src/shared/creds-util.c

   1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
   2
   3 #include <sys/file.h>
   4
   5 #if HAVE_OPENSSL
   6 #include <openssl/err.h>
   7 #endif
   8
   9 #include "sd-id128.h"
  10
  11 #include "blockdev-util.h"
  12 #include "chattr-util.h"
  13 #include "creds-util.h"
  14 #include "env-util.h"
  15 #include "fd-util.h"
  16 #include "fileio.h"
  17 #include "fs-util.h"
  18 #include "io-util.h"
  19 #include "memory-util.h"
  20 #include "mkdir.h"
  21 #include "openssl-util.h"
  22 #include "path-util.h"
  23 #include "random-util.h"
  24 #include "sparse-endian.h"
  25 #include "stat-util.h"
  26 #include "tpm2-util.h"
  27 #include "virt.h"
  28
  29 bool credential_name_valid(const char *s) {
  30         /* We want that credential names are both valid in filenames (since that's our primary way to pass
  31          * them around) and as fdnames (which is how we might want to pass them around eventually) */
  32         return filename_is_valid(s) && fdname_is_valid(s);
  33 }
  34
  35 int get_credentials_dir(const char **ret) {
  36         const char *e;
  37
  38         assert(ret);
  39
  40         e = secure_getenv("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY");
  41         if (!e)
  42                 return -ENXIO;
  43
  44         if (!path_is_absolute(e) || !path_is_normalized(e))
  45                 return -EINVAL;
  46
  47         *ret = e;
  48         return 0;
  49 }
  50
  51 int read_credential(const char *name, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) {
  52         _cleanup_free_ char *fn = NULL;
  53         const char *d;
  54         int r;
  55
  56         assert(ret);
  57
  58         if (!credential_name_valid(name))
  59                 return -EINVAL;
  60
  61         r = get_credentials_dir(&d);
  62         if (r < 0)
  63                 return r;
  64
  65         fn = path_join(d, name);
  66         if (!fn)
  67                 return -ENOMEM;
  68
  69         return read_full_file_full(
  70                         AT_FDCWD, fn,
  71                         UINT64_MAX, SIZE_MAX,
  72                         READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE,
  73                         NULL,
  74                         (char**) ret, ret_size);
  75 }
  76
  77 #if HAVE_OPENSSL
  78
  79 #define CREDENTIAL_HOST_SECRET_SIZE 4096
  80
  81 static const sd_id128_t credential_app_id =
  82         SD_ID128_MAKE(d3,ac,ec,ba,0d,ad,4c,df,b8,c9,38,15,28,93,6c,58);
  83
  84 struct credential_host_secret_format {
  85         /* The hashed machine ID of the machine this belongs to. Why? We want to ensure that each machine
  86          * gets its own secret, even if people forget to flush out this secret file. Hence we bind it to the
  87          * machine ID, for which there's hopefully a better chance it will be flushed out. We use a hashed
  88          * machine ID instead of the literal one, because it's trivial to, and it might be a good idea not
  89          * being able to directly associate a secret key file with a host. */
  90         sd_id128_t machine_id;
  91
  92         /* The actual secret key */
  93         uint8_t data[CREDENTIAL_HOST_SECRET_SIZE];
  94 } _packed_;
  95
  96 static int make_credential_host_secret(
  97                 int dfd,
  98                 const sd_id128_t machine_id,
  99                 const char *fn,
 100                 void **ret_data,
 101                 size_t *ret_size) {
 102
 103         struct credential_host_secret_format buf;
 104         _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
 105         _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
 106         int r;
 107
 108         assert(dfd >= 0);
 109         assert(fn);
 110
 111         fd = openat(dfd, ".", O_CLOEXEC|O_WRONLY|O_TMPFILE, 0400);
 112         if (fd < 0) {
 113                 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary credential file with O_TMPFILE, proceeding without: %m");
 114
 115                 if (asprintf(&t, "credential.secret.%016" PRIx64, random_u64()) < 0)
 116                         return -ENOMEM;
 117
 118                 fd = openat(dfd, t, O_CLOEXEC|O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW, 0400);
 119                 if (fd < 0)
 120                         return -errno;
 121         }
 122
 123         r = chattr_secret(fd, 0);
 124         if (r < 0)
 125                 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set file attributes for secrets file, ignoring: %m");
 126
 127         buf = (struct credential_host_secret_format) {
 128                 .machine_id = machine_id,
 129         };
 130
 131         r = genuine_random_bytes(buf.data, sizeof(buf.data), RANDOM_BLOCK);
 132         if (r < 0)
 133                 goto finish;
 134
 135         r = loop_write(fd, &buf, sizeof(buf), false);
 136         if (r < 0)
 137                 goto finish;
 138
 139         if (fsync(fd) < 0) {
 140                 r = -errno;
 141                 goto finish;
 142         }
 143
 144         if (t) {
 145                 r = rename_noreplace(dfd, t, dfd, fn);
 146                 if (r < 0)
 147                         goto finish;
 148
 149                 t = mfree(t);
 150         } else if (linkat(fd, "", dfd, fn, AT_EMPTY_PATH) < 0) {
 151                 r = -errno;
 152                 goto finish;
 153         }
 154
 155         if (fsync(dfd) < 0) {
 156                 r = -errno;
 157                 goto finish;
 158         }
 159
 160         if (ret_data) {
 161                 void *copy;
 162
 163                 copy = memdup(buf.data, sizeof(buf.data));
 164                 if (!copy) {
 165                         r = -ENOMEM;
 166                         goto finish;
 167                 }
 168
 169                 *ret_data = copy;
 170         }
 171
