2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2011, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
15 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
16 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
17 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
19 #include "crypto/random.h"
20 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
21 #include "ap_config.h"
22 #include "ieee802_11.h"
24 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
25 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
26 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
28 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
29 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
30 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
33 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
34 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
35 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
, size_t data_len
);
36 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
37 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
38 struct wpa_group
*group
);
39 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
40 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
41 struct wpa_group
*group
);
42 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
43 struct wpa_group
*group
);
45 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
= 4;
46 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
= 4;
47 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
48 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
49 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
51 /* TODO: make these configurable */
52 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
53 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
54 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
57 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
58 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
60 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report
)
61 return wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
66 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
67 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
70 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol
)
71 wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
75 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
76 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
78 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol
== NULL
)
80 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
);
84 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
85 const u8
*addr
, const u8
*prev_psk
)
87 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk
== NULL
)
89 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, prev_psk
);
93 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
94 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
96 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
== NULL
)
98 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
102 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
104 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
105 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
107 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key
== NULL
)
109 return wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
114 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
115 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
117 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum
== NULL
)
119 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
124 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
125 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
127 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol
== NULL
)
129 return wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
134 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
135 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
138 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta
== NULL
)
140 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
144 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
145 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
148 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth
== NULL
)
150 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
154 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
155 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
157 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
159 wpa_auth
->cb
.logger(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
163 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
164 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
170 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
173 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
174 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
179 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
182 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
188 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
191 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect
== NULL
)
193 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(addr
));
194 wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
,
195 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
199 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
202 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
203 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
205 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
206 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
207 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
209 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
214 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
216 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
218 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
219 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
222 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
223 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
224 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
227 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
228 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
229 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
234 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
236 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
237 struct wpa_group
*group
;
239 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
240 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
) {
241 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
243 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
244 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
245 } while (group
->changed
);
248 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
249 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
250 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
255 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
257 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
258 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
260 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
261 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
266 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
268 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
274 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
277 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
278 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
282 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
283 struct wpa_group
*group
)
285 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(group
)];
288 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
290 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
293 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
294 * Local MAC Address || Time)
296 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
297 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
298 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &group
, sizeof(group
));
299 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
302 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
303 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
305 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
306 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
312 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
313 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
315 struct wpa_group
*group
;
317 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
321 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
322 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
323 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
325 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
326 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
327 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
328 "the first station connects");
332 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
333 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
334 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
335 * on embedded devices.
337 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
338 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
346 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
347 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
348 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
350 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
351 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
352 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
360 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
361 * @addr: Authenticator address
362 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
363 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
364 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
366 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
367 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
368 struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
)
370 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
372 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
373 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
375 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
376 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
377 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->cb
, cb
, sizeof(*cb
));
379 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
380 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
385 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
386 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
387 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
392 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
394 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
395 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
396 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
401 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
402 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
403 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
404 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
405 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
406 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
410 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
412 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
413 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
414 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
417 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
418 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
419 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
426 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
428 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
430 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
432 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
433 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
434 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
440 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
441 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
443 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
445 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
447 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
448 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
450 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
451 while (wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
)
452 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
);
453 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
455 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
457 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
458 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
459 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
460 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
462 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
464 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
476 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
477 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
478 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
480 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
481 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
483 struct wpa_group
*group
;
484 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
487 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
488 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
489 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
494 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
497 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
498 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
500 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
501 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
502 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
508 struct wpa_state_machine
*
509 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
511 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
513 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
516 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
518 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
519 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
525 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
526 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
528 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
531 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
532 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
533 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
534 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
535 "start 4-way handshake");
538 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
541 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
542 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
543 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
546 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
547 "start authentication");
551 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
552 return 1; /* should not really happen */
554 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
555 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
559 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
561 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
562 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
563 * STA has not yet been removed. */
567 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
571 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
573 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
574 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
575 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
577 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
578 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
579 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
580 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
586 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
591 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
592 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
593 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
595 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
596 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
600 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
601 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
602 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
603 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
604 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
605 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
606 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
607 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
608 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
609 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
615 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
620 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
