2 This file is part of systemd.
4 Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering
6 systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
7 under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
8 the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
9 (at your option) any later version.
11 systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
12 WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
14 Lesser General Public License for more details.
16 You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
17 along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
27 #include <sys/personality.h>
28 #include <sys/prctl.h>
29 #include <sys/socket.h>
36 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
40 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
48 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
51 #include "sd-messages.h"
54 #include "alloc-util.h"
56 #include "apparmor-util.h"
61 #include "capability-util.h"
64 #include "errno-list.h"
66 #include "exit-status.h"
69 #include "formats-util.h"
71 #include "glob-util.h"
78 #include "namespace.h"
79 #include "parse-util.h"
80 #include "path-util.h"
81 #include "process-util.h"
82 #include "rlimit-util.h"
85 #include "seccomp-util.h"
87 #include "securebits.h"
88 #include "selinux-util.h"
89 #include "signal-util.h"
90 #include "smack-util.h"
91 #include "string-table.h"
92 #include "string-util.h"
94 #include "syslog-util.h"
95 #include "terminal-util.h"
97 #include "user-util.h"
99 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
101 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
102 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
104 /* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
105 #define TTY_MODE 0620
107 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
109 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
) {
110 int start
, restart_from
;
115 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
125 for (i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
128 /* Already at right index? */
132 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
139 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
140 * let's remember that and try again from here */
141 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
145 if (restart_from
< 0)
148 start
= restart_from
;
154 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
163 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags */
165 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
167 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
171 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
172 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
175 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
183 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
186 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
189 if (context
->tty_path
)
190 return context
->tty_path
;
192 return "/dev/console";
195 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
200 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
202 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
203 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
204 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
206 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
209 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
210 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
211 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
213 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
216 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
217 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
220 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
222 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
||
223 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
||
224 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
||
225 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
;
228 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
233 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
238 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
246 static int connect_journal_socket(int fd
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
247 union sockaddr_union sa
= {
248 .un
.sun_family
= AF_UNIX
,
249 .un
.sun_path
= "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
251 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
252 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
255 if (gid
!= GID_INVALID
) {
263 if (uid
!= UID_INVALID
) {
273 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, offsetof(struct sockaddr_un
, sun_path
) + strlen(sa
.un
.sun_path
));
277 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
278 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
280 if (uid
!= UID_INVALID
)
281 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
284 if (gid
!= GID_INVALID
)
285 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
290 static int connect_logger_as(const ExecContext
*context
, ExecOutput output
, const char *ident
, const char *unit_id
, int nfd
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
294 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
298 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
302 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, uid
, gid
);
306 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0) {
311 fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
321 context
->syslog_identifier
? context
->syslog_identifier
: ident
,
323 context
->syslog_priority
,
324 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
325 output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
|| output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
326 output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
|| output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
327 is_terminal_output(output
));
330 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
337 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, mode_t mode
, int nfd
) {
343 fd
= open_terminal(path
, mode
| O_NOCTTY
);
348 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
356 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
358 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY
||
359 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
||
360 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
;
363 static int fixup_input(ExecInput std_input
, int socket_fd
, bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
365 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
366 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
368 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
369 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
374 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
376 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
377 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
382 static int setup_input(
383 const ExecContext
*context
,
384 const ExecParameters
*params
,
392 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
393 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
396 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
397 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
398 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
403 i
= fixup_input(context
->std_input
, socket_fd
, params
->apply_tty_stdin
);
407 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
408 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
411 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
412 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
415 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
416 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
,
417 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
423 if (fd
!= STDIN_FILENO
) {
424 r
= dup2(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
432 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
433 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
436 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
440 static int setup_output(
442 const ExecContext
*context
,
443 const ExecParameters
*params
,
447 uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
458 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
460 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
463 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
466 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
467 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
470 return STDERR_FILENO
;
473 i
= fixup_input(context
->std_input
, socket_fd
, params
->apply_tty_stdin
);
474 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
476 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
478 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
