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1 HOWTO proxy certificates
2
3 0. WARNING
4
5 NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAS BEEN CHECKED! The code is just examples to
6 show you how things could be done. There might be typos or type conflicts, and
7 you will have to resolve them.
8
9 1. Introduction
10
11 Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820. They are really usual certificates
12 with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo.
13
14 Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user), either
15 directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by extension through
16 an already issued proxy certificate. Proxy certificates are used to extend
17 rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically, or sometimes to the
18 user itself). This allows the entity to perform operations on behalf of the
19 owner of the EE certificate.
20
21 See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt for more information.
22
23
24 2. A warning about proxy certificates
25
26 No one seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind. To this
27 date, it seems that proxy certificates have only been used in a context highly
28 aware of them.
29
30 Existing applications might misbehave when trying to validate a chain of
31 certificates which use a proxy certificate. They might incorrectly consider the
32 leaf to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, which is controlled
33 by the EE certificate owner.
34
35 subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates, and this
36 is enforced in OpenSSL. The subject must be the same as the issuer, with one
37 commonName added on.
38
39 Possible threats we can think of at this time include:
40
41 - impersonation through commonName (think server certificates).
42 - use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in certain
43 environments, that would grant extra or different authorisation rights.
44
45 For these reasons, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates be
46 explicitly allowed. Currently, this can be done using the following methods:
47
48 - if the application directly calls X509_verify_cert(), it can first call:
49
50 X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
51
52 Where ctx is the pointer which then gets passed to X509_verify_cert().
53
54 - proxy certificate validation can be enabled before starting the application
55 by setting the environment variable OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS.
56
57 In the future, it might be possible to enable proxy certificates by editing
58 openssl.cnf.
59
60
61 3. How to create proxy certificates
62
63 Creating proxy certificates is quite easy, by taking advantage of a lack of
64 checks in the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*). You must first create a
65 configuration section that contains a definition of the proxyCertInfo extension,
66 for example:
67
68 [ v3_proxy ]
69 # A proxy certificate MUST NEVER be a CA certificate.
70 basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
71
72 # Usual authority key ID
73 authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
74
75 # The extension which marks this certificate as a proxy
76 proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB
77
78 It's also possible to specify the proxy extension in a separate section:
79
80 proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext
81
82 [ proxy_ext ]
83 language=id-ppl-anyLanguage
84 pathlen=0
85 policy=text:BC
86
87 The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the syntag
88 determines what will be done with the string. The following syntags are
89 recognised:
90
91 text indicates that the string is simply bytes, without any encoding:
92
93 policy=text:räksmörgås
94
95 Previous versions of this design had a specific tag for UTF-8 text.
96 However, since the bytes are copied as-is anyway, there is no need for
97 such a specific tag.
98
99 hex indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons between each byte
100 (every second hex digit):
101
102 policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73
103
104 Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a complete DER
105 blob. However, the only legal use for this would be to surround the
106 bytes that would go with the hex: tag with whatever is needed to
107 construct a correct OCTET STRING. The DER tag therefore felt
108 superfluous, and was removed.
109
110 file indicates that the text of the policy should really be taken from a
111 file. The string is then really a file name. This is useful for
112 policies that are large (more than a few lines, e.g. XML documents).
113
114 The 'policy' setting can be split up in multiple lines like this:
115
116 0.policy=This is
117 1.polisy= a multi-
118 2.policy=line policy.
119
120 NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part which determines the rights granted to
121 the process using the proxy certificate. The value is completely dependent on
122 the application reading and interpreting it!
123
124 Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy certificate, you
125 can easily create a proxy certificate by doing:
126
127 openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key
128 openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 -out proxy.crt \
129 -CA user.crt -CAkey user.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy
130
131 You can also create a proxy certificate using another proxy certificate as
132 issuer (note: I'm using a different configuration section for it):
133
134 openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key
135 openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 -out proxy2.crt \
136 -CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2
137
138
139 4. How to have your application interpret the policy?
140
141 The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to start with some default rights,
142 then compute the resulting rights by checking the proxy certificate against
143 the chain of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates. You then
144 use the final computed rights. Sounds easy, huh? It almost is.
145
146 The slightly complicated part is figuring out how to pass data between your
147 application and the certificate validation procedure.
