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[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / basic / user-util.c
1 /***
2 This file is part of systemd.
3
4 Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering
5
6 systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
7 under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
8 the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
9 (at your option) any later version.
10
11 systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
12 WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
14 Lesser General Public License for more details.
15
16 You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
17 along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
18 ***/
19
20 #include <alloca.h>
21 #include <errno.h>
22 #include <fcntl.h>
23 #include <grp.h>
24 #include <pwd.h>
25 #include <stddef.h>
26 #include <stdint.h>
27 #include <stdio.h>
28 #include <stdlib.h>
29 #include <string.h>
30 #include <sys/stat.h>
31 #include <unistd.h>
32 #include <utmp.h>
33
34 #include "alloc-util.h"
35 #include "fd-util.h"
36 #include "fileio.h"
37 #include "formats-util.h"
38 #include "macro.h"
39 #include "missing.h"
40 #include "parse-util.h"
41 #include "path-util.h"
42 #include "string-util.h"
43 #include "strv.h"
44 #include "user-util.h"
45 #include "utf8.h"
46
47 bool uid_is_valid(uid_t uid) {
48
49 /* Some libc APIs use UID_INVALID as special placeholder */
50 if (uid == (uid_t) UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF))
51 return false;
52
53 /* A long time ago UIDs where 16bit, hence explicitly avoid the 16bit -1 too */
54 if (uid == (uid_t) UINT32_C(0xFFFF))
55 return false;
56
57 return true;
58 }
59
60 int parse_uid(const char *s, uid_t *ret) {
61 uint32_t uid = 0;
62 int r;
63
64 assert(s);
65
66 assert_cc(sizeof(uid_t) == sizeof(uint32_t));
67 r = safe_atou32(s, &uid);
68 if (r < 0)
69 return r;
70
71 if (!uid_is_valid(uid))
72 return -ENXIO; /* we return ENXIO instead of EINVAL
73 * here, to make it easy to distuingish
74 * invalid numeric uids from invalid
75 * strings. */
76
77 if (ret)
78 *ret = uid;
79
80 return 0;
81 }
82
83 char* getlogname_malloc(void) {
84 uid_t uid;
85 struct stat st;
86
87 if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) && fstat(STDIN_FILENO, &st) >= 0)
88 uid = st.st_uid;
89 else
90 uid = getuid();
91
92 return uid_to_name(uid);
93 }
94
95 char *getusername_malloc(void) {
96 const char *e;
97
98 e = getenv("USER");
99 if (e)
100 return strdup(e);
101
102 return uid_to_name(getuid());
103 }
104
105 int get_user_creds(
106 const char **username,
107 uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid,
108 const char **home,
109 const char **shell) {
110
111 struct passwd *p;
112 uid_t u;
113
114 assert(username);
115 assert(*username);
116
117 /* We enforce some special rules for uid=0: in order to avoid
118 * NSS lookups for root we hardcode its data. */
119
120 if (streq(*username, "root") || streq(*username, "0")) {
121 *username = "root";
122
123 if (uid)
124 *uid = 0;
125
126 if (gid)
127 *gid = 0;
128
129 if (home)
130 *home = "/root";
131
132 if (shell)
133 *shell = "/bin/sh";
134
135 return 0;
136 }
137
138 if (parse_uid(*username, &u) >= 0) {
139 errno = 0;
140 p = getpwuid(u);
141
142 /* If there are multiple users with the same id, make