480 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
482 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
483 * the way and are not on a tty */
484 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
485 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
486 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
487 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
491 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
492 if (e
== o
|| e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
493 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
497 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
498 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
499 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
500 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
502 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null, inherit that... */
503 if (i
!= EXEC_INPUT_NULL
)
504 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
506 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
510 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
511 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
516 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
517 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
519 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
520 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
521 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
523 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
524 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
526 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
:
527 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
:
528 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
529 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
530 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
531 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
532 r
= connect_logger_as(context
, o
, ident
, unit
->id
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
534 log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
535 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
539 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
540 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
541 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
544 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
548 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
553 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
554 (void) fchown(fd
, uid
, -1);
555 (void) fchmod(fd
, TTY_MODE
);
557 if (fstat(fd
, &st
) < 0)
560 if (st
.st_uid
!= uid
|| (st
.st_mode
& 0777) != TTY_MODE
)
566 static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
567 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
570 assert(_saved_stdin
);
571 assert(_saved_stdout
);
573 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
577 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
578 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
581 fd
= acquire_terminal(
586 DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
590 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
594 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
598 if (dup2(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
601 if (dup2(fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
608 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
609 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
611 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
616 _printf_(1, 2) static int write_confirm_message(const char *format
, ...) {
617 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
622 fd
= open_terminal("/dev/console", O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
626 va_start(ap
, format
);
627 vdprintf(fd
, format
, ap
);
633 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
637 assert(saved_stdout
);
641 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
642 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
645 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
646 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
649 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
650 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
655 static int ask_for_confirmation(char *response
, char **argv
) {
656 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
657 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
659 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
663 line
= exec_command_line(argv
);
667 r
= ask_char(response
, "yns", "Execute %s? [Yes, No, Skip] ", line
);
669 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
674 static int enforce_groups(const ExecContext
*context
, const char *username
, gid_t gid
) {
675 bool keep_groups
= false;
680 /* Lookup and set GID and supplementary group list. Here too
681 * we avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. */
683 if (context
->group
|| username
) {
684 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
685 if (username
&& gid
!= 0) {
686 if (initgroups(username
, gid
) < 0)
692 /* Second step, set our gids */
693 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
697 if (context
->supplementary_groups
) {
702 /* Final step, initialize any manually set supplementary groups */
703 assert_se((ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
)) > 0);
705 if (!(gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
)))
709 k
= getgroups(ngroups_max
, gids
);
717 STRV_FOREACH(i
, context
->supplementary_groups
) {
720 if (k
>= ngroups_max
) {
726 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, gids
+k
);
735 if (setgroups(k
, gids
) < 0) {
746 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
749 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
750 * capabilities while doing so. */
752 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
754 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
755 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
756 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
758 int sb
= context
->secure_bits
| 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
760 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != sb
)
761 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, sb
) < 0)
766 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
767 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
770 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
771 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
772 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
773 later. This is done outside of this call. */
780 static int null_conv(
782 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
783 struct pam_response
**resp
,
786 /* We don't support conversations */
791 static int setup_pam(
797 int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
) {
799 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
804 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
805 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
807 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
809 bool close_session
= false;
810 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
817 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
818 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
819 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
820 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
821 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
822 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
824 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
828 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
831 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
832 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
838 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
839 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
843 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
844 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
847 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
848 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
851 close_session
= true;
853 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
855 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
859 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
862 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
864 parent_pid
= getpid();
873 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
875 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
877 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
879 /* This string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
880 * of "/sbin/init"), to look pretty in /bin/ps */
881 rename_process("(sd-pam)");