625 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
626 const u8
*replay_counter
)
629 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
632 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
633 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
640 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
641 const u8
*replay_counter
)
644 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
646 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
647 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
648 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
649 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
654 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
655 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
656 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
657 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
659 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
660 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
662 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
663 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
664 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
665 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
669 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
670 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
671 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
673 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
674 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
675 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
679 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
680 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
681 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
682 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
683 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
687 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
688 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
689 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
690 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
691 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
692 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
693 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
694 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
695 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
701 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
704 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
705 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
707 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
708 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
709 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
710 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
713 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
714 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
715 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
716 "group cipher is not TKIP");
717 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
718 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
719 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
720 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
722 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
723 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
724 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
725 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
729 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
730 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
732 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
737 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
738 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
739 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
741 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
742 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
743 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
744 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
745 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
747 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
749 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
;
750 size_t eapol_key_ie_len
;
752 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
755 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
758 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
759 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
760 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
761 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_data_length
);
762 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
763 " key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u",
764 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
, key_data_length
);
765 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
)) {
766 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
767 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
769 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
774 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
775 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
777 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
778 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
780 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
781 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
782 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
783 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
784 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
789 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
790 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
791 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
797 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
799 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
800 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
802 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
805 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
806 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
807 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
809 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
814 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
817 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
820 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
822 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
823 } else if (key_data_length
== 0) {
825 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
828 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
831 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
832 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
834 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
835 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
836 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
837 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
838 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
839 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
841 "advertised support for "
842 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
847 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
848 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
849 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
851 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
858 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
859 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
860 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
861 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
862 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
863 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
869 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
870 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
873 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
874 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
875 key
->replay_counter
) &&
876 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
877 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
880 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
881 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
882 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
883 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
884 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
886 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
887 "Process SNonce update from STA "
888 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
890 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
891 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
892 key
->replay_counter
);
893 goto continue_processing
;
896 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
897 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
898 key
->replay_counter
) &&
899 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
900 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
901 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
902 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
904 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
905 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
906 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
908 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
909 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
911 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
912 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
913 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
915 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
916 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
923 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
924 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
925 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
926 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
927 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
928 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
929 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
933 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
934 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
936 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
937 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
938 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
939 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
940 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
941 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
944 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
945 "collect more entropy for random number "
947 random_mark_pool_ready();
948 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
951 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies((u8
*) (key
+ 1), key_data_length
,
953 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
954 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with "
955 "invalid Key Data contents");
959 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
960 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
962 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
963 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
965 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
966 wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
967 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
968 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
,
969 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
970 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
971 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
972 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not "
973 "match with msg 2/4");
975 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
976 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
978 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
979 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
980 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
981 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
984 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
985 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
986 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
989 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
992 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
994 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
995 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
996 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1002 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1003 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1004 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1005 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1006 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1007 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1011 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1015 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1016 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1017 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1020 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1021 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1022 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1023 "invalid state - dropped");
1027 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1031 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1032 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1037 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1038 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1040 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1041 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1042 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1046 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1047 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1048 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1052 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1053 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1054 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
)) {
1055 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1056 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1059 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1060 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1061 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1064 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1065 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1066 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1067 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1068 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1070 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1071 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1077 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1078 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1079 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1081 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1082 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1083 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1084 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1086 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1087 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1089 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1090 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1091 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1092 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1093 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1095 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1096 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1097 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1098 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1099 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1100 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1101 wpa_parse_kde_ies((const u8
*) (key
+ 1),
1102 key_data_length
, &kde
) == 0 &&
1105 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1106 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1108 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1109 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1112 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1113 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1114 key
->replay_counter
);
1116 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1118 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1119 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1120 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1121 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1122 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1124 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1125 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1127 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1128 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1132 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1133 * do not get copied again.