143 * sure to leave $USER to the configured value instead
144 * of the first occurrence in the database. However if
145 * the uid was configured by a numeric uid, then let's
146 * pick the real username from /etc/passwd. */
147 if (p)
148 *username = p->pw_name;
149 } else {
150 errno = 0;
151 p = getpwnam(*username);
152 }
153
154 if (!p)
155 return errno > 0 ? -errno : -ESRCH;
156
157 if (uid) {
158 if (!uid_is_valid(p->pw_uid))
159 return -EBADMSG;
160
161 *uid = p->pw_uid;
162 }
163
164 if (gid) {
165 if (!gid_is_valid(p->pw_gid))
166 return -EBADMSG;
167
168 *gid = p->pw_gid;
169 }
170
171 if (home)
172 *home = p->pw_dir;
173
174 if (shell)
175 *shell = p->pw_shell;
176
177 return 0;
178 }
179
180 int get_user_creds_clean(
181 const char **username,
182 uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid,
183 const char **home,
184 const char **shell) {
185
186 int r;
187
188 /* Like get_user_creds(), but resets home/shell to NULL if they don't contain anything relevant. */
189
190 r = get_user_creds(username, uid, gid, home, shell);
191 if (r < 0)
192 return r;
193
194 if (shell &&
195 (isempty(*shell) || PATH_IN_SET(*shell,
196 "/bin/nologin",
197 "/sbin/nologin",
198 "/usr/bin/nologin",
199 "/usr/sbin/nologin")))
200 *shell = NULL;
201
202 if (home &&
203 (isempty(*home) || path_equal(*home, "/")))
204 *home = NULL;
205
206 return 0;
207 }
208
209 int get_group_creds(const char **groupname, gid_t *gid) {
210 struct group *g;
211 gid_t id;
212
213 assert(groupname);
214
215 /* We enforce some special rules for gid=0: in order to avoid
216 * NSS lookups for root we hardcode its data. */
217
218 if (streq(*groupname, "root") || streq(*groupname, "0")) {
219 *groupname = "root";
220
221 if (gid)
222 *gid = 0;
223
224 return 0;
225 }
226
227 if (parse_gid(*groupname, &id) >= 0) {
228 errno = 0;
229 g = getgrgid(id);
230
231 if (g)
232 *groupname = g->gr_name;
233 } else {
234 errno = 0;
235 g = getgrnam(*groupname);
236 }
237
238 if (!g)
239 return errno > 0 ? -errno : -ESRCH;
240
241 if (gid) {
242 if (!gid_is_valid(g->gr_gid))
243 return -EBADMSG;
244
245 *gid = g->gr_gid;
246 }
247
248 return 0;
249 }
250
251 char* uid_to_name(uid_t uid) {
252 char *ret;
253 int r;
254
255 /* Shortcut things to avoid NSS lookups */
256 if (uid == 0)
257 return strdup("root");
258
259 if (uid_is_valid(uid)) {
260 long bufsize;
261
262 bufsize = sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX);
263 if (bufsize <= 0)
264 bufsize = 4096;
265
266 for (;;) {
267 struct passwd pwbuf, *pw = NULL;
268 _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL;
269
270 buf = malloc(bufsize);
271 if (!buf)
272 return NULL;
273
274 r = getpwuid_r(uid, &pwbuf, buf, (size_t) bufsize, &pw);
275 if (r == 0 && pw)
276 return strdup(pw->pw_name);
277 if (r != ERANGE)
278 break;
279
280 bufsize *= 2;
281 }
282 }
283
284 if (asprintf(&ret, UID_FMT, uid) < 0)
285 return NULL;
286
287 return ret;
288 }
289
290 char* gid_to_name(gid_t gid) {
291 char *ret;
292 int r;
293
294 if (gid == 0)
295 return strdup("root");
296
297 if (gid_is_valid(gid)) {
298 long bufsize;
299
300 bufsize = sysconf(_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX);
301 if (bufsize <= 0)
302 bufsize = 4096;
303
304 for (;;) {
305 struct group grbuf, *gr = NULL;
306 _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL;
307
308 buf = malloc(bufsize);
309 if (!buf)
310 return NULL;
311
312 r = getgrgid_r(gid, &grbuf, buf, (size_t) bufsize, &gr);
313 if (r == 0 && gr)
314 return strdup(gr->gr_name);
315 if (r != ERANGE)
316 break;
317
318 bufsize *= 2;
319 }
320 }
321
322 if (asprintf(&ret, GID_FMT, gid) < 0)
323 return NULL;
324
325 return ret;
326 }
327
328 int in_gid(gid_t gid) {
329 gid_t *gids;
330 int ngroups_max, r, i;
331
332 if (getgid() == gid)
333 return 1;
334
335 if (getegid() == gid)
336 return 1;
337
338 if (!gid_is_valid(gid))
339 return -EINVAL;
340
341 ngroups_max = sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX);
342 assert(ngroups_max > 0);
343
344 gids = alloca(sizeof(gid_t) * ngroups_max);
345
346 r = getgroups(ngroups_max, gids);
347 if (r < 0)
348 return -errno;
349
350 for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
351 if (gids[i] == gid)
352 return 1;
353
354 return 0;
355 }
356
357 int in_group(const char *name) {
358 int r;
359 gid_t gid;
360
361 r = get_group_creds(&name, &gid);
362 if (r < 0)
363 return r;
364
365 return in_gid(gid);
366 }
367
368 int get_home_dir(char **_h) {
369 struct passwd *p;
370 const char *e;
371 char *h;
372 uid_t u;
373
374 assert(_h);
375
376 /* Take the user specified one */
377 e = secure_getenv("HOME");
378 if (e && path_is_absolute(e)) {
379 h = strdup(e);
380 if (!h)
381 return -ENOMEM;
382
383 *_h = h;
384 return 0;
385 }
386
387 /* Hardcode home directory for root to avoid NSS */
388 u = getuid();
389 if (u == 0) {
390 h = strdup("/root");
391 if (!h)
392 return -ENOMEM;
393
394 *_h = h;
395 return 0;
396 }
397
398 /* Check the database... */
399 errno = 0;
400 p = getpwuid(u);
401 if (!p)
402 return errno > 0 ? -errno : -ESRCH;
403
404 if (!path_is_absolute(p->pw_dir))
405 return -EINVAL;
406
407 h = strdup(p->pw_dir);
408 if (!h)
409 return -ENOMEM;
410
411 *_h = h;
412 return 0;
413 }
414
415 int get_shell(char **_s) {
416 struct passwd *p;
417 const char *e;
418 char *s;
419 uid_t u;
420
421 assert(_s);
422
423 /* Take the user specified one */
424 e = getenv("SHELL");
425 if (e) {
426 s = strdup(e);
427 if (!s)
428 return -ENOMEM;
429
430 *_s = s;
431 return 0;
432 }
433
434 /* Hardcode home directory for root to avoid NSS */
435 u = getuid();
436 if (u == 0) {
437 s = strdup("/bin/sh");
438 if (!s)
439 return -ENOMEM;
440
441 *_s = s;
442 return 0;
443 }
444
445 /* Check the database... */
446 errno = 0;
447 p = getpwuid(u);
448 if (!p)
449 return errno > 0 ? -errno : -ESRCH;
450
451 if (!path_is_absolute(p->pw_shell))
452 return -EINVAL;
453
454 s = strdup(p->pw_shell);
455 if (!s)
456 return -ENOMEM;
457
458 *_s = s;
459 return 0;
460 }
461
462 int reset_uid_gid(void) {
463 int r;
464
465 r = maybe_setgroups(0, NULL);
466 if (r < 0)
467 return r;
468
469 if (setresgid(0, 0, 0) < 0)
470 return -errno;
471
472 if (setresuid(0, 0, 0) < 0)
473 return -errno;
474
475 return 0;
476 }
477
478 int take_etc_passwd_lock(const char *root) {
479
480 struct flock flock = {
481 .l_type = F_WRLCK,
482 .l_whence = SEEK_SET,
483 .l_start = 0,
484 .l_len = 0,
485 };
486
487 const char *path;
488 int fd, r;
489
490 /* This is roughly the same as lckpwdf(), but not as awful. We
491 * don't want to use alarm() and signals, hence we implement
492 * our own trivial version of this.
