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[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / core / namespace.c
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
2
3 #include <errno.h>
4 #include <linux/loop.h>
5 #include <sched.h>
6 #include <stdio.h>
7 #include <sys/file.h>
8 #include <sys/mount.h>
9 #include <unistd.h>
10 #if WANT_LINUX_FS_H
11 #include <linux/fs.h>
12 #endif
13
14 #include "alloc-util.h"
15 #include "base-filesystem.h"
16 #include "chase.h"
17 #include "dev-setup.h"
18 #include "devnum-util.h"
19 #include "env-util.h"
20 #include "escape.h"
21 #include "extension-util.h"
22 #include "fd-util.h"
23 #include "format-util.h"
24 #include "glyph-util.h"
25 #include "label.h"
26 #include "list.h"
27 #include "lock-util.h"
28 #include "loop-util.h"
29 #include "loopback-setup.h"
30 #include "missing_syscall.h"
31 #include "mkdir-label.h"
32 #include "mount-util.h"
33 #include "mountpoint-util.h"
34 #include "namespace-util.h"
35 #include "namespace.h"
36 #include "nsflags.h"
37 #include "nulstr-util.h"
38 #include "os-util.h"
39 #include "path-util.h"
40 #include "selinux-util.h"
41 #include "socket-util.h"
42 #include "sort-util.h"
43 #include "stat-util.h"
44 #include "string-table.h"
45 #include "string-util.h"
46 #include "strv.h"
47 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
48 #include "umask-util.h"
49 #include "user-util.h"
50
51 #define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC)
52
53 typedef enum MountMode {
54 /* This is ordered by priority! */
55 INACCESSIBLE,
56 OVERLAY_MOUNT,
57 MOUNT_IMAGES,
58 BIND_MOUNT,
59 BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
60 PRIVATE_TMP,
61 PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY,
62 PRIVATE_DEV,
63 BIND_DEV,
64 EMPTY_DIR,
65 PRIVATE_SYSFS,
66 BIND_SYSFS,
67 PROCFS,
68 READONLY,
69 READWRITE,
70 NOEXEC,
71 EXEC,
72 TMPFS,
73 RUN,
74 EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, /* Bind-mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
75 EXTENSION_IMAGES, /* Mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
76 MQUEUEFS,
77 READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
78 _MOUNT_MODE_MAX,
79 } MountMode;
80
81 typedef struct MountEntry {
82 const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */
83 MountMode mode:5;
84 bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */
85 bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */
86 bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */
87 bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */
88 bool noexec:1; /* Shall set MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
89 bool exec:1; /* Shall clear MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
90 bool applied:1; /* Already applied */
91 char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */
92 const char *unprefixed_path_const; /* If the path was amended with a prefix, these will save the original */
93 char *unprefixed_path_malloc;
94 const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */
95 char *source_malloc;
96 const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */
97 char *options_malloc;
98 unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */
99 unsigned n_followed;
100 LIST_HEAD(MountOptions, image_options);
101 } MountEntry;
102
103 /* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys, /proc, /dev and /run into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted
104 * something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */
105 static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = {
106 { "/proc", PROCFS, false },
107 { "/dev", BIND_DEV, false },
108 { "/sys", BIND_SYSFS, false },
109 { "/run", RUN, false, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_RUN, .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
110 };
111
112 /* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */
113 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table[] = {
114 { "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true },
115 { "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */
116 { "/proc/asound", READONLY, true },
117 { "/proc/bus", READONLY, true },
118 { "/proc/fs", READONLY, true },
119 { "/proc/irq", READONLY, true },
120 { "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true },
121 { "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true },
122 { "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true },
123 { "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true },
124 { "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true },
125 { "/proc/sys", READONLY, true },
126 { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true },
127 { "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true },
128 };
129
130 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table[] = {
131 { "/sys", READONLY, false },
132 { "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true },
133 { "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */
134 { "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true },
135 { "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true },
136 { "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true },
137 };
138
139 /* ProtectKernelModules= option */
140 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
141 #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
142 { "/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
143 #endif
144 { "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
145 };
146
147 /* ProtectKernelLogs= option */
148 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_proc_table[] = {
149 { "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
150 };
151
152 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_dev_table[] = {
153 { "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
154 };
155
156 /*
157 * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
158 * system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
159 */
160 static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = {
161 { "/home", READONLY, true },
162 { "/run/user", READONLY, true },
163 { "/root", READONLY, true },
164 };
165
166 /* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */
167 static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = {
168 { "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
169 { "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
170 { "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
171 };
172
173 /* ProtectHome=yes table */
174 static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = {
175 { "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true },
176 { "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true },
177 { "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true },
178 };
179
180 /* ProtectSystem=yes table */
181 static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = {
182 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
183 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
184 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
185 #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
186 { "/lib", READONLY, true },
187 { "/lib64", READONLY, true },
188 { "/bin", READONLY, true },
189 # if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
190 { "/sbin", READONLY, true },
191 # endif
192 #endif
193 };
194
195 /* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */
196 static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = {
197 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
198 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
199 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
200 { "/etc", READONLY, false },
201 #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
202 { "/lib", READONLY, true },
203 { "/lib64", READONLY, true },
204 { "/bin", READONLY, true },
205 # if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
206 { "/sbin", READONLY, true },
207 # endif
208 #endif
209 };
210
211 /*
212 * ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything
213 * read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS,
214 * which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables=
215 * protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal.
216 * (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome=
217 * shall manage those, orthogonally).
218 */
219 static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = {
220 { "/", READONLY, false },
221 { "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
222 { "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
223 { "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */
224 { "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
225 { "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
226 { "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
227 };
228
229 static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = {
230 [INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible",
231 [OVERLAY_MOUNT] = "overlay",
232 [BIND_MOUNT] = "bind",
233 [BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind",
234 [PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp",
235 [PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev",
236 [BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev",
237 [EMPTY_DIR] = "empty",
238 [PRIVATE_SYSFS] = "private-sysfs",
239 [BIND_SYSFS] = "bind-sysfs",
240 [PROCFS] = "procfs",
241 [READONLY] = "read-only",
242 [READWRITE] = "read-write",
243 [TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
244 [MOUNT_IMAGES] = "mount-images",
245 [READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "rw-implicit",
246 [EXEC] = "exec",
247 [NOEXEC] = "noexec",
248 [MQUEUEFS] = "mqueuefs",
249 };
250
251 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode);
252
253 static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) {
254 assert(p);
255
256 /* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that,
257 * otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */
258
259 return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const;
260 }
261
262 static const char *mount_entry_unprefixed_path(const MountEntry *p) {
263 assert(p);
264
265 /* Returns the unprefixed path (ie: before prefix_where_needed() ran), if any */
266
267 return p->unprefixed_path_malloc ?: p->unprefixed_path_const ?: mount_entry_path(p);
268 }
269
270 static void mount_entry_consume_prefix(MountEntry *p, char *new_path) {
271 assert(p);
272 assert(p->path_malloc || p->path_const);
273 assert(new_path);
274
275 /* Saves current path in unprefixed_ variable, and takes over new_path */
276
277 free_and_replace(p->unprefixed_path_malloc, p->path_malloc);
278 /* If we didn't have a path on the heap, then it's a static one */
279 if (!p->unprefixed_path_malloc)
280 p->unprefixed_path_const = p->path_const;
281 p->path_malloc = new_path;
282 p->has_prefix = true;
283 }
284
285 static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) {
286 assert(p);
287
288 return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY);
289 }
290
291 static bool mount_entry_noexec(const MountEntry *p) {
292 assert(p);
293
294 return p->noexec || IN_SET(p->mode, NOEXEC, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_SYSFS, BIND_SYSFS, PROCFS);
295 }
296
297 static bool mount_entry_exec(const MountEntry *p) {
298 assert(p);
299
300 return p->exec || p->mode == EXEC;
301 }
302
303 static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) {
304 assert(p);
305
306 return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const;
307 }
308
309 static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) {
310 assert(p);
311
312 return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const;
313 }
314
315 static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) {
316 assert(p);
317
318 p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc);
319 p->unprefixed_path_malloc = mfree(p->unprefixed_path_malloc);
320 p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc);
321 p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc);
322 p->image_options = mount_options_free_all(p->image_options);
323 }
324
325 static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) {
326 assert(p);
327
328 /* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */
329
330 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
331 bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false;
332 const char *e = *i;
333
334 /* Look for any prefixes */
335 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
336 e++;
337 ignore = true;
338 }
339 if (startswith(e, "+")) {
340 e++;
341 needs_prefix = true;
342 }
343
344 if (!path_is_absolute(e))
345 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
346 "Path is not absolute: %s", e);
347
348 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
349 .path_const = e,
350 .mode = mode,
351 .ignore = ignore,
352 .has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix,
353 };
354 }
355
356 return 0;
357 }
358
359 static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) {
360 assert(p);
361
362 /* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the
363 * "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */
364
365 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
366
367 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
368 .path_const = *i,
369 .mode = EMPTY_DIR,
370 .ignore = false,
371 .read_only = true,
372 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
373 .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
374 };
375 }
376
377 return 0;
378 }
379
380 static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) {
381 assert(p);
382
383 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
384 const BindMount *b = binds + i;
385
386 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
387 .path_const = b->destination,
388 .mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT,
389 .read_only = b->read_only,
390 .nosuid = b->nosuid,
391 .source_const = b->source,
392 .ignore = b->ignore_enoent,
393 };
394 }
395
396 return 0;
397 }
398
399 static int append_mount_images(MountEntry **p, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) {
400 assert(p);
401
402 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
403 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
404
405 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
406 .path_const = m->destination,
407 .mode = MOUNT_IMAGES,
408 .source_const = m->source,
409 .image_options = m->mount_options,
410 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
411 };
412 }
413
414 return 0;
415 }
416
417 static int append_extensions(
418 MountEntry **p,
419 const char *root,
420 const char *extension_dir,
421 char **hierarchies,
422 const MountImage *mount_images,
423 size_t n,
424 char **extension_directories) {
425
426 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **overlays = NULL;
427 int r;
428
429 if (n == 0 && strv_isempty(extension_directories))
430 return 0;
431
432 assert(p);
433 assert(extension_dir);
434
435 /* Prepare a list of overlays, that will have as each element a string suitable for being
436 * passed as a lowerdir= parameter, so start with the hierarchy on the root.