 172         if (ret_size)
 173                 *ret_size = sizeof(buf.data);
 174
 175         r = 0;
 176
 177 finish:
 178         if (t && unlinkat(dfd, t, 0) < 0)
 179                 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remove temporary credential key: %m");
 180
 181         explicit_bzero_safe(&buf, sizeof(buf));
 182         return r;
 183 }
 184
 185 int get_credential_host_secret(CredentialSecretFlags flags, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) {
 186         _cleanup_free_ char *_dirname = NULL, *_filename = NULL;
 187         _cleanup_close_ int dfd = -1;
 188         sd_id128_t machine_id;
 189         const char *dirname, *filename;
 190         int r;
 191
 192         r = sd_id128_get_machine_app_specific(credential_app_id, &machine_id);
 193         if (r < 0)
 194                 return r;
 195
 196         const char *e = secure_getenv("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_SECRET");
 197         if (e) {
 198                 if (!path_is_normalized(e))
 199                         return -EINVAL;
 200                 if (!path_is_absolute(e))
 201                         return -EINVAL;
 202
 203                 r = path_extract_directory(e, &_dirname);
 204                 if (r < 0)
 205                         return r;
 206
 207                 r = path_extract_filename(e, &_filename);
 208                 if (r < 0)
 209                         return r;
 210
 211                 dirname = _dirname;
 212                 filename = _filename;
 213         } else {
 214                 dirname = "/var/lib/systemd";
 215                 filename = "credential.secret";
 216         }
 217
 218         mkdir_parents(dirname, 0755);
 219         dfd = open_mkdir_at(AT_FDCWD, dirname, O_CLOEXEC, 0755);
 220         if (dfd < 0)
 221                 return log_debug_errno(dfd, "Failed to create or open directory '%s': %m", dirname);
 222
 223         if (FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_FAIL_ON_TEMPORARY_FS)) {
 224                 r = fd_is_temporary_fs(dfd);
 225                 if (r < 0)
 226                         return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to check directory '%s': %m", dirname);
 227                 if (r > 0)
 228                         return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOMEDIUM),
 229                                                "Directory '%s' is on a temporary file system, refusing.", dirname);
 230         }
 231
 232         for (unsigned attempt = 0;; attempt++) {
 233                 _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) struct credential_host_secret_format *f = NULL;
 234                 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
 235                 size_t l = 0;
 236                 ssize_t n = 0;
 237                 struct stat st;
 238
 239                 if (attempt >= 3) /* Somebody is playing games with us */
 240                         return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
 241                                                "All attempts to create secret store in %s failed.", dirname);
 242
 243                 fd = openat(dfd, filename, O_CLOEXEC|O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_NOFOLLOW);
 244                 if (fd < 0) {
 245                         if (errno != ENOENT || !FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_GENERATE))
 246                                 return log_debug_errno(errno,
 247                                                        "Failed to open %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename);
 248
 249
 250                         r = make_credential_host_secret(dfd, machine_id, filename, ret, ret_size);
 251                         if (r == -EEXIST) {
 252                                 log_debug_errno(r, "Credential secret %s/%s appeared while we were creating it, rereading.",
 253                                                 dirname, filename);
 254                                 continue;
 255                         }
 256                         if (r < 0)
 257                                 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create credential secret %s/%s: %m",
 258                                                        dirname, filename);
 259
 260                         return 0;
 261                 }
 262
 263                 if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
 264                         return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename);
 265
 266                 r = stat_verify_regular(&st);
 267                 if (r < 0)
 268                         return log_debug_errno(r, "%s/%s is not a regular file: %m", dirname, filename);
 269                 if (st.st_nlink == 0) /* Deleted by now, try again */
 270                         continue;
 271                 if (st.st_nlink > 1)
 272                         /* Our deletion check won't work if hardlinked somewhere else */
 273                         return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM),
 274                                                "%s/%s has too many links, refusing.",
 275                                                dirname, filename);
 276                 if ((st.st_mode & 07777) != 0400)
 277                         /* Don't use file if not 0400 access mode */
 278                         return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM),
 279                                                "%s/%s has permissive access mode, refusing.",
 280                                                dirname, filename);
 281                 l = st.st_size;
 282                 if (l < offsetof(struct credential_host_secret_format, data) + 1)
 283                         return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
