1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
6 #include <sys/eventfd.h>
10 #include <sys/personality.h>
11 #include <sys/prctl.h>
13 #include <sys/types.h>
19 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
23 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
31 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
34 #include "sd-messages.h"
38 #include "alloc-util.h"
40 #include "apparmor-util.h"
45 #include "capability-util.h"
46 #include "cgroup-setup.h"
47 #include "chown-recursive.h"
48 #include "cpu-set-util.h"
52 #include "errno-list.h"
54 #include "exit-status.h"
57 #include "format-util.h"
59 #include "glob-util.h"
60 #include "hexdecoct.h"
67 #include "memory-util.h"
68 #include "missing_fs.h"
70 #include "mount-util.h"
71 #include "mountpoint-util.h"
72 #include "namespace.h"
73 #include "parse-util.h"
74 #include "path-util.h"
75 #include "process-util.h"
76 #include "random-util.h"
77 #include "rlimit-util.h"
80 #include "seccomp-util.h"
82 #include "securebits-util.h"
83 #include "selinux-util.h"
84 #include "signal-util.h"
85 #include "smack-util.h"
86 #include "socket-util.h"
88 #include "stat-util.h"
89 #include "string-table.h"
90 #include "string-util.h"
92 #include "syslog-util.h"
93 #include "terminal-util.h"
94 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
95 #include "umask-util.h"
97 #include "user-util.h"
98 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
100 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
101 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
103 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
105 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
109 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
113 for (int start
= 0;;) {
114 int restart_from
= -1;
116 for (int i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
119 /* Already at right index? */
123 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
130 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
131 * let's remember that and try again from here */
132 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
136 if (restart_from
< 0)
139 start
= restart_from
;
145 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], size_t n_socket_fds
, size_t n_storage_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
149 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
155 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags.
156 * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */
158 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
160 if (i
< n_socket_fds
) {
161 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
166 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
167 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
170 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
178 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
181 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
184 if (context
->tty_path
)
185 return context
->tty_path
;
187 return "/dev/console";
190 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
195 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
197 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
198 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
199 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
201 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
204 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
205 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
206 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
208 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
211 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
212 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
215 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
218 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
219 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
);
222 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
225 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
226 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
);
229 static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o
) {
232 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
);
235 static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext
*c
) {
238 /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
240 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
))
243 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_output
))
246 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_error
))
249 return !!c
->tty_path
;
252 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
257 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
261 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
264 static int connect_journal_socket(
266 const char *log_namespace
,
270 union sockaddr_union sa
;
272 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
273 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
278 strjoina("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace
, "/stdout") :
279 "/run/systemd/journal/stdout";
280 r
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, j
);
285 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
288 if (setegid(gid
) < 0)
292 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
295 if (seteuid(uid
) < 0) {
301 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, sa_len
) < 0 ? -errno
: 0;
303 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
304 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
306 if (uid_is_valid(uid
))
307 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
310 if (gid_is_valid(gid
))
311 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
316 static int connect_logger_as(
318 const ExecContext
*context
,
319 const ExecParameters
*params
,
326 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
331 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
335 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
339 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, context
->log_namespace
, uid
, gid
);
343 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0)
346 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
356 context
->syslog_identifier
?: ident
,
357 params
->flags
& EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT
? unit
->id
: "",
358 context
->syslog_priority
,
359 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
361 is_kmsg_output(output
),
362 is_terminal_output(output
)) < 0)
365 return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd
), nfd
, false);
368 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, int flags
, int nfd
) {
374 fd
= open_terminal(path
, flags
| O_NOCTTY
);
378 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
381 static int acquire_path(const char *path
, int flags
, mode_t mode
) {
382 union sockaddr_union sa
;
384 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
389 if (IN_SET(flags
& O_ACCMODE
, O_WRONLY
, O_RDWR
))
392 fd
= open(path
, flags
|O_NOCTTY
, mode
);
396 if (errno
!= ENXIO
) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */
399 /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */
401 r
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, path
);
403 return r
== -EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: r
;
406 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
410 if (connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, sa_len
) < 0)
411 return errno
== EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: -errno
; /* Propagate initial error if we get EINVAL, i.e. we have
412 * indication that this wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */
414 if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_RDONLY
)
415 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_WR
);
416 else if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_WRONLY
)
417 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
);
426 static int fixup_input(
427 const ExecContext
*context
,
429 bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
435 std_input
= context
->std_input
;
437 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
438 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
440 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
441 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
443 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_DATA
&& context
->stdin_data_size
== 0)
444 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
449 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
451 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
452 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
457 static int setup_input(
458 const ExecContext
*context
,
459 const ExecParameters
*params
,
461 const int named_iofds
[static 3]) {
469 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
470 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
473 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
474 if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO
)) {
475 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
476 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
482 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
486 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
487 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
490 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
491 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
494 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
495 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY
:
496 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE
:
497 ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
,
502 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
505 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
506 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
508 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
510 case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
:
511 assert(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] >= 0);
513 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], false);
514 return dup2(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
516 case EXEC_INPUT_DATA
: {
519 fd
= acquire_data_fd(context
->stdin_data
, context
->stdin_data_size
, 0);
523 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
526 case EXEC_INPUT_FILE
: {
530 assert(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
532 rw
= (context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) ||
533 (context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]));
535 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], rw
? O_RDWR
: O_RDONLY
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
539 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
543 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
547 static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(
548 const ExecContext
*context
,
554 /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the
557 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
562 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
563 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
565 if (IN_SET(e
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
))
566 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
571 static int setup_output(
573 const ExecContext
*context
,
574 const ExecParameters
*params
,
577 const int named_iofds
[static 3],
581 dev_t
*journal_stream_dev
,
582 ino_t
*journal_stream_ino
) {
592 assert(journal_stream_dev
);
593 assert(journal_stream_ino
);
595 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
597 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
600 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
603 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
604 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
607 return STDERR_FILENO
;
610 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
611 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
613 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
615 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
617 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
619 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
620 * the way and are not on a tty */
621 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
622 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
623 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
624 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
628 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
629 if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context
, o
, e
))
630 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
634 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
635 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
636 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
637 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
639 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */
640 if (!IN_SET(i
, EXEC_INPUT_NULL
, EXEC_INPUT_DATA
))
641 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
643 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
647 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
648 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
653 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
654 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
656 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
657 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
658 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
660 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
661 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
663 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
664 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
665 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
666 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
667 r
= connect_logger_as(unit
, context
, params
, o
, ident
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
669 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
670 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
674 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
675 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
676 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not.
678 * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data
679 * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */
681 if (fstat(fileno
, &st
) >= 0 &&
682 (*journal_stream_ino
== 0 || fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
)) {
683 *journal_stream_dev
= st
.st_dev
;
684 *journal_stream_ino
= st
.st_ino
;
689 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
690 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
692 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
694 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
:
695 assert(named_iofds
[fileno
] >= 0);
697 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[fileno
], false);
698 return dup2(named_iofds
[fileno
], fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
700 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
:
701 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
:
702 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
: {
706 assert(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
]);
708 rw
= context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
&&
709 streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
712 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
715 if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
717 else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
)
720 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], flags
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
724 return move_fd(fd
, fileno
, 0);
728 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
732 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
737 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
738 if (isatty(fd
) < 1) {
739 if (IN_SET(errno
, EINVAL
, ENOTTY
))
740 return 0; /* not a tty */
745 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
746 r
= fchmod_and_chown(fd
, TTY_MODE
, uid
, -1);
753 static int setup_confirm_stdio(const char *vc
, int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
754 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
757 assert(_saved_stdin
);
758 assert(_saved_stdout
);
760 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
764 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
765 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
768 fd
= acquire_terminal(vc
, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
772 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
776 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
780 r
= rearrange_stdio(fd
, fd
, STDERR_FILENO
);
785 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
786 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
788 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
793 static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err
, int fd
, const Unit
*u
) {
796 if (err
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
797 dprintf(fd
, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
800 dprintf(fd
, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
804 static void write_confirm_error(int err
, const char *vc
, const Unit
*u
) {
805 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
809 fd
= open_terminal(vc
, O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
813 write_confirm_error_fd(err
, fd
, u
);
816 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
820 assert(saved_stdout
);
824 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
825 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
828 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
829 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
832 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
833 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
839 CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
= -1,
840 CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
= 0,
844 static int ask_for_confirmation(const char *vc
, Unit
*u
, const char *cmdline
) {
845 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
846 _cleanup_free_
char *e
= NULL
;
849 /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */
850 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(vc
, &saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
852 write_confirm_error(r
, vc
, u
);
853 return CONFIRM_EXECUTE
;
856 /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */
857 if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u
->manager
)) {
862 e
= ellipsize(cmdline
, 60, 100);
870 r
= ask_char(&c
, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e
);
872 write_confirm_error_fd(r
, STDOUT_FILENO
, u
);
879 printf("Resuming normal execution.\n");
880 manager_disable_confirm_spawn();
884 unit_dump(u
, stdout
, " ");
885 continue; /* ask again */
887 printf("Failing execution.\n");
888 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
;
891 printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n"
892 " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n"
893 " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n"
895 " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n"
896 " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n"
897 " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n"
898 " y - yes, execute the command\n");
899 continue; /* ask again */
901 printf(" Description: %s\n"
904 u
->id
, u
->description
, cmdline
);
905 continue; /* ask again */
907 manager_dump_jobs(u
->manager
, stdout
, " ");
908 continue; /* ask again */
910 /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */
911 printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n");
912 continue; /* ask again */
914 printf("Skipping execution.\n");
915 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
;
921 assert_not_reached("Unhandled choice");
927 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
931 static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **user
,
932 uid_t
*uid
, gid_t
*gid
,
933 const char **home
, const char **shell
) {
942 /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway
943 * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */
946 r
= get_user_creds(&name
, uid
, gid
, home
, shell
, USER_CREDS_CLEAN
);
954 static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **group
, gid_t
*gid
) {
964 r
= get_group_creds(&name
, gid
, 0);
972 static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *user
,
973 const char *group
, gid_t gid
,
974 gid_t
**supplementary_gids
, int *ngids
) {
978 bool keep_groups
= false;
979 gid_t
*groups
= NULL
;
980 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*l_gids
= NULL
;
985 * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list.
986 * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups
987 * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary
988 * groups of the caller.
990 if (user
&& gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= 0) {
991 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
992 if (initgroups(user
, gid
) < 0)
998 if (strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
))
1002 * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to
1003 * be positive, otherwise fail.
1006 ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
);
1007 if (ngroups_max
<= 0)
1008 return errno_or_else(EOPNOTSUPP
);
1010 l_gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
);
1016 * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we
1017 * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0.
1020 if (getgrouplist(user
, gid
, l_gids
, &k
) < 0)
1025 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->supplementary_groups
) {
1028 if (k
>= ngroups_max
)
1032 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, l_gids
+k
, 0);
1040 * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens
1041 * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty.
1048 /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */
1049 groups
= memdup(l_gids
, sizeof(gid_t
) * k
);
1053 *supplementary_gids
= groups
;
1061 static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid
, const gid_t
*supplementary_gids
, int ngids
) {
1064 /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */
1066 r
= maybe_setgroups(ngids
, supplementary_gids
);
1071 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1072 /* Then set our gids */
1073 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1080 static int set_securebits(int bits
, int mask
) {
1081 int current
, applied
;
1082 current
= prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
);
1085 /* Clear all securebits defined in mask and set bits */
1086 applied
= (current
& ~mask
) | bits
;
1087 if (current
== applied
)
1089 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, applied
) < 0)
1094 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
1098 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
1101 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
1102 * capabilities while doing so. For setting secure bits the capability CAP_SETPCAP is
1103 * required, so we also need keep-caps in this case.
1106 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0 || context
->secure_bits
!= 0) {
1108 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
1109 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
1110 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
1112 /* Add KEEP_CAPS to the securebits */
1113 r
= set_securebits(1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
, 0);
1119 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
1120 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1123 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
1124 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
1125 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
1126 later. This is done outside of this call. */
1133 static int null_conv(
1135 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
1136 struct pam_response
**resp
,
1137 void *appdata_ptr
) {
1139 /* We don't support conversations */
1141 return PAM_CONV_ERR
;
1146 static int setup_pam(
1153 const int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
1157 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
1162 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
1163 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
1165 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
1166 char **nv
, **e
= NULL
;
1167 bool close_session
= false;
1168 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
1175 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
1176 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
1177 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
1178 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
1179 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
1180 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
1182 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
1186 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
1187 flags
|= PAM_SILENT
;
1189 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
1190 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1196 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
;
1198 /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure
1199 * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */
1201 if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO
, &q
) >= 0)
1202 tty
= strjoina("/dev/", q
);
1206 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
1207 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1211 STRV_FOREACH(nv
, *env
) {
1212 pam_code
= pam_putenv(handle
, *nv
);
1213 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1217 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
1218 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1221 pam_code
= pam_setcred(handle
, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED
| flags
);
1222 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1223 log_debug("pam_setcred() failed, ignoring: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1225 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
1226 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1229 close_session
= true;
1231 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
1233 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
1237 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
1240 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
1242 parent_pid
= getpid_cached();
1244 r
= safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid
);
1248 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
1250 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
1252 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
1254 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only
1255 * those fds are open here that have been opened by PAM. */
1256 (void) close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
1258 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
1259 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
1260 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
1261 * to fail to exit normally */
1263 r
= maybe_setgroups(0, NULL
);
1265 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m");
1266 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1267 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m");
1268 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1269 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
1271 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1273 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
1274 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
1275 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
1276 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
1277 * to do the rest for us. */
1278 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
1281 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
1282 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
1283 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call.