437 * The overlays vector will have the same number of elements and will correspond to the
438 * hierarchies vector, so they can be iterated upon together. */
439 STRV_FOREACH(hierarchy, hierarchies) {
440 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
441
442 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, *hierarchy);
443 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
444 return -ENOMEM;
445
446 r = strv_consume(&overlays, TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy));
447 if (r < 0)
448 return r;
449 }
450
451 /* First, prepare a mount for each image, but these won't be visible to the unit, instead
452 * they will be mounted in our propagate directory, and used as a source for the overlay. */
453 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
454 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL;
455 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
456
457 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, i);
458 if (r < 0)
459 return -ENOMEM;
460
461 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
462 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
463
464 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
465 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
466 return -ENOMEM;
467
468 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
469 if (!escaped)
470 return -ENOMEM;
471
472 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
473 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
474 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
475 if (!lowerdir)
476 return -ENOMEM;
477
478 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
479 }
480
481 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
482 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
483 .image_options = m->mount_options,
484 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
485 .source_const = m->source,
486 .mode = EXTENSION_IMAGES,
487 .has_prefix = true,
488 };
489 }
490
491 /* Secondly, extend the lowerdir= parameters with each ExtensionDirectory.
492 * Bind mount them in the same location as the ExtensionImages, so that we
493 * can check that they are valid trees (extension-release.d). */
494 STRV_FOREACH(extension_directory, extension_directories) {
495 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL, *source = NULL;
496 const char *e = *extension_directory;
497 bool ignore_enoent = false;
498
499 /* Pick up the counter where the ExtensionImages left it. */
500 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, n++);
501 if (r < 0)
502 return -ENOMEM;
503
504 /* Look for any prefixes */
505 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
506 e++;
507 ignore_enoent = true;
508 }
509 /* Ignore this for now */
510 if (startswith(e, "+"))
511 e++;
512
513 source = strdup(e);
514 if (!source)
515 return -ENOMEM;
516
517 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
518 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
519
520 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
521 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
522 return -ENOMEM;
523
524 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
525 if (!escaped)
526 return -ENOMEM;
527
528 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
529 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
530 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
531 if (!lowerdir)
532 return -ENOMEM;
533
534 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
535 }
536
537 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
538 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
539 .source_const = TAKE_PTR(source),
540 .mode = EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES,
541 .ignore = ignore_enoent,
542 .has_prefix = true,
543 .read_only = true,
544 };
545 }
546
547 /* Then, for each hierarchy, prepare an overlay with the list of lowerdir= strings
548 * set up earlier. */
549 for (size_t i = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[i]; ++i) {
550 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
551
552 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, hierarchies[i]);
553 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
554 return -ENOMEM;
555
556 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
557 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy),
558 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(overlays[i]),
559 .mode = OVERLAY_MOUNT,
560 .has_prefix = true,
561 .ignore = true, /* If the source image doesn't set the ignore bit it will fail earlier. */
562 };
563 }
564
565 return 0;
566 }
567
568 static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) {
569 assert(p);
570
571 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
572 const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i;
573 _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL;
574 unsigned long flags;
575 bool ro = false;
576 int r;
577
578 if (!path_is_absolute(t->path))
579 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
580 "Path is not absolute: %s",
581 t->path);
582
583 str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options);
584 if (!str)
585 return -ENOMEM;
586
587 r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o);
588 if (r < 0)
589 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str);
590
591 ro = flags & MS_RDONLY;
592 if (ro)
593 flags ^= MS_RDONLY;
594
595 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
596 .path_const = t->path,
597 .mode = TMPFS,
598 .read_only = ro,
599 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o),
600 .flags = flags,
601 };
602 }
603
604 return 0;
605 }
606
607 static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) {
608 assert(p);
609 assert(mounts);
610
611 /* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */
612
613 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
614 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
615 .path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i),
616 .mode = mounts[i].mode,
617 .ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect,
618 };
619
620 return 0;
621 }
622
623 static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) {
624 assert(p);
625
626 switch (protect_home) {
627
628 case PROTECT_HOME_NO:
629 return 0;
630
631 case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY:
632 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect);
633
634 case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS:
635 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect);
636
637 case PROTECT_HOME_YES:
638 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect);
639
640 default:
641 assert_not_reached();
642 }
643 }
644
645 static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) {
646 assert(p);
647
648 switch (protect_system) {
649
650 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO:
651 return 0;
652
653 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT:
654 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect);
655
656 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES:
657 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect);
658
659 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL:
660 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect);
661
662 default:
663 assert_not_reached();
664 }
665 }
666
667 static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) {
668 int d;
669
670 /* ExtensionImages/Directories will be used by other mounts as a base, so sort them first
671 * regardless of the prefix - they are set up in the propagate directory anyway */
672 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES, b->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES);
673 if (d != 0)
674 return d;
675 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, b->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES);
676 if (d != 0)
677 return d;
678
679 /* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */
680 d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b));
681 if (d != 0)
682 return d;
683
684 /* If the paths are equal, check the mode */
685 return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode);
686 }
687
688 static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) {
689 /* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */
690
691 assert(m || n == 0);
692
693 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
694 char *s;
695
696 if (m[i].has_prefix)
697 continue;
698
699 s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i));
700 if (!s)
701 return -ENOMEM;
702
703 mount_entry_consume_prefix(&m[i], s);
704 }
705
706 return 0;
707 }
708
709 static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
710 MountEntry *f, *t, *previous;
711
712 assert(m);
713 assert(n);
714
715 /* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */
716
717 for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) {
718
719 /* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare()
720 * above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */
721 if (previous &&
722 path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) &&
723 !f->applied && !previous->applied) {
724 log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode));
725 /* Propagate the flags to the remaining entry */
726 previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f);
727 previous->noexec = previous->noexec || mount_entry_noexec(f);
728 previous->exec = previous->exec || mount_entry_exec(f);
729 mount_entry_done(f);
730 continue;
731 }
732
733 *t = *f;
734 previous = t;
735 t++;
736 }
737
738 *n = t - m;
739 }
740
741 static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
742 MountEntry *f, *t;
743 const char *clear = NULL;
744
745 assert(m);
746 assert(n);
747
748 /* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly
749 * ordered already. */
750
751 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
752
753 /* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop
754 * it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */
755 if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) {
756 log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear);
757 mount_entry_done(f);
758 continue;
759 }
760
761 clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL;
762
763 *t = *f;
764 t++;
765 }
766
767 *n = t - m;
768 }
769
770 static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
771 MountEntry *f, *t;
772
773 assert(m);
774 assert(n);
775
776 /* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the
777 * list is ordered by prefixes. */
778
779 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
780
781 /* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */
782 if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) {
783 MountEntry *found = NULL;
784
785 /* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */
786 for (MountEntry *p = PTR_SUB1(t, m); p; p = PTR_SUB1(p, m))
787 if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) {
788 found = p;
789 break;
790 }
791
792 /* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */
793 if (found && found->mode == f->mode) {
794 log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)",
795 mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode),
796 mount_entry_path(found), mount_mode_to_string(found->mode));
797 mount_entry_done(f);
798 continue;
799 }
800 }
801
802 *t = *f;
803 t++;
804 }
805
806 *n = t - m;
807 }
808
809 static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
810 MountEntry *f, *t;
811
812 assert(m);
813 assert(n);
814
815 /* Nothing to do */
816 if (!root_directory)
817 return;
818
819 /* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */
820
821 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
822
823 /* ExtensionImages/Directories bases are opened in /run/systemd/unit-extensions on the host */
824 if (!IN_SET(f->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) && !path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) {
825 log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f));
826 mount_entry_done(f);
827 continue;
828 }
829
830 *t = *f;
831 t++;
832 }
833
834 *n = t - m;
835 }
836
837 static int clone_device_node(
838 const char *d,
839 const char *temporary_mount,
840 bool *make_devnode) {
841
842 _cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL;
843 const char *dn, *bn, *t;
844 struct stat st;
845 int r;
846
847 if (stat(d, &st) < 0) {
848 if (errno == ENOENT) {
849 log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d);
850 return -ENXIO;
851 }
852
853 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d);
854 }
855
856 if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) &&
857 !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode))
858 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
859 "Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.",
860 d);
861
862 dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d);
863
864 /* First, try to create device node properly */
865 if (*make_devnode) {
866 mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode);
867 r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev);
868 mac_selinux_create_file_clear();
869 if (r >= 0)
870 goto add_symlink;
871 if (errno != EPERM)
872 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d);
873
874 /* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */
875 *make_devnode = false;
876 }
877
878 /* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device node. So create a dummy bind-mount target.