1135 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1138 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1139 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1140 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
);
1143 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1145 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1146 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_malloc(data_len
);
1147 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1149 os_memcpy(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
, data
, data_len
);
1150 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1152 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1153 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1154 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1155 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1156 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1161 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1162 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1164 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1168 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1169 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1170 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1171 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1172 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1175 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1176 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1177 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1178 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1180 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1183 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1184 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1185 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1186 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1189 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1195 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1197 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1198 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1200 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1201 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1202 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1207 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1208 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1209 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1210 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1211 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1213 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1214 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1217 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1219 int version
, pairwise
;
1222 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + sizeof(struct wpa_eapol_key
);
1225 version
= force_version
;
1226 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1227 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1228 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1229 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1231 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1233 pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1235 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1236 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1239 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1240 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1241 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1242 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1243 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1245 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1247 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1248 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1249 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1251 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1252 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1255 len
+= key_data_len
;
1257 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1260 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1261 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1262 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1263 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1265 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1266 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1267 key_info
|= version
;
1268 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1269 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1270 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1271 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1272 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1274 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1275 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1276 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
)
1277 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1279 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1280 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1281 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1282 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1283 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1284 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1286 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1287 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1288 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1289 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1292 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1295 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1298 os_memcpy(key
+ 1, kde
, kde_len
);
1299 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, kde_len
);
1300 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1301 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1307 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1313 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1315 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1316 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1317 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
,
1318 (u8
*) (key
+ 1))) {
1323 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, key_data_len
);
1326 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1327 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1328 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1329 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1330 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, 16);
1331 os_memcpy(key
+ 1, buf
, key_data_len
);
1332 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, (u8
*) (key
+ 1), key_data_len
);
1333 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_data_length
, key_data_len
);
1338 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1339 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1340 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1341 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1346 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, version
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1350 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1352 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1358 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1359 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1360 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1361 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1362 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1365 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1371 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1374 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1375 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1376 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1377 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1379 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1380 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1381 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1382 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1383 "counter %d)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1384 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1385 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1389 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
1391 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1392 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1397 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1400 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1401 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1402 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1403 os_memcpy(mic
, key
->key_mic
, 16);
1404 os_memset(key
->key_mic
, 0, 16);
1405 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1406 data
, data_len
, key
->key_mic
) ||
1407 os_memcmp(mic
, key
->key_mic
, 16) != 0)
1409 os_memcpy(key
->key_mic
, mic
, 16);
1414 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1416 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1417 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1418 wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
, 0);
1419 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1420 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1424 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, wpa_event event
)
1431 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1432 "event %d notification", event
);
1440 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1443 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1446 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1447 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1448 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1449 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1450 * properly at this point.
1452 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1453 "started - initialize now");
1456 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1457 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1459 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1462 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1464 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1465 * update for this STA.
1467 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1468 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1469 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1471 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1474 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1475 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1476 "after association");
1477 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1479 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1480 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1482 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1484 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1487 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1488 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1489 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1491 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1492 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1494 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1497 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1498 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1500 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1504 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1508 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1510 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1512 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1513 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1514 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1518 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1519 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1520 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1521 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1522 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1523 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1524 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1527 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1529 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1531 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1532 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1533 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1538 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1540 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1541 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1542 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1546 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1548 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1549 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1553 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1555 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1556 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1557 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1558 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1560 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1561 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1565 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1566 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1568 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1571 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1572 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1573 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1574 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1575 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1577 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1579 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1580 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1581 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1582 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1584 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1585 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1588 wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
);
1589 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
1590 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
1594 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1596 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1598 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1601 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1602 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1603 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1604 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1605 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1606 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1607 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1609 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1610 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1612 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1615 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1617 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1618 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1619 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1620 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1626 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1628 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1629 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1631 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1632 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1634 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1636 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1637 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
1638 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1639 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1640 "(len=%lu)", (unsigned long) len
);
1641 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, PMK_LEN
);
1642 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1643 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1644 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1645 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1647 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1649 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK");
1652 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1653 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1654 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1655 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1656 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1657 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1658 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1659 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1660 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1661 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1665 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1668 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1669 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, NULL
);
1671 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1672 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1673 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1674 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1675 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1677 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1681 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
1683 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
1684 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
1686 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
1687 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
1688 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1691 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1692 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1693 * immediately following this. */
1697 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1698 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1700 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
1701 * one possible PSK for this STA.