148
149 You need the following ingredients:
150
151 - a callback function that will be called for every certificate being
152 validated. The callback be called several times for each certificate,
153 so you must be careful to do the proxy policy interpretation at the right
154 time. You also need to fill in the defaults when the EE certificate is
155 checked.
156
157 - a data structure that is shared between your application code and the
158 callback.
159
160 - a wrapper function that sets it all up.
161
162 - an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic ex_data
163 store that is attached to an X509 validation context.
164
165 Here is some skeleton code you can fill in:
166
167 /* In this example, I will use a view of granted rights as a bit
168 array, one bit for each possible right. */
169 typedef struct your_rights {
170 unsigned char rights[total_rights / 8];
171 } YOUR_RIGHTS;
172
173 /* The following procedure will create an index for the ex_data
174 store in the X509 validation context the first time it's called.
175 Subsequent calls will return the same index. */
176 static int get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(void)
177 {
178 static volatile int idx = -1;
179 if (idx < 0)
180 {
181 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
182 if (idx < 0)
183 {
184 idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
185 "for verify callback",
186 NULL,NULL,NULL);
187 }
188 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
189 }
190 return idx;
191 }
192
193 /* Callback to be given to the X509 validation procedure. */
194 static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
195 {
196 if (ok == 1) /* It's REALLY important you keep the proxy policy
197 check within this section. It's important to know
198 that when ok is 1, the certificates are checked
199 from top to bottom. You get the CA root first,
200 followed by the possible chain of intermediate
201 CAs, followed by the EE certificate, followed by
202 the possible proxy certificates. */
203 {
204 X509 *xs = ctx->current_cert;
205
206 if (xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
207 {
208 YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
209 (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
210 get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx());
211 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci =
212 X509_get_ext_d2i(xs, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL);
213
214 switch (OBJ_obj2nid(pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage))
215 {
216 case NID_Independent:
217 /* Do whatever you need to grant explicit rights to
218 this particular proxy certificate, usually by
219 pulling them from some database. If there are none
220 to be found, clear all rights (making this and any
221 subsequent proxy certificate void of any rights).
222 */
223 memset(rights->rights, 0, sizeof(rights->rights));
224 break;
225 case NID_id_ppl_inheritAll:
226 /* This is basically a NOP, we simply let the current
227 rights stand as they are. */
228 break;
229 default:
230 /* This is usually the most complex section of code.
231 You really do whatever you want as long as you
232 follow RFC 3820. In the example we use here, the
233 simplest thing to do is to build another, temporary
234 bit array and fill it with the rights granted by
235 the current proxy certificate, then use it as a
236 mask on the accumulated rights bit array, and
237 voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit
238 array. */
239 {
240 int i;
241 YOUR_RIGHTS tmp_rights;
242 memset(tmp_rights.rights, 0, sizeof(tmp_rights.rights));
243
244 /* process_rights() is supposed to be a procedure
245 that takes a string and it's length, interprets
246 it and sets the bits in the YOUR_RIGHTS pointed
247 at by the third argument. */
248 process_rights((char *) pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data,
249 pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length,
250 &tmp_rights);
251
252 for(i = 0; i < total_rights / 8; i++)
253 rights->rights[i] &= tmp_rights.rights[i];
254 }
255 break;
256 }
257 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
258 }
259 else if (!(xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA))
260 {
261 /* We have a EE certificate, let's use it to set default!
262 */
263 YOUR_RIGHTS *rights =
264 (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
265 get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx());
266
267 /* The following procedure finds out what rights the owner
268 of the current certificate has, and sets them in the
269 YOUR_RIGHTS structure pointed at by the second
270 argument. */
271 set_default_rights(xs, rights);
272 }
273 }
274 return ok;
275 }
276
277 static int my_X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
278 YOUR_RIGHTS *needed_rights)
279 {
280 int i;
281 int (*save_verify_cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
282 YOUR_RIGHTS rights;
283
284 X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_callback);
285 X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(), &rights);
286 X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
287 ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
288
289 if (ok == 1)
290 {
291 ok = check_needed_rights(rights, needed_rights);
292 }
293
294 X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, save_verify_cb);
295
296 return ok;
297 }
298
299 If you use SSL or TLS, you can easily set up a callback to have the
300 certificates checked properly, using the code above:
301
302 SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, my_X509_verify_cert, &needed_rights);
303
304
305 --
306 Richard Levitte