879 * Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */
880 r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0);
881 if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
882 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d);
883
884 /* Fallback to bind-mounting: The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard
885 * properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should either be owned by root:root or
886 * root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx) and should not carry ACLs. */
887 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
888 if (r < 0)
889 return r;
890
891 add_symlink:
892 bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/");
893 if (!bn)
894 return 0;
895
896 /* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */
897 if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/" DEVNUM_FORMAT_STR,
898 temporary_mount,
899 S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block",
900 DEVNUM_FORMAT_VAL(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
901 return log_oom();
902
903 (void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755);
904
905 t = strjoina("../", bn);
906 if (symlink(t, sl) < 0)
907 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl);
908
909 return 0;
910 }
911
912 static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m) {
913 static const char devnodes[] =
914 "/dev/null\0"
915 "/dev/zero\0"
916 "/dev/full\0"
917 "/dev/random\0"
918 "/dev/urandom\0"
919 "/dev/tty\0";
920
921 char temporary_mount[] = "/tmp/namespace-dev-XXXXXX";
922 const char *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL;
923 bool can_mknod = true;
924 int r;
925
926 assert(m);
927
928 if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount))
929 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount);
930
931 dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev");
932 (void) mkdir(dev, 0755);
933 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_PRIVATE_DEV);
934 if (r < 0)
935 goto fail;
936
937 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, dev, "/dev", 0);
938 if (r < 0) {
939 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev);
940 goto fail;
941 }
942
943 devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts");
944 (void) mkdir(devpts, 0755);
945 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
946 if (r < 0)
947 goto fail;
948
949 /* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx.
950 * When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible.
951 * Thus, in that case make a clone.
952 * In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */
953 r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx");
954 if (r < 0) {
955 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m");
956 goto fail;
957 } else if (r > 0) {
958 devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx");
959 if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) {
960 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx);
961 goto fail;
962 }
963 } else {
964 r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
965 if (r < 0)
966 goto fail;
967 }
968
969 devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm");
970 (void) mkdir(devshm, 0755);
971 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
972 if (r < 0)
973 goto fail;
974
975 devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue");
976 (void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755);
977 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
978
979 devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages");
980 (void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755);
981 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
982
983 devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log");
984 if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0)
985 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog);
986
987 NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) {
988 r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
989 /* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */
990 if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
991 goto fail;
992 }
993
994 r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
995 if (r < 0)
996 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount);
997
998 /* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be missing when the service is started
999 * with RootDirectory. This is consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing. */
1000 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1001
1002 /* Unmount everything in old /dev */
1003 r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1004 if (r < 0)
1005 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1006
1007 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
1008 if (r < 0)
1009 goto fail;
1010
1011 (void) rmdir(dev);
1012 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
1013
1014 return 0;
1015
1016 fail:
1017 if (devpts)
1018 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devpts, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1019
1020 if (devshm)
1021 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devshm, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1022
1023 if (devhugepages)
1024 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devhugepages, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1025
1026 if (devmqueue)
1027 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devmqueue, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1028
1029 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1030 (void) rmdir(dev);
1031 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
1032
1033 return r;
1034 }
1035
1036 static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) {
1037 int r;
1038
1039 assert(m);
1040
1041 /* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the
1042 * service's /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */
1043
1044 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1045
1046 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1047 if (r < 0)
1048 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m");
1049 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */
1050 return 0;
1051
1052 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1053 if (r < 0)
1054 return r;
1055
1056 return 1;
1057 }
1058
1059 static int mount_private_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1060 const char *p = mount_entry_path(ASSERT_PTR(m));
1061 int r;
1062
1063 (void) mkdir_p_label(p, 0755);
1064
1065 r = remount_sysfs(p);
1066 if (r < 0 && (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) || ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))) {
1067 /* Running with an unprivileged user (PrivateUsers=yes), or the kernel seems old. Falling
1068 * back to bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */
1069
1070 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remount sysfs on %s, falling back to bind mount: %m", p);
1071
1072 (void) umount_recursive(p, 0);
1073
1074 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/sys", p, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1075 }
1076 if (r < 0)
1077 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remount sysfs on %s: %m", p);
1078
1079 return 1;
1080 }
1081
1082 static int mount_bind_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1083 int r;
1084
1085 assert(m);
1086
1087 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1088
1089 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1090 if (r < 0)
1091 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m");
1092 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */
1093 return 0;
1094
1095 /* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */
1096 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1097 if (r < 0)
1098 return r;
1099
1100 return 1;
1101 }
1102
1103 static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
1104 _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
1105 const char *entry_path;
1106 int r, n;
1107
1108 assert(m);
1109 assert(ns_info);
1110
1111 if (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1112 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
1113
1114 /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it
1115 * pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
1116 * if requested. To make sure this logic succeeds only on kernels where hidepid= is
1117 * per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was
1118 * added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */
1119
1120 const char *hpv = ns_info->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ?
1121 "off" :
1122 protect_proc_to_string(ns_info->protect_proc);
1123
1124 /* hidepid= support was added in 5.8, so we can use fsconfig()/fsopen() (which were added in
1125 * 5.2) to check if hidepid= is supported. This avoids a noisy dmesg log by the kernel when
1126 * trying to use hidepid= on systems where it isn't supported. The same applies for subset=.
1127 * fsopen()/fsconfig() was also backported on some distros which allows us to detect
1128 * hidepid=/subset= support in even more scenarios. */
1129
1130 if (mount_option_supported("proc", "hidepid", hpv) != 0) {
1131 opts = strjoin("hidepid=", hpv);
1132 if (!opts)
1133 return -ENOMEM;
1134 }
1135
1136 if (ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID &&
1137 mount_option_supported("proc", "subset", "pid") != 0)
1138 if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "subset=pid"))
1139 return -ENOMEM;
1140 }
1141
1142 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1143 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1144
1145 /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in
1146 * one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition, we want a new instance owned by
1147 * our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence, let's get rid of everything
1148 * mounted on /proc/ first. */
1149
1150 n = umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1151
1152 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts);
1153 if (r == -EINVAL && opts)
1154 /* If this failed with EINVAL then this likely means the textual hidepid= stuff is
1155 * not supported by the kernel, and thus the per-instance hidepid= neither, which
1156 * means we really don't want to use it, since it would affect our host's /proc
1157 * mount. Hence let's gracefully fallback to a classic, unrestricted version. */
1158 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
1159 if (r == -EPERM) {
1160 /* When we do not have enough privileges to mount /proc, fallback to use existing /proc. */
1161
1162 if (n > 0)
1163 /* /proc or some of sub-mounts are umounted in the above. Refuse incomplete tree.