1285 * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore
1286 * return failure here. */
1287 (void) barrier_place(&barrier
);
1289 /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */
1290 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
1293 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
1294 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
1297 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
1304 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
1309 pam_code
= pam_setcred(handle
, PAM_DELETE_CRED
| flags
);
1310 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1313 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
1314 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
1315 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1316 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1323 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1327 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
1329 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
1330 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
1333 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
1334 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
1336 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
1337 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
1340 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
1341 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
1342 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
1343 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1345 return strv_free_and_replace(*env
, e
);
1348 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1349 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1350 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1352 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
1356 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1358 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1370 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
1371 char process_name
[11];
1375 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1376 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1380 rename_process("(...)");
1386 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1387 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1393 process_name
[0] = '(';
1394 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1395 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1396 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1398 rename_process(process_name
);
1401 static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1404 return c
->address_families_allow_list
||
1405 !set_isempty(c
->address_families
);
1408 static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1411 return c
->syscall_allow_list
||
1412 !hashmap_isempty(c
->syscall_filter
);
1415 static bool context_has_syscall_logs(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1418 return c
->syscall_log_allow_list
||
1419 !hashmap_isempty(c
->syscall_log
);
1422 static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1425 if (c
->no_new_privileges
)
1428 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */
1431 /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
1432 return context_has_address_families(c
) ||
1433 c
->memory_deny_write_execute
||
1434 c
->restrict_realtime
||
1435 c
->restrict_suid_sgid
||
1436 exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
) ||
1438 c
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1439 c
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1440 c
->protect_kernel_logs
||
1441 c
->private_devices
||
1442 context_has_syscall_filters(c
) ||
1443 context_has_syscall_logs(c
) ||
1444 !set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
) ||
1445 c
->lock_personality
||
1446 c
->protect_hostname
;
1449 static bool exec_context_has_credentials(const ExecContext
*context
) {
1453 return !hashmap_isempty(context
->set_credentials
) ||
1454 context
->load_credentials
;
1459 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit
* u
, const char* msg
) {
1461 if (is_seccomp_available())
1464 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg
);
1468 static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
, bool needs_ambient_hack
) {
1469 uint32_t negative_action
, default_action
, action
;
1475 if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c
))
1478 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallFilter="))
1481 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL
? scmp_act_kill_process() : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1483 if (c
->syscall_allow_list
) {
1484 default_action
= negative_action
;
1485 action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1487 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1488 action
= negative_action
;
1491 if (needs_ambient_hack
) {
1492 r
= seccomp_filter_set_add(c
->syscall_filter
, c
->syscall_allow_list
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID
);
1497 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action
, c
->syscall_filter
, action
, false);
1500 static int apply_syscall_log(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1502 uint32_t default_action
, action
;
1508 if (!context_has_syscall_logs(c
))
1512 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallLog="))
1515 if (c
->syscall_log_allow_list
) {
1516 /* Log nothing but the ones listed */
1517 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1518 action
= SCMP_ACT_LOG
;
1520 /* Log everything but the ones listed */
1521 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_LOG
;
1522 action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1525 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action
, c
->syscall_log
, action
, false);
1527 /* old libseccomp */
1528 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP feature SCMP_ACT_LOG not available, skipping SystemCallLog=");
1533 static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1537 if (set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
))
1540 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallArchitectures="))
1543 return seccomp_restrict_archs(c
->syscall_archs
);
1546 static int apply_address_families(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1550 if (!context_has_address_families(c
))
1553 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
1556 return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c
->address_families
, c
->address_families_allow_list
);
1559 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1563 if (!c
->memory_deny_write_execute
)
1566 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
1569 return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute();
1572 static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1576 if (!c
->restrict_realtime
)
1579 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictRealtime="))
1582 return seccomp_restrict_realtime();
1585 static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1589 if (!c
->restrict_suid_sgid
)
1592 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictSUIDSGID="))
1595 return seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid();
1598 static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1602 /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but
1603 * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */
1605 if (!c
->protect_kernel_tunables
)
1608 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
1611 return seccomp_protect_sysctl();
1614 static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1618 /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
1620 if (!c
->protect_kernel_modules
)
1623 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelModules="))
1626 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1629 static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1633 if (!c
->protect_kernel_logs
)
1636 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelLogs="))
1639 return seccomp_protect_syslog();
1642 static int apply_protect_clock(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1646 if (!c
->protect_clock
)
1649 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectClock="))
1652 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1655 static int apply_private_devices(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1659 /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
1661 if (!c
->private_devices
)
1664 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "PrivateDevices="))
1667 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1670 static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1674 if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
))
1677 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictNamespaces="))
1680 return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c
->restrict_namespaces
);
1683 static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1684 unsigned long personality
;
1690 if (!c
->lock_personality
)
1693 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "LockPersonality="))
1696 personality
= c
->personality
;
1698 /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */
1699 if (personality
== PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
1701 r
= opinionated_personality(&personality
);
1706 return seccomp_lock_personality(personality
);
1711 static int apply_protect_hostname(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
, int *ret_exit_status
) {
1715 if (!c
->protect_hostname
)
1718 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS
)) {
1719 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS
) < 0) {
1720 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno
)) {
1721 *ret_exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
1722 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m");
1725 log_unit_warning(u
, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but UTS namespace setup is prohibited (container manager?), ignoring namespace setup.");
1728 log_unit_warning(u
, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup.");
1733 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectHostname="))
1736 r
= seccomp_protect_hostname();
1738 *ret_exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
1739 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m");
1746 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[static 4]) {
1749 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1750 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1752 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1755 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1757 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1760 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1761 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1763 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1764 (void) fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1767 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1771 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1774 static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t
);
1776 static int build_environment(
1778 const ExecContext
*c
,
1779 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1782 const char *username
,
1784 dev_t journal_stream_dev
,
1785 ino_t journal_stream_ino
,
1788 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1797 #define N_ENV_VARS 16
1798 our_env
= new0(char*, N_ENV_VARS
+ _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1803 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1805 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1807 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1809 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds
) < 0)
1811 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1813 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1817 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
);
1820 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1823 if ((p
->flags
& EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG
) && p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1824 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1826 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1828 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1830 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1833 /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
1834 * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
1835 * check the database directly. */
1836 if (p
->flags
& EXEC_NSS_BYPASS_BUS
) {
1837 x
= strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
1840 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1844 x
= strjoin("HOME=", home
);
1848 path_simplify(x
+ 5, true);
1849 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1853 x
= strjoin("LOGNAME=", username
);
1856 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1858 x
= strjoin("USER=", username
);
1861 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1865 x
= strjoin("SHELL=", shell
);
1869 path_simplify(x
+ 6, true);
1870 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1873 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
1874 if (asprintf(&x
, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR
, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u
->invocation_id
)) < 0)
1877 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1880 if (exec_context_needs_term(c
)) {
1881 const char *tty_path
, *term
= NULL
;
1883 tty_path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
1885 /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try
1886 * to inherit the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the
1887 * container manager passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
1889 if (path_equal_ptr(tty_path
, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
1890 term
= getenv("TERM");
1893 term
= default_term_for_tty(tty_path
);
1895 x
= strjoin("TERM=", term
);
1898 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1901 if (journal_stream_dev
!= 0 && journal_stream_ino
!= 0) {
1902 if (asprintf(&x
, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT
":" INO_FMT
, journal_stream_dev
, journal_stream_ino
) < 0)
1905 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1908 if (c
->log_namespace
) {
1909 x
= strjoin("LOG_NAMESPACE=", c
->log_namespace
);
1913 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1916 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1917 _cleanup_free_
char *pre
= NULL
, *joined
= NULL
;
1923 if (strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1926 n
= exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t
);
1930 pre
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/");
1934 joined
= strv_join_full(c
->directories
[t
].paths
, ":", pre
, true);
1938 x
= strjoin(n
, "=", joined
);
1942 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1945 if (exec_context_has_credentials(c
) && p
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
]) {
1946 x
= strjoin("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY=", p
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "/credentials/", u
->id
);
1950 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1953 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1954 assert(n_env
<= N_ENV_VARS
+ _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1957 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(our_env
);
1962 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1963 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1964 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1967 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1968 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1974 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
);
1978 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1981 pass_env
[n_env
++] = TAKE_PTR(x
);
1982 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1985 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(pass_env
);
1990 bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1991 const ExecContext
*context
,
1992 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1993 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1997 if (context
->root_image
)
2000 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_paths
) ||
2001 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_paths
) ||
2002 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_paths
))
2005 if (context
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
2008 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
2011 if (context
->n_mount_images
> 0)
2014 if (!IN_SET(context
->mount_flags
, 0, MS_SHARED
))
2017 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
2020 if (context
->private_devices
||
2021 context
->private_mounts
||
2022 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
2023 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
||
2024 context
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
2025 context
->protect_kernel_modules
||
2026 context
->protect_kernel_logs
||
2027 context
->protect_control_groups
||
2028 context
->protect_proc
!= PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT
||
2029 context
->proc_subset
!= PROC_SUBSET_ALL
)
2032 if (context
->root_directory
) {
2033 if (exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context
))
2036 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2037 if (params
&& !params
->prefix
[t
])
2040 if (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
2045 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2046 (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
].paths
) ||
2047 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
].paths
) ||
2048 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
].paths
)))
2051 if (context
->log_namespace
)
2057 static int setup_private_users(uid_t ouid
, gid_t ogid
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
2058 _cleanup_free_
char *uid_map
= NULL
, *gid_map
= NULL
;
2059 _cleanup_close_pair_
int errno_pipe
[2] = { -1, -1 };
2060 _cleanup_close_
int unshare_ready_fd
= -1;
2061 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp
) pid_t pid
= 0;
2066 /* Set up a user namespace and map the original UID/GID (IDs from before any user or group changes, i.e.
2067 * the IDs from the user or system manager(s)) to itself, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to
2068 * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which
2069 * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process,
2070 * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The
2071 * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and
2072 * continues execution normally.
2073 * For unprivileged users (i.e. without capabilities), the root to root mapping is excluded. As such, it
2074 * does not need CAP_SETUID to write the single line mapping to itself. */
2076 /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETUID. */
2077 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETUID
) && uid
!= ouid
&& uid_is_valid(uid
))
2078 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
2079 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n" /* Map $OUID → $OUID */
2080 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */
2081 ouid
, ouid
, uid
, uid
);
2083 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
2084 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $OUID → $OUID */
2090 /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETGID. */
2091 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETGID
) && gid
!= ogid
&& gid_is_valid(gid
))
2092 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
2093 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n" /* Map $OGID → $OGID */
2094 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */
2095 ogid
, ogid
, gid
, gid
);
2097 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
2098 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $OGID -> $OGID */
2104 /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user
2106 unshare_ready_fd
= eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC
);
2107 if (unshare_ready_fd
< 0)
2110 /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it
2112 if (pipe2(errno_pipe
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0)
2115 r
= safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS
|FORK_DEATHSIG
, &pid
);
2119 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
2123 /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from
2124 * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */
2127 errno_pipe
[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[0]);
2129 /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */
2130 if (read(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0) {
2135 /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */
2136 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "setgroups");
2137 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2139 if (errno
!= ENOENT
) {
2144 /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */
2146 if (write(fd
, "deny\n", 5) < 0) {
2151 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
2154 /* First write the GID map */
2155 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "gid_map");
2156 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2161 if (write(fd
, gid_map
, strlen(gid_map
)) < 0) {
2165 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
2167 /* The write the UID map */
2168 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "uid_map");
2169 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2174 if (write(fd
, uid_map
, strlen(uid_map
)) < 0) {
2179 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
2182 (void) write(errno_pipe
[1], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2183 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
2186 errno_pipe
[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[1]);
2188 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER
) < 0)
2191 /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */
2192 if (write(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0)
2195 /* Try to read an error code from the child */
2196 n
= read(errno_pipe
[0], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2199 if (n
== sizeof(r
)) { /* an error code was sent to us */
2204 if (n
!= 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */
2207 r
= wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", pid
, 0);
2211 if (r
!= EXIT_SUCCESS
) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */
2217 static bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext
*context
, ExecDirectoryType type
) {
2218 if (!context
->dynamic_user
)
2221 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
2224 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
&& context
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
== EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
)
2230 static int setup_exec_directory(
2231 const ExecContext
*context
,
2232 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2235 ExecDirectoryType type
,
2238 static const int exit_status_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
2239 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
,
2240 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY
,
2241 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY
,
2242 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY
,
2243 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY
,
2250 assert(type
>= 0 && type
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
2251 assert(exit_status
);
2253 if (!params
->prefix
[type
])
2256 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES
) {
2257 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
2259 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
))
2263 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->directories
[type
].paths
) {
2264 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
, *pp
= NULL
;
2266 p
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], *rt
);
2272 r
= mkdir_parents_label(p
, 0755);
2276 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, type
)) {
2277 _cleanup_free_
char *private_root
= NULL
;
2279 /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that
2280 * case we want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by
2281 * a dynamic user whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same
2282 * trick used by container managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of
2283 * the same UID in containers: we place everything inside a directory that has an
2284 * access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root, so that it acts as security boundary
2285 * for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing to make this directory
2286 * permeable for the service itself.