 284                                                "%s/%s is too small, refusing.", dirname, filename);
 285                 if (l > 16*1024*1024)
 286                         return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(E2BIG),
 287                                                "%s/%s is too big, refusing.", dirname, filename);
 288
 289                 f = malloc(l+1);
 290                 if (!f)
 291                         return log_oom_debug();
 292
 293                 n = read(fd, f, l+1);
 294                 if (n < 0)
 295                         return log_debug_errno(errno,
 296                                                "Failed to read %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename);
 297                 if ((size_t) n != l) /* What? The size changed? */
 298                         return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
 299                                                "Failed to read %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename);
 300
 301                 if (sd_id128_equal(machine_id, f->machine_id)) {
 302                         size_t sz;
 303
 304                         if (FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_WARN_NOT_ENCRYPTED)) {
 305                                 r = fd_is_encrypted(fd);
 306                                 if (r < 0)
 307                                         log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine if credential secret file '%s/%s' is encrypted.",
 308                                                         dirname, filename);
 309                                 else if (r == 0)
 310                                         log_warning("Credential secret file '%s/%s' is not located on encrypted media, using anyway.",
 311                                                     dirname, filename);
 312                         }
 313
 314                         sz = l - offsetof(struct credential_host_secret_format, data);
 315                         assert(sz > 0);
 316
 317                         if (ret) {
 318                                 void *copy;
 319
 320                                 assert(sz <= sizeof(f->data)); /* Ensure we don't read past f->data bounds */
 321
 322                                 copy = memdup(f->data, sz);
 323                                 if (!copy)
 324                                         return log_oom_debug();
 325
 326                                 *ret = copy;
 327                         }
 328
 329                         if (ret_size)
 330                                 *ret_size = sz;
 331
 332                         return 0;
 333                 }
 334
 335                 /* Hmm, this secret is from somewhere else. Let's delete the file. Let's first acquire a lock
 336                  * to ensure we are the only ones accessing the file while we delete it. */
 337
 338                 if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX) < 0)
 339                         return log_debug_errno(errno,
 340                                                "Failed to flock %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename);
 341
 342                 /* Before we delete it check that the file is still linked into the file system */
 343                 if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
 344                         return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename);
 345                 if (st.st_nlink == 0) /* Already deleted by now? */
 346                         continue;
 347                 if (st.st_nlink != 1) /* Safety check, someone is playing games with us */
 348                         return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM),
 349                                                "%s/%s unexpectedly has too many links.",
 350                                                dirname, filename);
 351                 if (unlinkat(dfd, filename, 0) < 0)
 352                         return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unlink %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename);
 353
 354                 /* And now try again */
 355         }
 356 }
 357
 358 /* Construction is like this:
 359  *
 360  * A symmetric encryption key is derived from:
 361  *
 362  *      1. Either the "host" key (a key stored in /var/lib/credential.secret)
 363  *
 364  *      2. A key generated by letting the TPM2 calculate an HMAC hash of some nonce we pass to it, keyed
 365  *         by a key derived from its internal seed key.
 366  *
 367  *      3. The concatenation of the above.
 368  *
 369  * The above is hashed with SHA256 which is then used as encryption key for AES256-GCM. The encrypted
 370  * credential is a short (unencrypted) header describing which of the three keys to use, the IV to use for
 371  * AES256-GCM and some more meta information (sizes of certain objects) that is strictly speaking redundant,
 372  * but kinda nice to have since we can have a more generic parser. If the TPM2 key is used this is followed
 373  * by another (unencrypted) header, with information about the TPM2 policy used (specifically: the PCR mask
 374  * to bind against, and a hash of the resulting policy — the latter being redundant, but speeding up things a
 375  * bit, since we can more quickly refuse PCR state), followed by a sealed/exported TPM2 HMAC key. This is
 376  * then followed by the encrypted data, which begins with a metadata header (which contains validity
 377  * timestamps as well as the credential name), followed by the actual credential payload. The file ends in
 378  * the AES256-GCM tag. To make things simple, the AES256-GCM AAD covers the main and the TPM2 header in
 379  * full. This means the whole file is either protected by AAD, or is ciphertext, or is the tag. No
 380  * unprotected data is included.