883 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this
884 child. We assume that otherwise only those fds are
885 open here that have been opened by PAM. */
886 close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
888 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
889 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
890 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
891 * to fail to exit normally */
892 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
893 log_error_errno(r
, "Error: Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
895 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
897 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
898 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
899 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
900 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
901 * to do the rest for us. */
902 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
905 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
906 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
907 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. */
908 barrier_place(&barrier
);
910 /* Check if our parent process might already have
912 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
915 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
916 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
919 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
926 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
931 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
932 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
933 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
934 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
941 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
945 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
947 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
948 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
951 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
952 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
954 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
955 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
958 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
959 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
960 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
961 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
969 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
970 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
971 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
973 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
977 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
979 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
989 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
990 char process_name
[11];
994 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
995 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
999 rename_process("(...)");
1005 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1006 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1012 process_name
[0] = '(';
1013 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1014 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1015 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1017 rename_process(process_name
);
1022 static int apply_seccomp(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1023 uint32_t negative_action
, action
;
1024 scmp_filter_ctx
*seccomp
;
1031 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL
: SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1033 seccomp
= seccomp_init(c
->syscall_whitelist
? negative_action
: SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1037 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
1039 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, i
) {
1040 r
= seccomp_arch_add(seccomp
, PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1);
1048 r
= seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp
);
1053 action
= c
->syscall_whitelist
? SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
: negative_action
;
1054 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_filter
, i
) {
1055 r
= seccomp_rule_add(seccomp
, action
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1, 0);
1060 r
= seccomp_attr_set(seccomp
, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP
, 0);
1064 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1067 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1071 static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1072 scmp_filter_ctx
*seccomp
;
1078 seccomp
= seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1082 r
= seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp
);
1086 if (c
->address_families_whitelist
) {
1087 int af
, first
= 0, last
= 0;
1090 /* If this is a whitelist, we first block the address
1091 * families that are out of range and then everything
1092 * that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest
1093 * and highest address family in the set. */
1095 SET_FOREACH(afp
, c
->address_families
, i
) {
1096 af
= PTR_TO_INT(afp
);
1098 if (af
<= 0 || af
>= af_max())
1101 if (first
== 0 || af
< first
)
1104 if (last
== 0 || af
> last
)
1108 assert((first
== 0) == (last
== 0));
1112 /* No entries in the valid range, block everything */
1113 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1115 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1123 /* Block everything below the first entry */
1124 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1126 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1129 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT
, first
));
1133 /* Block everything above the last entry */
1134 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1136 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1139 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GT
, last
));
1143 /* Block everything between the first and last
1145 for (af
= 1; af
< af_max(); af
++) {
1147 if (set_contains(c
->address_families
, INT_TO_PTR(af
)))
1150 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1152 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1155 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ
, af
));
1164 /* If this is a blacklist, then generate one rule for
1165 * each address family that are then combined in OR
1168 SET_FOREACH(af
, c
->address_families
, i
) {
1170 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1172 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1175 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ
, PTR_TO_INT(af
)));
1181 r
= seccomp_attr_set(seccomp
, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP
, 0);
1185 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1188 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1194 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[4]) {
1198 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1199 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1201 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1204 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1206 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1209 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1210 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1212 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1213 fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1216 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1220 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1223 static int build_environment(
1224 const ExecContext
*c
,
1225 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1228 const char *username
,
1232 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1239 our_env
= new0(char*, 11);
1244 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1246 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid()) < 0)
1248 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1250 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%u", n_fds
) < 0)
1252 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1254 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1258 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
, NULL
);
1261 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1264 if (p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1265 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid()) < 0)
1267 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1269 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1271 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1275 x
= strappend("HOME=", home
);
1278 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1282 x
= strappend("LOGNAME=", username
);