2288 * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create
2289 * a directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place
2290 * "foo" inside of that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to
2291 * "private/foo". This way, privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but
2292 * unprivileged host users can't look into it. Inside of the namespace of the unit
2293 * "private/" is replaced by a more liberally accessible tmpfs, into which the host's
2294 * "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus disabling the access boundary
2295 * for the service and making sure it only gets access to the dirs it needs but no
2296 * others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works!
2298 * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not
2299 * to be owned by the service itself.
2301 * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used
2302 * for sharing files or sockets with other services. */
2304 private_root
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], "private");
2305 if (!private_root
) {
2310 /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */
2311 r
= mkdir_safe_label(private_root
, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE
);
2315 pp
= path_join(private_root
, *rt
);
2321 /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */
2322 r
= mkdir_parents_label(pp
, 0755);
2326 if (is_dir(p
, false) > 0 &&
2327 (laccess(pp
, F_OK
) < 0 && errno
== ENOENT
)) {
2329 /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move
2330 * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use
2331 * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */
2333 log_info("Found pre-existing public %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n"
2334 "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned off, and has now turned it on.",
2335 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), p
, pp
);
2337 if (rename(p
, pp
) < 0) {
2342 /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */
2344 r
= mkdir_label(pp
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2345 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2349 /* And link it up from the original place */
2350 r
= symlink_idempotent(pp
, p
, true);
2355 _cleanup_free_
char *target
= NULL
;
2357 if (type
!= EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
&&
2358 readlink_and_make_absolute(p
, &target
) >= 0) {
2359 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
, *q_resolved
= NULL
, *target_resolved
= NULL
;
2361 /* This already exists and is a symlink? Interesting. Maybe it's one created
2362 * by DynamicUser=1 (see above)?
2364 * We do this for all directory types except for ConfigurationDirectory=,
2365 * since they all support the private/ symlink logic at least in some
2366 * configurations, see above. */
2368 r
= chase_symlinks(target
, NULL
, 0, &target_resolved
, NULL
);
2372 q
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], "private", *rt
);
2378 /* /var/lib or friends may be symlinks. So, let's chase them also. */
2379 r
= chase_symlinks(q
, NULL
, CHASE_NONEXISTENT
, &q_resolved
, NULL
);
2383 if (path_equal(q_resolved
, target_resolved
)) {
2385 /* Hmm, apparently DynamicUser= was once turned on for this service,
2386 * but is no longer. Let's move the directory back up. */
2388 log_info("Found pre-existing private %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n"
2389 "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned on, and has now turned it off.",
2390 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), q
, p
);
2392 if (unlink(p
) < 0) {
2397 if (rename(q
, p
) < 0) {
2404 r
= mkdir_label(p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2409 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) {
2412 /* Don't change the owner/access mode of the configuration directory,
2413 * as in the common case it is not written to by a service, and shall
2414 * not be writable. */
2416 if (stat(p
, &st
) < 0) {
2421 /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */
2422 if (((st
.st_mode
^ context
->directories
[type
].mode
) & 07777) != 0)
2423 log_warning("%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. "
2424 "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)",
2425 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), *rt
,
2426 st
.st_mode
& 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), context
->directories
[type
].mode
& 07777);
2433 /* Lock down the access mode (we use chmod_and_chown() to make this idempotent. We don't
2434 * specify UID/GID here, so that path_chown_recursive() can optimize things depending on the
2435 * current UID/GID ownership.) */
2436 r
= chmod_and_chown(pp
?: p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
, UID_INVALID
, GID_INVALID
);
2440 /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary. When dynamic users are used we
2441 * drop the suid/sgid bits, since we really don't want SUID/SGID files for dynamic UID/GID
2442 * assignments to exist.*/
2443 r
= path_chown_recursive(pp
?: p
, uid
, gid
, context
->dynamic_user
? 01777 : 07777);
2451 *exit_status
= exit_status_table
[type
];
2455 static int write_credential(
2461 bool ownership_ok
) {
2463 _cleanup_(unlink_and_freep
) char *tmp
= NULL
;
2464 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
2467 r
= tempfn_random_child("", "cred", &tmp
);
2471 fd
= openat(dfd
, tmp
, O_CREAT
|O_RDWR
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_EXCL
|O_NOFOLLOW
|O_NOCTTY
, 0600);
2477 r
= loop_write(fd
, data
, size
, /* do_pool = */ false);
2481 if (fchmod(fd
, 0400) < 0) /* Take away "w" bit */
2484 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= getuid()) {
2485 r
= fd_add_uid_acl_permission(fd
, uid
, ACL_READ
);
2487 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
2490 if (!ownership_ok
) /* Ideally we use ACLs, since we can neatly express what we want
2491 * to express: that the user gets read access and nothing
2492 * else. But if the backing fs can't support that (e.g. ramfs)
2493 * then we can use file ownership instead. But that's only safe if
2494 * we can then re-mount the whole thing read-only, so that the
2495 * user can no longer chmod() the file to gain write access. */
2498 if (fchown(fd
, uid
, (gid_t
) -1) < 0)
2503 if (renameat(dfd
, tmp
, dfd
, id
) < 0)
2510 #define CREDENTIALS_BYTES_MAX (1024LU * 1024LU) /* Refuse to pass more than 1M, after all this is unswappable memory */
2512 static int acquire_credentials(
2513 const ExecContext
*context
,
2514 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2518 bool ownership_ok
) {
2520 uint64_t left
= CREDENTIALS_BYTES_MAX
;
2521 _cleanup_close_
int dfd
= -1;
2522 ExecSetCredential
*sc
;
2529 dfd
= open(p
, O_DIRECTORY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2533 /* First we use the literally specified credentials. Note that they might be overridden again below,
2534 * and thus act as a "default" if the same credential is specified multiple times */
2535 HASHMAP_FOREACH(sc
, context
->set_credentials
) {
2538 add
= strlen(sc
->id
) + sc
->size
;
2542 r
= write_credential(dfd
, sc
->id
, sc
->data
, sc
->size
, uid
, ownership_ok
);
2549 /* Then, load credential off disk (or acquire via AF_UNIX socket) */
2550 STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(id
, fn
, context
->load_credentials
) {
2551 ReadFullFileFlags flags
= READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE
;
2552 _cleanup_(erase_and_freep
) char *data
= NULL
;
2553 _cleanup_free_
char *j
= NULL
, *bindname
= NULL
;
2557 if (path_is_absolute(*fn
)) {
2558 /* If this is an absolute path, read the data directly from it, and support AF_UNIX sockets */
2560 flags
|= READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET
;
2562 /* Pass some minimal info about the unit and the credential name we are looking to acquire
2563 * via the source socket address in case we read off an AF_UNIX socket. */
2564 if (asprintf(&bindname
, "@%" PRIx64
"/unit/%s/%s", random_u64(), unit
, *id
) < 0)
2567 } else if (params
->received_credentials
) {
2568 /* If this is a relative path, take it relative to the credentials we received
2569 * ourselves. We don't support the AF_UNIX stuff in this mode, since we are operating
2570 * on a credential store, i.e. this is guaranteed to be regular files. */
2571 j
= path_join(params
->received_credentials
, *fn
);
2581 r
= read_full_file_full(AT_FDCWD
, source
, UINT64_MAX
, SIZE_MAX
, flags
, bindname
, &data
, &size
);
2585 faccessat(dfd
, *id
, F_OK
, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
) >= 0) /* If the source file doesn't exist, but we already acquired the key otherwise, then don't fail */
2590 add
= strlen(*id
) + size
;
2594 r
= write_credential(dfd
, *id
, data
, size
, uid
, ownership_ok
);
2601 if (fchmod(dfd
, 0500) < 0) /* Now take away the "w" bit */
2604 /* After we created all keys with the right perms, also make sure the credential store as a whole is
2607 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= getuid()) {
2608 r
= fd_add_uid_acl_permission(dfd
, uid
, ACL_READ
| ACL_EXECUTE
);
2610 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
2616 if (fchown(dfd
, uid
, (gid_t
) -1) < 0)
2624 static int setup_credentials_internal(
2625 const ExecContext
*context
,
2626 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2628 const char *final
, /* This is where the credential store shall eventually end up at */
2629 const char *workspace
, /* This is where we can prepare it before moving it to the final place */
2630 bool reuse_workspace
, /* Whether to reuse any existing workspace mount if it already is a mount */
2631 bool must_mount
, /* Whether to require that we mount something, it's not OK to use the plain directory fall back */
2634 int r
, workspace_mounted
; /* negative if we don't know yet whether we have/can mount something; true
2635 * if we mounted something; false if we definitely can't mount anything */
2643 if (reuse_workspace
) {
2644 r
= path_is_mount_point(workspace
, NULL
, 0);
2648 workspace_mounted
= true; /* If this is already a mount, and we are supposed to reuse it, let's keep this in mind */
2650 workspace_mounted
= -1; /* We need to figure out if we can mount something to the workspace */
2652 workspace_mounted
= -1; /* ditto */
2654 r
= path_is_mount_point(final
, NULL
, 0);
2658 /* If the final place already has something mounted, we use that. If the workspace also has
2659 * something mounted we assume it's actually the same mount (but with MS_RDONLY
2661 final_mounted
= true;
2663 if (workspace_mounted
< 0) {
2664 /* If the final place is mounted, but the workspace we isn't, then let's bind mount
2665 * the final version to the workspace, and make it writable, so that we can make
2668 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, final
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REC
, NULL
);
2672 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REMOUNT
|MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, NULL
);
2676 workspace_mounted
= true;
2679 final_mounted
= false;
2681 if (workspace_mounted
< 0) {
2682 /* Nothing is mounted on the workspace yet, let's try to mount something now */
2683 for (int try = 0;; try++) {
2686 /* Try "ramfs" first, since it's not swap backed */
2687 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, "ramfs", workspace
, "ramfs", MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, "mode=0700");
2689 workspace_mounted
= true;
2693 } else if (try == 1) {
2694 _cleanup_free_
char *opts
= NULL
;
2696 if (asprintf(&opts
, "mode=0700,nr_inodes=1024,size=%lu", CREDENTIALS_BYTES_MAX
) < 0)
2699 /* Fall back to "tmpfs" otherwise */
2700 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, "tmpfs", workspace
, "tmpfs", MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, opts
);
2702 workspace_mounted
= true;
2707 /* If that didn't work, try to make a bind mount from the final to the workspace, so that we can make it writable there. */
2708 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, final
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REC
, NULL
);
2710 if (!ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
)) /* Propagate anything that isn't a permission problem */
2713 if (must_mount
) /* If we it's not OK to use the plain directory
2714 * fallback, propagate all errors too */
2717 /* If we lack privileges to bind mount stuff, then let's gracefully
2718 * proceed for compat with container envs, and just use the final dir
2721 workspace_mounted
= false;
2725 /* Make the new bind mount writable (i.e. drop MS_RDONLY) */
2726 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REMOUNT
|MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, NULL
);
2730 workspace_mounted
= true;
2736 assert(!must_mount
|| workspace_mounted
> 0);
2737 where
= workspace_mounted
? workspace
: final
;
2739 r
= acquire_credentials(context
, params
, unit
, where
, uid
, workspace_mounted
);
2743 if (workspace_mounted
) {
2744 /* Make workspace read-only now, so that any bind mount we make from it defaults to read-only too */
2745 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REMOUNT
|MS_RDONLY
|MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, NULL
);
2749 /* And mount it to the final place, read-only */
2751 r
= umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, workspace
, MNT_DETACH
|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW
);
2753 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, workspace
, final
, NULL
, MS_MOVE
, NULL
);
2757 _cleanup_free_
char *parent
= NULL
;
2759 /* If we do not have our own mount put used the plain directory fallback, then we need to
2760 * open access to the top-level credential directory and the per-service directory now */
2762 parent
= dirname_malloc(final
);
2765 if (chmod(parent
, 0755) < 0)
2772 static int setup_credentials(
2773 const ExecContext
*context
,
2774 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2778 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
, *q
= NULL
;
2785 if (!exec_context_has_credentials(context
))
2788 if (!params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
])
2791 /* This where we'll place stuff when we are done; this main credentials directory is world-readable,
2792 * and the subdir we mount over with a read-only file system readable by the service's user */
2793 q
= path_join(params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "credentials");
2797 r
= mkdir_label(q
, 0755); /* top-level dir: world readable/searchable */
2798 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2801 p
= path_join(q
, unit
);
2805 r
= mkdir_label(p
, 0700); /* per-unit dir: private to user */
2806 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2809 r
= safe_fork("(sd-mkdcreds)", FORK_DEATHSIG
|FORK_WAIT
|FORK_NEW_MOUNTNS
, NULL
);
2811 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
, *u
= NULL
;
2813 /* If this is not a privilege or support issue then propagate the error */
2814 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
2817 /* Temporary workspace, that remains inaccessible all the time. We prepare stuff there before moving
2818 * it into place, so that users can't access half-initialized credential stores. */
2819 t
= path_join(params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "systemd/temporary-credentials");
2823 /* We can't set up a mount namespace. In that case operate on a fixed, inaccessible per-unit
2824 * directory outside of /run/credentials/ first, and then move it over to /run/credentials/
2825 * after it is fully set up */
2826 u
= path_join(t
, unit
);
2830 FOREACH_STRING(i
, t
, u
) {
2831 r
= mkdir_label(i
, 0700);
2832 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2836 r
= setup_credentials_internal(
2840 p
, /* final mount point */
2841 u
, /* temporary workspace to overmount */
2842 true, /* reuse the workspace if it is already a mount */
2843 false, /* it's OK to fall back to a plain directory if we can't mount anything */
2846 (void) rmdir(u
); /* remove the workspace again if we can. */
2851 } else if (r
== 0) {
2853 /* We managed to set up a mount namespace, and are now in a child. That's great. In this case
2854 * we can use the same directory for all cases, after turning off propagation. Question
2855 * though is: where do we turn off propagation exactly, and where do we place the workspace
2856 * directory? We need some place that is guaranteed to be a mount point in the host, and
2857 * which is guaranteed to have a subdir we can mount over. /run/ is not suitable for this,
2858 * since we ultimately want to move the resulting file system there, i.e. we need propagation
2859 * for /run/ eventually. We could use our own /run/systemd/bind mount on itself, but that
2860 * would be visible in the host mount table all the time, which we want to avoid. Hence, what
2861 * we do here instead we use /dev/ and /dev/shm/ for our purposes. We know for sure that
2862 * /dev/ is a mount point and we now for sure that /dev/shm/ exists. Hence we can turn off
2863 * propagation on the former, and then overmount the latter.