 381  */
 382
 383 struct _packed_ encrypted_credential_header {
 384         sd_id128_t id;
 385         le32_t key_size;
 386         le32_t block_size;
 387         le32_t iv_size;
 388         le32_t tag_size;
 389         uint8_t iv[];
 390         /* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */
 391 };
 392
 393 struct _packed_ tpm2_credential_header {
 394         le64_t pcr_mask;    /* Note that the spec for PC Clients only mandates 24 PCRs, and that's what systems
 395                              * generally have. But keep the door open for more. */
 396         le16_t pcr_bank;    /* For now, either TPM2_ALG_SHA256 or TPM2_ALG_SHA1 */
 397         le16_t primary_alg; /* Primary key algorithm (either TPM2_ALG_RSA or TPM2_ALG_ECC for now) */
 398         le32_t blob_size;
 399         le32_t policy_hash_size;
 400         uint8_t policy_hash_and_blob[];
 401         /* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */
 402 };
 403
 404 struct _packed_ metadata_credential_header {
 405         le64_t timestamp;
 406         le64_t not_after;
 407         le32_t name_size;
 408         char name[];
 409         /* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */
 410 };
 411
 412 /* Some generic limit for parts of the encrypted credential for which we don't know the right size ahead of
 413  * time, but where we are really sure it won't be larger than this. Should be larger than any possible IV,
 414  * padding, tag size and so on. This is purely used for early filtering out of invalid sizes. */
 415 #define CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX (16U*1024U)
 416
 417 static int sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key(
 418                 const void *host_key,
 419                 size_t host_key_size,
 420                 const void *tpm2_key,
 421                 size_t tpm2_key_size,
 422                 uint8_t ret[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) {
 423
 424         _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL;
 425         unsigned l;
 426
 427         assert(host_key_size == 0 || host_key);
 428         assert(tpm2_key_size == 0 || tpm2_key);
 429         assert(ret);
 430
 431         /* Combines the host key and the TPM2 HMAC hash into a SHA256 hash value we'll use as symmetric encryption key. */
 432
 433         md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
 434         if (!md)
 435                 return log_oom();
 436
 437         if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, EVP_sha256(), NULL) != 1)
 438                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initial SHA256 context.");
 439
 440         if (host_key && EVP_DigestUpdate(md, host_key, host_key_size) != 1)
 441                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to hash host key.");
 442
 443         if (tpm2_key && EVP_DigestUpdate(md, tpm2_key, tpm2_key_size) != 1)
 444                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to hash TPM2 key.");
 445
 446         assert(EVP_MD_CTX_size(md) == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
 447
 448         if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, ret, &l) != 1)
 449                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to finalize SHA256 hash.");
 450
 451         assert(l == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
 452         return 0;
 453 }
 454
 455 int encrypt_credential_and_warn(
 456                 sd_id128_t with_key,
 457                 const char *name,
 458                 usec_t timestamp,
 459                 usec_t not_after,
 460                 const char *tpm2_device,
 461                 uint32_t tpm2_pcr_mask,
 462                 const void *input,
 463                 size_t input_size,
 464                 void **ret,
 465                 size_t *ret_size) {
 466
 467         _cleanup_(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_freep) EVP_CIPHER_CTX *context = NULL;
 468         _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *host_key = NULL, *tpm2_key = NULL;
 469         size_t host_key_size = 0, tpm2_key_size = 0, tpm2_blob_size = 0, tpm2_policy_hash_size = 0, output_size, p, ml;
 470         _cleanup_free_ void *tpm2_blob = NULL, *tpm2_policy_hash = NULL, *iv = NULL, *output = NULL;
 471         _cleanup_free_ struct metadata_credential_header *m = NULL;
 472         uint16_t tpm2_pcr_bank = 0, tpm2_primary_alg = 0;
 473         struct encrypted_credential_header *h;
 474         int ksz, bsz, ivsz, tsz, added, r;
 475         uint8_t md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 476         const EVP_CIPHER *cc;
 477 #if HAVE_TPM2
 478         bool try_tpm2 = false;
 479 #endif
 480         sd_id128_t id;
 481
 482         assert(input || input_size == 0);
 483         assert(ret);
 484         assert(ret_size);
 485
 486         if (name && !credential_name_valid(name))
 487                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid credential name: %s", name);
 488
 489         if (not_after != USEC_INFINITY && timestamp != USEC_INFINITY && not_after < timestamp)
 490                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Credential is invalidated before it is valid (" USEC_FMT " < " USEC_FMT ").", not_after, timestamp);
 491
 492         if (DEBUG_LOGGING) {
 493                 char buf[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX];
 494
 495                 if (name)
 496                         log_debug("Including credential name '%s' in encrypted credential.", name);
 497                 if (timestamp != USEC_INFINITY)
 498                         log_debug("Including timestamp '%s' in encrypted credential.", format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), timestamp));
 499                 if (not_after != USEC_INFINITY)
 500                         log_debug("Including not-after timestamp '%s' in encrypted credential.", format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), not_after));
 501         }
 502
 503         if (sd_id128_is_null(with_key) ||
 504             sd_id128_in_set(with_key, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC)) {
 505
 506                 r = get_credential_host_secret(
 507                                 CREDENTIAL_SECRET_GENERATE|
 508                                 CREDENTIAL_SECRET_WARN_NOT_ENCRYPTED|