1164 * Propagate the original error code returned by mount() in the above. */
1165 return -EPERM;
1166
1167 r = path_is_mount_point(entry_path, NULL, 0);
1168 if (r < 0)
1169 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /proc is already mounted: %m");
1170 if (r == 0) {
1171 /* We lack permissions to mount a new instance of /proc, and it is not already
1172 * mounted. But we can access the host's, so as a final fallback bind-mount it to
1173 * the destination, as most likely we are inside a user manager in an unprivileged
1174 * user namespace. */
1175 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/proc", entry_path, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1176 if (r < 0)
1177 return -EPERM;
1178 }
1179 } else if (r < 0)
1180 return r;
1181
1182 return 1;
1183 }
1184
1185 static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1186 const char *entry_path, *inner_path;
1187 int r;
1188
1189 assert(m);
1190
1191 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1192 inner_path = mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m);
1193
1194 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new
1195 * tmpfs */
1196
1197 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1198 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1199
1200 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1201 if (r < 0)
1202 return r;
1203
1204 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, entry_path, inner_path, 0);
1205 if (r < 0)
1206 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, inner_path);
1207
1208 return 1;
1209 }
1210
1211 static int mount_run(const MountEntry *m) {
1212 int r;
1213
1214 assert(m);
1215
1216 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1217 if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
1218 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /run is already mounted: %m");
1219 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /run is already a mount point */
1220 return 0;
1221
1222 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1223 }
1224
1225 static int mount_mqueuefs(const MountEntry *m) {
1226 int r;
1227 const char *entry_path;
1228
1229 assert(m);
1230
1231 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1232
1233 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1234 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1235
1236 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "mqueue", entry_path, "mqueue", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1237 if (r < 0)
1238 return r;
1239
1240 return 0;
1241 }
1242
1243 static int mount_image(const MountEntry *m, const char *root_directory) {
1244
1245 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1246 *host_os_release_sysext_level = NULL;
1247 int r;
1248
1249 assert(m);
1250
1251 if (m->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES) {
1252 r = parse_os_release(
1253 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1254 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1255 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1256 "SYSEXT_LEVEL", &host_os_release_sysext_level,
1257 NULL);
1258 if (r < 0)
1259 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1260 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1261 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1262 }
1263
1264 r = verity_dissect_and_mount(
1265 /* src_fd= */ -1, mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m), m->image_options,
1266 host_os_release_id, host_os_release_version_id, host_os_release_sysext_level, NULL);
1267 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1268 return 0;
1269 if (r == -ESTALE && host_os_release_id)
1270 return log_error_errno(r,
1271 "Failed to mount image %s, extension-release metadata does not match the lower layer's: ID=%s%s%s%s%s",
1272 mount_entry_source(m),
1273 host_os_release_id,
1274 host_os_release_version_id ? " VERSION_ID=" : "",
1275 strempty(host_os_release_version_id),
1276 host_os_release_sysext_level ? " SYSEXT_LEVEL=" : "",
1277 strempty(host_os_release_sysext_level));
1278 if (r < 0)
1279 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image %s on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m));
1280
1281 return 1;
1282 }
1283
1284 static int mount_overlay(const MountEntry *m) {
1285 const char *options;
1286 int r;
1287
1288 assert(m);
1289
1290 options = strjoina("lowerdir=", mount_entry_options(m));
1291
1292 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1293
1294 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "overlay", mount_entry_path(m), "overlay", MS_RDONLY, options);
1295 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1296 return 0;
1297 if (r < 0)
1298 return r;
1299
1300 return 1;
1301 }
1302
1303 static int follow_symlink(
1304 const char *root_directory,
1305 MountEntry *m) {
1306
1307 _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL;
1308 int r;
1309
1310 /* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we
1311 * might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at
1312 * a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the
1313 * end and already have a fully normalized name. */
1314
1315 r = chase(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL);
1316 if (r < 0)
1317 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1318 if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */
1319 return 1;
1320
1321 if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */
1322 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1323 "Symlink loop on '%s'.",
1324 mount_entry_path(m));
1325
1326 log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s %s %s.",
1327 mount_entry_path(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), target);
1328
1329 mount_entry_consume_prefix(m, TAKE_PTR(target));
1330
1331 m->n_followed ++;
1332
1333 return 0;
1334 }
1335
1336 static int apply_one_mount(
1337 const char *root_directory,
1338 MountEntry *m,
1339 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
1340
1341 _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
1342 bool rbind = true, make = false;
1343 const char *what;
1344 int r;
1345
1346 assert(m);
1347 assert(ns_info);
1348
1349 log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
1350
1351 switch (m->mode) {
1352
1353 case INACCESSIBLE: {
1354 _cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL;
1355 const char *runtime_dir;
1356 struct stat target;
1357
1358 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there
1359 * is anything... Then, overmount it with an
1360 * inaccessible path. */
1361 (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1362
1363 if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) {
1364 if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore)
1365 return 0;
1366
1367 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m",
1368 mount_entry_path(m));
1369 }
1370
1371 if (geteuid() == 0)
1372 runtime_dir = "/run";
1373 else {
1374 if (asprintf(&tmp, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0)
1375 return -ENOMEM;
1376
1377 runtime_dir = tmp;
1378 }
1379
1380 r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible);
1381 if (r < 0)
1382 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1383 "File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed");
1384 what = inaccessible;
1385 break;
1386 }
1387
1388 case READONLY:
1389 case READWRITE:
1390 case READWRITE_IMPLICIT:
1391 case EXEC:
1392 case NOEXEC:
1393 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0);
1394 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1395 return 0;
1396 if (r < 0)
1397 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m",
1398 mount_entry_path(m));
1399 if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY
1400 * and MS_NOEXEC bits for the mount point if needed. */
1401 return 0;
1402 /* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */
1403 what = mount_entry_path(m);
1404 break;
1405
1406 case EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES: {
1407 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1408 *host_os_release_sysext_level = NULL, *extension_name = NULL;
1409 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **extension_release = NULL;
1410
1411 r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name);
1412 if (r < 0)
1413 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1414
1415 r = parse_os_release(
1416 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1417 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1418 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1419 "SYSEXT_LEVEL", &host_os_release_sysext_level,
1420 NULL);
1421 if (r < 0)
1422 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1423 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1424 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1425
1426 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), IMAGE_SYSEXT, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1427 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1428 return 0;
1429 if (r < 0)
1430 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse directory %s extension-release metadata: %m", extension_name);
1431
1432 r = extension_release_validate(
1433 extension_name,
1434 host_os_release_id,
1435 host_os_release_version_id,
1436 host_os_release_sysext_level,
1437 /* host_sysext_scope */ NULL, /* Leave empty, we need to accept both system and portable */
1438 extension_release,
1439 IMAGE_SYSEXT);
1440 if (r == 0)
1441 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Directory %s extension-release metadata does not match the root's", extension_name);
1442 if (r < 0)
1443 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to compare directory %s extension-release metadata with the root's os-release: %m", extension_name);
1444
1445 _fallthrough_;
1446 }
1447
1448 case BIND_MOUNT:
1449 rbind = false;
1450
1451 _fallthrough_;
1452 case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: {
1453 _cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL;
1454
1455 /* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note
1456 * that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as
1457 * root directory to chase() here. */
1458
1459 r = chase(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL);
1460 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) {
1461 log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m));
1462 return 0;
1463 }
1464 if (r < 0)
1465 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1466
1467 log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s %s %s.",
1468 mount_entry_source(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), chased);
1469
1470 free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased);
1471
1472 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1473 make = true;
1474 break;
1475 }
1476
1477 case EMPTY_DIR:
1478 case TMPFS:
1479 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1480
1481 case PRIVATE_TMP:
1482 case PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY:
1483 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1484 make = true;
1485 break;
1486
1487 case PRIVATE_DEV:
1488 return mount_private_dev(m);
1489
1490 case BIND_DEV:
1491 return mount_bind_dev(m);
1492
1493 case PRIVATE_SYSFS:
1494 return mount_private_sysfs(m);
1495
1496 case BIND_SYSFS:
1497 return mount_bind_sysfs(m);
1498
1499 case PROCFS:
1500 return mount_procfs(m, ns_info);
1501
1502 case RUN:
1503 return mount_run(m);
1504
1505 case MQUEUEFS:
1506 return mount_mqueuefs(m);
1507
1508 case MOUNT_IMAGES:
1509 return mount_image(m, NULL);
1510
1511 case EXTENSION_IMAGES:
1512 return mount_image(m, root_directory);
1513
1514 case OVERLAY_MOUNT:
1515 return mount_overlay(m);
1516
1517 default:
1518 assert_not_reached();
1519 }
1520
1521 assert(what);
1522
1523 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1524 if (r < 0) {
1525 bool try_again = false;
1526
1527 if (r == -ENOENT && make) {
1528 int q;
1529
1530 /* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create
1531 the destination, then try again. */
1532
1533 (void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1534
1535 q = make_mount_point_inode_from_path(what, mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1536 if (q < 0 && q != -EEXIST)
1537 log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m",
1538 mount_entry_path(m));
1539 else
1540 try_again = true;
1541 }
1542
1543 if (try_again)
1544 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1545 if (r < 0)
1546 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1547 }
1548
1549 log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1550 return 0;
1551 }
1552
1553 static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1554 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
1555 bool submounts;
1556 int r;
1557
1558 assert(m);
1559 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1560
1561 if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) {
1562 new_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
1563 flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY;
1564 }
1565
1566 if (m->nosuid) {
1567 new_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
1568 flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID;
1569 }
1570
1571 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1572 return 0;
1573
1574 /* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's
1575 * nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the
1576 * per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace
1577 * and running Linux <= 4.17. */
1578 submounts =
1579 mount_entry_read_only(m) &&
1580 !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1581 if (submounts)
1582 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1583 else
1584 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1585
1586 /* Note that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked
1587 * read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we
1588 * won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */
1589
1590 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1591 return 0;
1592 if (r < 0)
1593 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1594 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1595 return 0;
1596 }
1597
1598 static int make_noexec(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1599 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
1600 bool submounts;
1601 int r;
1602
1603 assert(m);
1604 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1605
1606 if (mount_entry_noexec(m)) {
1607 new_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
1608 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1609 } else if (mount_entry_exec(m)) {
1610 new_flags &= ~MS_NOEXEC;
1611 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1612 }
1613
1614 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1615 return 0;
1616
1617 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1618
1619 if (submounts)
1620 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1621 else
1622 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1623
1624 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1625 return 0;
1626 if (r < 0)
1627 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1628 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1629 return 0;
1630 }
1631
1632 static int make_nosuid(const MountEntry *m, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1633 bool submounts;
1634 int r;
1635
1636 assert(m);
1637 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1638
1639 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1640
1641 if (submounts)
1642 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, NULL, proc_self_mountinfo);
1643 else
1644 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, proc_self_mountinfo);
1645 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1646 return 0;
1647 if (r < 0)
1648 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1649 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1650 return 0;
1651 }
1652
1653 static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
1654 assert(ns_info);
1655
1656 /*
1657 * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
1658 * since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the
1659 * first place...