2865 * Yes it's nasty playing games with /dev/ and /dev/shm/ like this, since it does not exist
2866 * for this purpose, but there are few other candidates that work equally well for us, and
2867 * given that the we do this in a privately namespaced short-lived single-threaded process
2868 * that no one else sees this should be OK to do.*/
2870 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, "/dev", NULL
, MS_SLAVE
|MS_REC
, NULL
); /* Turn off propagation from our namespace to host */
2874 r
= setup_credentials_internal(
2878 p
, /* final mount point */
2879 "/dev/shm", /* temporary workspace to overmount */
2880 false, /* do not reuse /dev/shm if it is already a mount, under no circumstances */
2881 true, /* insist that something is mounted, do not allow fallback to plain directory */
2886 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
2889 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
2896 static int setup_smack(
2897 const ExecContext
*context
,
2898 int executable_fd
) {
2902 assert(executable_fd
>= 0);
2904 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
2905 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
2909 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
2911 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
2913 r
= mac_smack_read_fd(executable_fd
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
2914 if (r
< 0 && !IN_SET(r
, -ENODATA
, -EOPNOTSUPP
))
2917 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
2927 static int compile_bind_mounts(
2928 const ExecContext
*context
,
2929 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2930 BindMount
**ret_bind_mounts
,
2931 size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts
,
2932 char ***ret_empty_directories
) {
2934 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2935 BindMount
*bind_mounts
;
2941 assert(ret_bind_mounts
);
2942 assert(ret_n_bind_mounts
);
2943 assert(ret_empty_directories
);
2945 n
= context
->n_bind_mounts
;
2946 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2947 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2950 n
+= strv_length(context
->directories
[t
].paths
);
2954 *ret_bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2955 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2956 *ret_empty_directories
= NULL
;
2960 bind_mounts
= new(BindMount
, n
);
2964 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< context
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++) {
2965 BindMount
*item
= context
->bind_mounts
+ i
;
2968 s
= strdup(item
->source
);
2974 d
= strdup(item
->destination
);
2981 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2984 .read_only
= item
->read_only
,
2985 .recursive
= item
->recursive
,
2986 .ignore_enoent
= item
->ignore_enoent
,
2990 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2993 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2996 if (strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
2999 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
) &&
3000 !exec_context_with_rootfs(context
)) {
3003 /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own
3004 * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a
3005 * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */
3007 private_root
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], "private");
3008 if (!private_root
) {
3013 r
= strv_consume(&empty_directories
, private_root
);
3018 STRV_FOREACH(suffix
, context
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
3021 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
))
3022 s
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], "private", *suffix
);
3024 s
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], *suffix
);
3030 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
) &&
3031 exec_context_with_rootfs(context
))
3032 /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private
3033 * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory
3034 * on the 'non-private' place. */
3035 d
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], *suffix
);
3044 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
3048 .nosuid
= context
->dynamic_user
, /* don't allow suid/sgid when DynamicUser= is on */
3050 .ignore_enoent
= false,
3057 *ret_bind_mounts
= bind_mounts
;
3058 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= n
;
3059 *ret_empty_directories
= TAKE_PTR(empty_directories
);
3064 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, h
);
3068 static bool insist_on_sandboxing(
3069 const ExecContext
*context
,
3070 const char *root_dir
,
3071 const char *root_image
,
3072 const BindMount
*bind_mounts
,
3073 size_t n_bind_mounts
) {
3076 assert(n_bind_mounts
== 0 || bind_mounts
);
3078 /* Checks whether we need to insist on fs namespacing. i.e. whether we have settings configured that
3079 * would alter the view on the file system beyond making things read-only or invisible, i.e. would
3080 * rearrange stuff in a way we cannot ignore gracefully. */
3082 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
3085 if (root_dir
|| root_image
)
3088 if (context
->n_mount_images
> 0)
3091 if (context
->dynamic_user
)
3094 /* If there are any bind mounts set that don't map back onto themselves, fs namespacing becomes
3096 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
3097 if (!path_equal(bind_mounts
[i
].source
, bind_mounts
[i
].destination
))
3100 if (context
->log_namespace
)
3106 static int apply_mount_namespace(
3108 ExecCommandFlags command_flags
,
3109 const ExecContext
*context
,
3110 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3111 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3112 char **error_path
) {
3114 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
3115 const char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
3116 const char *root_dir
= NULL
, *root_image
= NULL
;
3117 _cleanup_free_
char *creds_path
= NULL
, *incoming_dir
= NULL
, *propagate_dir
= NULL
;
3118 NamespaceInfo ns_info
;
3119 bool needs_sandboxing
;
3120 BindMount
*bind_mounts
= NULL
;
3121 size_t n_bind_mounts
= 0;
3126 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
3127 root_image
= context
->root_image
;
3130 root_dir
= context
->root_directory
;
3133 r
= compile_bind_mounts(context
, params
, &bind_mounts
, &n_bind_mounts
, &empty_directories
);
3137 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command_flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
3138 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3139 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
3140 * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
3141 * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here.
3142 * This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */
3144 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
3145 if (streq_ptr(runtime
->tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
))
3146 tmp_dir
= runtime
->tmp_dir
;
3147 else if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
3148 tmp_dir
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
3150 if (streq_ptr(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
))
3151 var_tmp_dir
= runtime
->var_tmp_dir
;
3152 else if (runtime
->var_tmp_dir
)
3153 var_tmp_dir
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
3156 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
3157 .ignore_protect_paths
= false,
3158 .private_dev
= context
->private_devices
,
3159 .protect_control_groups
= context
->protect_control_groups
,
3160 .protect_kernel_tunables
= context
->protect_kernel_tunables
,
3161 .protect_kernel_modules
= context
->protect_kernel_modules
,
3162 .protect_kernel_logs
= context
->protect_kernel_logs
,
3163 .protect_hostname
= context
->protect_hostname
,
3164 .mount_apivfs
= exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context
),
3165 .private_mounts
= context
->private_mounts
,
3166 .protect_home
= context
->protect_home
,
3167 .protect_system
= context
->protect_system
,
3168 .protect_proc
= context
->protect_proc
,
3169 .proc_subset
= context
->proc_subset
,
3171 } else if (!context
->dynamic_user
&& root_dir
)
3173 * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
3174 * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
3175 * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
3177 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
3178 .ignore_protect_paths
= true,
3181 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {};
3183 if (context
->mount_flags
== MS_SHARED
)
3184 log_unit_debug(u
, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring");
3186 if (exec_context_has_credentials(context
) && params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
]) {
3187 creds_path
= path_join(params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "credentials", u
->id
);
3194 if (MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(u
->manager
)) {
3195 propagate_dir
= path_join("/run/systemd/propagate/", u
->id
);
3198 incoming_dir
= strdup("/run/systemd/incoming");
3203 r
= setup_namespace(root_dir
, root_image
, context
->root_image_options
,
3204 &ns_info
, context
->read_write_paths
,
3205 needs_sandboxing
? context
->read_only_paths
: NULL
,
3206 needs_sandboxing
? context
->inaccessible_paths
: NULL
,
3210 context
->temporary_filesystems
,
3211 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
,
3212 context
->mount_images
,
3213 context
->n_mount_images
,
3217 context
->log_namespace
,
3218 context
->mount_flags
,
3219 context
->root_hash
, context
->root_hash_size
, context
->root_hash_path
,
3220 context
->root_hash_sig
, context
->root_hash_sig_size
, context
->root_hash_sig_path
,
3221 context
->root_verity
,
3224 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP
|DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK
|DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK
,
3227 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports
3228 * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively
3229 * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a
3230 * completely different execution environment. */
3232 if (insist_on_sandboxing(
3234 root_dir
, root_image
,
3237 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n"
3238 "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s",
3239 n_bind_mounts
, context
->n_temporary_filesystems
, yes_no(root_dir
), yes_no(root_image
), yes_no(context
->dynamic_user
));
3243 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring.");
3249 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, n_bind_mounts
);
3253 static int apply_working_directory(
3254 const ExecContext
*context
,
3255 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3262 assert(exit_status
);
3264 if (context
->working_directory_home
) {
3267 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3274 wd
= empty_to_root(context
->working_directory
);
3276 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
)
3279 d
= prefix_roota(context
->root_directory
, wd
);
3281 if (chdir(d
) < 0 && !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
3282 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3289 static int apply_root_directory(
3290 const ExecContext
*context
,
3291 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3292 const bool needs_mount_ns
,
3296 assert(exit_status
);
3298 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
)
3299 if (!needs_mount_ns
&& context
->root_directory
)
3300 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0) {
3301 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
3308 static int setup_keyring(
3310 const ExecContext
*context
,
3311 const ExecParameters
*p
,
3312 uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
3314 key_serial_t keyring
;
3323 /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that
3324 * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond
3325 * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be
3326 * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in
3327 * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where
3328 * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */
3330 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
)
3333 /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up
3334 * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel
3335 * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user
3336 * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */
3338 saved_uid
= getuid();
3339 saved_gid
= getgid();
3341 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
3342 if (setregid(gid
, -1) < 0)
3343 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m");
3346 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
3347 if (setreuid(uid
, -1) < 0) {
3348 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m");
3353 keyring
= keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0, 0, 0);
3354 if (keyring
== -1) {
3355 if (errno
== ENOSYS
)
3356 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring.");
3357 else if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno
))
3358 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring.");
3359 else if (errno
== EDQUOT
)
3360 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring.");
3362 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m");
3367 /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */
3368 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
) {
3370 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK
,
3371 KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING
,
3372 KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0) < 0) {
3373 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m");
3378 /* Restore uid/gid back */
3379 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
3380 if (setreuid(saved_uid
, -1) < 0) {
3381 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m");
3386 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
3387 if (setregid(saved_gid
, -1) < 0)
3388 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m");
3391 /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */
3392 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
3395 key
= add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u
->invocation_id
, sizeof(u
->invocation_id
), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
);
3397 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m");
3399 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM
, key
,
3400 KEY_POS_VIEW
|KEY_POS_READ
|KEY_POS_SEARCH
|
3401 KEY_USR_VIEW
|KEY_USR_READ
|KEY_USR_SEARCH
, 0, 0) < 0)
3402 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m");
3407 /* Revert back uid & gid for the last time, and exit */
3408 /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */
3409 if (getuid() != saved_uid
)
3410 (void) setreuid(saved_uid
, -1);
3412 if (getgid() != saved_gid
)
3413 (void) setregid(saved_gid
, -1);
3418 static void append_socket_pair(int *array
, size_t *n
, const int pair
[static 2]) {
3424 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[0];
3426 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[1];
3429 static int close_remaining_fds(
3430 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3431 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3432 const DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
3435 const int *fds
, size_t n_fds
) {
3437 size_t n_dont_close
= 0;
3438 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 12];
3442 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
3443 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
3444 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
3445 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
3446 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
3447 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
3450 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
3452 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
3453 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
3457 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
3461 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->user
->storage_socket
);
3463 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->group
->storage_socket
);
3466 if (user_lookup_fd
>= 0)
3467 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = user_lookup_fd
;
3469 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
3472 static int send_user_lookup(
3480 /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
3481 * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
3484 if (user_lookup_fd
< 0)
3487 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) && !gid_is_valid(gid
))
3490 if (writev(user_lookup_fd
,
3492 IOVEC_INIT(&uid
, sizeof(uid
)),
3493 IOVEC_INIT(&gid
, sizeof(gid
)),
3494 IOVEC_INIT_STRING(unit
->id
) }, 3) < 0)
3500 static int acquire_home(const ExecContext
*c
, uid_t uid
, const char** home
, char **buf
) {
3507 /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */
3512 if (!c
->working_directory_home
)
3515 r
= get_home_dir(buf
);
3523 static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, char ***ret
) {
3524 _cleanup_strv_free_
char ** list
= NULL
;
3531 assert(c
->dynamic_user
);
3533 /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for
3534 * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special
3537 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
3540 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
3546 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
3549 if (exec_directory_is_private(c
, t
))
3550 e
= path_join(p
->prefix
[t
], "private", *i
);
3552 e
= path_join(p
->prefix
[t
], *i
);
3556 r
= strv_consume(&list
, e
);
3562 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(list
);
3567 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
);
3569 static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters
*params
, char **ret
) {
3570 bool using_subcgroup
;
3576 if (!params
->cgroup_path
)
3579 /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated
3580 * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control
3581 * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one,
3582 * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process,
3583 * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=,
3584 * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre=
3585 * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
3586 * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */
3588 using_subcgroup
= FLAGS_SET(params
->flags
, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
|EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