 509                                 (sd_id128_is_null(with_key) ? CREDENTIAL_SECRET_FAIL_ON_TEMPORARY_FS : 0),
 510                                 &host_key,
 511                                 &host_key_size);
 512                 if (r == -ENOMEDIUM && sd_id128_is_null(with_key))
 513                         log_debug_errno(r, "Credential host secret location on temporary file system, not using.");
 514                 else if (r < 0)
 515                         return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine local credential host secret: %m");
 516         }
 517
 518 #if HAVE_TPM2
 519         if (sd_id128_is_null(with_key)) {
 520                 /* If automatic mode is selected and we are running in a container, let's not try TPM2. OTOH
 521                  * if user picks TPM2 explicitly, let's always honour the request and try. */
 522
 523                 r = detect_container();
 524                 if (r < 0)
 525                         log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether we are running in a container, ignoring: %m");
 526                 else if (r > 0)
 527                         log_debug("Running in container, not attempting to use TPM2.");
 528
 529                 try_tpm2 = r <= 0;
 530         }
 531
 532         if (try_tpm2 ||
 533             sd_id128_in_set(with_key, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC)) {
 534
 535                 r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_device,
 536                               tpm2_pcr_mask,
 537                               NULL,
 538                               &tpm2_key,
 539                               &tpm2_key_size,
 540                               &tpm2_blob,
 541                               &tpm2_blob_size,
 542                               &tpm2_policy_hash,
 543                               &tpm2_policy_hash_size,
 544                               &tpm2_pcr_bank,
 545                               &tpm2_primary_alg);
 546                 if (r < 0) {
 547                         if (!sd_id128_is_null(with_key))
 548                                 return r;
 549
 550                         log_debug_errno(r, "TPM2 sealing didn't work, not using: %m");
 551                 }
 552
 553                 assert(tpm2_blob_size <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX);
 554                 assert(tpm2_policy_hash_size <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX);
 555         }
 556 #endif
 557
 558         if (sd_id128_is_null(with_key)) {
 559                 /* Let's settle the key type in auto mode now. */
 560
 561                 if (host_key && tpm2_key)
 562                         id = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC;
 563                 else if (tpm2_key)
 564                         id = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC;
 565                 else if (host_key)
 566                         id = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST;
 567                 else
 568                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE),
 569                                                "TPM2 not available and host key located on temporary file system, no encryption key available.");
 570         } else
 571                 id = with_key;
 572
 573         /* Let's now take the host key and the TPM2 key and hash it together, to use as encryption key for the data */
 574         r = sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key(host_key, host_key_size, tpm2_key, tpm2_key_size, md);
 575         if (r < 0)
 576                 return r;
 577
 578         assert_se(cc = EVP_aes_256_gcm());
 579
 580         ksz = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cc);
 581         assert(ksz == sizeof(md));
 582
 583         bsz = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cc);
 584         assert(bsz > 0);
 585         assert((size_t) bsz <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX);
 586
 587         ivsz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cc);
 588         if (ivsz > 0) {
 589                 assert((size_t) ivsz <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX);
 590
 591                 iv = malloc(ivsz);
 592                 if (!iv)
 593                         return log_oom();
 594
 595                 r = genuine_random_bytes(iv, ivsz, RANDOM_BLOCK);
 596                 if (r < 0)
 597                         return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquired randomized IV: %m");
 598         }
 599
 600         tsz = 16; /* FIXME: On OpenSSL 3 there is EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_tag_length(), until then let's hardcode this */
 601
 602         context = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 603         if (!context)
 604                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOMEM), "Failed to allocate encryption object: %s",
 605                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 606
 607         if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, md, iv) != 1)
 608                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize encryption context: %s",
 609                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 610
 611         /* Just an upper estimate */
 612         output_size =
 613                 ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + ivsz) +
 614                 ALIGN8(tpm2_key ? offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + tpm2_blob_size + tpm2_policy_hash_size : 0) +
 615                 ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + strlen_ptr(name)) +
 616                 input_size + 2U * (size_t) bsz +
 617                 tsz;
 618
 619         output = malloc0(output_size);
 620         if (!output)
 621                 return log_oom();
 622
 623         h = (struct encrypted_credential_header*) output;
 624         h->id = id;
 625         h->block_size = htole32(bsz);
 626         h->key_size = htole32(ksz);
 627         h->tag_size = htole32(tsz);
 628         h->iv_size = htole32(ivsz);
 629         memcpy(h->iv, iv, ivsz);
 630
 631         p = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + ivsz);
 632
 633         if (tpm2_key) {
 634                 struct tpm2_credential_header *t;
 635