1660 */
1661
1662 return ns_info->mount_apivfs ||
1663 ns_info->protect_control_groups ||
1664 ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ||
1665 ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1666 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL;
1667 }
1668
1669 static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
1670 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
1671 char** read_write_paths,
1672 char** read_only_paths,
1673 char** inaccessible_paths,
1674 char** exec_paths,
1675 char** no_exec_paths,
1676 char** empty_directories,
1677 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1678 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1679 size_t n_mount_images,
1680 size_t n_extension_images,
1681 size_t n_extension_directories,
1682 size_t n_hierarchies,
1683 const char* tmp_dir,
1684 const char* var_tmp_dir,
1685 const char *creds_path,
1686 const char* log_namespace,
1687 bool setup_propagate,
1688 const char* notify_socket) {
1689
1690 size_t protect_home_cnt;
1691 size_t protect_system_cnt =
1692 (ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
1693 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) :
1694 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
1695 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) :
1696 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
1697 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0)));
1698
1699 protect_home_cnt =
1700 (ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
1701 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) :
1702 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
1703 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) :
1704 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
1705 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0)));
1706
1707 return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir +
1708 strv_length(read_write_paths) +
1709 strv_length(read_only_paths) +
1710 strv_length(inaccessible_paths) +
1711 strv_length(exec_paths) +
1712 strv_length(no_exec_paths) +
1713 strv_length(empty_directories) +
1714 n_bind_mounts +
1715 n_mount_images +
1716 (n_extension_images > 0 || n_extension_directories > 0 ? /* Mount each image and directory plus an overlay per hierarchy */
1717 n_hierarchies + n_extension_images + n_extension_directories: 0) +
1718 n_temporary_filesystems +
1719 ns_info->private_dev +
1720 (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ?
1721 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table) : 0) +
1722 (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
1723 (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ?
1724 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table) : 0) +
1725 (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
1726 protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
1727 (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
1728 (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
1729 (creds_path ? 2 : 1) +
1730 !!log_namespace +
1731 setup_propagate + /* /run/systemd/incoming */
1732 !!notify_socket +
1733 ns_info->private_network + /* /sys */
1734 ns_info->private_ipc; /* /dev/mqueue */
1735 }
1736
1737 /* Walk all mount entries and dropping any unused mounts. This affects all
1738 * mounts:
1739 * - that are implicitly protected by a path that has been rendered inaccessible
1740 * - whose immediate parent requests the same protection mode as the mount itself
1741 * - that are outside of the relevant root directory
1742 * - which are duplicates
1743 */
1744 static void drop_unused_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) {
1745 assert(root_directory);
1746 assert(n_mounts);
1747 assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0);
1748
1749 typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare);
1750
1751 drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts);
1752 drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts);
1753 drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts);
1754 drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts);
1755 }
1756
1757 static int create_symlinks_from_tuples(const char *root, char **strv_symlinks) {
1758 int r;
1759
1760 STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(src, dst, strv_symlinks) {
1761 _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL;
1762
1763 src_abs = path_join(root, *src);
1764 dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst);
1765 if (!src_abs || !dst_abs)
1766 return -ENOMEM;
1767
1768 r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755);
1769 if (r < 0)
1770 return r;
1771
1772 r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true);
1773 if (r < 0)
1774 return r;
1775 }
1776
1777 return 0;
1778 }
1779
1780 static int apply_mounts(
1781 const char *root,
1782 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
1783 MountEntry *mounts,
1784 size_t *n_mounts,
1785 char **exec_dir_symlinks,
1786 char **error_path) {
1787
1788 _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
1789 _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL;
1790 int r;
1791
1792 if (n_mounts == 0) /* Shortcut: nothing to do */
1793 return 0;
1794
1795 assert(root);
1796 assert(mounts);
1797 assert(n_mounts);
1798
1799 /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of
1800 * /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */
1801 proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re");
1802 if (!proc_self_mountinfo) {
1803 r = -errno;
1804
1805 if (error_path)
1806 *error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo");
1807
1808 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m");
1809 }
1810
1811 /* First round, establish all mounts we need */
1812 for (;;) {
1813 bool again = false;
1814
1815 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1816
1817 if (m->applied)
1818 continue;
1819
1820 /* ExtensionImages/Directories are first opened in the propagate directory, not in the root_directory */
1821 r = follow_symlink(!IN_SET(m->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) ? root : NULL, m);
1822 if (r < 0) {
1823 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1824 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1825 return r;
1826 }
1827 if (r == 0) {
1828 /* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might
1829 * point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed
1830 * list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry
1831 * at the new location we might need some other mounts first */
1832 again = true;
1833 break;
1834 }
1835
1836 r = apply_one_mount(root, m, ns_info);
1837 if (r < 0) {
1838 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1839 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1840 return r;
1841 }
1842
1843 m->applied = true;
1844 }
1845
1846 if (!again)
1847 break;
1848
1849 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, n_mounts);
1850 }
1851
1852 /* Now that all filesystems have been set up, but before the
1853 * read-only switches are flipped, create the exec dirs symlinks.