|EXEC_IS_CONTROL
);
3589 if (using_subcgroup
)
3590 p
= path_join(params
->cgroup_path
, ".control");
3592 p
= strdup(params
->cgroup_path
);
3597 return using_subcgroup
;
3600 static int exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext
*c
, CPUSet
*ret
) {
3601 _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset
) CPUSet s
= {};
3607 if (!c
->numa_policy
.nodes
.set
) {
3608 log_debug("Can't derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask because NUMA mask is not set, ignoring");
3612 r
= numa_to_cpu_set(&c
->numa_policy
, &s
);
3618 return cpu_set_add_all(ret
, &s
);
3621 bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext
*c
) {
3624 return c
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
;
3627 static int add_shifted_fd(int *fds
, size_t fds_size
, size_t *n_fds
, int fd
, int *ret_fd
) {
3632 assert(*n_fds
< fds_size
);
3640 if (fd
< 3 + (int) *n_fds
) {
3641 /* Let's move the fd up, so that it's outside of the fd range we will use to store
3642 * the fds we pass to the process (or which are closed only during execve). */
3644 r
= fcntl(fd
, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC
, 3 + (int) *n_fds
);
3648 CLOSE_AND_REPLACE(fd
, r
);
3651 *ret_fd
= fds
[*n_fds
] = fd
;
3656 static int exec_child(
3658 const ExecCommand
*command
,
3659 const ExecContext
*context
,
3660 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3661 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3662 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
3664 const int named_iofds
[static 3],
3666 size_t n_socket_fds
,
3667 size_t n_storage_fds
,
3672 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **accum_env
= NULL
, **replaced_argv
= NULL
;
3673 int r
, ngids
= 0, exec_fd
;
3674 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*supplementary_gids
= NULL
;
3675 const char *username
= NULL
, *groupname
= NULL
;
3676 _cleanup_free_
char *home_buffer
= NULL
;
3677 const char *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
;
3678 char **final_argv
= NULL
;
3679 dev_t journal_stream_dev
= 0;
3680 ino_t journal_stream_ino
= 0;
3681 bool userns_set_up
= false;
3682 bool needs_sandboxing
, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */
3683 needs_setuid
, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */
3684 needs_mount_namespace
, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */
3685 needs_ambient_hack
; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */
3687 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
3688 bool use_selinux
= false;
3691 bool use_smack
= false;
3694 bool use_apparmor
= false;
3696 uid_t saved_uid
= getuid();
3697 gid_t saved_gid
= getgid();
3698 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
3699 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
3700 size_t n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
, /* fds to pass to the child */
3701 n_keep_fds
; /* total number of fds not to close */
3703 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*gids_after_pam
= NULL
;
3704 int ngids_after_pam
= 0;
3710 assert(exit_status
);
3712 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
3714 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
3715 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
3716 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
3717 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
3718 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
3719 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
3720 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
3722 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
3723 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
3725 r
= reset_signal_mask();
3727 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
3728 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m");
3731 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
3732 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
3734 /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
3735 * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have
3736 * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the
3737 * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */
3740 log_set_open_when_needed(true);
3742 /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */
3745 int keep_fds
[n_fds
+ 2];
3746 memcpy_safe(keep_fds
, fds
, n_fds
* sizeof(int));
3749 r
= add_shifted_fd(keep_fds
, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds
), &n_keep_fds
, params
->exec_fd
, &exec_fd
);
3751 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3752 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
3755 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, dcreds
, user_lookup_fd
, socket_fd
, keep_fds
, n_keep_fds
);
3757 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3758 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m");
3761 if (!context
->same_pgrp
&&
3763 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
3764 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to create new process session: %m");
3767 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
3769 if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit
)) {
3770 const char *vc
= params
->confirm_spawn
;
3771 _cleanup_free_
char *cmdline
= NULL
;
3773 cmdline
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
3775 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3779 r
= ask_for_confirmation(vc
, unit
, cmdline
);
3780 if (r
!= CONFIRM_EXECUTE
) {
3781 if (r
== CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
) {
3782 *exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
3785 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
3786 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ECANCELED
),
3787 "Execution cancelled by the user");
3791 /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is
3792 * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note
3793 * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS
3794 * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they
3795 * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */
3796 if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit
->id
, true) != 0 ||
3797 setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(unit
->manager
) ? "system" : "user", true) != 0) {
3798 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3799 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
3802 if (context
->dynamic_user
&& dcreds
) {
3803 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **suggested_paths
= NULL
;
3805 /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS
3806 * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here.*/
3807 if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) {
3808 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3809 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
3812 r
= compile_suggested_paths(context
, params
, &suggested_paths
);
3814 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3818 r
= dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds
, suggested_paths
, &uid
, &gid
);
3820 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3822 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP
),
3823 "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists.");
3824 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m");
3827 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
3828 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3829 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH
), "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT
"\"", uid
);
3832 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
3833 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3834 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH
), "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT
"\"", gid
);
3838 username
= dcreds
->user
->name
;
3841 r
= get_fixed_user(context
, &username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
3843 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3844 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m");
3847 r
= get_fixed_group(context
, &groupname
, &gid
);
3849 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3850 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m");
3854 /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */
3855 r
= get_supplementary_groups(context
, username
, groupname
, gid
,
3856 &supplementary_gids
, &ngids
);
3858 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3859 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m");
3862 r
= send_user_lookup(unit
, user_lookup_fd
, uid
, gid
);
3864 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3865 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m");
3868 user_lookup_fd
= safe_close(user_lookup_fd
);
3870 r
= acquire_home(context
, uid
, &home
, &home_buffer
);
3872 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3873 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m");
3876 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
3877 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
3879 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
3881 /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields.
3882 * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */
3883 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3884 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3886 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &p
);
3888 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3889 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m");
3892 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, p
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
3894 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3895 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p
);
3899 if (context
->network_namespace_path
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3900 r
= open_netns_path(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
, context
->network_namespace_path
);
3902 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3903 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context
->network_namespace_path
);
3907 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
);
3909 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3910 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard input: %m");
3913 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3915 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
3916 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard output: %m");
3919 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3921 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
3922 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m");
3925 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
3926 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
3927 * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */
3928 r
= set_oom_score_adjust(context
->oom_score_adjust
);
3929 if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
3930 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
3932 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
3933 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m");
3937 if (context
->coredump_filter_set
) {
3938 r
= set_coredump_filter(context
->coredump_filter
);
3939 if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
3940 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter, ignoring: %m");
3942 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter: %m");
3945 if (context
->nice_set
) {
3946 r
= setpriority_closest(context
->nice
);
3948 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m");
3951 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
3952 struct sched_param param
= {
3953 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
3956 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
3957 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
3958 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
3959 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
3962 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
3963 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m");
3967 if (context
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
|| context
->cpu_set
.set
) {
3968 _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset
) CPUSet converted_cpu_set
= {};
3969 const CPUSet
*cpu_set
;
3971 if (context
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
) {
3972 r
= exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(context
, &converted_cpu_set
);
3974 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3975 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask: %m");
3978 cpu_set
= &converted_cpu_set
;
3980 cpu_set
= &context
->cpu_set
;
3982 if (sched_setaffinity(0, cpu_set
->allocated
, cpu_set
->set
) < 0) {
3983 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3984 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m");
3988 if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&context
->numa_policy
))) {
3989 r
= apply_numa_policy(&context
->numa_policy
);
3990 if (r
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
3991 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "NUMA support not available, ignoring.");
3993 *exit_status
= EXIT_NUMA_POLICY
;
3994 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set NUMA memory policy: %m");
3998 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
3999 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
4000 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
4001 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m");
4004 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
4005 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
4006 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
4007 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m");
4010 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
4011 r
= safe_personality(context
->personality
);
4013 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
4014 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m");
4018 if (context
->utmp_id
)
4019 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid_cached(), getsid(0),
4021 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
4022 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
4026 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
4027 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
4029 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
4030 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m");
4034 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1
4035 * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not
4036 * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only
4037 * touch a single hierarchy too. */
4038 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& (params
->flags
& EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
)) {
4039 r
= cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, uid
, gid
);
4041 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
4042 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m");
4046 for (ExecDirectoryType dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
4047 r
= setup_exec_directory(context
, params
, uid
, gid
, dt
, exit_status
);
4049 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params
->prefix
[dt
]);
4052 if (FLAGS_SET(params
->flags
, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS
)) {
4053 r
= setup_credentials(context
, params
, unit
->id
, uid
);
4055 *exit_status
= EXIT_CREDENTIALS
;
4056 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up credentials: %m");
4060 r
= build_environment(
4072 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4076 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
4078 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4082 accum_env
= strv_env_merge(5,
4083 params
->environment
,
4086 context
->environment
,
4089 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4092 accum_env
= strv_env_clean(accum_env
);
4094 (void) umask(context
->umask
);
4096 r
= setup_keyring(unit
, context
, params
, uid
, gid
);
4098 *exit_status
= EXIT_KEYRING
;
4099 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m");
4102 /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted from it */
4103 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
4105 /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps */
4106 needs_ambient_hack
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC
) && !ambient_capabilities_supported();
4108 /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not desired */
4109 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
4110 needs_setuid
= false;
4112 needs_setuid
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID
));
4114 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4115 /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on /sys being
4116 * present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as possible, to avoid
4117 * impacting our own code paths. */
4120 use_selinux
= mac_selinux_use();
4123 use_smack
= mac_smack_use();
4126 use_apparmor
= mac_apparmor_use();
4130 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4133 /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what
4134 * is set here. (See below.) */
4136 r
= setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit
* const *) context
->rlimit
, &which_failed
);
4138 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
4139 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed
));
4143 if (needs_setuid
&& context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
4144 /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits
4145 * wins here. (See above.) */
4147 /* All fds passed in the fds array will be closed in the pam child process. */
4148 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, gid
, context
->tty_path
, &accum_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
4150 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
4151 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m");
4154 ngids_after_pam
= getgroups_alloc(&gids_after_pam
);
4155 if (ngids_after_pam
< 0) {
4156 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4157 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, ngids_after_pam
, "Failed to obtain groups after setting up PAM: %m");
4161 if (needs_sandboxing
&& context
->private_users
&& !have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
4162 /* If we're unprivileged, set up the user namespace first to enable use of the other namespaces.
4163 * Users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can set up user namespaces last because they will be able to
4164 * set up the all of the other namespaces (i.e. network, mount, UTS) without a user namespace. */
4166 userns_set_up
= true;
4167 r
= setup_private_users(saved_uid
, saved_gid
, uid
, gid
);
4169 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
4170 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user: %m");
4174 if ((context
->private_network
|| context
->network_namespace_path
) && runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
4176 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET
)) {
4177 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
4179 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
,
4180 "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but network namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m");
4182 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
4183 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m");
4185 } else if (context
->network_namespace_path
) {
4186 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
4187 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP
),
4188 "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing.");
4190 log_unit_warning(unit
, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring.");
4193 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
4194 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
4195 _cleanup_free_
char *error_path
= NULL
;
4197 r
= apply_mount_namespace(unit
, command
->flags
, context
, params
, runtime
, &error_path
);
4199 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
4200 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m",
4201 error_path
? ": " : "", strempty(error_path
));
4205 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4206 r
= apply_protect_hostname(unit
, context
, exit_status
);
4211 /* Drop groups as early as possible.
4212 * This needs to be done after PrivateDevices=y setup as device nodes should be owned by the host's root.
4213 * For non-root in a userns, devices will be owned by the user/group before the group change, and nobody. */
4215 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*gids_to_enforce
= NULL
;
4216 int ngids_to_enforce
= 0;
4218 ngids_to_enforce
= merge_gid_lists(supplementary_gids
,
4223 if (ngids_to_enforce
< 0) {
4224 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4225 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
,
4227 "Failed to merge group lists. Group membership might be incorrect: %m");
4230 r
= enforce_groups(gid
, gids_to_enforce
, ngids_to_enforce
);
4232 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
4233 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing group credentials failed: %m");
4237 /* If the user namespace was not set up above, try to do it now.
4238 * It's preferred to set up the user namespace later (after all other namespaces) so as not to be
4239 * restricted by rules pertaining to combining user namspaces with other namespaces (e.g. in the
4240 * case of mount namespaces being less privileged when the mount point list is copied from a
4241 * different user namespace). */
4243 if (needs_sandboxing
&& context
->private_users
&& !userns_set_up
) {
4244 r
= setup_private_users(saved_uid
, saved_gid
, uid
, gid
);
4246 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
4247 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m");
4251 /* Now that the mount namespace has been set up and privileges adjusted, let's look for the thing we
4254 _cleanup_free_
char *executable
= NULL
;
4255 _cleanup_close_
int executable_fd
= -1;
4256 r
= find_executable_full(command
->path
, false, &executable
, &executable_fd
);
4258 if (r
!= -ENOMEM
&& (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE
)) {
4259 log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO
, r
,
4260 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
4262 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
4263 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m",
4265 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
4269 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4270 return log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO
, r
,
4271 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
4273 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
4274 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed to locate executable %s: %m",
4276 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
4279 r
= add_shifted_fd(keep_fds
, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds
), &n_keep_fds
, executable_fd
, &executable_fd
);
4281 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
4282 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
4286 if (needs_sandboxing
&& use_selinux
&& params
->selinux_context_net
&& socket_fd
>= 0) {
4287 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, executable
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
4289 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
4290 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m");
4295 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that we are
4296 * more aggressive this time since socket_fd and the netns fds we don't need anymore. We do keep the exec_fd
4297 * however if we have it as we want to keep it open until the final execve(). */
4299 r
= close_all_fds(keep_fds
, n_keep_fds
);
4301 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
4303 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_socket_fds
, n_storage_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
4305 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
4306 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m");
4309 /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off
4310 * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined,
4311 * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we
4314 secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
4316 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4319 /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly
4320 * requested. (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see
4321 * above, in order to take precedence.) */
4322 if (context
->restrict_realtime
&& !context
->rlimit
[RLIMIT_RTPRIO
]) {
4323 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO
, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) {
4324 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
4325 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m");
4330 /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the
4331 * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */
4333 r
= setup_smack(context
, executable_fd
);
4335 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
4336 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m");
4341 bset
= context
->capability_bounding_set
;
4342 /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for
4343 * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own,
4344 * instead of us doing that */
4345 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
4346 bset
|= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP
) |
4347 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID
) |
4348 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID
);
4350 if (!cap_test_all(bset
)) {
4351 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(bset
, false);
4353 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4354 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m");
4358 /* Ambient capabilities are cleared during setresuid() (in enforce_user()) even with
4360 * To be able to raise the ambient capabilities after setresuid() they have to be
4361 * added to the inherited set and keep caps has to be set (done in enforce_user()).
4362 * After setresuid() the ambient capabilities can be raised as they are present in
4363 * the permitted and inhertiable set. However it is possible that someone wants to
4364 * set ambient capabilities without changing the user, so we also set the ambient
4365 * capabilities here.
4366 * The requested ambient capabilities are raised in the inheritable set if the
4367 * second argument is true. */
4368 if (!needs_ambient_hack
) {
4369 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
4371 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4372 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m");
4377 /* chroot to root directory first, before we lose the ability to chroot */
4378 r
= apply_root_directory(context
, params
, needs_mount_namespace
, exit_status
);
4380 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Chrooting to the requested root directory failed: %m");
4383 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
4384 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
4386 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
4387 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT
": %m", uid
);
4390 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
4391 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
4393 /* Raise the ambient capabilities after user change. */
4394 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
4396 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4397 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m");
4403 /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running
4404 * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */
4405 r
= apply_working_directory(context
, params
, home
, exit_status
);
4407 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m");
4409 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4410 /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to
4411 * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires
4412 * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
4413 * are restricted. */
4417 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
4420 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
4422 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
4423 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context
);
4430 if (use_apparmor
&& context
->apparmor_profile
) {
4431 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
4432 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
4433 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
4434 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context
->apparmor_profile
);
4439 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential EPERMs
4440 * we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. Setting securebits requires
4442 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
) {
4443 /* CAP_SETPCAP is required to set securebits. This capability is raised into the
4444 * effective set here.
4445 * The effective set is overwritten during execve with the following values:
4446 * - ambient set (for non-root processes)
4447 * - (inheritable | bounding) set for root processes)
4449 * Hence there is no security impact to raise it in the effective set before execve
4451 r
= capability_gain_cap_setpcap(NULL
);
4453 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4454 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to gain CAP_SETPCAP for setting secure bits");
4456 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
4457 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
4458 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m");
4462 if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context
))
4463 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
4464 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
4465 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m");
4469 r
= apply_address_families(unit
, context
);
4471 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
4472 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to restrict address families: %m");
4475 r
= apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit
, context
);
4477 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4478 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m");
4481 r
= apply_restrict_realtime(unit
, context
);
4483 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4484 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m");
4487 r
= apply_restrict_suid_sgid(unit
, context
);
4489 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4490 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m");
4493 r
= apply_restrict_namespaces(unit
, context
);
4495 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4496 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m");
4499 r
= apply_protect_sysctl(unit
, context
);
4501 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4502 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m");
4505 r
= apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit
, context
);
4507 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4508 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m");
4511 r
= apply_protect_kernel_logs(unit
, context
);
4513 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4514 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m");
4517 r
= apply_protect_clock(unit
, context
);
4519 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4520 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply clock restrictions: %m");
4523 r
= apply_private_devices(unit
, context
);
4525 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4526 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up private devices: %m");
4529 r
= apply_syscall_archs(unit
, context
);
4531 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4532 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m");
4535 r
= apply_lock_personality(unit
, context
);
4537 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4538 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to lock personalities: %m");
4541 r
= apply_syscall_log(unit
, context
);
4543 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4544 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply system call log filters: %m");
4547 /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected
4548 * by the filter as little as possible. */
4549 r
= apply_syscall_filter(unit
, context
, needs_ambient_hack
);
4551 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4552 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m");
4557 if (!strv_isempty(context
->unset_environment
)) {
4560 ee
= strv_env_delete(accum_env
, 1, context
->unset_environment
);
4562 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4566 strv_free_and_replace(accum_env
, ee
);
4569 if (!FLAGS_SET(command
->flags
, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND
)) {
4570 replaced_argv
= replace_env_argv(command
->argv
, accum_env
);
4571 if (!replaced_argv
) {
4572 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4575 final_argv
= replaced_argv
;
4577 final_argv
= command
->argv
;
4579 if (DEBUG_LOGGING
) {
4580 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
4582 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
4584 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
4585 "EXECUTABLE=%s", executable
,
4586 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
4588 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
4594 /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point
4595 * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */
4597 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
4598 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4599 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m");
4603 r
= fexecve_or_execve(executable_fd
, executable
, final_argv
, accum_env
);
4608 /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager
4609 * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */
4611 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
4612 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4613 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m");
4617 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4618 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to execute %s: %m", executable
);
4621 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
);
4622 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[static 3]);
4624 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
4625 ExecCommand
*command
,
4626 const ExecContext
*context
,
4627 const ExecParameters
*params
,
4628 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
4629 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
4632 int socket_fd
, r
, named_iofds
[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds
= NULL
;
4633 _cleanup_free_
char *subcgroup_path
= NULL
;
4634 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
4635 size_t n_storage_fds
= 0, n_socket_fds
= 0;
4636 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
4644 assert(params
->fds
|| (params
->n_socket_fds
+ params
->n_storage_fds
<= 0));
4646 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
4647 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
4648 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
4650 if (params
->n_socket_fds
> 1)
4651 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Got more than one socket.");
4653 if (params
->n_socket_fds
== 0)
4654 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Got no socket.");
4656 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
4660 n_socket_fds
= params
->n_socket_fds
;
4661 n_storage_fds
= params
->n_storage_fds
;
4664 r
= exec_context_named_iofds(context
, params
, named_iofds
);
4666 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m");
4668 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
4670 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
4672 line
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
4676 /* Fork with up-to-date SELinux label database, so the child inherits the up-to-date db
4677 and, until the next SELinux policy changes, we save further reloads in future children. */
4678 mac_selinux_maybe_reload();
4680 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
4681 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute %s", line
),
4682 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
, /* We won't know the real executable path until we create
4683 the mount namespace in the child, but we want to log
4684 from the parent, so we need to use the (possibly
4685 inaccurate) path here. */
4687 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
4689 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
4690 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &subcgroup_path
);
4692 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m");
4693 if (r
> 0) { /* We are using a child cgroup */
4694 r
= cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
);
4696 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to create control group '%s': %m", subcgroup_path
);
4702 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
4705 int exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
4707 r
= exec_child(unit
,
4719 unit
->manager
->user_lookup_fds
[1],
4723 const char *status
=
4724 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
,
4725 EXIT_STATUS_LIBC
| EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
);
4727 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
4728 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
4730 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
4731 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
4732 status
, command
->path
),
4733 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
4739 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
4741 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever
4742 * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the
4743 * process will be killed too). */
4745 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
, pid
);
4747 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
4753 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
4757 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
4758 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
4759 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
4760 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
4761 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
4762 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
4763 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
4764 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++)
4765 c
->directories
[t
].mode
= 0755;
4766 c
->timeout_clean_usec
= USEC_INFINITY
;
4767 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
4768 assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
!= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL
);
4769 c
->restrict_namespaces
= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
;
4770 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
4772 c
->syscall_errno
= SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL
;
4774 numa_policy_reset(&c
->numa_policy
);
4777 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
4780 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
4781 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
4782 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
4783 c
->unset_environment
= strv_free(c
->unset_environment
);
4785 rlimit_free_all(c
->rlimit
);
4787 for (size_t l
= 0; l
< 3; l
++) {
4788 c
->stdio_fdname
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_fdname
[l
]);
4789 c
->stdio_file
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_file
[l
]);
4792 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
4793 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
4794 c
->root_image
= mfree(c
->root_image
);
4795 c
->root_image_options
= mount_options_free_all(c
->root_image_options
);
4796 c
->root_hash
= mfree(c
->root_hash
);
4797 c
->root_hash_size
= 0;
4798 c
->root_hash_path
= mfree(c
->root_hash_path
);
4799 c
->root_hash_sig
= mfree(c
->root_hash_sig
);
4800 c
->root_hash_sig_size
= 0;
4801 c
->root_hash_sig_path
= mfree(c
->root_hash_sig_path
);
4802 c
->root_verity
= mfree(c
->root_verity
);
4803 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
4804 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
4805 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
4806 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
4808 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
4810 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
4812 c
->read_only_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_only_paths
);
4813 c
->read_write_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_write_paths
);
4814 c
->inaccessible_paths
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_paths
);
4816 bind_mount_free_many(c
->bind_mounts
, c
->n_bind_mounts
);
4817 c
->bind_mounts
= NULL
;
4818 c
->n_bind_mounts
= 0;
4819 temporary_filesystem_free_many(c