 636                 t = (struct tpm2_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) output + p);
 637                 t->pcr_mask = htole64(tpm2_pcr_mask);
 638                 t->pcr_bank = htole16(tpm2_pcr_bank);
 639                 t->primary_alg = htole16(tpm2_primary_alg);
 640                 t->blob_size = htole32(tpm2_blob_size);
 641                 t->policy_hash_size = htole32(tpm2_policy_hash_size);
 642                 memcpy(t->policy_hash_and_blob, tpm2_blob, tpm2_blob_size);
 643                 memcpy(t->policy_hash_and_blob + tpm2_blob_size, tpm2_policy_hash, tpm2_policy_hash_size);
 644
 645                 p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + tpm2_blob_size + tpm2_policy_hash_size);
 646         }
 647
 648         /* Pass the encrypted + TPM2 header as AAD */
 649         if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, NULL, &added, output, p) != 1)
 650                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to write AAD data: %s",
 651                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 652
 653         /* Now construct the metadata header */
 654         ml = strlen_ptr(name);
 655         m = malloc0(ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + ml));
 656         if (!m)
 657                 return log_oom();
 658
 659         m->timestamp = htole64(timestamp);
 660         m->not_after = htole64(not_after);
 661         m->name_size = htole32(ml);
 662         memcpy_safe(m->name, name, ml);
 663
 664         /* And encrypt the metadata header */
 665         if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, (uint8_t*) output + p, &added, (const unsigned char*) m, ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + ml)) != 1)
 666                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to encrypt metadata header: %s",
 667                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 668
 669         assert(added >= 0);
 670         assert((size_t) added <= output_size - p);
 671         p += added;
 672
 673         /* Then encrypt the plaintext */
 674         if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, (uint8_t*) output + p, &added, input, input_size) != 1)
 675                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to encrypt data: %s",
 676                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 677
 678         assert(added >= 0);
 679         assert((size_t) added <= output_size - p);
 680         p += added;
 681
 682         /* Finalize */
 683         if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(context, (uint8_t*) output + p, &added) != 1)
 684                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to finalize data encryption: %s",
 685                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 686
 687         assert(added >= 0);
 688         assert((size_t) added <= output_size - p);
 689         p += added;
 690
 691         assert(p <= output_size - tsz);
 692
 693         /* Append tag */
 694         if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, tsz, (uint8_t*) output + p) != 1)
 695                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to get tag: %s",
 696                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 697
 698         p += tsz;
 699         assert(p <= output_size);
 700
 701         if (DEBUG_LOGGING && input_size > 0) {
 702                 size_t base64_size;
 703
 704                 base64_size = DIV_ROUND_UP(p * 4, 3); /* Include base64 size increase in debug output */
 705                 assert(base64_size >= input_size);
 706                 log_debug("Input of %zu bytes grew to output of %zu bytes (+%2zu%%).", input_size, base64_size, base64_size * 100 / input_size - 100);
 707         }
 708
 709         *ret = TAKE_PTR(output);
 710         *ret_size = p;
 711
 712         return 0;
 713 }
 714
 715 int decrypt_credential_and_warn(
 716                 const char *validate_name,
 717                 usec_t validate_timestamp,
 718                 const char *tpm2_device,
 719                 const void *input,
 720                 size_t input_size,
 721                 void **ret,
 722                 size_t *ret_size) {
 723
 724         _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *host_key = NULL, *tpm2_key = NULL, *plaintext = NULL;
 725         _cleanup_(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_freep) EVP_CIPHER_CTX *context = NULL;
 726         size_t host_key_size = 0, tpm2_key_size = 0, plaintext_size, p, hs;
 727         struct encrypted_credential_header *h;
 728         struct metadata_credential_header *m;
 729         uint8_t md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 730         bool with_tpm2, with_host_key;
 731         const EVP_CIPHER *cc;
 732         int r, added;
 733
 734         assert(input || input_size == 0);
 735         assert(ret);
 736         assert(ret_size);
 737
 738         h = (struct encrypted_credential_header*) input;
 739
 740         /* The ID must fit in, for the current and all future formats */
 741         if (input_size < sizeof(h->id))
 742                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short.");
 743
 744         with_host_key = sd_id128_in_set(h->id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC);
 745         with_tpm2 = sd_id128_in_set(h->id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC);
 746
 747         if (!with_host_key && !with_tpm2)
 748                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Unknown encryption format, or corrupted data: %m");
 749
 750         /* Now we know the minimum header size */
 751         if (input_size < offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv))
 752                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short.");
 753
 754         /* Verify some basic header values */
 755         if (le32toh(h->key_size) != sizeof(md))
 756                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected key size in header.");
 757         if (le32toh(h->block_size) <= 0 || le32toh(h->block_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX)
 758                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected block size in header.");
 759         if (le32toh(h->iv_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX)