1285 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1287 x
= strappend("USER=", username
);
1290 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1294 x
= strappend("SHELL=", shell
);
1297 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1300 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
) ||
1301 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
||
1302 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
||
1305 x
= strdup(default_term_for_tty(exec_context_tty_path(c
)));
1308 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1311 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1312 assert(n_env
<= 11);
1320 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1321 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1322 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1325 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1326 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1332 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
, NULL
);
1335 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1337 pass_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1338 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1348 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1349 const ExecContext
*context
,
1350 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1351 ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1356 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_dirs
) ||
1357 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_dirs
) ||
1358 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_dirs
))
1361 if (context
->mount_flags
!= 0)
1364 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
1367 if (context
->private_devices
||
1368 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
1369 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
)
1375 static int close_remaining_fds(
1376 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1377 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
1379 int *fds
, unsigned n_fds
) {
1381 unsigned n_dont_close
= 0;
1382 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 7];
1386 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
1387 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
1388 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
1389 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
1390 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
1391 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
1394 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
1396 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
1397 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
1401 if (runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0)
1402 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0];
1403 if (runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0)
1404 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[1];
1407 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
1410 static int exec_child(
1412 ExecCommand
*command
,
1413 const ExecContext
*context
,
1414 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1415 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
1418 int *fds
, unsigned n_fds
,
1422 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **pam_env
= NULL
, **final_env
= NULL
, **final_argv
= NULL
;
1423 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
1424 const char *username
= NULL
, *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
, *wd
;
1425 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
1426 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
1428 bool needs_mount_namespace
;
1434 assert(exit_status
);
1436 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
1438 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
1439 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
1440 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
1441 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
1442 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
1443 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
1444 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
1446 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
1447 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1449 r
= reset_signal_mask();
1451 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
1455 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
1456 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
1458 /* Close sockets very early to make sure we don't
1459 * block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
1464 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, socket_fd
, fds
, n_fds
);
1466 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
1470 if (!context
->same_pgrp
)
1472 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
1476 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
1478 if (params
->confirm_spawn
) {
1481 r
= ask_for_confirmation(&response
, argv
);
1482 if (r
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
1483 write_confirm_message("Confirmation question timed out, assuming positive response.\n");
1485 write_confirm_message("Couldn't ask confirmation question, assuming positive response: %s\n", strerror(-r
));
1486 else if (response
== 's') {
1487 write_confirm_message("Skipping execution.\n");
1488 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
1490 } else if (response
== 'n') {
1491 write_confirm_message("Failing execution.\n");
1497 if (context
->user
) {
1498 username
= context
->user
;
1499 r
= get_user_creds(&username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
1501 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
1506 if (context
->group
) {
1507 const char *g
= context
->group
;
1509 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, &gid
);
1511 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
1517 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
1518 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
1520 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
1522 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
);
1524 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
1528 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
);
1530 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
1534 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
);
1536 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
1540 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
1541 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
1543 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
1548 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
1549 char t
[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(context
->oom_score_adjust
)];
1551 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then
1552 * let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
1553 * prohibit write access to this file, and we
1554 * shouldn't trip up over that. */
1556 sprintf(t
, "%i", context
->oom_score_adjust
);
1557 r
= write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t
, 0);
1558 if (r
== -EPERM
|| r
== -EACCES
) {
1560 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
1563 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
1568 if (context
->nice_set
)
1569 if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->nice
) < 0) {
1570 *exit_status
= EXIT_NICE
;
1574 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
1575 struct sched_param param
= {
1576 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
1579 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
1580 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
1581 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
1582 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
1585 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
1590 if (context
->cpuset
)
1591 if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context
->cpuset_ncpus
), context
->cpuset
) < 0) {
1592 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
1596 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
1597 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
1598 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
1602 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
1603 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
1604 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
1608 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
1609 if (personality(context
->personality
) < 0) {
1610 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
1614 if (context
->utmp_id
)
1615 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid(), getsid(0), context
->tty_path
,
1616 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
1617 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