1854 * Note that when /var/lib is not empty/tmpfs, these symlinks will already
1855 * exist, which means this will be a no-op. */
1856 r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, exec_dir_symlinks);
1857 if (r < 0)
1858 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up ExecDirectories symlinks inside mount namespace: %m");
1859
1860 /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */
1861 deny_list = new(char*, (*n_mounts)+1);
1862 if (!deny_list)
1863 return -ENOMEM;
1864 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
1865 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1866 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
1867
1868 /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */
1869 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1870 r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1871 if (r < 0) {
1872 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1873 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1874 return r;
1875 }
1876 }
1877
1878 /* Third round, flip the noexec bits with a simplified deny list. */
1879 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
1880 if (IN_SET((mounts+j)->mode, EXEC, NOEXEC))
1881 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1882 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
1883
1884 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1885 r = make_noexec(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1886 if (r < 0) {
1887 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1888 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1889 return r;
1890 }
1891 }
1892
1893 /* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */
1894 if (ns_info->mount_nosuid)
1895 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1896 r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo);
1897 if (r < 0) {
1898 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1899 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1900 return r;
1901 }
1902 }
1903
1904 return 1;
1905 }
1906
1907 static bool root_read_only(
1908 char **read_only_paths,
1909 ProtectSystem protect_system) {
1910
1911 /* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */
1912
1913 if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT)
1914 return true;
1915
1916 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/"))
1917 return true;
1918
1919 return false;
1920 }
1921
1922 static bool home_read_only(
1923 char** read_only_paths,
1924 char** inaccessible_paths,
1925 char** empty_directories,
1926 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
1927 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1928 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
1929 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1930 ProtectHome protect_home) {
1931
1932 /* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes,
1933 * this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple
1934 * settings. */
1935
1936 if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
1937 return true;
1938
1939 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") ||
1940 prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") ||
1941 prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home"))
1942 return true;
1943
1944 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++)
1945 if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home"))
1946 return true;
1947
1948 /* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */
1949 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++)
1950 if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home"))
1951 return true;
1952
1953 return false;
1954 }
1955
1956 static int verity_settings_prepare(
1957 VeritySettings *verity,
1958 const char *root_image,
1959 const void *root_hash,
1960 size_t root_hash_size,
1961 const char *root_hash_path,
1962 const void *root_hash_sig,
1963 size_t root_hash_sig_size,
1964 const char *root_hash_sig_path,
1965 const char *verity_data_path) {
1966
1967 int r;
1968
1969 assert(verity);
1970
1971 if (root_hash) {
1972 void *d;
1973
1974 d = memdup(root_hash, root_hash_size);
1975 if (!d)
1976 return -ENOMEM;
1977
1978 free_and_replace(verity->root_hash, d);
1979 verity->root_hash_size = root_hash_size;
1980 verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT;
1981 }
1982
1983 if (root_hash_sig) {
1984 void *d;
1985
1986 d = memdup(root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size);
1987 if (!d)
1988 return -ENOMEM;
1989
1990 free_and_replace(verity->root_hash_sig, d);
1991 verity->root_hash_sig_size = root_hash_sig_size;
1992 verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT;
1993 }
1994
1995 if (verity_data_path) {
1996 r = free_and_strdup(&verity->data_path, verity_data_path);
1997 if (r < 0)
1998 return r;
1999 }
2000
2001 r = verity_settings_load(
2002 verity,
2003 root_image,
2004 root_hash_path,
2005 root_hash_sig_path);
2006 if (r < 0)
2007 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m");
2008
2009 return 0;
2010 }
2011
2012 int setup_namespace(
2013 const char* root_directory,
2014 const char* root_image,
2015 const MountOptions *root_image_options,
2016 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
2017 char** read_write_paths,
2018 char** read_only_paths,
2019 char** inaccessible_paths,
2020 char** exec_paths,
2021 char** no_exec_paths,
2022 char** empty_directories,
2023 char** exec_dir_symlinks,
2024 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
2025 size_t n_bind_mounts,
2026 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
2027 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
2028 const MountImage *mount_images,
2029 size_t n_mount_images,
2030 const char* tmp_dir,
2031 const char* var_tmp_dir,
2032 const char *creds_path,
2033 const char *log_namespace,
2034 unsigned long mount_propagation_flag,
2035 const void *root_hash,
2036 size_t root_hash_size,
2037 const char *root_hash_path,
2038 const void *root_hash_sig,
2039 size_t root_hash_sig_size,
2040 const char *root_hash_sig_path,
2041 const char *verity_data_path,
2042 const MountImage *extension_images,
2043 size_t n_extension_images,
2044 char **extension_directories,
2045 const char *propagate_dir,
2046 const char *incoming_dir,
2047 const char *extension_dir,
2048 const char *notify_socket,
2049 char **error_path) {
2050
2051 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
2052 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
2053 _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT;
2054 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL;
2055 MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL;
2056 bool require_prefix = false, setup_propagate = false;
2057 const char *root;
2058 DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags =
2059 DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT |
2060 DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT |
2061 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP |
2062 DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK |
2063 DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK |
2064 DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT |
2065 DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS |
2066 DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES |
2067 DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES;
2068 size_t n_mounts;
2069 int r;
2070
2071 assert(ns_info);
2072
2073 /* Make sure that all mknod(), mkdir() calls we do are unaffected by the umask, and the access modes
2074 * we configure take effect */
2075 BLOCK_WITH_UMASK(0000);
2076
2077 if (!isempty(propagate_dir) && !isempty(incoming_dir))
2078 setup_propagate = true;
2079
2080 if (mount_propagation_flag == 0)
2081 mount_propagation_flag = MS_SHARED;
2082
2083 if (root_image) {
2084 /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
2085 if (root_read_only(read_only_paths,
2086 ns_info->protect_system) &&
2087 home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories,
2088 bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems,
2089 ns_info->protect_home) &&
2090 strv_isempty(read_write_paths))
2091 dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
2092
2093 r = verity_settings_prepare(
2094 &verity,
2095 root_image,
2096 root_hash, root_hash_size, root_hash_path,
2097 root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size, root_hash_sig_path,
2098 verity_data_path);
2099 if (r < 0)
2100 return r;
2101
2102 SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, verity.data_path);
2103
2104 r = loop_device_make_by_path(
2105 root_image,
2106 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
2107 /* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX,
2108 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
2109 LOCK_SH,
2110 &loop_device);
2111 if (r < 0)
2112 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m");
2113
2114 r = dissect_loop_device(
2115 loop_device,
2116 &verity,
2117 root_image_options,
2118 dissect_image_flags,
2119 &dissected_image);
2120 if (r < 0)
2121 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
2122
2123 r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
2124 dissected_image,
2125 loop_device->fd,
2126 &verity);
2127 if (r < 0)
2128 return r;
2129
2130 r = dissected_image_decrypt(
2131 dissected_image,
2132 NULL,
2133 &verity,
2134 dissect_image_flags);
2135 if (r < 0)
2136 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
2137 }
2138
2139 if (root_directory)
2140 root = root_directory;
2141 else {
2142 /* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like
2143 * when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure
2144 * we create it if it doesn't already exist. */
2145 (void) mkdir_p_label("/run/systemd", 0755);
2146
2147 /* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating directly
2148 * in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being potentially obscured
2149 * my other mounts we already applied. We use the same mount point for all images, which is
2150 * safe, since they all live in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each
2151 * other. */
2152
2153 root = "/run/systemd/unit-root";
2154 (void) mkdir_label(root, 0700);
2155 require_prefix = true;
2156 }
2157
2158 if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories)) {
2159 r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies, "SYSTEMD_SYSEXT_HIERARCHIES");
2160 if (r < 0)
2161 return r;
2162 }
2163
2164 n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts(
2165 ns_info,
2166 read_write_paths,
2167 read_only_paths,
2168 inaccessible_paths,
2169 exec_paths,
2170 no_exec_paths,
2171 empty_directories,
2172 n_bind_mounts,
2173 n_temporary_filesystems,
2174 n_mount_images,
2175 n_extension_images,
2176 strv_length(extension_directories),
2177 strv_length(hierarchies),
2178 tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir,
2179 creds_path,
2180 log_namespace,
2181 setup_propagate,
2182 notify_socket);
2183
2184 if (n_mounts > 0) {
2185 m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts);
2186 if (!mounts)
2187 return -ENOMEM;
2188
2189 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
2190 if (r < 0)
2191 goto finish;
2192
2193 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
2194 if (r < 0)
2195 goto finish;
2196
2197 r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
2198 if (r < 0)
2199 goto finish;
2200
2201 r = append_access_mounts(&m, exec_paths, EXEC, require_prefix);
2202 if (r < 0)
2203 goto finish;
2204
2205 r = append_access_mounts(&m, no_exec_paths, NOEXEC, require_prefix);
2206 if (r < 0)
2207 goto finish;
2208
2209 r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories);
2210 if (r < 0)
2211 goto finish;
2212
2213 r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts);
2214 if (r < 0)
2215 goto finish;
2216
2217 r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems);
2218 if (r < 0)
2219 goto finish;
2220
2221 if (tmp_dir) {
2222 bool ro = streq(tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2223
2224 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2225 .path_const = "/tmp",
2226 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
2227 .source_const = tmp_dir,
2228 };
2229 }
2230
2231 if (var_tmp_dir) {