 760                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "IV size too large.");
 761         if (le32toh(h->tag_size) != 16) /* FIXME: On OpenSSL 3, let's verify via EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_tag_length() */
 762                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected tag size in header.");
 763
 764         /* Ensure we have space for the full header now (we don't know the size of the name hence this is a
 765          * lower limit only) */
 766         if (input_size <
 767             ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size)) +
 768             ALIGN8((with_tpm2 ? offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) : 0)) +
 769             ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)) +
 770             le32toh(h->tag_size))
 771                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short.");
 772
 773         p = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size));
 774
 775         if (with_tpm2) {
 776 #if HAVE_TPM2
 777                 struct tpm2_credential_header* t = (struct tpm2_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) input + p);
 778
 779                 if (le64toh(t->pcr_mask) >= (UINT64_C(1) << TPM2_PCRS_MAX))
 780                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 PCR mask out of range.");
 781                 if (!tpm2_pcr_bank_to_string(le16toh(t->pcr_bank)))
 782                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 PCR bank invalid or not supported");
 783                 if (!tpm2_primary_alg_to_string(le16toh(t->primary_alg)))
 784                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 primary key algorithm invalid or not supported.");
 785                 if (le32toh(t->blob_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX)
 786                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected TPM2 blob size.");
 787                 if (le32toh(t->policy_hash_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX)
 788                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected TPM2 policy hash size.");
 789
 790                 /* Ensure we have space for the full TPM2 header now (still don't know the name, and its size
 791                  * though, hence still just a lower limit test only) */
 792                 if (input_size <
 793                     ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size)) +
 794                     ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + le32toh(t->blob_size) + le32toh(t->policy_hash_size)) +
 795                     ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)) +
 796                     le32toh(h->tag_size))
 797                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short.");
 798
 799                 r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_device,
 800                                 le64toh(t->pcr_mask),
 801                                 le16toh(t->pcr_bank),
 802                                 le16toh(t->primary_alg),
 803                                 t->policy_hash_and_blob,
 804                                 le32toh(t->blob_size),
 805                                 t->policy_hash_and_blob + le32toh(t->blob_size),
 806                                 le32toh(t->policy_hash_size),
 807                                 NULL,
 808                                 &tpm2_key,
 809                                 &tpm2_key_size);
 810                 if (r < 0)
 811                         return r;
 812
 813                 p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) +
 814                             le32toh(t->blob_size) +
 815                             le32toh(t->policy_hash_size));
 816 #else
 817                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Credential requires TPM2 support, but TPM2 support not available.");
 818 #endif
 819         }
 820
 821         if (with_host_key) {
 822                 r = get_credential_host_secret(
 823                                 0,
 824                                 &host_key,
 825                                 &host_key_size);
 826                 if (r < 0)
 827                         return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine local credential key: %m");
 828         }
 829
 830         sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key(host_key, host_key_size, tpm2_key, tpm2_key_size, md);
 831
 832         assert_se(cc = EVP_aes_256_gcm());
 833
 834         /* Make sure cipher expectations match the header */
 835         if (EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cc) != (int) le32toh(h->key_size))
 836                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected key size in header.");
 837         if (EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cc) != (int) le32toh(h->block_size))
 838                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected block size in header.");
 839
 840         context = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 841         if (!context)
 842                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOMEM), "Failed to allocate decryption object: %s",
 843                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 844
 845         if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
 846                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize decryption context: %s",
 847                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 848
 849         if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, le32toh(h->iv_size), NULL) != 1)
 850                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set IV size on decryption context: %s",
 851                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 852
 853         if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(context, NULL, NULL, md, h->iv) != 1)
 854                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set IV and key: %s",
 855                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 856
 857         if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(context, NULL, &added, input, p) != 1)
 858                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to write AAD data: %s",
 859                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 860