1619 username
? "root" : context
->user
);
1621 if (context
->user
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
)) {
1622 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
1624 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
1629 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup
1630 * (but only in systemd's own controller hierarchy!) to the
1631 * user of the new process. */
1632 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& params
->cgroup_delegate
) {
1633 r
= cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0644, uid
, gid
);
1635 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
1640 r
= cg_set_group_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0755, uid
, gid
);
1642 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
1647 if (!strv_isempty(context
->runtime_directory
) && params
->runtime_prefix
) {
1650 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->runtime_directory
) {
1651 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
1653 p
= strjoin(params
->runtime_prefix
, "/", *rt
, NULL
);
1655 *exit_status
= EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
;
1659 r
= mkdir_p_label(p
, context
->runtime_directory_mode
);
1661 *exit_status
= EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
;
1665 r
= chmod_and_chown(p
, context
->runtime_directory_mode
, uid
, gid
);
1667 *exit_status
= EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
;
1673 umask(context
->umask
);
1675 if (params
->apply_permissions
) {
1676 r
= enforce_groups(context
, username
, gid
);
1678 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
1682 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
1683 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
1685 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
1689 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
1691 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
1693 r
= mac_smack_read(command
->path
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
1694 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENODATA
&& r
!= -EOPNOTSUPP
) {
1695 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
1699 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
1701 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
1708 if (context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
1709 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, context
->tty_path
, &pam_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
1711 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
1718 if (context
->private_network
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
1719 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
1721 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
1726 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
1728 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
1729 char *tmp
= NULL
, *var
= NULL
;
1731 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent
1732 * of the private /tmp, which is
1733 * non-accessible to world users. Inside of it
1734 * there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's
1735 * the one we want to use here. */
1737 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
1738 if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
1739 tmp
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
1740 if (runtime
->var_tmp_dir
)
1741 var
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
1744 r
= setup_namespace(
1745 params
->apply_chroot
? context
->root_directory
: NULL
,
1746 context
->read_write_dirs
,
1747 context
->read_only_dirs
,
1748 context
->inaccessible_dirs
,
1751 context
->private_devices
,
1752 context
->protect_home
,
1753 context
->protect_system
,
1754 context
->mount_flags
);
1756 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is
1757 * probably due to a missing capability. In this case,
1758 * silently proceeed. */
1759 if (r
== -EPERM
|| r
== -EACCES
) {
1761 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
1764 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
1769 if (context
->working_directory_home
)
1771 else if (context
->working_directory
)
1772 wd
= context
->working_directory
;
1776 if (params
->apply_chroot
) {
1777 if (!needs_mount_namespace
&& context
->root_directory
)
1778 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0) {
1779 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
1783 if (chdir(wd
) < 0 &&
1784 !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
1785 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
1791 d
= strjoina(strempty(context
->root_directory
), "/", strempty(wd
));
1793 !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
1794 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
1800 if (params
->apply_permissions
&& mac_selinux_use() && params
->selinux_context_net
&& socket_fd
>= 0) {
1801 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, command
->path
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
1803 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
1809 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that
1810 * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that
1811 * we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd
1812 * and the netns fds we don't need anymore. The custom
1813 * endpoint fd was needed to upload the policy and can
1814 * now be closed as well. */
1815 r
= close_all_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
1817 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
1819 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
1821 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
1825 if (params
->apply_permissions
) {
1827 int secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
1829 for (i
= 0; i
< _RLIMIT_MAX
; i
++) {
1830 if (!context
->rlimit
[i
])
1833 if (setrlimit_closest(i
, context
->rlimit
[i
]) < 0) {
1834 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
1839 if (!cap_test_all(context
->capability_bounding_set
)) {
1840 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(context
->capability_bounding_set
, false);
1842 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
1847 /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
1848 * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
1849 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
1850 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
1852 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
1857 if (context
->user
) {
1858 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
1860 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
1863 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
1865 /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
1866 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
1868 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
1872 /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
1873 * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
1874 * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
1875 * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
1876 * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
1877 * drop the bit away next. */
1879 secure_bits
|= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
1883 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while
1884 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress
1885 * potential EPERMs we'll try not to call
1886 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
1887 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
)
1888 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
1889 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
1893 if (context
->no_new_privileges
)
1894 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
1895 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
1900 if (context
->address_families_whitelist
||
1901 !set_isempty(context
->address_families
)) {
1902 r
= apply_address_families(context
);
1904 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
1909 if (context
->syscall_whitelist
||
1910 !set_isempty(context
->syscall_filter
) ||
1911 !set_isempty(context
->syscall_archs
)) {
1912 r
= apply_seccomp(context
);
1914 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
1921 if (mac_selinux_use()) {
1922 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
1925 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
1927 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
1934 #ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
1935 if (context
->apparmor_profile
&& mac_apparmor_use()) {
1936 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
1937 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
1938 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