->temporary_filesystems
, c
->n_temporary_filesystems
);
4820 c
->temporary_filesystems
= NULL
;
4821 c
->n_temporary_filesystems
= 0;
4822 c
->mount_images
= mount_image_free_many(c
->mount_images
, &c
->n_mount_images
);
4824 cpu_set_reset(&c
->cpu_set
);
4825 numa_policy_reset(&c
->numa_policy
);
4827 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
4828 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
4829 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
4830 c
->smack_process_label
= mfree(c
->smack_process_label
);
4832 c
->syscall_filter
= hashmap_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
4833 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
4834 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
4836 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++)
4837 c
->directories
[t
].paths
= strv_free(c
->directories
[t
].paths
);
4839 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
4841 exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c
);
4843 c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
= 0;
4844 c
->log_ratelimit_burst
= 0;
4846 c
->stdin_data
= mfree(c
->stdin_data
);
4847 c
->stdin_data_size
= 0;
4849 c
->network_namespace_path
= mfree(c
->network_namespace_path
);
4851 c
->log_namespace
= mfree(c
->log_namespace
);
4853 c
->load_credentials
= strv_free(c
->load_credentials
);
4854 c
->set_credentials
= hashmap_free(c
->set_credentials
);
4857 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
4862 if (!runtime_prefix
)
4865 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
].paths
) {
4866 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
4868 if (exec_directory_is_private(c
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
))
4869 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, "private", *i
);
4871 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, *i
);
4875 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the
4877 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
4883 int exec_context_destroy_credentials(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
, const char *unit
) {
4884 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
4888 if (!runtime_prefix
|| !unit
)
4891 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, "credentials", unit
);
4895 /* This is either a tmpfs/ramfs of its own, or a plain directory. Either way, let's first try to
4896 * unmount it, and afterwards remove the mount point */
4897 (void) umount2(p
, MNT_DETACH
|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW
);
4898 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_CHMOD
);
4903 static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
4906 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
4907 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
4910 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
4913 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4914 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
4917 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
4921 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
4922 exec_command_done(i
);
4929 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
4930 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4931 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
4934 void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
4935 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4936 exec_status_reset(&c
[i
].exec_status
);
4939 void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
4940 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
4943 LIST_FOREACH(command
, z
, c
[i
])
4944 exec_status_reset(&z
->exec_status
);
4948 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
4953 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
4954 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
4956 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
4959 const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext
*c
, int fd_index
) {
4965 if (c
->std_input
!= EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4968 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] ?: "stdin";
4971 if (c
->std_output
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4974 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] ?: "stdout";
4977 if (c
->std_error
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4980 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] ?: "stderr";
4987 static int exec_context_named_iofds(
4988 const ExecContext
*c
,
4989 const ExecParameters
*p
,
4990 int named_iofds
[static 3]) {
4993 const char* stdio_fdname
[3];
4998 assert(named_iofds
);
5000 targets
= (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
5001 (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
5002 (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
);
5004 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
5005 stdio_fdname
[i
] = exec_context_fdname(c
, i
);
5007 n_fds
= p
->n_storage_fds
+ p
->n_socket_fds
;
5009 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n_fds
&& targets
> 0; i
++)
5010 if (named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] < 0 &&
5011 c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
5012 stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] &&
5013 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
])) {
5015 named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
5018 } else if (named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] < 0 &&
5019 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
5020 stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] &&
5021 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) {
5023 named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
5026 } else if (named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] < 0 &&
5027 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
5028 stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] &&
5029 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
])) {
5031 named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
5035 return targets
== 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT
;
5038 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
5039 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
5044 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
5047 bool ignore
= false;
5049 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
5058 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
5066 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
5067 k
= safe_glob(fn
, 0, &pglob
);
5076 /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */
5077 assert(pglob
.gl_pathc
> 0);
5079 for (unsigned n
= 0; n
< pglob
.gl_pathc
; n
++) {
5080 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], &p
);
5088 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
5090 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
5092 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
5095 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
5103 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
5119 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
5120 _cleanup_free_
char *resolved
= NULL
;
5125 tty
= skip_dev_prefix(tty
);
5127 /* trivial identity? */
5128 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
5131 if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved
) < 0)
5132 return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
5134 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
5135 return path_equal(resolved
, tty
) || (streq(resolved
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
5138 static bool exec_context_may_touch_tty(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
5141 return ec
->tty_reset
||
5143 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
5144 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
5145 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
5146 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
);
5149 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
5151 return exec_context_may_touch_tty(ec
) &&
5152 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
5155 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
5161 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
5164 void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
5165 char **e
, **d
, buf_clean
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
5171 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5175 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
5176 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
5177 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
5178 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
5179 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
5180 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
5181 "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
5182 "%sProtectKernelLogs: %s\n"
5183 "%sProtectClock: %s\n"
5184 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
5185 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
5186 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
5187 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
5188 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
5189 "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n"
5190 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
5191 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
5192 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n"
5193 "%sRestrictSUIDSGID: %s\n"
5194 "%sKeyringMode: %s\n"
5195 "%sProtectHostname: %s\n"
5196 "%sProtectProc: %s\n"
5197 "%sProcSubset: %s\n",
5199 prefix
, empty_to_root(c
->working_directory
),
5200 prefix
, empty_to_root(c
->root_directory
),
5201 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
5202 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
5203 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
5204 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_tunables
),
5205 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_modules
),
5206 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_logs
),
5207 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_clock
),
5208 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_control_groups
),
5209 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
5210 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_users
),
5211 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
5212 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
5213 prefix
, yes_no(exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(c
)),
5214 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
),
5215 prefix
, yes_no(c
->memory_deny_write_execute
),
5216 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_realtime
),
5217 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_suid_sgid
),
5218 prefix
, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c
->keyring_mode
),
5219 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_hostname
),
5220 prefix
, protect_proc_to_string(c
->protect_proc
),
5221 prefix
, proc_subset_to_string(c
->proc_subset
));
5224 fprintf(f
, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_image
);
5226 if (c
->root_image_options
) {
5229 fprintf(f
, "%sRootImageOptions:", prefix
);
5230 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options
, o
, c
->root_image_options
)
5231 if (!isempty(o
->options
))
5232 fprintf(f
, " %s:%s",
5233 partition_designator_to_string(o
->partition_designator
),
5239 _cleanup_free_
char *encoded
= NULL
;
5240 encoded
= hexmem(c
->root_hash
, c
->root_hash_size
);
5242 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix
, encoded
);
5245 if (c
->root_hash_path
)
5246 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_hash_path
);
5248 if (c
->root_hash_sig
) {
5249 _cleanup_free_
char *encoded
= NULL
;
5251 len
= base64mem(c
->root_hash_sig
, c
->root_hash_sig_size
, &encoded
);
5253 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHashSignature: base64:%s\n", prefix
, encoded
);
5256 if (c
->root_hash_sig_path
)
5257 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHashSignature: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_hash_sig_path
);
5260 fprintf(f
, "%sRootVerity: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_verity
);
5262 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
5263 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5265 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
5266 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5268 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
5269 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5271 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->unset_environment
)
5272 fprintf(f
, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5274 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix
, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
));
5276 for (ExecDirectoryType dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
5277 fprintf(f
, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), c
->directories
[dt
].mode
);
5279 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->directories
[dt
].paths
)
5280 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), *d
);
5284 "%sTimeoutCleanSec: %s\n",
5285 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_clean
, sizeof(buf_clean
), c
->timeout_clean_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
5292 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
5294 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
5295 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
5297 if (c
->coredump_filter_set
)
5299 "%sCoredumpFilter: 0x%"PRIx64
"\n",
5300 prefix
, c
->coredump_filter
);
5302 for (unsigned i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
5304 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
5305 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
5306 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
5307 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
5310 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
5311 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
5313 r
= ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
5315 fprintf(f
, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix
, class_str
);
5317 fprintf(f
, "%sIOPriority: %lu\n", prefix
, IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
5320 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
5321 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
5323 r
= sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
5325 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, policy_str
);
5328 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
5329 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
5330 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
5331 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
5334 if (c
->cpu_set
.set
) {
5335 _cleanup_free_
char *affinity
= NULL
;
5337 affinity
= cpu_set_to_range_string(&c
->cpu_set
);
5338 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity: %s\n", prefix
, affinity
);
5341 if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&c
->numa_policy
))) {
5342 _cleanup_free_
char *nodes
= NULL
;
5344 nodes
= cpu_set_to_range_string(&c
->numa_policy
.nodes
);
5345 fprintf(f
, "%sNUMAPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, mpol_to_string(numa_policy_get_type(&c
->numa_policy
)));
5346 fprintf(f
, "%sNUMAMask: %s\n", prefix
, strnull(nodes
));
5349 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
5350 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
5353 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
5354 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
5355 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
5356 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
5357 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
5358 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
5360 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
5361 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
5362 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
5363 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
5364 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
5365 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
5367 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
)
5368 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
5369 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
5370 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
5371 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
5372 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
5373 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
)
5374 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileToTruncate: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
5375 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
5376 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
5377 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
5378 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
5379 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
)
5380 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileToTruncate: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
5386 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
5387 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
5388 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
5389 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
5390 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
5391 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
5393 if (IN_SET(c
->std_output
,
5395 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
5396 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
5397 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) ||
5398 IN_SET(c
->std_error
,
5400 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
5401 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
5402 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
)) {
5404 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
5406 r
= log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
5408 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix
, fac_str
);
5410 r
= log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
5412 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix
, lvl_str
);
5415 if (c
->log_level_max
>= 0) {
5416 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
;
5418 (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c
->log_level_max
, &t
);
5420 fprintf(f
, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix
, strna(t
));
5423 if (c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
> 0) {
5424 char buf_timespan
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
5427 "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n",
5428 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_timespan
, sizeof(buf_timespan
), c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
5431 if (c
->log_ratelimit_burst
> 0)
5432 fprintf(f
, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix
, c
->log_ratelimit_burst
);
5434 for (size_t j
= 0; j
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; j
++) {
5435 fprintf(f
, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix
);
5436 fwrite(c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_base
,
5437 1, c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_len
,
5442 if (c
->log_namespace
)
5443 fprintf(f
, "%sLogNamespace: %s\n", prefix
, c
->log_namespace
);
5445 if (c
->secure_bits
) {
5446 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
5448 r
= secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c
->secure_bits
, &str
);
5450 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
5453 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
5454 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
5456 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_bounding_set
, &str
);
5458 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
5461 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
5462 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
5464 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_ambient_set
, &str
);
5466 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
5470 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
5472 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
5474 fprintf(f
, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix
, yes_no(c
->dynamic_user
));
5476 if (!strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
)) {
5477 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
5478 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
5483 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
5485 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_write_paths
)) {
5486 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix
);
5487 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_paths
);
5491 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_only_paths
)) {
5492 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix
);
5493 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_paths
);
5497 if (!strv_isempty(c
->inaccessible_paths
)) {
5498 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix
);
5499 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_paths
);
5503 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< c
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
5504 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix
,
5505 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].read_only
? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths",
5506 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].ignore_enoent
? "-": "",
5507 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].source
,
5508 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].destination
,
5509 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].recursive
? "rbind" : "norbind");
5511 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< c
->n_temporary_filesystems
; i
++) {
5512 const TemporaryFileSystem
*t
= c
->temporary_filesystems
+ i
;
5514 fprintf(f
, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix
,
5516 isempty(t
->options
) ? "" : ":",
5517 strempty(t
->options
));
5522 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
5523 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
5525 if (c
->selinux_context
)
5527 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
5528 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
5530 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
5532 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
5533 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
5535 if (c
->smack_process_label
)
5537 "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n",
5538 prefix
, c