 861         plaintext = malloc(input_size - p - le32toh(h->tag_size));
 862         if (!plaintext)
 863                 return -ENOMEM;
 864
 865         if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(
 866                             context,
 867                             plaintext,
 868                             &added,
 869                             (uint8_t*) input + p,
 870                             input_size - p - le32toh(h->tag_size)) != 1)
 871                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to decrypt data: %s",
 872                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 873
 874         assert(added >= 0);
 875         assert((size_t) added <= input_size - p - le32toh(h->tag_size));
 876         plaintext_size = added;
 877
 878         if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, le32toh(h->tag_size), (uint8_t*) input + input_size - le32toh(h->tag_size)) != 1)
 879                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set tag: %s",
 880                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 881
 882         if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(context, (uint8_t*) plaintext + plaintext_size, &added) != 1)
 883                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Decryption failed (incorrect key?): %s",
 884                                        ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 885
 886         plaintext_size += added;
 887
 888         if (plaintext_size < ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)))
 889                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Metadata header incomplete.");
 890
 891         m = plaintext;
 892
 893         if (le64toh(m->timestamp) != USEC_INFINITY &&
 894             le64toh(m->not_after) != USEC_INFINITY &&
 895             le64toh(m->timestamp) >= le64toh(m->not_after))
 896                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Timestamps of credential are not in order, refusing.");
 897
 898         if (le32toh(m->name_size) > CREDENTIAL_NAME_MAX)
 899                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Embedded credential name too long, refusing.");
 900
 901         hs = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + le32toh(m->name_size));
 902         if (plaintext_size < hs)
 903                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Metadata header incomplete.");
 904
 905         if (le32toh(m->name_size) > 0) {
 906                 _cleanup_free_ char *embedded_name = NULL;
 907
 908                 if (memchr(m->name, 0, le32toh(m->name_size)))
 909                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Embedded credential name contains NUL byte, refusing.");
 910
 911                 embedded_name = memdup_suffix0(m->name, le32toh(m->name_size));
 912                 if (!embedded_name)
 913                         return log_oom();
 914
 915                 if (!credential_name_valid(embedded_name))
 916                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Embedded credential name is not valid, refusing.");
 917
 918                 if (validate_name && !streq(embedded_name, validate_name)) {
 919
 920                         r = getenv_bool_secure("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NAME");
 921                         if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
 922                                 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NAME: %m");
 923                         if (r != 0)
 924                                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EREMOTE), "Embedded credential name '%s' does not match filename '%s', refusing.", embedded_name, validate_name);
 925
 926                         log_debug("Embedded credential name '%s' does not match expected name '%s', but configured to use credential anyway.", embedded_name, validate_name);
 927                 }
 928         }
 929
 930         if (validate_timestamp != USEC_INFINITY) {
 931                 if (le64toh(m->timestamp) != USEC_INFINITY && le64toh(m->timestamp) > validate_timestamp)
 932                         log_debug("Credential timestamp is from the future, assuming clock skew.");
 933
 934                 if (le64toh(m->not_after) != USEC_INFINITY && le64toh(m->not_after) < validate_timestamp) {
 935
 936                         r = getenv_bool_secure("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NOT_AFTER");
 937                         if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
 938                                 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NOT_AFTER: %m");
 939                         if (r != 0)
 940                                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Credential's time passed, refusing to use.");
 941
 942                         log_debug("Credential not-after timestamp has passed, but configured to use credential anyway.");
 943                 }
 944         }
 945
 946         if (ret) {
 947                 char *without_metadata;
 948
 949                 without_metadata = memdup((uint8_t*) plaintext + hs, plaintext_size - hs);
 950                 if (!without_metadata)
 951                         return log_oom();
 952
 953                 *ret = without_metadata;
 954         }
 955
 956         if (ret_size)
 957                 *ret_size = plaintext_size - hs;
 958
 959         return 0;
 960 }
 961
 962 #else
 963
 964 int get_credential_host_secret(CredentialSecretFlags flags, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) {
 965         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available.");
 966 }
 967
 968 int encrypt_credential_and_warn(sd_id128_t with_key, const char *name, usec_t timestamp, usec_t not_after, const char *tpm2_device, uint32_t tpm2_pcr_mask, const void *input, size_t input_size, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) {
 969         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available.");
 970 }
 971
 972 int decrypt_credential_and_warn(const char *validate_name, usec_t validate_timestamp, const char *tpm2_device, const void *input, size_t input_size, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) {
 973         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available.");
 974 }
 975
 976 #endif