1945 r
= build_environment(context
, params
, n_fds
, home
, username
, shell
, &our_env
);
1947 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
1951 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
1953 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
1957 final_env
= strv_env_merge(6,
1958 params
->environment
,
1961 context
->environment
,
1966 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
1970 final_argv
= replace_env_argv(argv
, final_env
);
1972 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
1976 final_env
= strv_env_clean(final_env
);
1978 if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_DEBUG
)) {
1979 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
1981 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
1984 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
1986 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
1987 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
1993 execve(command
->path
, final_argv
, final_env
);
1994 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
1998 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
1999 ExecCommand
*command
,
2000 const ExecContext
*context
,
2001 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2002 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2005 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
2006 int *fds
= NULL
; unsigned n_fds
= 0;
2007 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
2017 assert(params
->fds
|| params
->n_fds
<= 0);
2019 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
2020 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
2021 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
2023 if (params
->n_fds
!= 1) {
2024 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got more than one socket.");
2028 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
2032 n_fds
= params
->n_fds
;
2035 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
2037 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
2039 argv
= params
->argv
?: command
->argv
;
2040 line
= exec_command_line(argv
);
2044 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
2046 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute: %s", line
),
2047 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
2051 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
2056 r
= exec_child(unit
,
2068 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
2069 LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED
),
2071 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
2072 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
),
2074 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
2081 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
2083 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so
2084 * that we can be sure that no user code is ever executed
2085 * outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be
2086 * sure that when we kill the cgroup the process will be
2088 if (params
->cgroup_path
)
2089 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, pid
);
2091 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
2097 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
2101 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
2102 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
2103 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
2104 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
2105 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
2106 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
2107 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
2108 c
->runtime_directory_mode
= 0755;
2109 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
2112 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
2117 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
2118 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
2119 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
2121 for (l
= 0; l
< ELEMENTSOF(c
->rlimit
); l
++)
2122 c
->rlimit
[l
] = mfree(c
->rlimit
[l
]);
2124 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
2125 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
2126 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
2127 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
2128 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
2129 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
2131 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
2133 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
2135 c
->read_only_dirs
= strv_free(c
->read_only_dirs
);
2136 c
->read_write_dirs
= strv_free(c
->read_write_dirs
);
2137 c
->inaccessible_dirs
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_dirs
);
2140 CPU_FREE(c
->cpuset
);
2142 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
2143 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
2144 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
2146 c
->syscall_filter
= set_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
2147 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
2148 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
2150 c
->runtime_directory
= strv_free(c
->runtime_directory
);
2153 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
2158 if (!runtime_prefix
)
2161 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->runtime_directory
) {
2162 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
2164 p
= strjoin(runtime_prefix
, "/", *i
, NULL
);
2168 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be
2169 * sure this is gone when we start the service
2171 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
2177 void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
2180 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
2182 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
2185 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, unsigned n
) {
2188 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
2189 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
2192 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
2196 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
2197 exec_command_done(i
);
2204 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, unsigned n
) {
2207 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
2208 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
2211 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
2216 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
2217 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
2219 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
2222 int exec_context_load_environment(Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
2223 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
2228 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
2231 bool ignore
= false;
2233 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
2243 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
2251 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
2253 if (glob(fn
, 0, NULL
, &pglob
) != 0) {
2258 return errno
> 0 ? -errno
: -EINVAL
;
2260 count
= pglob
.gl_pathc
;
2268 for (n
= 0; n
< count
; n
++) {
2269 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], NULL
, &p
);
2277 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
2279 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
2281 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
2284 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
2292 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
2308 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
2309 _cleanup_free_
char *active
= NULL
;
2315 if (startswith(tty
, "/dev/"))
2318 /* trivial identity? */
2319 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
2322 console
= resolve_dev_console(&active
);
2323 /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
2327 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
2328 return streq(console
, tty
) || (streq(console
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
2331 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(ExecContext
*ec
) {
2333 return (ec
->tty_reset
||
2335 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
2336 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
2337 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
2338 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
)) &&
2339 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
2342 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
2348 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
2351 void exec_context_dump(ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
2358 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
2362 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
2363 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
2364 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
2365 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
2366 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
2367 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
2368 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
2369 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
2370 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n",
2372 prefix
, c
->working_directory
? c
->working_directory
: "/",
2373 prefix
, c
->root_directory
? c
->root_directory
: "/",
2374 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
2375 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
2376 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
2377 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
2378 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
2379 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
2380 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
));
2382 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
2383 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
2385 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
2386 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
2388 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
2389 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
2391 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryMode: %04o\n", prefix
, c
->runtime_directory_mode
);
2393 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->runtime_directory
)
2394 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectory: %s\n", prefix
, *d
);
2401 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
2403 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
2404 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
2406 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
2408 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
2409 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
2410 fprintf(f
, "%s%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
2411 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
2414 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
2415 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
2417 ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
2419 "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n"
2420 "%sIOPriority: %i\n",
2421 prefix
, strna(class_str
),
2422 prefix
, (int) IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
2425 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
2426 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
2428 sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
2430 "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n"
2431 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
2432 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
2433 prefix
, strna(policy_str
),
2434 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
2435 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
2439 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix
);
2440 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->cpuset_ncpus
; i
++)
2441 if (CPU_ISSET_S(i
, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c
->cpuset_ncpus
), c
->cpuset
))
2442 fprintf(f
, " %u", i
);
2446 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
2447 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
2450 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
2451 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
2452 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
2453 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
2454 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
2455 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
2461 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
2462 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
2463 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
2464 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
2465 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
2466 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
2468 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
||
2469 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
||
2470 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
||
2471 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2472 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2473 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
||
2474 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
||
2475 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
||
2476 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
||
2477 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2478 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2479 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) {
2481 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
2483 log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
2484 log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
2487 "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n"
2488 "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n",
2489 prefix
, strna(fac_str
),
2490 prefix
, strna(lvl_str
));
2494 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
2496 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
) ? " keep-caps" : "",
2497 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED
) ? " keep-caps-locked" : "",
2498 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP
) ? " no-setuid-fixup" : "",
2499 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED
) ? " no-setuid-fixup-locked" : "",
2500 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NOROOT
) ? " noroot" : "",
2501 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED
) ? "noroot-locked" : "");
2503 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
2505 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix
);
2507 for (l
= 0; l
<= cap_last_cap(); l
++)
2508 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
& (UINT64_C(1) << l
))
2509 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l
)));
2514 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
2516 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities:", prefix
);
2518 for (l
= 0; l
<= cap_last_cap(); l
++)
2519 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
& (UINT64_C(1) << l
))
2520 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l
)));
2526 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
2528 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
2530 if (strv_length(c
->supplementary_groups
) > 0) {
2531 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
2532 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
2537 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
2539 if (strv_length(c
->read_write_dirs
) > 0) {
2540 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWriteDirs:", prefix
);
2541 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_dirs
);
2545 if (strv_length(c
->read_only_dirs
) > 0) {
2546 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyDirs:", prefix
);
2547 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_dirs
);
2551 if (strv_length(c
->inaccessible_dirs
) > 0) {
2552 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessibleDirs:", prefix
);
2553 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_dirs
);
2559 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
2560 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
2562 if (c
->selinux_context
)
2564 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
2565 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
2567 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
2569 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
2570 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
2572 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
2580 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
2583 if (!c
->syscall_whitelist
)
2587 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_filter
, j
) {
2588 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
2595 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
2596 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
2603 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
2610 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
2614 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, j
)
2615 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
2620 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0)
2622 "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: %s\n",
2623 prefix
, strna(errno_to_name(c
->syscall_errno
)));
2625 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
2627 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