->smack_process_label_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->smack_process_label
);
5540 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
5542 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
5543 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
5546 "%sLockPersonality: %s\n",
5547 prefix
, yes_no(c
->lock_personality
));
5549 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
5556 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
5559 if (!c
->syscall_allow_list
)
5563 HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val
, id
, c
->syscall_filter
) {
5564 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
5565 const char *errno_name
= NULL
;
5566 int num
= PTR_TO_INT(val
);
5573 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
5574 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
5577 errno_name
= seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(num
);
5579 fprintf(f
, ":%s", errno_name
);
5581 fprintf(f
, ":%d", num
);
5589 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
5595 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
5599 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
)
5600 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
5605 if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
)) {
5606 _cleanup_free_
char *s
= NULL
;
5608 r
= namespace_flags_to_string(c
->restrict_namespaces
, &s
);
5610 fprintf(f
, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n",
5614 if (c
->network_namespace_path
)
5616 "%sNetworkNamespacePath: %s\n",
5617 prefix
, c
->network_namespace_path
);
5619 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0) {
5621 const char *errno_name
;
5624 fprintf(f
, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix
);
5627 errno_name
= seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(c
->syscall_errno
);
5629 fputs(errno_name
, f
);
5631 fprintf(f
, "%d", c
->syscall_errno
);
5636 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< c
->n_mount_images
; i
++) {
5639 fprintf(f
, "%sMountImages: %s%s:%s%s", prefix
,
5640 c
->mount_images
[i
].ignore_enoent
? "-": "",
5641 c
->mount_images
[i
].source
,
5642 c
->mount_images
[i
].destination
,
5643 LIST_IS_EMPTY(c
->mount_images
[i
].mount_options
) ? "": ":");
5644 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options
, o
, c
->mount_images
[i
].mount_options
)
5646 partition_designator_to_string(o
->partition_designator
),
5652 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
5655 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under
5656 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
5661 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
5667 int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext
*c
) {
5675 p
= ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0);
5677 return IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 4);
5682 bool exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(const ExecContext
*c
) {
5685 /* Explicit setting wins */
5686 if (c
->mount_apivfs_set
)
5687 return c
->mount_apivfs
;
5689 /* Default to "yes" if root directory or image are specified */
5690 if (exec_context_with_rootfs(c
))
5696 void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext
*c
) {
5699 for (size_t l
= 0; l
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; l
++)
5700 free(c
->log_extra_fields
[l
].iov_base
);
5701 c
->log_extra_fields
= mfree(c
->log_extra_fields
);
5702 c
->n_log_extra_fields
= 0;
5705 void exec_context_revert_tty(ExecContext
*c
) {
5710 /* First, reset the TTY (possibly kicking everybody else from the TTY) */
5711 exec_context_tty_reset(c
, NULL
);
5713 /* And then undo what chown_terminal() did earlier. Note that we only do this if we have a path
5714 * configured. If the TTY was passed to us as file descriptor we assume the TTY is opened and managed
5715 * by whoever passed it to us and thus knows better when and how to chmod()/chown() it back. */
5717 if (exec_context_may_touch_tty(c
)) {
5720 path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
5722 r
= chmod_and_chown(path
, TTY_MODE
, 0, TTY_GID
);
5723 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENOENT
)
5724 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to reset TTY ownership/access mode of %s, ignoring: %m", path
);
5729 int exec_context_get_clean_directories(
5735 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
5742 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
5745 if (!FLAGS_SET(mask
, 1U << t
))
5751 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
5754 j
= path_join(prefix
[t
], *i
);
5758 r
= strv_consume(&l
, j
);
5762 /* Also remove private directories unconditionally. */
5763 if (t
!= EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) {
5764 j
= path_join(prefix
[t
], "private", *i
);
5768 r
= strv_consume(&l
, j
);
5779 int exec_context_get_clean_mask(ExecContext
*c
, ExecCleanMask
*ret
) {
5780 ExecCleanMask mask
= 0;
5785 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++)
5786 if (!strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
5793 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
5800 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
5803 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, const ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
5811 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
5816 if (context
&& context
->utmp_id
)
5817 (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
5820 void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus
*s
) {
5823 *s
= (ExecStatus
) {};
5826 void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5827 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
5835 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5838 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
5841 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->start_timestamp
))
5843 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
5844 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
5846 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->exit_timestamp
))
5848 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
5850 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
5851 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
5852 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
5856 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
5864 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
5872 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
5879 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
5890 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
5891 * spaces and ticks in them */
5896 static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5897 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
5898 const char *prefix2
;
5903 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5904 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
5906 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
5908 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
5909 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror_safe(ENOMEM
));
5911 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
5914 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5917 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5919 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
5920 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
5923 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
5930 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
5931 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
5932 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
5937 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
5945 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
5957 free_and_replace(c
->path
, p
);
5959 return strv_free_and_replace(c
->argv
, l
);
5962 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
5963 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
5971 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
5977 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
5984 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
5985 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
5987 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
5991 static ExecRuntime
* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
5998 (void) hashmap_remove(rt
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
);
6000 /* When destroy is true, then rm_rf tmp_dir and var_tmp_dir. */
6002 if (destroy
&& rt
->tmp_dir
&& !streq(rt
->tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
)) {
6003 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
6005 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
6007 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
6012 if (destroy
&& rt
->var_tmp_dir
&& !streq(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
)) {
6013 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6015 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6017 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6019 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
6022 rt
->id
= mfree(rt
->id
);
6023 rt
->tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->tmp_dir
);
6024 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6025 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
6029 static void exec_runtime_freep(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
6030 (void) exec_runtime_free(*rt
, false);
6033 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**ret
, const char *id
) {
6034 _cleanup_free_
char *id_copy
= NULL
;
6039 id_copy
= strdup(id
);
6043 n
= new(ExecRuntime
, 1);
6047 *n
= (ExecRuntime
) {
6048 .id
= TAKE_PTR(id_copy
),
6049 .netns_storage_socket
= { -1, -1 },
6056 static int exec_runtime_add(
6061 int netns_storage_socket
[2],
6062 ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
6064 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt
= NULL
;
6070 /* tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, netns_storage_socket fds are donated on success */
6072 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt
, id
);
6076 r
= hashmap_ensure_put(&m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
, rt
->id
, rt
);
6080 assert(!!rt
->tmp_dir
== !!rt
->var_tmp_dir
); /* We require both to be set together */
6081 rt
->tmp_dir
= TAKE_PTR(*tmp_dir
);
6082 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= TAKE_PTR(*var_tmp_dir
);
6084 if (netns_storage_socket
) {
6085 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket
[0]);
6086 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket
[1]);
6093 /* do not remove created ExecRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */
6098 static int exec_runtime_make(
6100 const ExecContext
*c
,
6102 ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
6104 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp
) char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
6105 _cleanup_close_pair_
int netns_storage_socket
[2] = { -1, -1 };
6112 /* It is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
6113 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
&& !c
->network_namespace_path
) {
6118 if (c
->private_tmp
&&
6119 !(prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/tmp") &&
6120 (prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/var/tmp") ||
6121 prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/var")))) {
6122 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
);
6127 if (c
->private_network
|| c
->network_namespace_path
) {
6128 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
|SOCK_CLOEXEC
, 0, netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
6132 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
, netns_storage_socket
, ret
);
6139 int exec_runtime_acquire(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, bool create
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
6147 rt
= hashmap_get(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, id
);
6149 /* We already have a ExecRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */
6157 /* If not found, then create a new object. */
6158 r
= exec_runtime_make(m
, c
, id
, &rt
);
6162 /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
6168 /* increment reference counter. */
6174 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
6178 assert(rt
->n_ref
> 0);
6184 return exec_runtime_free(rt
, destroy
);
6187 int exec_runtime_serialize(const Manager
*m
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
6194 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
) {
6195 fprintf(f
, "exec-runtime=%s", rt
->id
);
6198 fprintf(f
, " tmp-dir=%s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
6200 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
6201 fprintf(f
, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6203 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
6206 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
6210 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy
);
6213 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
6216 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
6220 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy
);
6229 int exec_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit
*u
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
6230 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt_create
= NULL
;
6234 /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text.
6235 * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=.
6236 * Even if the ExecRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge
6237 * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */
6243 /* Manager manages ExecRuntime objects by the unit id.
6244 * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */
6245 if (isempty(u
->id
)) {
6246 log_unit_debug(u
, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter.");
6250 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
6252 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to allocate storage for runtime parameter: %m");
6256 rt
= hashmap_get(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, u
->id
);
6258 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt_create
, u
->id
);
6265 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
6268 copy
= strdup(value
);
6272 free_and_replace(rt
->tmp_dir
, copy
);
6274 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
6277 copy
= strdup(value
);
6281 free_and_replace(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, copy
);
6283 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
6286 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
6287 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
6291 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
6292 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
6294 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
6297 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
6298 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
6302 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
6303 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
6307 /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecRuntime objects. */
6309 r
= hashmap_put(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt_create
->id
, rt_create
);
6311 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m");
6315 rt_create
->manager
= u
->manager
;
6318 TAKE_PTR(rt_create
);
6324 int exec_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager
*m
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
6325 _cleanup_free_
char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
6327 int r
, fdpair
[] = {-1, -1};
6328 const char *p
, *v
= value
;
6335 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6336 id
= strndupa(v
, n
);
6341 v
= startswith(p
, "tmp-dir=");
6343 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6344 tmp_dir
= strndup(v
, n
);
6352 v
= startswith(p
, "var-tmp-dir=");
6354 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6355 var_tmp_dir
= strndup(v
, n
);
6363 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-0=");
6367 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6368 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
6370 r
= safe_atoi(buf
, &fdpair
[0]);
6372 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification netns-socket-0=%s: %m", buf
);
6373 if (!fdset_contains(fds
, fdpair
[0]))
6374 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF
),
6375 "exec-runtime specification netns-socket-0= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", fdpair
[0]);
6376 fdpair
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fdpair
[0]);
6382 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-1=");
6386 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6387 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
6388 r
= safe_atoi(buf
, &fdpair
[1]);
6390 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification netns-socket-1=%s: %m", buf
);
6391 if (!fdset_contains(fds
, fdpair
[1]))
6392 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF
),
6393 "exec-runtime specification netns-socket-1= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", fdpair
[1]);
6394 fdpair
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fdpair
[1]);
6398 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
, fdpair
, NULL
);
6400 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m");
6404 void exec_runtime_vacuum(Manager
*m
) {
6409 /* Free unreferenced ExecRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */
6411 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
) {
6415 (void) exec_runtime_free(rt
, false);
6419 void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters
*p
) {
6423 p
->environment
= strv_free(p
->environment
);
6424 p
->fd_names
= strv_free(p
->fd_names
);
6425 p
->fds
= mfree(p
->fds
);
6426 p
->exec_fd
= safe_close(p
->exec_fd
);
6429 ExecSetCredential
*exec_set_credential_free(ExecSetCredential
*sc
) {
6438 DEFINE_HASH_OPS_WITH_VALUE_DESTRUCTOR(exec_set_credential_hash_ops
, char, string_hash_func
, string_compare_func
, ExecSetCredential
, exec_set_credential_free
);
6440 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
6441 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
6442 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
6443 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
6444 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
6445 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
6446 [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
6447 [EXEC_INPUT_DATA
] = "data",
6448 [EXEC_INPUT_FILE
] = "file",
6451 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
6453 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
6454 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
6455 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
6456 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
6457 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
6458 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
6459 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
6460 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
6461 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
6462 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
6463 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
] = "file",
6464 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
] = "append",
6465 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
] = "truncate",
6468 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
6470 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
6471 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
6472 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
6473 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
6476 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);
6478 static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table
[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX
] = {
6479 [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
] = "no",
6480 [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
] = "yes",
6481 [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART
] = "restart",
6484 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode
, ExecPreserveMode
, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
);
6486 /* This table maps ExecDirectoryType to the setting it is configured with in the unit */
6487 static const char* const exec_directory_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
6488 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RuntimeDirectory",
6489 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "StateDirectory",
6490 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CacheDirectory",
6491 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LogsDirectory",
6492 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "ConfigurationDirectory",
6495 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
6497 /* And this table maps ExecDirectoryType too, but to a generic term identifying the type of resource. This
6498 * one is supposed to be generic enough to be used for unit types that don't use ExecContext and per-unit
6499 * directories, specifically .timer units with their timestamp touch file. */
6500 static const char* const exec_resource_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
6501 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "runtime",
6502 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "state",
6503 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "cache",
6504 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "logs",
6505 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "configuration",
6508 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_resource_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
6510 /* And this table also maps ExecDirectoryType, to the environment variable we pass the selected directory to
6511 * the service payload in. */
6512 static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
6513 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY",
6514 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "STATE_DIRECTORY",
6515 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY",
6516 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY",
6517 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY",
6520 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name
, ExecDirectoryType
);
6522 static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table
[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX
] = {
6523 [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
6524 [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE
] = "private",
6525 [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
] = "shared",
6528 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode
, ExecKeyringMode
);