493 *
494 * Note that shadow-utils also takes per-database locks in
495 * addition to lckpwdf(). However, we don't given that they
496 * are redundant as they invoke lckpwdf() first and keep
497 * it during everything they do. The per-database locks are
498 * awfully racy, and thus we just won't do them. */
499
500 if (root)
501 path = prefix_roota(root, "/etc/.pwd.lock");
502 else
503 path = "/etc/.pwd.lock";
504
505 fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600);
506 if (fd < 0)
507 return -errno;
508
509 r = fcntl(fd, F_SETLKW, &flock);
510 if (r < 0) {
511 safe_close(fd);
512 return -errno;
513 }
514
515 return fd;
516 }
517
518 bool valid_user_group_name(const char *u) {
519 const char *i;
520 long sz;
521
522 /* Checks if the specified name is a valid user/group name. */
523
524 if (isempty(u))
525 return false;
526
527 if (!(u[0] >= 'a' && u[0] <= 'z') &&
528 !(u[0] >= 'A' && u[0] <= 'Z') &&
529 u[0] != '_')
530 return false;
531
532 for (i = u+1; *i; i++) {
533 if (!(*i >= 'a' && *i <= 'z') &&
534 !(*i >= 'A' && *i <= 'Z') &&
535 !(*i >= '0' && *i <= '9') &&
536 *i != '_' &&
537 *i != '-')
538 return false;
539 }
540
541 sz = sysconf(_SC_LOGIN_NAME_MAX);
542 assert_se(sz > 0);
543
544 if ((size_t) (i-u) > (size_t) sz)
545 return false;
546
547 if ((size_t) (i-u) > UT_NAMESIZE - 1)
548 return false;
549
550 return true;
551 }
552
553 bool valid_user_group_name_or_id(const char *u) {
554
555 /* Similar as above, but is also fine with numeric UID/GID specifications, as long as they are in the right
556 * range, and not the invalid user ids. */
557
558 if (isempty(u))
559 return false;
560
561 if (valid_user_group_name(u))
562 return true;
563
564 return parse_uid(u, NULL) >= 0;
565 }
566
567 bool valid_gecos(const char *d) {
568
569 if (!d)
570 return false;
571
572 if (!utf8_is_valid(d))
573 return false;
574
575 if (string_has_cc(d, NULL))
576 return false;
577
578 /* Colons are used as field separators, and hence not OK */
579 if (strchr(d, ':'))
580 return false;
581
582 return true;
583 }
584
585 bool valid_home(const char *p) {
586
587 if (isempty(p))
588 return false;
589
590 if (!utf8_is_valid(p))
591 return false;
592
593 if (string_has_cc(p, NULL))
594 return false;
595
596 if (!path_is_absolute(p))
597 return false;
598
599 if (!path_is_safe(p))
600 return false;
601
602 /* Colons are used as field separators, and hence not OK */
603 if (strchr(p, ':'))
604 return false;
605
606 return true;
607 }
608
609 int maybe_setgroups(size_t size, const gid_t *list) {
610 int r;
611
612 /* Check if setgroups is allowed before we try to drop all the auxiliary groups */
613 if (size == 0) { /* Dropping all aux groups? */
614 _cleanup_free_ char *setgroups_content = NULL;
615 bool can_setgroups;
616
617 r = read_one_line_file("/proc/self/setgroups", &setgroups_content);
618 if (r == -ENOENT)
619 /* Old kernels don't have /proc/self/setgroups, so assume we can use setgroups */
620 can_setgroups = true;
621 else if (r < 0)
622 return r;
623 else
624 can_setgroups = streq(setgroups_content, "allow");
625
626 if (!can_setgroups) {
627 log_debug("Skipping setgroups(), /proc/self/setgroups is set to 'deny'");
628 return 0;
629 }
630 }
631
632 if (setgroups(size, list) < 0)
633 return -errno;
634
635 return 0;
636 }