xtmp
);
3167 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3169 switch (trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1)) {
3170 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3171 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3177 sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
3180 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3181 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3183 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3185 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane
))
3186 trust
= check_dane_pkeys(ctx
);
3187 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3188 trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
);
3192 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3194 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3195 /* Callback already issued */
3197 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
:
3199 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3201 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3202 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
);
3203 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3204 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || dane
->pdpth
>= 0))
3205 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
3206 if (ss
&& sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
3207 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3208 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
);
3210 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3211 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
);
3212 if (ctx
->num_untrusted
< num
)
3213 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3214 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
);
3215 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
-1,
3216 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
);
3220 static const int minbits_table
[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3221 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
= OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table
);
3224 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3227 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3229 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3231 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
);
3232 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3234 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3240 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3241 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3243 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
) >= minbits_table
[level
- 1];
3247 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3248 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3249 * self-signed or otherwise).
3251 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3253 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3255 int nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(cert
);
3256 int mdnid
= NID_undef
;
3258 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3262 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3263 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3265 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3266 if (nid
&& OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid
, &mdnid
, NULL
)) {
3269 /* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet */
3270 if (mdnid
!= NID_undef
&& (md
= EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid
)) != NULL
)
3271 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
3274 return secbits
>= minbits_table
[level
- 1];