1703 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
1704 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1706 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1707 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
1708 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1709 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
1711 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1712 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
1715 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
1716 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
1718 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, PMK_LEN
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
1719 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1720 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
1723 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
1724 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
1725 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
1729 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
1730 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
1732 size_t ptk_len
= sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
? 48 : 64;
1733 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1734 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1735 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
, ptk_len
);
1736 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1738 wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, "Pairwise key expansion",
1739 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, sm
->SNonce
,
1740 (u8
*) ptk
, ptk_len
,
1741 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
1747 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
1751 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
1753 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
1754 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
1755 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
1757 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
1758 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
1761 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1762 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, pmk
);
1768 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, pmk
, &PTK
);
1770 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
1771 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
1776 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1781 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1782 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
1786 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1787 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1789 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
1790 * with the value we derived.
1792 if (os_memcmp(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
1793 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
1794 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1795 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
1797 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
1799 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
1800 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
1801 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
1805 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1807 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1808 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1810 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1811 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
1812 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
1814 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
1817 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1819 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
1820 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
1824 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
1826 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
1831 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1833 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1835 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
1836 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ sizeof(struct wpa_igtk_kde
);
1843 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
1845 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
1846 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
1848 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
1851 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
1853 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
1854 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, igtk
.pn
) < 0)
1855 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
1856 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
1857 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
1859 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
1862 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, WPA_IGTK_LEN
) < 0)
1865 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
1866 (const u8
*) &igtk
, sizeof(igtk
), NULL
, 0);
1871 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1873 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1879 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
1884 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1887 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
1889 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
1890 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
1891 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
1893 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
1895 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
1896 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1899 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1900 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1901 * immediately following this. */
1905 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
1906 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
1908 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1909 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
1910 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
1911 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
1912 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
1913 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
1914 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
1915 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
1916 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE */
1917 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
1918 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
1920 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1921 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1922 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
1923 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
1925 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
1926 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
1927 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
1929 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
1930 * of GTK in the BSS.
1932 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
1940 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
1946 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
1948 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
1949 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
1950 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
1951 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
1952 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
1953 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
1955 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1956 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
1957 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
1962 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
1964 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
1965 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1966 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1967 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
1968 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
1970 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1971 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
1976 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
1978 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1979 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1980 int res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, pos
- kde
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
1982 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
1983 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
1989 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1992 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
1994 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
1997 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
1999 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2000 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2002 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2004 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2005 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2006 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2007 NULL
, NULL
, pos
, kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2010 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2011 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2017 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2018 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2020 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
2021 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
2024 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2025 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2027 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
2028 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
2031 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2033 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2034 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2035 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
2036 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
2037 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
2042 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
2044 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
2045 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2047 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2048 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2049 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2050 sm
->PTK
.tk1
, klen
)) {
2051 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2054 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2055 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
2057 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
2058 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2059 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
2060 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
2064 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2065 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2066 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
2070 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2072 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
2073 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2074 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
2077 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
2080 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
2081 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
2082 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2083 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
2086 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2087 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2088 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2090 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2091 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2092 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2098 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2101 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2102 else if (sm
->Disconnect
2103 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2104 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2105 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2106 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2108 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
2109 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2110 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
2111 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
2112 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
2113 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2114 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
2115 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2116 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
2117 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
2119 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
2120 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2122 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
2123 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2125 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
2126 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2128 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
2129 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2130 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2131 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
2132 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
2133 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)
2134 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2135 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
2137 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
2138 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2139 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0)
2140 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2142 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2143 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2144 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2145 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2148 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
2149 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, NULL
))
2150 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2152 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2153 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2154 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2155 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2158 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
2159 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2160 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2161 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2162 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2163 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2164 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2165 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2166 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2167 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2168 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2169 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2170 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2172 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
2173 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
2174 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
2175 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2176 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2177 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2178 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2179 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2181 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
2182 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2184 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
2185 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
2186 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2187 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2188 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2189 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
2190 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2191 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2192 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2193 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2194 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
2196 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2197 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2198 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2199 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2201 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
2207 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
2209 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2211 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
2212 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
2213 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2215 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2219 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
2221 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2222 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2223 u8
*kde
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
2225 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2227 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2230 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
) {
2231 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2232 * immediately following this. */
2236 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2237 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
2238 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2239 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
2240 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2241 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
2242 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2243 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2244 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
2246 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2247 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2249 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2250 * of GTK in the BSS.