2232 bool ro = streq(var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2233
2234 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2235 .path_const = "/var/tmp",
2236 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
2237 .source_const = var_tmp_dir,
2238 };
2239 }
2240
2241 r = append_mount_images(&m, mount_images, n_mount_images);
2242 if (r < 0)
2243 goto finish;
2244
2245 r = append_extensions(&m, root, extension_dir, hierarchies, extension_images, n_extension_images, extension_directories);
2246 if (r < 0)
2247 goto finish;
2248
2249 if (ns_info->private_dev)
2250 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2251 .path_const = "/dev",
2252 .mode = PRIVATE_DEV,
2253 .flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS,
2254 };
2255
2256 /* In case /proc is successfully mounted with pid tree subset only (ProcSubset=pid), the
2257 protective mounts to non-pid /proc paths would fail. But the pid only option may have
2258 failed gracefully, so let's try the mounts but it's not fatal if they don't succeed. */
2259 bool ignore_protect_proc = ns_info->ignore_protect_paths || ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID;
2260 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) {
2261 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2262 protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table,
2263 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table),
2264 ignore_protect_proc);
2265 if (r < 0)
2266 goto finish;
2267
2268 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2269 protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table,
2270 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table),
2271 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2272 if (r < 0)
2273 goto finish;
2274 }
2275
2276 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) {
2277 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2278 protect_kernel_modules_table,
2279 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
2280 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2281 if (r < 0)
2282 goto finish;
2283 }
2284
2285 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) {
2286 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2287 protect_kernel_logs_proc_table,
2288 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table),
2289 ignore_protect_proc);
2290 if (r < 0)
2291 goto finish;
2292
2293 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2294 protect_kernel_logs_dev_table,
2295 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table),
2296 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2297 if (r < 0)
2298 goto finish;
2299 }
2300
2301 if (ns_info->protect_control_groups)
2302 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2303 .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
2304 .mode = READONLY,
2305 };
2306
2307 r = append_protect_home(&m, ns_info->protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2308 if (r < 0)
2309 goto finish;
2310
2311 r = append_protect_system(&m, ns_info->protect_system, false);
2312 if (r < 0)
2313 goto finish;
2314
2315 if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) {
2316 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2317 apivfs_table,
2318 ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
2319 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2320 if (r < 0)
2321 goto finish;
2322 }
2323
2324 /* Note, if proc is mounted with subset=pid then neither of the
2325 * two paths will exist, i.e. they are implicitly protected by
2326 * the mount option. */
2327 if (ns_info->protect_hostname) {
2328 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2329 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
2330 .mode = READONLY,
2331 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
2332 };
2333 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2334 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname",
2335 .mode = READONLY,
2336 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
2337 };
2338 }
2339
2340 if (ns_info->private_network)
2341 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2342 .path_const = "/sys",
2343 .mode = PRIVATE_SYSFS,
2344 };
2345
2346 if (ns_info->private_ipc)
2347 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2348 .path_const = "/dev/mqueue",
2349 .mode = MQUEUEFS,
2350 .flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME,
2351 };
2352
2353 if (creds_path) {
2354 /* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide
2355 * everything else. */
2356
2357 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2358 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2359 .mode = TMPFS,
2360 .read_only = true,
2361 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
2362 .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
2363 };
2364
2365 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2366 .path_const = creds_path,
2367 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2368 .read_only = true,
2369 .source_const = creds_path,
2370 };
2371 } else {
2372 /* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole
2373 * credentials tree inaccessible wholesale. */
2374
2375 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2376 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2377 .mode = INACCESSIBLE,
2378 .ignore = true,
2379 };
2380 }
2381
2382 if (log_namespace) {
2383 _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL;
2384
2385 q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace);
2386 if (!q) {
2387 r = -ENOMEM;
2388 goto finish;
2389 }
2390
2391 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2392 .path_const = "/run/systemd/journal",
2393 .mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
2394 .read_only = true,
2395 .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q),
2396 };
2397 }
2398
2399 /* Will be used to add bind mounts at runtime */
2400 if (setup_propagate)
2401 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2402 .source_const = propagate_dir,
2403 .path_const = incoming_dir,
2404 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2405 .read_only = true,
2406 };
2407
2408 if (notify_socket)
2409 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2410 .path_const = notify_socket,
2411 .source_const = notify_socket,
2412 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2413 .read_only = true,
2414 };
2415
2416 assert(mounts + n_mounts == m);
2417
2418 /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */
2419 r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root);
2420 if (r < 0)
2421 goto finish;
2422
2423 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
2424 }
2425
2426 /* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */
2427
2428 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) {
2429 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m");
2430 if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) ||
2431 ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))
2432 /* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter
2433 * in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then
2434 * propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case
2435 * (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */
2436 r = -ENOANO;
2437
2438 goto finish;
2439 }
2440
2441 /* Create the source directory to allow runtime propagation of mounts */
2442 if (setup_propagate)
2443 (void) mkdir_p(propagate_dir, 0600);
2444
2445 if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories))
2446 /* ExtensionImages/Directories mountpoint directories will be created while parsing the
2447 * mounts to create, so have the parent ready */
2448 (void) mkdir_p(extension_dir, 0600);
2449
2450 /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
2451 * shows up in the parent */
2452 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
2453 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m");
2454 goto finish;
2455 }
2456
2457 if (root_image) {
2458 /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
2459 r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, root, UID_INVALID, UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags);
2460 if (r < 0) {
2461 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m");
2462 goto finish;
2463 }
2464
2465 /* Now release the block device lock, so that udevd is free to call BLKRRPART on the device
2466 * if it likes. */
2467 r = loop_device_flock(loop_device, LOCK_UN);
2468 if (r < 0) {
2469 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to release lock on loopback block device: %m");
2470 goto finish;
2471 }
2472
2473 r = dissected_image_relinquish(dissected_image);
2474 if (r < 0) {
2475 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish dissected image: %m");
2476 goto finish;
2477 }
2478
2479 } else if (root_directory) {
2480
2481 /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
2482 r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
2483 if (r < 0) {
2484 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root);
2485 goto finish;
2486 }
2487 if (r == 0) {
2488 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2489 if (r < 0)
2490 goto finish;
2491 }
2492
2493 } else {
2494 /* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */
2495 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2496 if (r < 0)
2497 goto finish;
2498 }
2499
2500 /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
2501 if (root_image || root_directory)
2502 (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
2503
2504 /* Now make the magic happen */
2505 r = apply_mounts(root, ns_info, mounts, &n_mounts, exec_dir_symlinks, error_path);
2506 if (r < 0)
2507 goto finish;
2508
2509 /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
2510 r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
2511 if (r == -EINVAL && root_directory) {
2512 /* If we are using root_directory and we don't have privileges (ie: user manager in a user
2513 * namespace) and the root_directory is already a mount point in the parent namespace,
2514 * MS_MOVE will fail as we don't have permission to change it (with EINVAL rather than
2515 * EPERM). Attempt to bind-mount it over itself (like we do above if it's not already a
2516 * mount point) and try again. */
2517 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2518 if (r < 0)
2519 goto finish;
2520 r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
2521 }
2522 if (r < 0) {
2523 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m");
2524 goto finish;
2525 }
2526
2527 /* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not reestablish propagation from our side to
2528 * the host, since what's disconnected is disconnected. */
2529 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_propagation_flag | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
2530 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m");
2531 goto finish;
2532 }
2533
2534 /* bind_mount_in_namespace() will MS_MOVE into that directory, and that's only
2535 * supported for non-shared mounts. This needs to happen after remounting / or it will fail. */
2536 if (setup_propagate) {
2537 r = mount(NULL, incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL);
2538 if (r < 0) {
2539 log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", incoming_dir);
2540 goto finish;
2541 }
2542 }
2543
2544 r = 0;
2545
2546 finish:
2547 if (n_mounts > 0)
2548 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++)
2549 mount_entry_done(m);
2550
2551 free(mounts);
2552
2553 return r;
2554 }
2555
2556 void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) {
2557 assert(b || n == 0);
2558
2559 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2560 free(b[i].source);
2561 free(b[i].destination);
2562 }
2563
2564 free(b);
2565 }
2566
2567 int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) {
2568 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
2569 BindMount *c;
2570
2571 assert(b);
2572 assert(n);
2573 assert(item);
2574
2575 s = strdup(item->source);
2576 if (!s)
2577 return -ENOMEM;
2578
2579 d = strdup(item->destination);
2580 if (!d)
2581 return -ENOMEM;
2582
2583 c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount));
2584 if (!c)
2585 return -ENOMEM;
2586
2587 *b = c;
2588
