2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
17 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
19 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
20 #include "crypto/random.h"
21 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
22 #include "ap_config.h"
23 #include "ieee802_11.h"
25 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
26 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
27 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
29 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
30 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
31 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
34 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
35 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
36 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
38 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
39 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
40 struct wpa_group
*group
);
41 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
42 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
43 struct wpa_group
*group
);
44 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
45 struct wpa_group
*group
);
46 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
47 const u8
*pmk
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
);
49 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
= 4;
50 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
= 4;
51 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
52 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
53 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
55 /* TODO: make these configurable */
56 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
57 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
58 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
61 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
62 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
64 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report
)
65 return wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
70 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
71 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
74 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol
)
75 wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
79 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
80 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
82 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol
== NULL
)
84 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
);
88 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
90 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
93 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk
== NULL
)
95 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
100 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
101 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
103 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
== NULL
)
105 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
109 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
111 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
112 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
114 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key
== NULL
)
116 return wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
121 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
122 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
124 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum
== NULL
)
126 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
131 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
132 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
134 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol
== NULL
)
136 return wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
142 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
145 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.start_ampe
== NULL
)
147 return wpa_auth
->cb
.start_ampe(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
149 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
152 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
153 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
156 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta
== NULL
)
158 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
162 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
163 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
166 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth
== NULL
)
168 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
172 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
173 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
175 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
177 wpa_auth
->cb
.logger(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
181 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
182 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
188 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
191 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
192 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
197 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
200 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
206 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
209 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect
== NULL
)
211 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(addr
));
212 wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
,
213 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
217 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
220 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
221 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
223 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
224 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
225 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
227 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
228 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
)
234 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
236 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
238 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
239 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
242 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
243 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
244 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
247 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
248 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
249 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
254 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
256 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
257 struct wpa_group
*group
;
259 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
260 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
) {
261 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
263 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
264 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
265 } while (group
->changed
);
268 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
269 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
270 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
275 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
277 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
278 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
280 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
281 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
286 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
288 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
294 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
297 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
298 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
302 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
303 struct wpa_group
*group
)
305 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
309 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
311 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
314 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
315 * Local MAC Address || Time)
317 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
318 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
319 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
320 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
321 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
324 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
325 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
327 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
328 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
334 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
335 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
337 struct wpa_group
*group
;
339 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
343 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
344 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
345 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
347 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
348 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
349 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
350 "the first station connects");
354 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
355 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
356 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
357 * on embedded devices.
359 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
360 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
368 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
369 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
370 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
372 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
373 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
374 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
382 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
383 * @addr: Authenticator address
384 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
385 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
386 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
388 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
389 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
390 struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
)
392 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
394 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
395 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
397 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
398 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
399 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->cb
, cb
, sizeof(*cb
));
401 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
402 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
407 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
408 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
409 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
414 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
416 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
417 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
418 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
419 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
424 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
425 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
426 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
427 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
428 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
429 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
430 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
434 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
436 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
437 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
438 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
441 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
442 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
443 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
447 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
448 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
449 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
453 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
455 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
461 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
463 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
465 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
467 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
468 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
469 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
470 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
477 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
478 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
480 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
482 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
484 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
485 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
487 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
488 while (wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
)
489 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
);
490 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
492 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
494 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
495 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
496 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
497 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
500 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
501 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
504 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
506 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
518 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
519 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
520 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
522 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
523 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
525 struct wpa_group
*group
;
526 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
529 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
530 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
531 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
536 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
539 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
540 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
542 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
543 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
544 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
550 struct wpa_state_machine
*
551 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
552 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
554 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
556 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
559 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
562 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
564 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
566 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
567 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
573 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
574 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
576 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
579 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
580 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
581 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
582 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
583 "start 4-way handshake");
584 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
585 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
588 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
591 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
592 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
593 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
596 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
597 "start authentication");
601 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
602 return 1; /* should not really happen */
604 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
605 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
609 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
611 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
612 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
613 * STA has not yet been removed. */
617 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
621 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
624 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
626 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
627 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
628 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
629 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
631 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