2252 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2256 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2257 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
2258 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2259 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2264 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2266 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2268 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2271 pos
= kde
+ gsm
->GTK_len
;
2274 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2275 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2277 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
2278 rsc
, gsm
->GNonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
2279 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
2284 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
2286 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2287 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2288 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2289 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2290 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2291 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2292 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2293 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2294 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
2295 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2300 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
2302 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2303 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2304 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2305 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2306 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2310 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
2312 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
2313 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2314 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
2315 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
2316 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
2317 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
2318 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
2319 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2321 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
2322 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2323 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2324 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
2325 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
2326 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
)
2327 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
2328 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2329 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2331 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
2332 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2334 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
2335 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2341 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2342 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2346 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2347 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2348 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
2349 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2350 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2352 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
2353 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
2355 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2356 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
2357 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2358 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2359 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
2360 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2361 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4],
2364 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
2365 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
2367 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2373 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2374 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2376 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2377 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2378 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
2379 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
2382 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
2385 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2388 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2389 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
2390 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2394 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
2396 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
2399 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
2400 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2401 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
2402 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2405 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
2407 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
2408 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
2409 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
2411 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2412 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
2413 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
2416 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
2417 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2420 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
2421 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
2429 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
2430 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2432 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2435 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
2439 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
2441 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
2445 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2448 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2449 size_t subelem_len
, pad_len
;
2454 /* GTK subslement */
2455 key_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2456 if (key_len
> sizeof(keybuf
))
2460 * Pad key for AES Key Wrap if it is not multiple of 8 bytes or is less
2463 pad_len
= key_len
% 8;
2465 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
2466 if (key_len
+ pad_len
< 16)
2469 os_memcpy(keybuf
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], key_len
);
2470 os_memset(keybuf
+ key_len
, 0, pad_len
);
2471 keybuf
[key_len
] = 0xdd;
2475 key
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2478 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
2479 * Key[5..32] | 8 padding.
2481 subelem_len
= 13 + key_len
+ 8;
2482 subelem
= os_zalloc(subelem_len
);
2483 if (subelem
== NULL
)
2486 subelem
[0] = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
2487 subelem
[1] = 11 + key_len
+ 8;
2488 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
2489 WPA_PUT_LE16(&subelem
[2], gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
2490 subelem
[4] = gsm
->GTK_len
;
2491 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, subelem
+ 5) != 0)
2496 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, key_len
/ 8, key
, subelem
+ 13)) {
2501 os_memcpy(pos
, subelem
, subelem_len
);
2503 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext GTK",
2504 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
2511 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2512 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2515 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2519 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] |
2520 * Key[16] | 8 padding */
2521 subelem_len
= 1 + 1 + 2 + 6 + WPA_IGTK_LEN
+ 8;
2522 subelem
= os_zalloc(subelem_len
);
2523 if (subelem
== NULL
)
2527 *ptr
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
2528 *ptr
++ = subelem_len
- 2;
2529 WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
2531 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, ptr
) != 0) {
2536 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, WPA_IGTK_LEN
/ 8,
2537 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], ptr
)) {
2542 os_memcpy(pos
, subelem
, subelem_len
);
2544 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext IGTK",
2545 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN
);
2550 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2551 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
2554 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2555 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2559 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2560 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2561 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2562 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
2563 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
2565 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2567 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2568 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2569 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2570 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2571 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2572 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
2573 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
2574 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
2575 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2577 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
2578 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
2579 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
2580 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2581 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
2583 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
2584 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
2585 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2589 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2590 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2594 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
2595 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
2596 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
2597 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2600 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2601 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
&&
2602 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, WPA_ALG_IGTK
,
2603 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
2604 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4],
2607 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2613 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2614 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2616 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2617 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2618 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2619 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
2621 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0)
2628 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2629 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2632 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
2633 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
2634 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
2635 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2636 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
2638 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2639 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
2640 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
2641 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2642 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
2643 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2648 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2653 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
2654 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
2655 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
2656 * recursive call. */
2657 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
2661 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
2663 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2666 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2667 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
2669 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
2670 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2672 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
2673 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2675 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
2676 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
2677 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
2679 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
2680 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
2681 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
2682 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
2689 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
2691 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
2696 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2700 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
2704 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
2707 struct wpa_group
*group
;
2709 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2712 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
2714 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
2716 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2718 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2719 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2720 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2721 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2722 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2723 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2724 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2729 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int bool)
2731 return bool ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
2735 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
2736 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
2737 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
2739 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
2742 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
2743 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
2744 const int preauth
= 1;
2745 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2746 const int preauth
= 0;
2747 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2749 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2752 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2753 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
2754 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
2755 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
2756 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
2757 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
2758 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
2759 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
2760 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2764 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
2765 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
2768 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2769 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
2770 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
2771 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
2772 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
2773 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
2774 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
2775 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
2776 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
2777 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
2778 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
2779 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
2780 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
2781 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
2782 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
2783 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2784 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2785 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2786 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
2787 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2788 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2789 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2790 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
2791 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
2792 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
2794 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
2795 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
,
2796 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
,
2797 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
2798 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
2799 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
2800 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
2801 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
2802 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
2803 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
2805 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
2806 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
2807 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
2808 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
2809 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
2810 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2814 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
2815 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
2818 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
2819 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
2820 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2828 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
2836 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
2838 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
2840 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
2841 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
2847 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2848 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
2849 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
2850 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
2851 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
2852 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
2853 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
2854 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
2855 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
2856 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
2857 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
2859 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
2860 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
2861 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
2862 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2867 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
2868 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
2869 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
2871 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
2872 if (ret
< 0 || (size_t) ret
>= buflen
- len
)
2880 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
2883 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
2887 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2889 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
2893 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2895 return sm
->pairwise
;
2899 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2903 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
2907 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2915 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
2916 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
2918 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
2925 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
2926 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2928 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
2932 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2935 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
2939 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
2941 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2943 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
2944 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
2948 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
2949 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
2951 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
2952 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
2955 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
,
2956 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
2957 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2964 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2965 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
2966 int session_timeout
,
2967 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
2969 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
2972 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, wpa_auth
->addr
,
2973 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
2974 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
2981 static struct wpa_group
*
2982 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
2984 struct wpa_group
*group
;
2986 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
2989 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
2991 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
2995 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
2996 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
3002 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
3004 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3006 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3009 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
3011 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3013 group
= group
->next
;
3016 if (group
== NULL
) {
3017 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
3022 if (sm
->group
== group
)
3025 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
3026 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
3033 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3034 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
3036 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
3038 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
3039 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
3040 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
3042 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
3043 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
3044 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
3045 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
3046 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
3047 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
3048 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
3049 * the station has received the frame.
3051 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
3052 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
3053 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
3055 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3056 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
3057 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
3058 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3063 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3067 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);