2628 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
2631 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(ExecContext
*c
) {
2634 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run run under
2635 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
2640 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
2646 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
2651 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
2654 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
2657 if (s
->pid
&& s
->pid
!= pid
)
2661 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
2667 if (context
->utmp_id
)
2668 utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
2670 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, NULL
);
2674 void exec_status_dump(ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
2675 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
2683 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
2686 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
2689 if (s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
> 0)
2691 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
2692 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
2694 if (s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
> 0)
2696 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
2698 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
2699 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
2700 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
2704 char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
2712 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
2715 if (!(n
= new(char, k
)))
2719 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
2726 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
2737 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
2738 * spaces and ticks in them */
2743 void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
2744 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
2745 const char *prefix2
;
2750 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
2751 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
2753 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
2755 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
2756 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror(ENOMEM
));
2758 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
2761 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
2764 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
2766 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
2767 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
2770 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
2777 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
2778 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
2779 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
2784 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
2792 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
2813 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
2814 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
2822 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
2828 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
2836 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
2841 *rt
= new0(ExecRuntime
, 1);
2846 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] = (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1] = -1;
2851 int exec_runtime_make(ExecRuntime
**rt
, ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
) {
2861 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
)
2864 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
2868 if (c
->private_network
&& (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] < 0) {
2869 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
, 0, (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
2873 if (c
->private_tmp
&& !(*rt
)->tmp_dir
) {
2874 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &(*rt
)->tmp_dir
, &(*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
);
2882 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_ref(ExecRuntime
*r
) {
2884 assert(r
->n_ref
> 0);
2890 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*r
) {
2895 assert(r
->n_ref
> 0);
2902 free(r
->var_tmp_dir
);
2903 safe_close_pair(r
->netns_storage_socket
);
2909 int exec_runtime_serialize(Unit
*u
, ExecRuntime
*rt
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
2918 unit_serialize_item(u
, f
, "tmp-dir", rt
->tmp_dir
);
2920 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
2921 unit_serialize_item(u
, f
, "var-tmp-dir", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
2923 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
2926 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
2930 unit_serialize_item_format(u
, f
, "netns-socket-0", "%i", copy
);
2933 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
2936 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
2940 unit_serialize_item_format(u
, f
, "netns-socket-1", "%i", copy
);
2946 int exec_runtime_deserialize_item(Unit
*u
, ExecRuntime
**rt
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
2953 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
2956 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
2960 copy
= strdup(value
);
2964 free((*rt
)->tmp_dir
);
2965 (*rt
)->tmp_dir
= copy
;
2967 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
2970 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
2974 copy
= strdup(value
);
2978 free((*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
);
2979 (*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
= copy
;
2981 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
2984 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
2988 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
))
2989 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
2991 safe_close((*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
2992 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
2994 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
2997 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3001 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
))
3002 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
3004 safe_close((*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
3005 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
3013 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
3014 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
3016 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
3020 void exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime
*rt
) {
3026 /* If there are multiple users of this, let's leave the stuff around */
3031 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
3033 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
3035 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
3042 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
) {
3043 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3045 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3047 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3048 free(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3051 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
3054 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
3057 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
3058 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
3059 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
3060 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
3061 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
3062 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket"
3065 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
3067 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
3068 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
3069 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
3070 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
3071 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
] = "syslog",
3072 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "syslog+console",
3073 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
3074 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
3075 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
3076 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
3077 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket"
3080 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
3082 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
3083 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
3084 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
3085 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
3088 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);