632 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
633 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
635 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
636 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
637 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
638 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
640 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
641 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
642 wpabuf_free(sm
->ft_pending_req_ies
);
643 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
644 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
650 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
655 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
656 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
657 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
659 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
660 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
664 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
665 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
666 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
667 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
668 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
669 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
670 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
671 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
672 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
673 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
679 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
684 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
689 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
690 const u8
*replay_counter
)
693 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
696 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
697 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
704 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
705 const u8
*replay_counter
)
708 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
710 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
711 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
712 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
713 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
718 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
719 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
720 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
721 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
723 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
724 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
726 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
727 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
728 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
729 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
733 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
734 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
735 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
737 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
738 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
739 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
743 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
744 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
745 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
746 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
747 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
751 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
752 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
753 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
754 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
755 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
756 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
757 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
758 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
759 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
765 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
768 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
769 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
771 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
772 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
773 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
774 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
777 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
778 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
779 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
780 "group cipher is not TKIP");
781 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
782 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
783 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
784 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
786 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
787 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
788 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
789 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
793 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
794 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
796 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
801 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*data
,
806 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
809 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
810 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
811 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
817 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, pmk
, &PTK
);
819 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
, data
, data_len
)
825 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
830 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
831 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
835 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
836 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
837 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= 0;
838 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
839 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
840 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
846 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
847 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
848 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
850 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
851 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
852 struct wpa_eapol_key_192
*key192
;
853 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
854 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
855 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
857 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
859 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
, *key_data
;
860 size_t eapol_key_ie_len
, keyhdrlen
, mic_len
;
862 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
865 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
866 keyhdrlen
= mic_len
== 24 ? sizeof(*key192
) : sizeof(*key
);
868 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + keyhdrlen
)
871 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
872 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
873 key192
= (struct wpa_eapol_key_192
*) (hdr
+ 1);
874 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
876 key_data
= (const u8
*) (key192
+ 1);
877 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(key192
->key_data_length
);
879 key_data
= (const u8
*) (key
+ 1);
880 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_data_length
);
882 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
883 " key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u",
884 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
, key_data_length
);
885 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - keyhdrlen
) {
886 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
887 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
889 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
894 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
895 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
897 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
898 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
900 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
901 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
902 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
903 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
904 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
909 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
910 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
911 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
917 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
919 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
920 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
922 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
925 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
926 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
927 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
929 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
934 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
937 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
940 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
942 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
943 } else if (key_data_length
== 0) {
945 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
948 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
951 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
952 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
954 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
955 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
956 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
957 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
958 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
&&
959 !wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
960 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
961 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
963 "advertised support for "
964 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
969 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
970 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
971 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
973 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
979 if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
980 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
) {
981 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
982 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
987 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
988 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
989 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
990 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
991 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
992 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
998 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
999 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
1002 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1003 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1004 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1005 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1006 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
1009 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1010 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1011 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1012 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1013 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1015 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1016 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1017 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1019 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
1020 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_SNonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1021 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= TRUE
;
1022 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1023 sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1024 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1025 goto continue_processing
;
1028 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_4
&& sm
->alt_snonce_valid
&&
1029 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1030 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1031 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0) {
1033 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1034 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1035 * different SNonce values.
1037 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1038 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1039 goto continue_processing
;
1042 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1043 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1044 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1045 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
1046 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1047 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1048 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
1050 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1051 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1052 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
1054 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
1055 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
1057 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
1058 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1059 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1061 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
1062 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1066 continue_processing
:
1069 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
1070 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
1071 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
1072 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
1073 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1074 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1075 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1079 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1080 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
1082 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1083 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1084 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1085 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1086 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1087 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1090 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1091 "collect more entropy for random number "
1093 random_mark_pool_ready();
1094 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1097 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
1098 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1099 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with "
1100 "invalid Key Data contents");
1104 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
1105 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
1106 } else if (kde
.osen
) {
1107 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.osen
;
1108 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.osen_len
;
1110 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
1111 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
1113 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
1114 wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
1115 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
1116 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
,
1117 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
1118 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
1119 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1120 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not "
1121 "match with msg 2/4");
1123 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
1124 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
1126 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
1127 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
1128 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
1129 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1132 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1133 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
1134 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1137 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1139 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
1140 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
1142 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: IP address requested in "
1143 "EAPOL-Key exchange");
1144 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
1146 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.
1148 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
1149 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
1150 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Assigned IP "
1151 "address %u.%u.%u.%u to " MACSTR
,
1152 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
1153 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
1157 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
1160 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1162 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1163 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1164 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1170 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1171 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1172 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1173 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1174 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1175 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1179 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1183 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1184 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1185 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1188 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1189 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1190 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1191 "invalid state - dropped");
1195 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1199 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1200 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1205 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1206 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1208 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1209 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1210 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1214 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1215 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1216 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1220 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1221 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1222 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &sm
->PTK
, data
,
1224 (msg
!= PAIRWISE_4
|| !sm
->alt_snonce_valid
||
1225 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm
, data
, data_len
))) {
1226 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1227 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1230 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1231 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1232 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1235 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1236 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1237 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1238 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1239 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1241 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1242 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1248 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1249 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1250 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1252 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1253 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1254 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1255 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1257 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1258 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1260 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1261 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1262 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1263 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1264 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1266 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1267 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1268 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1269 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
,
1271 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1272 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1273 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
,
1277 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1278 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1280 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1281 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1284 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1285 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1286 key
->replay_counter
);
1288 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1290 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1291 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1292 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1293 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1294 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1296 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1297 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1299 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1300 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1304 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1305 * do not get copied again.
1307 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1310 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1311 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1312 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1315 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1317 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1318 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_malloc(data_len
);
1319 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1321 os_memcpy(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
, data
, data_len
);
1322 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1324 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1325 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1326 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1327 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1328 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1333 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1334 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1336 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1340 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1341 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1342 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1343 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1344 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1347 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1348 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1349 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1350 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1352 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1355 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1356 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1357 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1358 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1361 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1367 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1369 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1370 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1372 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1373 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1374 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1379 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1380 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1381 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1382 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1383 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1385 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1386 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1387 struct wpa_eapol_key_192
*key192
;
1388 size_t len
, mic_len
, keyhdrlen
;
1390 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1392 int version
, pairwise
;
1396 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
1397 keyhdrlen
= mic_len
== 24 ? sizeof(*key192
) : sizeof(*key
);
1399 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + keyhdrlen
;
1402 version
= force_version
;
1403 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1404 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1405 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
;
1406 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1407 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1408 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1409 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1411 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1413 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1415 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1416 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1419 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1420 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1421 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1422 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1423 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1425 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1427 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1428 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1429 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1430 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1431 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1433 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1434 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1437 len
+= key_data_len
;
1439 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1442 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1443 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1444 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1445 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1446 key192
= (struct wpa_eapol_key_192
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1447 key_data
= ((u8
*) (hdr
+ 1)) + keyhdrlen
;
1449 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1450 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1451 key_info
|= version
;
1452 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1453 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1454 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1455 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1456 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1458 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1459 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1460 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
)
1461 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1463 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1464 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1465 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1466 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1467 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1468 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1470 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1471 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1472 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1473 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1474 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1475 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1478 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1481 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1484 os_memcpy(key_data
, kde
, kde_len
);
1486 WPA_PUT_BE16(key192
->key_data_length
, kde_len
);
1488 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, kde_len
);
1489 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1490 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1496 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1502 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1504 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1505 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1506 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1507 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1508 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
1509 (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
, key_data
)) {
1515 WPA_PUT_BE16(key192
->key_data_length
,
1518 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
,
1520 } else if (sm
->PTK
.kek_len
== 16) {
1522 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1523 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1524 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1525 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1526 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1527 os_memcpy(key_data
, buf
, key_data_len
);
1528 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, key_data
, key_data_len
);
1530 WPA_PUT_BE16(key192
->key_data_length
,
1533 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
,
1543 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1546 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1547 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1548 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1554 key_mic
= key192
->key_mic
; /* same offset for key and key192 */
1555 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
1556 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, version
,
1557 (u8
*) hdr
, len
, key_mic
);
1558 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1560 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0 &&
1562 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1563 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1564 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1567 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1570 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1572 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1578 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1579 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1580 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1581 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1582 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1585 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1591 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1594 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1595 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1596 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1597 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1599 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1600 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1601 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1602 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1603 "counter %d)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1604 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1605 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1609 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
1612 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1613 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1614 struct wpa_eapol_key_192
*key192
;
1617 u8 mic
[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN
];
1618 size_t mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(akmp
);
1620 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1623 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1624 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1625 key192
= (struct wpa_eapol_key_192
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1626 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1627 os_memcpy(mic
, key192
->key_mic
, mic_len
);
1628 os_memset(key192
->key_mic
, 0, mic_len
);
1629 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, PTK
->kck_len
, akmp
,
1630 key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1631 data
, data_len
, key192
->key_mic
) ||
1632 os_memcmp_const(mic
, key192
->key_mic
, mic_len
) != 0)
1634 os_memcpy(key192
->key_mic
, mic
, mic_len
);
1639 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1641 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1642 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1643 wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
, 0);
1644 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1645 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1649 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, wpa_event event
)
1656 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1657 "event %d notification", event
);
1662 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1663 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
)) {
1668 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1673 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1676 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1679 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1680 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1681 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1682 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1683 * properly at this point.
1685 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1686 "started - initialize now");
1689 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1690 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1692 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1695 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1697 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1698 * update for this STA.
1700 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1701 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1702 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1704 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1707 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1708 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1709 "after association");
1710 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1712 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1713 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1715 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1717 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1720 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1721 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1722 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1724 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1725 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1727 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1730 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1731 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1733 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1737 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1741 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1743 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1745 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1746 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1747 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1751 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1752 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1753 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1754 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1755 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1756 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1757 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1760 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1762 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1764 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1765 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1766 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1771 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1773 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1774 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1775 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1779 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1781 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1782 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1786 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1788 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1789 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1790 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1791 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1793 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1794 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1798 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1799 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1801 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1804 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1805 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1806 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1807 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1808 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1810 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1812 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1813 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1814 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1815 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1817 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1818 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1821 wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
);
1822 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
1823 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
1827 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1829 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1831 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1832 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1835 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1836 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1837 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1838 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1839 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1840 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1841 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1843 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1844 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1846 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1849 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1851 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1852 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1853 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1859 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1861 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1862 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1864 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1865 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1867 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1869 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1870 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
1871 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1872 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1873 "(len=%lu)", (unsigned long) len
);
1874 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, PMK_LEN
);
1875 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1876 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1877 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1878 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1880 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1882 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
1883 sm
->wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
);
1885 os_memset(msk
, 0, sizeof(msk
));
1887 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1888 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1889 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1890 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1891 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1892 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1893 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1894 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1895 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1896 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1900 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1903 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1904 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
);
1906 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1907 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1908 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1909 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1910 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1912 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1916 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
1918 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
1919 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
1921 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
1922 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
1923 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1924 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= FALSE
;
1927 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1928 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1929 * immediately following this. */
1933 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1934 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1936 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
1937 * one possible PSK for this STA.
1939 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
1940 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1941 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
1943 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1944 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
1945 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1946 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
1948 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1949 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
1950 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1951 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
1955 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
1956 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
1958 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, PMK_LEN
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
1959 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1960 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
1963 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
1964 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
1965 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
1969 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
1970 const u8
*pmk
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
1972 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1973 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1974 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
);
1975 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1977 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, "Pairwise key expansion",
1978 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, snonce
,
1979 ptk
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
1983 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
1987 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
1989 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
1990 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
1991 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
1993 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
1994 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
1997 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1998 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1999 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
2005 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->SNonce
, pmk
, &PTK
);
2007 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
,
2008 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2009 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
2014 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2019 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2020 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2024 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2025 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2027 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2028 * with the value we derived.
2030 if (os_memcmp_const(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2031 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
2032 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2033 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
2035 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
2037 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2038 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
2039 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2043 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2045 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
2046 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2048 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2049 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
2050 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
2052 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
2055 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
2057 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
2058 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2062 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
2064 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
2069 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2071 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2073 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
2075 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2076 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
;
2083 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2085 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
2086 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2087 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2088 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2090 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
2093 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
2095 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
2096 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
2097 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2099 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2100 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2101 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2103 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
2106 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, len
) < 0)
2109 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
2110 (const u8
*) &igtk
, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
,
2116 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2118 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2124 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2129 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2132 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
2134 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2135 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
2136 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2138 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
2140 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2141 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2144 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2145 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2146 * immediately following this. */
2150 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
2151 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
2153 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2154 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2155 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
2156 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
2157 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
2158 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
2159 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
2160 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
2161 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
2162 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2163 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
2164 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2165 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2167 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2168 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2169 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2170 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2172 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2173 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2174 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2176 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2177 * of GTK in the BSS.
2179 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
2187 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2193 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
2195 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2196 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2197 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2198 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2199 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2200 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2202 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2203 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2204 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2209 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2211 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
2212 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2213 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2214 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2215 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2217 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2219 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
2220 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
2221 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2222 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2227 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
2229 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2230 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2231 int res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, pos
- kde
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
2233 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
2234 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2240 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2243 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
2245 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2248 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2250 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2251 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2253 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2255 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2256 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2257 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2258 NULL
, NULL
, pos
, kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2261 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2262 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2268 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2269 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2271 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
2272 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
2275 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2276 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2278 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
2279 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
2282 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2284 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
2286 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
2287 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
2288 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
2289 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
2290 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
2292 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2294 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2295 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2296 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
2297 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
2298 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
2303 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
2305 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
2306 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2308 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2309 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2310 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2311 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2312 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2315 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2316 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
2318 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
2319 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2320 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
2321 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
2325 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2326 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2327 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
2331 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2333 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
2334 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2335 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
2338 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
2341 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
2342 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
2343 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2344 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
2347 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2348 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2349 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2351 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2352 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2353 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2359 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2362 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2363 else if (sm
->Disconnect
2364 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2365 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2366 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2367 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2369 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
2370 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2371 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
2372 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
2373 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
2374 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2375 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
2376 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2377 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
2378 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
2380 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
2381 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2383 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
2384 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2386 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
2387 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2389 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
2390 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2391 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2392 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
2393 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
2394 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)
2395 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2396 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
2398 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
2399 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2400 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0)
2401 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2403 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2404 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2405 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2406 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2409 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
2410 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
2412 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2414 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2415 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2416 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2417 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2420 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
2421 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2422 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2423 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2424 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2425 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2426 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2427 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2428 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2429 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2430 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2431 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2432 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2434 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
2435 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
2436 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
2437 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2438 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2439 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2440 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2441 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2443 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
2444 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2446 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
2447 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
2448 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2449 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2450 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2451 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
2452 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2453 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2454 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2455 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2456 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
2458 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2459 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2460 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2461 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2463 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
2469 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
2471 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2473 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
2474 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
2475 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2477 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2481 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
2483 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2484 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2486 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
2488 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2490 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2493 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
) {
2494 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2495 * immediately following this. */
2499 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2500 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
2501 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2502 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
2503 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2504 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
2505 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2506 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2507 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
2509 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2510 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2512 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2513 * of GTK in the BSS.
2515 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2519 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2520 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
2521 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2522 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2523 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
2526 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
2527 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2529 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2531 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2532 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
2535 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2538 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2539 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2541 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
2542 rsc
, gsm
->GNonce
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
2548 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
2550 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2551 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2552 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2553 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2554 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2555 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2556 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2557 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2558 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
2559 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2564 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
2566 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2567 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2568 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2569 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2570 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2574 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
2576 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
2577 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2578 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
2579 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
2580 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
2581 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
2582 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
2583 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2585 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
2586 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2587 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2588 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
2589 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
2590 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
)
2591 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
2592 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2593 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2595 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
2596 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2598 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
2599 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2605 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2606 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2610 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2611 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2612 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
2613 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2614 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2616 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
2617 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
2619 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2620 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
2622 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2623 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2624 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2625 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
2626 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2627 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
2629 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
2630 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2632 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2638 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2639 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2641 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2642 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2643 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
2644 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
2647 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
2650 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2653 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2654 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
2655 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2659 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
2661 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
2664 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
2665 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2666 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
2667 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2670 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
2672 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
2673 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
2674 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
2676 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2677 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
2678 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
2681 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
2682 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2685 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
2686 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
2694 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
2695 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2697 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2700 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
2704 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
2707 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
2711 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2713 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2718 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
2721 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
2722 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
2723 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
2724 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
2726 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
2727 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
2730 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
2731 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2733 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2735 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2736 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
2742 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2743 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2745 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2747 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2751 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
2753 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
2754 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + len
;
2755 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
2757 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
2761 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2764 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2766 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2767 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2771 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2772 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
2775 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2776 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2780 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2781 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2782 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2783 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
2784 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
2786 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2788 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2789 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2790 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2791 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2792 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2793 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
2794 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
2795 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
2796 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2798 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
2799 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
2800 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
2801 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2802 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
2804 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
2805 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
2806 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2810 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2811 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2815 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
2816 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
2817 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
2818 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2821 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2822 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
2826 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2827 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2830 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, alg
,
2831 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
2832 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
2835 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2841 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
2843 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
2844 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
2845 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
2847 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2854 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2855 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2857 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
2858 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2859 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
2860 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
2864 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2865 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2867 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2868 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2869 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2870 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
2872 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
2873 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
2881 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2882 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2885 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
2886 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
2887 /* Do not allow group operations */
2888 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
2889 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
2890 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2891 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
2893 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2894 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
2895 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
2896 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2897 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
2898 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2903 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2908 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
2909 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
2910 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
2911 * recursive call. */
2912 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
2916 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
2918 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2921 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2922 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
2924 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
2925 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2927 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
2928 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2930 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
2931 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
2932 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
2934 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
2935 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
2936 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
2937 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
2944 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
2946 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
2951 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2955 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
2959 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
2962 struct wpa_group
*group
;
2964 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2967 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
2969 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
2971 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2973 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2974 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2975 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2976 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2977 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2978 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2979 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2984 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int bool)
2986 return bool ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
2990 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
2991 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
2992 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
2994 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
2997 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
2998 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
2999 const int preauth
= 1;
3000 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3001 const int preauth
= 0;
3002 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3004 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3007 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3008 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
3009 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
3010 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
3011 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
3012 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
3013 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
3014 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
3015 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3019 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
3020 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
3023 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3024 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
3025 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
3026 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
3027 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
3028 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
3029 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
3030 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
3031 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
3032 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
3033 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
3034 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
3035 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
3036 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
3037 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
3038 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3039 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3040 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3041 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
3042 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3043 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3044 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3045 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
3046 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
3047 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
3049 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
3050 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
,
3051 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
,
3052 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
3053 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
3054 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
3055 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
3056 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
3057 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
3058 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
3060 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
3061 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
3062 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
3063 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
3064 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
3065 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3069 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
3070 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
3073 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
3074 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
3075 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3083 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3091 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
3093 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
3095 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
3096 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
3102 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3103 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
3104 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
3105 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
3106 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3107 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
3108 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
3109 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
3110 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
3111 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
3112 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
3114 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
3115 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
3116 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
3117 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3122 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3123 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
3124 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
3126 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
3127 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3135 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3138 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
3142 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3144 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
3148 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3150 return sm
->pairwise
;
3154 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3158 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
3162 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3170 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3171 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3173 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
3180 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3181 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3183 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
3187 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3190 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
3194 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
3196 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3198 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3199 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3203 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
3204 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3206 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
3207 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3210 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
,
3211 sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
3212 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
3213 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3220 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3221 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3222 int session_timeout
,
3223 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3225 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3228 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
,
3231 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
3232 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
3239 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
3242 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3245 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
,
3247 wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, 0, NULL
,
3255 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3258 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
3260 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
3262 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
3264 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
3265 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
3266 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
3271 static struct wpa_group
*
3272 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3274 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3276 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
3279 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3281 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
3285 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
3286 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
3292 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
3294 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3296 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3299 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
3301 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3303 group
= group
->next
;
3306 if (group
== NULL
) {
3307 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
3312 if (sm
->group
== group
)
3315 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
3318 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
3319 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
3326 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3327 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
3329 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
3331 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
3332 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
3333 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
3335 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
3336 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
3337 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
3338 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
3339 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
3340 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
3341 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
3342 * the station has received the frame.
3344 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
3345 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
3346 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
3348 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3349 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
3350 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
3351 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3356 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3360 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
3364 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3368 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
3373 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
3375 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
3377 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
3380 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
3383 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3384 struct radius_das_attrs
*attr
)
3386 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, attr
);