2589 c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) {
2590 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2591 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
2592 .read_only = item->read_only,
2593 .nosuid = item->nosuid,
2594 .recursive = item->recursive,
2595 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2596 };
2597
2598 return 0;
2599 }
2600
2601 MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) {
2602 assert(n);
2603 assert(m || *n == 0);
2604
2605 for (size_t i = 0; i < *n; i++) {
2606 free(m[i].source);
2607 free(m[i].destination);
2608 mount_options_free_all(m[i].mount_options);
2609 }
2610
2611 free(m);
2612 *n = 0;
2613 return NULL;
2614 }
2615
2616 int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) {
2617 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
2618 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL;
2619 MountImage *c;
2620
2621 assert(m);
2622 assert(n);
2623 assert(item);
2624
2625 s = strdup(item->source);
2626 if (!s)
2627 return -ENOMEM;
2628
2629 if (item->destination) {
2630 d = strdup(item->destination);
2631 if (!d)
2632 return -ENOMEM;
2633 }
2634
2635 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, i, item->mount_options) {
2636 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *o = NULL;
2637
2638 o = new(MountOptions, 1);
2639 if (!o)
2640 return -ENOMEM;
2641
2642 *o = (MountOptions) {
2643 .partition_designator = i->partition_designator,
2644 .options = strdup(i->options),
2645 };
2646 if (!o->options)
2647 return -ENOMEM;
2648
2649 LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, TAKE_PTR(o));
2650 }
2651
2652 c = reallocarray(*m, *n + 1, sizeof(MountImage));
2653 if (!c)
2654 return -ENOMEM;
2655
2656 *m = c;
2657
2658 c[(*n) ++] = (MountImage) {
2659 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2660 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
2661 .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(options),
2662 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2663 .type = item->type,
2664 };
2665
2666 return 0;
2667 }
2668
2669 void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) {
2670 assert(t || n == 0);
2671
2672 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2673 free(t[i].path);
2674 free(t[i].options);
2675 }
2676
2677 free(t);
2678 }
2679
2680 int temporary_filesystem_add(
2681 TemporaryFileSystem **t,
2682 size_t *n,
2683 const char *path,
2684 const char *options) {
2685
2686 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL;
2687 TemporaryFileSystem *c;
2688
2689 assert(t);
2690 assert(n);
2691 assert(path);
2692
2693 p = strdup(path);
2694 if (!p)
2695 return -ENOMEM;
2696
2697 if (!isempty(options)) {
2698 o = strdup(options);
2699 if (!o)
2700 return -ENOMEM;
2701 }
2702
2703 c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem));
2704 if (!c)
2705 return -ENOMEM;
2706
2707 *t = c;
2708
2709 c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) {
2710 .path = TAKE_PTR(p),
2711 .options = TAKE_PTR(o),
2712 };
2713
2714 return 0;
2715 }
2716
2717 static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) {
2718 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
2719 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
2720 int r;
2721
2722 /* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */
2723 r = access(prefix, F_OK);
2724 if (r >= 0)
2725 return 0;
2726 if (errno != ENOENT)
2727 return -errno;
2728
2729 WITH_UMASK(000)
2730 r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755);
2731 if (r < 0)
2732 return r;
2733
2734 r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t);
2735 if (r < 0)
2736 return r;
2737
2738 /* umask will corrupt this access mode, but that doesn't matter, we need to call chmod() anyway for
2739 * the suid bit, below. */
2740 fd = open_mkdir_at(AT_FDCWD, t, O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, 0777);
2741 if (fd < 0)
2742 return fd;
2743
2744 r = RET_NERRNO(fchmod(fd, 01777));
2745 if (r < 0) {
2746 (void) rmdir(t);
2747 return r;
2748 }
2749
2750 r = RET_NERRNO(rename(t, prefix));
2751 if (r < 0) {
2752 (void) rmdir(t);
2753 return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */
2754 }
2755
2756 return 0;
2757
2758 }
2759
2760 static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) {
2761 _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
2762 _cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL;
2763 sd_id128_t boot_id;
2764 bool rw = true;
2765 int r;
2766
2767 assert(id);
2768 assert(prefix);
2769 assert(path);
2770
2771 /* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a
2772 * reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */
2773
2774 r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id);
2775 if (r < 0)
2776 return r;
2777
2778 x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", SD_ID128_TO_STRING(boot_id), "-", id, "-XXXXXX");
2779 if (!x)
2780 return -ENOMEM;
2781
2782 r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix);
2783 if (r < 0)
2784 return r;
2785
2786 WITH_UMASK(0077)
2787 if (!mkdtemp(x)) {
2788 if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno))
2789 rw = false;
2790 else
2791 return -errno;
2792 }
2793
2794 if (rw) {
2795 y = strjoin(x, "/tmp");
2796 if (!y)
2797 return -ENOMEM;
2798
2799 WITH_UMASK(0000)
2800 if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0)
2801 return -errno;
2802
2803 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, y, prefix, 0);
2804 if (r < 0)
2805 return r;
2806
2807 if (tmp_path)
2808 *tmp_path = TAKE_PTR(y);
2809 } else {
2810 /* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being
2811 * read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real
2812 * file system. */
2813 WITH_UMASK(0000)
2814 r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500);
2815 if (r < 0)
2816 return r;
2817
2818 r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2819 if (r < 0)
2820 return r;
2821 }
2822
2823 *path = TAKE_PTR(x);
2824 return 0;
2825 }
2826
2827 int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) {
2828 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL;
2829 _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL;
2830 char *b;
2831 int r;
2832
2833 assert(id);
2834 assert(tmp_dir);
2835 assert(var_tmp_dir);
2836
2837 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp);
2838 if (r < 0)
2839 return r;
2840
2841 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL);
2842 if (r < 0)
2843 return r;
2844
2845 a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */
2846 *tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a);
2847 *var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b);
2848
2849 return 0;
2850 }
2851
2852 int setup_shareable_ns(int ns_storage_socket[static 2], unsigned long nsflag) {
2853 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF;
2854 int r;
2855 const char *ns_name, *ns_path;
2856
2857 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2858 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2859 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2860
2861 ns_name = namespace_single_flag_to_string(nsflag);
2862 assert(ns_name);
2863
2864 /* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our
2865 * namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first
2866 * shall create a new namespace, all others should just join
2867 * it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket
2868 * pair.
2869 *
2870 * It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */
2871
2872 r = posix_lock(ns_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX);
2873 if (r < 0)
2874 return r;
2875
2876 CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(ns_storage_socket[0]);
2877
2878 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT);
2879 if (ns >= 0) {
2880 /* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */
2881 r = RET_NERRNO(setns(ns, nsflag));
2882 if (r < 0)
2883 return r;
2884
2885 return 0;
2886 }
2887
2888 if (ns != -EAGAIN)
2889 return ns;
2890
2891 /* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */
2892
2893 if (unshare(nsflag) < 0)
2894 return -errno;
2895
2896 (void) loopback_setup();
2897
2898 ns_path = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", ns_name);
2899 ns = open(ns_path, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
2900 if (ns < 0)
2901 return -errno;
2902
2903 r = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2904 if (r < 0)
2905 return r;
2906
2907 return 1;
2908 }
2909
2910 int open_shareable_ns_path(int ns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path, unsigned long nsflag) {
2911 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF;
2912 int r;
2913
2914 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2915 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2916 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2917 assert(path);
2918
2919 /* If the storage socket doesn't contain a ns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in
2920 * it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_shareable_ns() which will
2921 * allocate a new anonymous ns if needed. */
2922
2923 r = posix_lock(ns_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX);
2924 if (r < 0)
2925 return r;
2926
2927 CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(ns_storage_socket[0]);
2928
2929 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT);
2930 if (ns >= 0)
2931 return 0;
2932 if (ns != -EAGAIN)
2933 return ns;
2934
2935 /* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */
2936
2937 ns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
2938 if (ns < 0)
2939 return -errno;
2940
2941 r = fd_is_ns(ns, nsflag);
2942 if (r == 0)
2943 return -EINVAL;
2944 if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */
2945 return r;
2946
2947 r = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2948 if (r < 0)
2949 return r;
2950
2951 return 1;
2952 }
2953
2954 bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) {
2955 const char *t, *ns_proc;
2956
2957 t = namespace_type_to_string(type);
2958 if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */
2959 return false;
2960
2961 ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t);
2962 return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0;
2963 }
2964
2965 static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = {
2966 [PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no",
2967 [PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes",
2968 [PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only",
2969 [PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
2970 };
2971
2972 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES);
2973
2974 static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = {
2975 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no",
2976 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes",
2977 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full",
2978 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict",
2979 };
2980
2981 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES);
2982
2983 static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = {
2984 [NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt",
2985 [NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup",
2986 [NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts",
2987 [NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc",
2988 [NAMESPACE_USER] = "user",
2989 [NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid",
2990 [NAMESPACE_NET] = "net",
2991 [NAMESPACE_TIME] = "time",
2992 };
2993
2994 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType);
2995
2996 static const char* const protect_proc_table[_PROTECT_PROC_MAX] = {
2997 [PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT] = "default",
2998 [PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS] = "noaccess",
2999 [PROTECT_PROC_INVISIBLE] = "invisible",
3000 [PROTECT_PROC_PTRACEABLE] = "ptraceable",
3001 };
3002
3003 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(protect_proc, ProtectProc);
3004
3005 static const char* const proc_subset_table[_PROC_SUBSET_MAX] = {
3006 [PROC_SUBSET_ALL] = "all",
3007 [PROC_SUBSET_PID] = "pid",
3008 };
3009
3010 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset);