1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
3 #if HAVE_VALGRIND_MEMCHECK_H
4 #include <valgrind/memcheck.h>
7 #include <linux/dm-ioctl.h>
8 #include <linux/loop.h>
10 #include <sys/mount.h>
11 #include <sys/prctl.h>
16 #include <openssl/err.h>
17 #include <openssl/pem.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509.h>
21 #include "sd-device.h"
24 #include "architecture.h"
25 #include "ask-password-api.h"
26 #include "blkid-util.h"
27 #include "blockdev-util.h"
28 #include "btrfs-util.h"
30 #include "conf-files.h"
31 #include "constants.h"
33 #include "cryptsetup-util.h"
34 #include "device-nodes.h"
35 #include "device-util.h"
36 #include "devnum-util.h"
37 #include "discover-image.h"
38 #include "dissect-image.h"
42 #include "extension-util.h"
46 #include "fsck-util.h"
48 #include "hexdecoct.h"
49 #include "hostname-setup.h"
50 #include "id128-util.h"
51 #include "import-util.h"
53 #include "missing_mount.h"
54 #include "mkdir-label.h"
55 #include "mount-util.h"
56 #include "mountpoint-util.h"
57 #include "namespace-util.h"
58 #include "nulstr-util.h"
59 #include "openssl-util.h"
61 #include "path-util.h"
62 #include "process-util.h"
63 #include "raw-clone.h"
64 #include "resize-fs.h"
65 #include "signal-util.h"
66 #include "sparse-endian.h"
67 #include "stat-util.h"
68 #include "stdio-util.h"
69 #include "string-table.h"
70 #include "string-util.h"
72 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
73 #include "udev-util.h"
74 #include "user-util.h"
75 #include "xattr-util.h"
77 /* how many times to wait for the device nodes to appear */
78 #define N_DEVICE_NODE_LIST_ATTEMPTS 10
80 int dissect_fstype_ok(const char *fstype
) {
84 /* When we automatically mount file systems, be a bit conservative by default what we are willing to
85 * mount, just as an extra safety net to not mount with badly maintained legacy file system
88 e
= secure_getenv("SYSTEMD_DISSECT_FILE_SYSTEMS");
90 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
92 l
= strv_split(e
, ":");
96 b
= strv_contains(l
, fstype
);
98 b
= STR_IN_SET(fstype
,
108 log_debug("File system type '%s' is not allowed to be mounted as result of automatic dissection.", fstype
);
112 int probe_sector_size(int fd
, uint32_t *ret
) {
121 le64_t alternate_lba
;
122 le64_t first_usable_lba
;
123 le64_t last_usable_lba
;
124 sd_id128_t disk_guid
;
125 le64_t partition_entry_lba
;
126 le32_t number_of_partition_entries
;
127 le32_t size_of_partition_entry
;
128 le32_t partition_entry_array_crc32
;
131 /* Disk images might be for 512B or for 4096 sector sizes, let's try to auto-detect that by searching
132 * for the GPT headers at the relevant byte offsets */
134 assert_cc(sizeof(struct gpt_header
) == 92);
136 /* We expect a sector size in the range 512…4096. The GPT header is located in the second
137 * sector. Hence it could be at byte 512 at the earliest, and at byte 4096 at the latest. And we must
138 * read with granularity of the largest sector size we care about. Which means 8K. */
139 uint8_t sectors
[2 * 4096];
146 n
= pread(fd
, sectors
, sizeof(sectors
), 0);
149 if (n
!= sizeof(sectors
)) /* too short? */
152 /* Let's see if we find the GPT partition header with various expected sector sizes */
153 for (uint32_t sz
= 512; sz
<= 4096; sz
<<= 1) {
154 struct gpt_header
*p
;
156 assert(sizeof(sectors
) >= sz
* 2);
157 p
= (struct gpt_header
*) (sectors
+ sz
);
159 if (memcmp(p
->signature
, (const char[8]) { 'E', 'F', 'I', ' ', 'P', 'A', 'R', 'T' }, 8) != 0)
162 if (le32toh(p
->revision
) != UINT32_C(0x00010000)) /* the only known revision of the spec: 1.0 */
165 if (le32toh(p
->header_size
) < sizeof(struct gpt_header
))
168 if (le32toh(p
->header_size
) > 4096) /* larger than a sector? something is off… */
171 if (le64toh(p
->my_lba
) != 1) /* this sector must claim to be at sector offset 1 */
175 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTUNIQ
),
176 "Detected valid partition table at offsets matching multiple sector sizes, refusing.");
182 log_debug("Determined sector size %" PRIu32
" based on discovered partition table.", found
);
184 return 1; /* indicate we *did* find it */
188 log_debug("Couldn't find any partition table to derive sector size of.");
189 *ret
= 512; /* pick the traditional default */
190 return 0; /* indicate we didn't find it */
193 int probe_sector_size_prefer_ioctl(int fd
, uint32_t *ret
) {
199 /* Just like probe_sector_size(), but if we are looking at a block device, will use the already
200 * configured sector size rather than probing by contents */
202 if (fstat(fd
, &st
) < 0)
205 if (S_ISBLK(st
.st_mode
))
206 return blockdev_get_sector_size(fd
, ret
);
208 return probe_sector_size(fd
, ret
);
211 int probe_filesystem_full(
218 /* Try to find device content type and return it in *ret_fstype. If nothing is found,
219 * 0/NULL will be returned. -EUCLEAN will be returned for ambiguous results, and a
220 * different error otherwise. */
223 _cleanup_(blkid_free_probep
) blkid_probe b
= NULL
;
224 _cleanup_free_
char *path_by_fd
= NULL
;
225 _cleanup_close_
int fd_close
= -EBADF
;
229 assert(fd
>= 0 || path
);
233 fd_close
= open(path
, O_RDONLY
|O_NONBLOCK
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_NOCTTY
);
241 r
= fd_get_path(fd
, &path_by_fd
);
248 if (size
== 0) /* empty size? nothing found! */
251 b
= blkid_new_probe();
256 r
= blkid_probe_set_device(
260 size
== UINT64_MAX
? 0 : size
); /* when blkid sees size=0 it understands "everything". We prefer using UINT64_MAX for that */
262 return errno_or_else(ENOMEM
);
264 blkid_probe_enable_superblocks(b
, 1);
265 blkid_probe_set_superblocks_flags(b
, BLKID_SUBLKS_TYPE
);
268 r
= blkid_do_safeprobe(b
);
269 if (r
== _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_NOT_FOUND
)
271 if (r
== _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_AMBIGUOUS
)
272 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN
),
273 "Results ambiguous for partition %s", path
);
274 if (r
== _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_ERROR
)
275 return log_debug_errno(errno_or_else(EIO
), "Failed to probe partition %s: %m", path
);
277 assert(r
== _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_FOUND
);
279 (void) blkid_probe_lookup_value(b
, "TYPE", &fstype
, NULL
);
284 log_debug("Probed fstype '%s' on partition %s.", fstype
, path
);
295 log_debug("No type detected on partition %s", path
);
304 static int image_policy_may_use(
305 const ImagePolicy
*policy
,
306 PartitionDesignator designator
) {
308 PartitionPolicyFlags f
;
310 /* For each partition we find in the partition table do a first check if it may exist at all given
311 * the policy, or if it shall be ignored. */
313 f
= image_policy_get_exhaustively(policy
, designator
);
317 if ((f
& _PARTITION_POLICY_USE_MASK
) == PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT
)
318 /* only flag set in policy is "absent"? then this partition may not exist at all */
319 return log_debug_errno(
320 SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ERFKILL
),
321 "Partition of designator '%s' exists, but not allowed by policy, refusing.",
322 partition_designator_to_string(designator
));
323 if ((f
& _PARTITION_POLICY_USE_MASK
& ~PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT
) == PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED
) {
324 /* only "unused" or "unused" + "absent" are set? then don't use it */
325 log_debug("Partition of designator '%s' exists, and policy dictates to ignore it, doing so.",
326 partition_designator_to_string(designator
));
327 return false; /* ignore! */
330 return true; /* use! */
333 static int image_policy_check_protection(
334 const ImagePolicy
*policy
,
335 PartitionDesignator designator
,
336 PartitionPolicyFlags found_flags
) {
338 PartitionPolicyFlags policy_flags
;
340 /* Checks if the flags in the policy for the designated partition overlap the flags of what we found */
345 policy_flags
= image_policy_get_exhaustively(policy
, designator
);
346 if (policy_flags
< 0)
349 if ((found_flags
& policy_flags
) == 0) {
350 _cleanup_free_
char *found_flags_string
= NULL
, *policy_flags_string
= NULL
;
352 (void) partition_policy_flags_to_string(found_flags
, /* simplify= */ true, &found_flags_string
);
353 (void) partition_policy_flags_to_string(policy_flags
, /* simplify= */ true, &policy_flags_string
);
355 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ERFKILL
), "Partition %s discovered with policy '%s' but '%s' was required, refusing.",
356 partition_designator_to_string(designator
),
357 strnull(found_flags_string
), strnull(policy_flags_string
));
363 static int image_policy_check_partition_flags(
364 const ImagePolicy
*policy
,
365 PartitionDesignator designator
,
366 uint64_t gpt_flags
) {
368 PartitionPolicyFlags policy_flags
;
371 /* Checks if the partition flags in the policy match reality */
373 policy_flags
= image_policy_get_exhaustively(policy
, designator
);
374 if (policy_flags
< 0)
377 b
= FLAGS_SET(gpt_flags
, SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
);
378 if ((policy_flags
& _PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_MASK
) == (b
? PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_OFF
: PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_ON
))
379 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ERFKILL
), "Partition %s has 'read-only' flag incorrectly set (must be %s, is %s), refusing.",
380 partition_designator_to_string(designator
),
381 one_zero(!b
), one_zero(b
));
383 b
= FLAGS_SET(gpt_flags
, SD_GPT_FLAG_GROWFS
);
384 if ((policy_flags
& _PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_MASK
) == (b
? PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_OFF
: PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_ON
))
385 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ERFKILL
), "Partition %s has 'growfs' flag incorrectly set (must be %s, is %s), refusing.",
386 partition_designator_to_string(designator
),
387 one_zero(!b
), one_zero(b
));
392 static int dissected_image_probe_filesystems(
395 const ImagePolicy
*policy
) {
401 /* Fill in file system types if we don't know them yet. */
403 for (PartitionDesignator i
= 0; i
< _PARTITION_DESIGNATOR_MAX
; i
++) {
404 DissectedPartition
*p
= m
->partitions
+ i
;
405 PartitionPolicyFlags found_flags
;
411 /* If we have an fd referring to the partition block device, use that. Otherwise go
412 * via the whole block device or backing regular file, and read via offset. */
413 if (p
->mount_node_fd
>= 0)
414 r
= probe_filesystem_full(p
->mount_node_fd
, p
->node
, 0, UINT64_MAX
, &p
->fstype
);
416 r
= probe_filesystem_full(fd
, p
->node
, p
->offset
, p
->size
, &p
->fstype
);
421 if (streq_ptr(p
->fstype
, "crypto_LUKS")) {
423 found_flags
= PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED
; /* found this one, and its definitely encrypted */
425 /* found it, but it's definitely not encrypted, hence mask the encrypted flag, but
426 * set all other ways that indicate "present". */
427 found_flags
= PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED
|PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY
|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED
;
429 if (p
->fstype
&& fstype_is_ro(p
->fstype
))
435 /* We might have learnt more about the file system now (i.e. whether it is encrypted or not),
436 * hence we need to validate this against policy again, to see if the policy still matches
437 * with this new information. Note that image_policy_check_protection() will check for
438 * overlap between what's allowed in the policy and what we pass as 'found_policy' here. In
439 * the unencrypted case we thus might pass an overly unspecific mask here (i.e. unprotected
440 * OR verity OR signed), but that's fine since the earlier policy check already checked more
441 * specific which of those three cases where OK. Keep in mind that this function here only
442 * looks at specific partitions (and thus can only deduce encryption or not) but not the
443 * overall partition table (and thus cannot deduce verity or not). The earlier dissection
444 * checks already did the relevant checks that look at the whole partition table, and
445 * enforced policy there as needed. */
446 r
= image_policy_check_protection(policy
, i
, found_flags
);
454 static void check_partition_flags(
456 unsigned long long pflags
,
457 unsigned long long supported
) {
461 /* Mask away all flags supported by this partition's type and the three flags the UEFI spec defines generically */
462 pflags
&= ~(supported
|
463 SD_GPT_FLAG_REQUIRED_PARTITION
|
464 SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL
|
465 SD_GPT_FLAG_LEGACY_BIOS_BOOTABLE
);
470 /* If there are other bits set, then log about it, to make things discoverable */
471 for (unsigned i
= 0; i
< sizeof(pflags
) * 8; i
++) {
472 unsigned long long bit
= 1ULL << i
;
473 if (!FLAGS_SET(pflags
, bit
))
476 log_debug("Unexpected partition flag %llu set on %s!", bit
, node
);
480 static int dissected_image_new(const char *path
, DissectedImage
**ret
) {
481 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp
) DissectedImage
*m
= NULL
;
482 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
488 _cleanup_free_
char *filename
= NULL
;
490 r
= path_extract_filename(path
, &filename
);
494 r
= raw_strip_suffixes(filename
, &name
);
498 if (!image_name_is_valid(name
)) {
499 log_debug("Image name %s is not valid, ignoring.", strna(name
));
504 m
= new(DissectedImage
, 1);
508 *m
= (DissectedImage
) {
509 .has_init_system
= -1,
510 .image_name
= TAKE_PTR(name
),
513 for (PartitionDesignator i
= 0; i
< _PARTITION_DESIGNATOR_MAX
; i
++)
514 m
->partitions
[i
] = DISSECTED_PARTITION_NULL
;
521 static void dissected_partition_done(DissectedPartition
*p
) {
527 free(p
->decrypted_fstype
);
528 free(p
->decrypted_node
);
529 free(p
->mount_options
);
530 safe_close(p
->mount_node_fd
);
532 *p
= DISSECTED_PARTITION_NULL
;
536 static int make_partition_devname(
537 const char *whole_devname
,
540 DissectImageFlags flags
,
543 _cleanup_free_
char *s
= NULL
;
546 assert(whole_devname
);
547 assert(nr
!= 0); /* zero is not a valid partition nr */
550 if (!FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_DISKSEQ_DEVNODE
) || diskseq
== 0) {
552 /* Given a whole block device node name (e.g. /dev/sda or /dev/loop7) generate a partition
553 * device name (e.g. /dev/sda7 or /dev/loop7p5). The rule the kernel uses is simple: if whole
554 * block device node name ends in a digit, then suffix a 'p', followed by the partition
555 * number. Otherwise, just suffix the partition number without any 'p'. */
557 if (nr
< 0) { /* whole disk? */
558 s
= strdup(whole_devname
);
562 size_t l
= strlen(whole_devname
);
563 if (l
< 1) /* underflow check for the subtraction below */
566 bool need_p
= ascii_isdigit(whole_devname
[l
-1]); /* Last char a digit? */
568 if (asprintf(&s
, "%s%s%i", whole_devname
, need_p
? "p" : "", nr
) < 0)
572 if (nr
< 0) /* whole disk? */
573 r
= asprintf(&s
, "/dev/disk/by-diskseq/%" PRIu64
, diskseq
);
575 r
= asprintf(&s
, "/dev/disk/by-diskseq/%" PRIu64
"-part%i", diskseq
, nr
);
584 static int open_partition(
587 const LoopDevice
*loop
) {
589 _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp
) sd_device
*dev
= NULL
;
590 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -EBADF
;
597 fd
= open(node
, O_RDONLY
|O_NONBLOCK
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_NOCTTY
);
601 /* Check if the block device is a child of (or equivalent to) the originally provided one. */
602 r
= block_device_new_from_fd(fd
, is_partition
? BLOCK_DEVICE_LOOKUP_WHOLE_DISK
: 0, &dev
);
606 r
= sd_device_get_devnum(dev
, &devnum
);
610 if (loop
->devno
!= devnum
)
613 /* Also check diskseq. */
614 if (loop
->diskseq
!= 0) {
617 r
= fd_get_diskseq(fd
, &diskseq
);
621 if (loop
->diskseq
!= diskseq
)
625 log_debug("Opened %s (fd=%i, whole_block_devnum=" DEVNUM_FORMAT_STR
", diskseq=%" PRIu64
").",
626 node
, fd
, DEVNUM_FORMAT_VAL(loop
->devno
), loop
->diskseq
);
630 static int compare_arch(Architecture a
, Architecture b
) {
634 if (a
== native_architecture())
637 if (b
== native_architecture())
640 #ifdef ARCHITECTURE_SECONDARY
641 if (a
== ARCHITECTURE_SECONDARY
)
644 if (b
== ARCHITECTURE_SECONDARY
)
651 static int dissect_image(
655 const VeritySettings
*verity
,
656 const MountOptions
*mount_options
,
657 const ImagePolicy
*policy
,
658 DissectImageFlags flags
) {
660 sd_id128_t root_uuid
= SD_ID128_NULL
, root_verity_uuid
= SD_ID128_NULL
;
661 sd_id128_t usr_uuid
= SD_ID128_NULL
, usr_verity_uuid
= SD_ID128_NULL
;
662 bool is_gpt
, is_mbr
, multiple_generic
= false,
663 generic_rw
= false, /* initialize to appease gcc */
664 generic_growfs
= false;
665 _cleanup_(blkid_free_probep
) blkid_probe b
= NULL
;
666 _cleanup_free_
char *generic_node
= NULL
;
667 sd_id128_t generic_uuid
= SD_ID128_NULL
;
668 const char *pttype
= NULL
, *sptuuid
= NULL
;
670 int r
, generic_nr
= -1, n_partitions
;
675 assert(!verity
|| verity
->designator
< 0 || IN_SET(verity
->designator
, PARTITION_ROOT
, PARTITION_USR
));
676 assert(!verity
|| verity
->root_hash
|| verity
->root_hash_size
== 0);
677 assert(!verity
|| verity
->root_hash_sig
|| verity
->root_hash_sig_size
== 0);
678 assert(!verity
|| (verity
->root_hash
|| !verity
->root_hash_sig
));
679 assert(!((flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_GPT_ONLY
) && (flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE
)));
680 assert(m
->sector_size
> 0);
682 /* Probes a disk image, and returns information about what it found in *ret.
684 * Returns -ENOPKG if no suitable partition table or file system could be found.
685 * Returns -EADDRNOTAVAIL if a root hash was specified but no matching root/verity partitions found.
686 * Returns -ENXIO if we couldn't find any partition suitable as root or /usr partition
687 * Returns -ENOTUNIQ if we only found multiple generic partitions and thus don't know what to do with that
688 * Returns -ERFKILL if image doesn't match image policy
689 * Returns -EBADR if verity data was provided externally for an image that has a GPT partition table (i.e. is not just a naked fs)
690 * Returns -EPROTONOSUPPORT if DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES is set but the block device does not have partition logic enabled
691 * Returns -ENOMSG if we didn't find a single usable partition (and DISSECT_IMAGE_REFUSE_EMPTY is set) */
693 uint64_t diskseq
= m
->loop
? m
->loop
->diskseq
: 0;
695 if (verity
&& verity
->root_hash
) {
696 sd_id128_t fsuuid
, vuuid
;
698 /* If a root hash is supplied, then we use the root partition that has a UUID that match the
699 * first 128bit of the root hash. And we use the verity partition that has a UUID that match
700 * the final 128bit. */
702 if (verity
->root_hash_size
< sizeof(sd_id128_t
))
705 memcpy(&fsuuid
, verity
->root_hash
, sizeof(sd_id128_t
));
706 memcpy(&vuuid
, (const uint8_t*) verity
->root_hash
+ verity
->root_hash_size
- sizeof(sd_id128_t
), sizeof(sd_id128_t
));
708 if (sd_id128_is_null(fsuuid
))
710 if (sd_id128_is_null(vuuid
))
713 /* If the verity data declares it's for the /usr partition, then search for that, in all
714 * other cases assume it's for the root partition. */
715 if (verity
->designator
== PARTITION_USR
) {
717 usr_verity_uuid
= vuuid
;
720 root_verity_uuid
= vuuid
;
724 b
= blkid_new_probe();
729 r
= blkid_probe_set_device(b
, fd
, 0, 0);
731 return errno_or_else(ENOMEM
);
734 r
= blkid_probe_set_sectorsize(b
, m
->sector_size
);
736 return errno_or_else(EIO
);
738 if ((flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_GPT_ONLY
) == 0) {
739 /* Look for file system superblocks, unless we only shall look for GPT partition tables */
740 blkid_probe_enable_superblocks(b
, 1);
741 blkid_probe_set_superblocks_flags(b
, BLKID_SUBLKS_TYPE
|BLKID_SUBLKS_USAGE
|BLKID_SUBLKS_UUID
);
744 blkid_probe_enable_partitions(b
, 1);
745 blkid_probe_set_partitions_flags(b
, BLKID_PARTS_ENTRY_DETAILS
);
748 r
= blkid_do_safeprobe(b
);
749 if (r
== _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_ERROR
)
750 return errno_or_else(EIO
);
751 if (IN_SET(r
, _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_AMBIGUOUS
, _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_NOT_FOUND
))
752 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG
), "Failed to identify any partition table.");
754 assert(r
== _BLKID_SAFEPROBE_FOUND
);
756 if ((!(flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_GPT_ONLY
) &&
757 (flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT
)) ||
758 (flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE
)) {
759 const char *usage
= NULL
;
761 /* If flags permit this, also allow using non-partitioned single-filesystem images */
763 (void) blkid_probe_lookup_value(b
, "USAGE", &usage
, NULL
);
764 if (STRPTR_IN_SET(usage
, "filesystem", "crypto")) {
765 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
, *n
= NULL
, *o
= NULL
;
766 const char *fstype
= NULL
, *options
= NULL
, *suuid
= NULL
;
767 _cleanup_close_
int mount_node_fd
= -EBADF
;
768 sd_id128_t uuid
= SD_ID128_NULL
;
769 PartitionPolicyFlags found_flags
;
772 /* OK, we have found a file system, that's our root partition then. */
774 r
= image_policy_may_use(policy
, PARTITION_ROOT
);
777 if (r
== 0) /* policy says ignore this, so we ignore it */
780 (void) blkid_probe_lookup_value(b
, "TYPE", &fstype
, NULL
);
781 (void) blkid_probe_lookup_value(b
, "UUID", &suuid
, NULL
);
783 encrypted
= streq_ptr(fstype
, "crypto_LUKS");
785 if (verity_settings_data_covers(verity
, PARTITION_ROOT
))
786 found_flags
= verity
->root_hash_sig
? PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED
: PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY
;
788 found_flags
= encrypted
? PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED
: PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED
;
790 r
= image_policy_check_protection(policy
, PARTITION_ROOT
, found_flags
);
794 r
= image_policy_check_partition_flags(policy
, PARTITION_ROOT
, 0); /* we have no gpt partition flags, hence check against all bits off */
798 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES
)) {
799 mount_node_fd
= open_partition(devname
, /* is_partition = */ false, m
->loop
);
800 if (mount_node_fd
< 0)
801 return mount_node_fd
;
811 /* blkid will return FAT's serial number as UUID, hence it is quite possible
812 * that parsing this will fail. We'll ignore the ID, since it's just too
813 * short to be useful as tru identifier. */
814 r
= sd_id128_from_string(suuid
, &uuid
);
816 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to parse file system UUID '%s', ignoring: %m", suuid
);
819 r
= make_partition_devname(devname
, diskseq
, -1, flags
, &n
);
823 m
->single_file_system
= true;
824 m
->encrypted
= encrypted
;
826 m
->has_verity
= verity
&& verity
->data_path
;
827 m
->verity_ready
= verity_settings_data_covers(verity
, PARTITION_ROOT
);
829 m
->has_verity_sig
= false; /* signature not embedded, must be specified */
830 m
->verity_sig_ready
= m
->verity_ready
&& verity
->root_hash_sig
;
832 m
->image_uuid
= uuid
;
834 options
= mount_options_from_designator(mount_options
, PARTITION_ROOT
);
841 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
] = (DissectedPartition
) {
843 .rw
= !m
->verity_ready
&& !fstype_is_ro(fstype
),
845 .architecture
= _ARCHITECTURE_INVALID
,
846 .fstype
= TAKE_PTR(t
),
848 .mount_options
= TAKE_PTR(o
),
849 .mount_node_fd
= TAKE_FD(mount_node_fd
),
858 (void) blkid_probe_lookup_value(b
, "PTTYPE", &pttype
, NULL
);
862 is_gpt
= streq_ptr(pttype
, "gpt");
863 is_mbr
= streq_ptr(pttype
, "dos");
865 if (!is_gpt
&& ((flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_GPT_ONLY
) || !is_mbr
))
868 /* We support external verity data partitions only if the image has no partition table */
869 if (verity
&& verity
->data_path
)
872 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES
)) {
873 /* Safety check: refuse block devices that carry a partition table but for which the kernel doesn't
874 * do partition scanning. */
875 r
= blockdev_partscan_enabled(fd
);
879 return -EPROTONOSUPPORT
;
882 (void) blkid_probe_lookup_value(b
, "PTUUID", &sptuuid
, NULL
);
884 r
= sd_id128_from_string(sptuuid
, &m
->image_uuid
);
886 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to parse partition table UUID '%s', ignoring: %m", sptuuid
);
890 pl
= blkid_probe_get_partitions(b
);
892 return errno_or_else(ENOMEM
);
895 n_partitions
= blkid_partlist_numof_partitions(pl
);
896 if (n_partitions
< 0)
897 return errno_or_else(EIO
);
899 for (int i
= 0; i
< n_partitions
; i
++) {
900 _cleanup_free_
char *node
= NULL
;
901 unsigned long long pflags
;
902 blkid_loff_t start
, size
;
907 pp
= blkid_partlist_get_partition(pl
, i
);
909 return errno_or_else(EIO
);
911 pflags
= blkid_partition_get_flags(pp
);
914 nr
= blkid_partition_get_partno(pp
);
916 return errno_or_else(EIO
);
919 start
= blkid_partition_get_start(pp
);
921 return errno_or_else(EIO
);
923 assert((uint64_t) start
< UINT64_MAX
/512);
926 size
= blkid_partition_get_size(pp
);
928 return errno_or_else(EIO
);
930 assert((uint64_t) size
< UINT64_MAX
/512);
932 /* While probing we need the non-diskseq device node name to access the thing, hence mask off
933 * DISSECT_IMAGE_DISKSEQ_DEVNODE. */
934 r
= make_partition_devname(devname
, diskseq
, nr
, flags
& ~DISSECT_IMAGE_DISKSEQ_DEVNODE
, &node
);
938 /* So here's the thing: after the main ("whole") block device popped up it might take a while
939 * before the kernel fully probed the partition table. Waiting for that to finish is icky in
940 * userspace. So here's what we do instead. We issue the BLKPG_ADD_PARTITION ioctl to add the
941 * partition ourselves, racing against the kernel. Good thing is: if this call fails with
942 * EBUSY then the kernel was quicker than us, and that's totally OK, the outcome is good for
943 * us: the device node will exist. If OTOH our call was successful we won the race. Which is
944 * also good as the outcome is the same: the partition block device exists, and we can use
947 * Kernel returns EBUSY if there's already a partition by that number or an overlapping
948 * partition already existent. */
950 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES
)) {
951 r
= block_device_add_partition(fd
, node
, nr
, (uint64_t) start
* 512, (uint64_t) size
* 512);
954 return log_debug_errno(r
, "BLKPG_ADD_PARTITION failed: %m");
956 log_debug_errno(r
, "Kernel was quicker than us in adding partition %i.", nr
);
958 log_debug("We were quicker than kernel in adding partition %i.", nr
);
962 const char *fstype
= NULL
, *label
;
963 sd_id128_t type_id
, id
;
964 GptPartitionType type
;
965 bool rw
= true, growfs
= false;
967 r
= blkid_partition_get_uuid_id128(pp
, &id
);
969 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to read partition UUID, ignoring: %m");
973 r
= blkid_partition_get_type_id128(pp
, &type_id
);
975 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to read partition type UUID, ignoring: %m");
979 type
= gpt_partition_type_from_uuid(type_id
);
981 label
= blkid_partition_get_name(pp
); /* libblkid returns NULL here if empty */
983 if (IN_SET(type
.designator
,
989 check_partition_flags(node
, pflags
,
990 SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
| SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
| SD_GPT_FLAG_GROWFS
);
992 if (pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
)
995 rw
= !(pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
);
996 growfs
= FLAGS_SET(pflags
, SD_GPT_FLAG_GROWFS
);
998 } else if (type
.designator
== PARTITION_ESP
) {
1000 /* Note that we don't check the SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO flag for the ESP, as it is
1001 * not defined there. We instead check the SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL, as
1002 * recommended by the UEFI spec (See "12.3.3 Number and Location of System
1005 if (pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL
)
1010 } else if (type
.designator
== PARTITION_ROOT
) {
1012 check_partition_flags(node
, pflags
,
1013 SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
| SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
| SD_GPT_FLAG_GROWFS
);
1015 if (pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
)
1018 /* If a root ID is specified, ignore everything but the root id */
1019 if (!sd_id128_is_null(root_uuid
) && !sd_id128_equal(root_uuid
, id
))
1022 rw
= !(pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
);
1023 growfs
= FLAGS_SET(pflags
, SD_GPT_FLAG_GROWFS
);
1025 } else if (type
.designator
== PARTITION_ROOT_VERITY
) {
1027 check_partition_flags(node
, pflags
,
1028 SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
| SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
);
1030 if (pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
)
1033 m
->has_verity
= true;
1035 /* If no verity configuration is specified, then don't do verity */
1038 if (verity
->designator
>= 0 && verity
->designator
!= PARTITION_ROOT
)
1041 /* If root hash is specified, then ignore everything but the root id */
1042 if (!sd_id128_is_null(root_verity_uuid
) && !sd_id128_equal(root_verity_uuid
, id
))
1045 fstype
= "DM_verity_hash";
1048 } else if (type
.designator
== PARTITION_ROOT_VERITY_SIG
) {
1050 check_partition_flags(node
, pflags
,
1051 SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
| SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
);
1053 if (pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
)
1056 m
->has_verity_sig
= true;
1060 if (verity
->designator
>= 0 && verity
->designator
!= PARTITION_ROOT
)
1063 fstype
= "verity_hash_signature";
1066 } else if (type
.designator
== PARTITION_USR
) {
1068 check_partition_flags(node
, pflags
,
1069 SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
| SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
| SD_GPT_FLAG_GROWFS
);
1071 if (pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
)
1074 /* If a usr ID is specified, ignore everything but the usr id */
1075 if (!sd_id128_is_null(usr_uuid
) && !sd_id128_equal(usr_uuid
, id
))
1078 rw
= !(pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
);
1079 growfs
= FLAGS_SET(pflags
, SD_GPT_FLAG_GROWFS
);
1081 } else if (type
.designator
== PARTITION_USR_VERITY
) {
1083 check_partition_flags(node
, pflags
,
1084 SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
| SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
);
1086 if (pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
)
1089 m
->has_verity
= true;
1093 if (verity
->designator
>= 0 && verity
->designator
!= PARTITION_USR
)
1096 /* If usr hash is specified, then ignore everything but the usr id */
1097 if (!sd_id128_is_null(usr_verity_uuid
) && !sd_id128_equal(usr_verity_uuid
, id
))
1100 fstype
= "DM_verity_hash";
1103 } else if (type
.designator
== PARTITION_USR_VERITY_SIG
) {
1105 check_partition_flags(node
, pflags
,
1106 SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
| SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
);
1108 if (pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
)
1111 m
->has_verity_sig
= true;
1115 if (verity
->designator
>= 0 && verity
->designator
!= PARTITION_USR
)
1118 fstype
= "verity_hash_signature";
1121 } else if (type
.designator
== PARTITION_SWAP
) {
1123 check_partition_flags(node
, pflags
, SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
);
1125 if (pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
)
1128 /* Note: we don't set fstype = "swap" here, because we still need to probe if
1129 * it might be encrypted (i.e. fstype "crypt_LUKS") or unencrypted
1130 * (i.e. fstype "swap"), and the only way to figure that out is via fstype
1133 /* We don't have a designator for SD_GPT_LINUX_GENERIC so check the UUID instead. */
1134 } else if (sd_id128_equal(type
.uuid
, SD_GPT_LINUX_GENERIC
)) {
1136 check_partition_flags(node
, pflags
,
1137 SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
| SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
| SD_GPT_FLAG_GROWFS
);
1139 if (pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
)
1143 multiple_generic
= true;
1146 generic_rw
= !(pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
);
1147 generic_growfs
= FLAGS_SET(pflags
, SD_GPT_FLAG_GROWFS
);
1149 generic_node
= TAKE_PTR(node
);
1152 } else if (type
.designator
== PARTITION_VAR
) {
1154 check_partition_flags(node
, pflags
,
1155 SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
| SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
| SD_GPT_FLAG_GROWFS
);
1157 if (pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_NO_AUTO
)
1160 if (!FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK
)) {
1161 sd_id128_t var_uuid
;
1163 /* For /var we insist that the uuid of the partition matches the
1164 * HMAC-SHA256 of the /var GPT partition type uuid, keyed by machine
1165 * ID. Why? Unlike the other partitions /var is inherently
1166 * installation specific, hence we need to be careful not to mount it
1167 * in the wrong installation. By hashing the partition UUID from
1168 * /etc/machine-id we can securely bind the partition to the
1171 r
= sd_id128_get_machine_app_specific(SD_GPT_VAR
, &var_uuid
);
1175 if (!sd_id128_equal(var_uuid
, id
)) {
1176 log_debug("Found a /var/ partition, but its UUID didn't match our expectations "
1177 "(found: " SD_ID128_UUID_FORMAT_STR
", expected: " SD_ID128_UUID_FORMAT_STR
"), ignoring.",
1178 SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(id
), SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(var_uuid
));
1183 rw
= !(pflags
& SD_GPT_FLAG_READ_ONLY
);
1184 growfs
= FLAGS_SET(pflags
, SD_GPT_FLAG_GROWFS
);
1187 if (type
.designator
!= _PARTITION_DESIGNATOR_INVALID
) {
1188 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
, *o
= NULL
, *l
= NULL
, *n
= NULL
;
1189 _cleanup_close_
int mount_node_fd
= -EBADF
;
1190 const char *options
= NULL
;
1192 r
= image_policy_may_use(policy
, type
.designator
);
1196 /* Policy says: ignore; Remember this fact, so that we later can distinguish between "found but ignored" and "not found at all" */
1198 if (!m
->partitions
[type
.designator
].found
)
1199 m
->partitions
[type
.designator
].ignored
= true;
1204 if (m
->partitions
[type
.designator
].found
) {
1205 /* For most partition types the first one we see wins. Except for the
1206 * rootfs and /usr, where we do a version compare of the label, and
1207 * let the newest version win. This permits a simple A/B versioning
1208 * scheme in OS images. */
1210 if (compare_arch(type
.arch
, m
->partitions
[type
.designator
].architecture
) <= 0)
1213 if (!partition_designator_is_versioned(type
.designator
) ||
1214 strverscmp_improved(m
->partitions
[type
.designator
].label
, label
) >= 0)
1217 dissected_partition_done(m
->partitions
+ type
.designator
);
1220 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES
) &&
1221 type
.designator
!= PARTITION_SWAP
) {
1222 mount_node_fd
= open_partition(node
, /* is_partition = */ true, m
->loop
);
1223 if (mount_node_fd
< 0)
1224 return mount_node_fd
;
1227 r
= make_partition_devname(devname
, diskseq
, nr
, flags
, &n
);
1243 options
= mount_options_from_designator(mount_options
, type
.designator
);
1245 o
= strdup(options
);
1250 m
->partitions
[type
.designator
] = (DissectedPartition
) {
1255 .architecture
= type
.arch
,
1256 .node
= TAKE_PTR(n
),
1257 .fstype
= TAKE_PTR(t
),
1258 .label
= TAKE_PTR(l
),
1260 .mount_options
= TAKE_PTR(o
),
1261 .mount_node_fd
= TAKE_FD(mount_node_fd
),
1262 .offset
= (uint64_t) start
* 512,
1263 .size
= (uint64_t) size
* 512,
1264 .gpt_flags
= pflags
,
1268 } else if (is_mbr
) {
1270 switch (blkid_partition_get_type(pp
)) {
1272 case 0x83: /* Linux partition */
1274 if (pflags
!= 0x80) /* Bootable flag */
1278 multiple_generic
= true;
1282 generic_growfs
= false;
1283 generic_node
= TAKE_PTR(node
);
1288 case 0xEA: { /* Boot Loader Spec extended $BOOT partition */
1289 _cleanup_close_
int mount_node_fd
= -EBADF
;
1290 _cleanup_free_
char *o
= NULL
, *n
= NULL
;
1291 sd_id128_t id
= SD_ID128_NULL
;
1292 const char *options
= NULL
;
1294 r
= image_policy_may_use(policy
, PARTITION_XBOOTLDR
);
1297 if (r
== 0) { /* policy says: ignore */
1298 if (!m
->partitions
[PARTITION_XBOOTLDR
].found
)
1299 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_XBOOTLDR
].ignored
= true;
1304 /* First one wins */
1305 if (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_XBOOTLDR
].found
)
1308 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES
)) {
1309 mount_node_fd
= open_partition(node
, /* is_partition = */ true, m
->loop
);
1310 if (mount_node_fd
< 0)
1311 return mount_node_fd
;
1314 (void) blkid_partition_get_uuid_id128(pp
, &id
);
1316 r
= make_partition_devname(devname
, diskseq
, nr
, flags
, &n
);
1320 options
= mount_options_from_designator(mount_options
, PARTITION_XBOOTLDR
);
1322 o
= strdup(options
);
1327 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_XBOOTLDR
] = (DissectedPartition
) {
1332 .architecture
= _ARCHITECTURE_INVALID
,
1333 .node
= TAKE_PTR(n
),
1335 .mount_options
= TAKE_PTR(o
),
1336 .mount_node_fd
= TAKE_FD(mount_node_fd
),
1337 .offset
= (uint64_t) start
* 512,
1338 .size
= (uint64_t) size
* 512,
1346 if (!m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].found
&&
1347 (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT_VERITY
].found
||
1348 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT_VERITY_SIG
].found
))
1349 return -EADDRNOTAVAIL
; /* Verity found but no matching rootfs? Something is off, refuse. */
1351 /* Hmm, we found a signature partition but no Verity data? Something is off. */
1352 if (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT_VERITY_SIG
].found
&& !m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT_VERITY
].found
)
1353 return -EADDRNOTAVAIL
;
1355 if (!m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].found
&&
1356 (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR_VERITY
].found
||
1357 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR_VERITY_SIG
].found
))
1358 return -EADDRNOTAVAIL
; /* as above */
1361 if (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR_VERITY_SIG
].found
&& !m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR_VERITY
].found
)
1362 return -EADDRNOTAVAIL
;
1364 /* If root and /usr are combined then insist that the architecture matches */
1365 if (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].found
&&
1366 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].found
&&
1367 (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].architecture
>= 0 &&
1368 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].architecture
>= 0 &&
1369 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].architecture
!= m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].architecture
))
1370 return -EADDRNOTAVAIL
;
1372 if (!m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].found
&&
1373 !m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].found
&&
1374 (flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT
) &&
1375 (!verity
|| !verity
->root_hash
|| verity
->designator
!= PARTITION_USR
)) {
1377 /* OK, we found nothing usable, then check if there's a single generic partition, and use
1378 * that. If the root hash was set however, then we won't fall back to a generic node, because
1379 * the root hash decides. */
1381 /* If we didn't find a properly marked root partition, but we did find a single suitable
1382 * generic Linux partition, then use this as root partition, if the caller asked for it. */
1383 if (multiple_generic
)
1386 /* If we didn't find a generic node, then we can't fix this up either */
1388 r
= image_policy_may_use(policy
, PARTITION_ROOT
);
1392 /* Policy says: ignore; remember that we did */
1393 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].ignored
= true;
1395 _cleanup_close_
int mount_node_fd
= -EBADF
;
1396 _cleanup_free_
char *o
= NULL
, *n
= NULL
;
1397 const char *options
;
1399 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES
)) {
1400 mount_node_fd
= open_partition(generic_node
, /* is_partition = */ true, m
->loop
);
1401 if (mount_node_fd
< 0)
1402 return mount_node_fd
;
1405 r
= make_partition_devname(devname
, diskseq
, generic_nr
, flags
, &n
);
1409 options
= mount_options_from_designator(mount_options
, PARTITION_ROOT
);
1411 o
= strdup(options
);
1416 assert(generic_nr
>= 0);
1417 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
] = (DissectedPartition
) {
1420 .growfs
= generic_growfs
,
1421 .partno
= generic_nr
,
1422 .architecture
= _ARCHITECTURE_INVALID
,
1423 .node
= TAKE_PTR(n
),
1424 .uuid
= generic_uuid
,
1425 .mount_options
= TAKE_PTR(o
),
1426 .mount_node_fd
= TAKE_FD(mount_node_fd
),
1427 .offset
= UINT64_MAX
,
1434 /* Check if we have a root fs if we are told to do check. /usr alone is fine too, but only if appropriate flag for that is set too */
1435 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT
) &&
1436 !(m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].found
|| (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].found
&& FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT
))))
1439 if (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT_VERITY
].found
) {
1440 /* We only support one verity partition per image, i.e. can't do for both /usr and root fs */
1441 if (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR_VERITY
].found
)
1444 /* We don't support verity enabled root with a split out /usr. Neither with nor without
1445 * verity there. (Note that we do support verity-less root with verity-full /usr, though.) */
1446 if (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].found
)
1447 return -EADDRNOTAVAIL
;
1451 /* If a verity designator is specified, then insist that the matching partition exists */
1452 if (verity
->designator
>= 0 && !m
->partitions
[verity
->designator
].found
)
1453 return -EADDRNOTAVAIL
;
1455 bool have_verity_sig_partition
=
1456 m
->partitions
[verity
->designator
== PARTITION_USR
? PARTITION_USR_VERITY_SIG
: PARTITION_ROOT_VERITY_SIG
].found
;
1458 if (verity
->root_hash
) {
1459 /* If we have an explicit root hash and found the partitions for it, then we are ready to use
1460 * Verity, set things up for it */
1462 if (verity
->designator
< 0 || verity
->designator
== PARTITION_ROOT
) {
1463 if (!m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT_VERITY
].found
|| !m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].found
)
1464 return -EADDRNOTAVAIL
;
1466 /* If we found a verity setup, then the root partition is necessarily read-only. */
1467 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].rw
= false;
1468 m
->verity_ready
= true;
1471 assert(verity
->designator
== PARTITION_USR
);
1473 if (!m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR_VERITY
].found
|| !m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].found
)
1474 return -EADDRNOTAVAIL
;
1476 m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].rw
= false;
1477 m
->verity_ready
= true;
1480 if (m
->verity_ready
)
1481 m
->verity_sig_ready
= verity
->root_hash_sig
|| have_verity_sig_partition
;
1483 } else if (have_verity_sig_partition
) {
1485 /* If we found an embedded signature partition, we are ready, too. */
1487 m
->verity_ready
= m
->verity_sig_ready
= true;
1488 m
->partitions
[verity
->designator
== PARTITION_USR
? PARTITION_USR
: PARTITION_ROOT
].rw
= false;
1494 /* After we discovered all partitions let's see if the verity requirements match the policy. (Note:
1495 * we don't check encryption requirements here, because we haven't probed the file system yet, hence
1496 * don't know if this is encrypted or not) */
1497 for (PartitionDesignator di
= 0; di
< _PARTITION_DESIGNATOR_MAX
; di
++) {
1498 PartitionDesignator vi
, si
;
1499 PartitionPolicyFlags found_flags
;
1501 any
= any
|| m
->partitions
[di
].found
;
1503 vi
= partition_verity_of(di
);
1504 si
= partition_verity_sig_of(di
);
1506 /* Determine the verity protection level for this partition. */
1507 found_flags
= m
->partitions
[di
].found
?
1508 (vi
>= 0 && m
->partitions
[vi
].found
?
1509 (si
>= 0 && m
->partitions
[si
].found
? PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED
: PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY
) :
1510 PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED
|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED
) :
1511 (m
->partitions
[di
].ignored
? PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED
: PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT
);
1513 r
= image_policy_check_protection(policy
, di
, found_flags
);
1517 if (m
->partitions
[di
].found
) {
1518 r
= image_policy_check_partition_flags(policy
, di
, m
->partitions
[di
].gpt_flags
);
1524 if (!any
&& !FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_ALLOW_EMPTY
))
1527 r
= dissected_image_probe_filesystems(m
, fd
, policy
);
1535 int dissect_image_file(
1537 const VeritySettings
*verity
,
1538 const MountOptions
*mount_options
,
1539 const ImagePolicy
*image_policy
,
1540 DissectImageFlags flags
,
1541 DissectedImage
**ret
) {
1544 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp
) DissectedImage
*m
= NULL
;
1545 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -EBADF
;
1550 fd
= open(path
, O_RDONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_NONBLOCK
|O_NOCTTY
);
1554 r
= fd_verify_regular(fd
);
1558 r
= dissected_image_new(path
, &m
);
1562 r
= probe_sector_size(fd
, &m
->sector_size
);
1566 r
= dissect_image(m
, fd
, path
, verity
, mount_options
, image_policy
, flags
);
1578 static int dissect_log_error(int r
, const char *name
, const VeritySettings
*verity
) {
1583 case 0 ... INT_MAX
: /* success! */
1587 return log_error_errno(r
, "Dissecting images is not supported, compiled without blkid support.");
1590 return log_error_errno(r
, "%s: Couldn't identify a suitable partition table or file system.", name
);
1593 return log_error_errno(r
, "%s: The image does not pass os-release/extension-release validation.", name
);
1595 case -EADDRNOTAVAIL
:
1596 return log_error_errno(r
, "%s: No root partition for specified root hash found.", name
);
1599 return log_error_errno(r
, "%s: Multiple suitable root partitions found in image.", name
);
1602 return log_error_errno(r
, "%s: No suitable root partition found in image.", name
);
1604 case -EPROTONOSUPPORT
:
1605 return log_error_errno(r
, "Device '%s' is a loopback block device with partition scanning turned off, please turn it on.", name
);
1608 return log_error_errno(r
, "%s: Image is not a block device.", name
);
1611 return log_error_errno(r
,
1612 "Combining partitioned images (such as '%s') with external Verity data (such as '%s') not supported. "
1613 "(Consider setting $SYSTEMD_DISSECT_VERITY_SIDECAR=0 to disable automatic discovery of external Verity data.)",
1614 name
, strna(verity
? verity
->data_path
: NULL
));
1617 return log_error_errno(r
, "%s: image does not match image policy.", name
);
1620 return log_error_errno(r
, "%s: no suitable partitions found.", name
);
1623 return log_error_errno(r
, "Failed to dissect image '%s': %m", name
);
1627 int dissect_image_file_and_warn(
1629 const VeritySettings
*verity
,
1630 const MountOptions
*mount_options
,
1631 const ImagePolicy
*image_policy
,
1632 DissectImageFlags flags
,
1633 DissectedImage
**ret
) {
1635 return dissect_log_error(
1636 dissect_image_file(path
, verity
, mount_options
, image_policy
, flags
, ret
),
1641 DissectedImage
* dissected_image_unref(DissectedImage
*m
) {
1645 /* First, clear dissected partitions. */
1646 for (PartitionDesignator i
= 0; i
< _PARTITION_DESIGNATOR_MAX
; i
++)
1647 dissected_partition_done(m
->partitions
+ i
);
1649 /* Second, free decrypted images. This must be after dissected_partition_done(), as freeing
1650 * DecryptedImage may try to deactivate partitions. */
1651 decrypted_image_unref(m
->decrypted_image
);
1653 /* Third, unref LoopDevice. This must be called after the above two, as freeing LoopDevice may try to
1654 * remove existing partitions on the loopback block device. */
1655 loop_device_unref(m
->loop
);
1657 free(m
->image_name
);
1659 strv_free(m
->machine_info
);
1660 strv_free(m
->os_release
);
1661 strv_free(m
->initrd_release
);
1662 strv_free(m
->extension_release
);
1667 static int is_loop_device(const char *path
) {
1668 char s
[SYS_BLOCK_PATH_MAX("/../loop/")];
1673 if (stat(path
, &st
) < 0)
1676 if (!S_ISBLK(st
.st_mode
))
1679 xsprintf_sys_block_path(s
, "/loop/", st
.st_dev
);
1680 if (access(s
, F_OK
) < 0) {
1681 if (errno
!= ENOENT
)
1684 /* The device itself isn't a loop device, but maybe it's a partition and its parent is? */
1685 xsprintf_sys_block_path(s
, "/../loop/", st
.st_dev
);
1686 if (access(s
, F_OK
) < 0)
1687 return errno
== ENOENT
? false : -errno
;
1693 static int run_fsck(int node_fd
, const char *fstype
) {
1697 assert(node_fd
>= 0);
1700 r
= fsck_exists_for_fstype(fstype
);
1702 log_debug_errno(r
, "Couldn't determine whether fsck for %s exists, proceeding anyway.", fstype
);
1706 log_debug("Not checking partition %s, as fsck for %s does not exist.", FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(node_fd
), fstype
);
1713 &node_fd
, 1, /* Leave the node fd open */
1714 FORK_RESET_SIGNALS
|FORK_CLOSE_ALL_FDS
|FORK_RLIMIT_NOFILE_SAFE
|FORK_DEATHSIG
|FORK_REARRANGE_STDIO
|FORK_CLOEXEC_OFF
,
1717 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to fork off fsck: %m");
1720 execl("/sbin/fsck", "/sbin/fsck", "-aT", FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(node_fd
), NULL
);
1722 log_debug_errno(errno
, "Failed to execl() fsck: %m");
1723 _exit(FSCK_OPERATIONAL_ERROR
);
1726 exit_status
= wait_for_terminate_and_check("fsck", pid
, 0);
1727 if (exit_status
< 0)
1728 return log_debug_errno(exit_status
, "Failed to fork off /sbin/fsck: %m");
1730 if ((exit_status
& ~FSCK_ERROR_CORRECTED
) != FSCK_SUCCESS
) {
1731 log_debug("fsck failed with exit status %i.", exit_status
);
1733 if ((exit_status
& (FSCK_SYSTEM_SHOULD_REBOOT
|FSCK_ERRORS_LEFT_UNCORRECTED
)) != 0)
1734 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN
), "File system is corrupted, refusing.");
1736 log_debug("Ignoring fsck error.");
1742 static int fs_grow(const char *node_path
, const char *mount_path
) {
1743 _cleanup_close_
int mount_fd
= -EBADF
, node_fd
= -EBADF
;
1744 uint64_t size
, newsize
;
1747 node_fd
= open(node_path
, O_RDONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_NONBLOCK
|O_NOCTTY
);
1749 return log_debug_errno(errno
, "Failed to open node device %s: %m", node_path
);
1751 if (ioctl(node_fd
, BLKGETSIZE64
, &size
) != 0)
1752 return log_debug_errno(errno
, "Failed to get block device size of %s: %m", node_path
);
1754 mount_fd
= open(mount_path
, O_RDONLY
|O_DIRECTORY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1756 return log_debug_errno(errno
, "Failed to open mountd file system %s: %m", mount_path
);
1758 log_debug("Resizing \"%s\" to %"PRIu64
" bytes...", mount_path
, size
);
1759 r
= resize_fs(mount_fd
, size
, &newsize
);
1761 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to resize \"%s\" to %"PRIu64
" bytes: %m", mount_path
, size
);
1763 if (newsize
== size
)
1764 log_debug("Successfully resized \"%s\" to %s bytes.",
1765 mount_path
, FORMAT_BYTES(newsize
));
1767 assert(newsize
< size
);
1768 log_debug("Successfully resized \"%s\" to %s bytes (%"PRIu64
" bytes lost due to blocksize).",
1769 mount_path
, FORMAT_BYTES(newsize
), size
- newsize
);
1775 int partition_pick_mount_options(
1776 PartitionDesignator d
,
1781 unsigned long *ret_ms_flags
) {
1783 _cleanup_free_
char *options
= NULL
;
1785 assert(ret_options
);
1787 /* Selects a baseline of bind mount flags, that should always apply.
1789 * Firstly, we set MS_NODEV universally on all mounts, since we don't want to allow device nodes outside of /dev/.
1791 * On /var/tmp/ we'll also set MS_NOSUID, same as we set for /tmp/ on the host.
1793 * On the ESP and XBOOTLDR partitions we'll also disable symlinks, and execution. These file systems
1794 * are generally untrusted (i.e. not encrypted or authenticated), and typically VFAT hence we should
1795 * be as restrictive as possible, and this shouldn't hurt, since the functionality is not available
1798 unsigned long flags
= MS_NODEV
;
1806 case PARTITION_XBOOTLDR
:
1807 flags
|= MS_NOSUID
|MS_NOEXEC
|ms_nosymfollow_supported();
1809 /* The ESP might contain a pre-boot random seed. Let's make this unaccessible to regular
1810 * userspace. ESP/XBOOTLDR is almost certainly VFAT, hence if we don't know assume it is. */
1811 if (!fstype
|| fstype_can_umask(fstype
))
1812 if (!strextend_with_separator(&options
, ",", "umask=0077"))
1824 /* So, when you request MS_RDONLY from ext4, then this means nothing. It happily still writes to the
1825 * backing storage. What's worse, the BLKRO[GS]ET flag and (in case of loopback devices)
1826 * LO_FLAGS_READ_ONLY don't mean anything, they affect userspace accesses only, and write accesses
1827 * from the upper file system still get propagated through to the underlying file system,
1828 * unrestricted. To actually get ext4/xfs/btrfs to stop writing to the device we need to specify
1829 * "norecovery" as mount option, in addition to MS_RDONLY. Yes, this sucks, since it means we need to
1830 * carry a per file system table here.
1832 * Note that this means that we might not be able to mount corrupted file systems as read-only
1833 * anymore (since in some cases the kernel implementations will refuse mounting when corrupted,
1834 * read-only and "norecovery" is specified). But I think for the case of automatically determined
1835 * mount options for loopback devices this is the right choice, since otherwise using the same
1836 * loopback file twice even in read-only mode, is going to fail badly sooner or later. The usecase of
1837 * making reuse of the immutable images "just work" is more relevant to us than having read-only
1838 * access that actually modifies stuff work on such image files. Or to say this differently: if
1839 * people want their file systems to be fixed up they should just open them in writable mode, where
1840 * all these problems don't exist. */
1841 if (!rw
&& fstype
&& fstype_can_norecovery(fstype
))
1842 if (!strextend_with_separator(&options
, ",", "norecovery"))
1845 if (discard
&& fstype
&& fstype_can_discard(fstype
))
1846 if (!strextend_with_separator(&options
, ",", "discard"))
1849 if (!ret_ms_flags
) /* Fold flags into option string if ret_flags specified as NULL */
1850 if (!strextend_with_separator(&options
, ",",
1851 FLAGS_SET(flags
, MS_RDONLY
) ? "ro" : "rw",
1852 FLAGS_SET(flags
, MS_NODEV
) ? "nodev" : "dev",
1853 FLAGS_SET(flags
, MS_NOSUID
) ? "nosuid" : "suid",
1854 FLAGS_SET(flags
, MS_NOEXEC
) ? "noexec" : "exec",
1855 FLAGS_SET(flags
, MS_NOSYMFOLLOW
) ? "nosymfollow" : NULL
))
1856 /* NB: we suppress 'symfollow' here, since it's the default, and old /bin/mount might not know it */
1860 *ret_ms_flags
= flags
;
1862 *ret_options
= TAKE_PTR(options
);
1866 static int mount_partition(
1867 PartitionDesignator d
,
1868 DissectedPartition
*m
,
1870 const char *directory
,
1873 DissectImageFlags flags
) {
1875 _cleanup_free_
char *chased
= NULL
, *options
= NULL
;
1876 bool rw
, discard
, remap_uid_gid
= false;
1877 const char *p
, *node
, *fstype
;
1878 unsigned long ms_flags
;
1884 if (m
->mount_node_fd
< 0)
1887 /* Use decrypted node and matching fstype if available, otherwise use the original device */
1888 node
= FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(m
->mount_node_fd
);
1889 fstype
= dissected_partition_fstype(m
);
1892 return -EAFNOSUPPORT
;
1893 r
= dissect_fstype_ok(fstype
);
1897 return -EIDRM
; /* Recognizable error */
1899 /* We are looking at an encrypted partition? This either means stacked encryption, or the caller
1900 * didn't call dissected_image_decrypt() beforehand. Let's return a recognizable error for this
1902 if (streq(fstype
, "crypto_LUKS"))
1905 rw
= m
->rw
&& !(flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_MOUNT_READ_ONLY
);
1907 discard
= ((flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD
) ||
1908 ((flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP
) && is_loop_device(m
->node
) > 0));
1910 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK
) && rw
) {
1911 r
= run_fsck(m
->mount_node_fd
, fstype
);
1917 /* Automatically create missing mount points inside the image, if necessary. */
1918 r
= mkdir_p_root(where
, directory
, uid_shift
, (gid_t
) uid_shift
, 0755);
1919 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EROFS
)
1922 r
= chase(directory
, where
, CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT
, &chased
, NULL
);
1928 /* Create top-level mount if missing – but only if this is asked for. This won't modify the
1929 * image (as the branch above does) but the host hierarchy, and the created directory might
1930 * survive our mount in the host hierarchy hence. */
1931 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_MKDIR
)) {
1932 r
= mkdir_p(where
, 0755);
1940 r
= partition_pick_mount_options(d
, dissected_partition_fstype(m
), rw
, discard
, &options
, &ms_flags
);
1944 if (uid_is_valid(uid_shift
) && uid_shift
!= 0) {
1946 if (fstype_can_uid_gid(fstype
)) {
1947 _cleanup_free_
char *uid_option
= NULL
;
1949 if (asprintf(&uid_option
, "uid=" UID_FMT
",gid=" GID_FMT
, uid_shift
, (gid_t
) uid_shift
) < 0)
1952 if (!strextend_with_separator(&options
, ",", uid_option
))
1954 } else if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_MOUNT_IDMAPPED
))
1955 remap_uid_gid
= true;
1958 if (!isempty(m
->mount_options
))
1959 if (!strextend_with_separator(&options
, ",", m
->mount_options
))
1962 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, node
, p
, fstype
, ms_flags
, options
);
1966 if (rw
&& m
->growfs
&& FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS
))
1967 (void) fs_grow(node
, p
);
1969 if (remap_uid_gid
) {
1970 r
= remount_idmap(p
, uid_shift
, uid_range
, UID_INVALID
, REMOUNT_IDMAPPING_HOST_ROOT
);
1978 static int mount_root_tmpfs(const char *where
, uid_t uid_shift
, DissectImageFlags flags
) {
1979 _cleanup_free_
char *options
= NULL
;
1984 /* For images that contain /usr/ but no rootfs, let's mount rootfs as tmpfs */
1986 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_MKDIR
)) {
1987 r
= mkdir_p(where
, 0755);
1992 if (uid_is_valid(uid_shift
)) {
1993 if (asprintf(&options
, "uid=" UID_FMT
",gid=" GID_FMT
, uid_shift
, (gid_t
) uid_shift
) < 0)
1997 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, "rootfs", where
, "tmpfs", MS_NODEV
, options
);
2004 int dissected_image_mount(
2009 DissectImageFlags flags
) {
2011 int r
, xbootldr_mounted
;
2018 * -ENXIO → No root partition found
2019 * -EMEDIUMTYPE → DISSECT_IMAGE_VALIDATE_OS set but no os-release/extension-release file found
2020 * -EUNATCH → Encrypted partition found for which no dm-crypt was set up yet
2021 * -EUCLEAN → fsck for file system failed
2022 * -EBUSY → File system already mounted/used elsewhere (kernel)
2023 * -EAFNOSUPPORT → File system type not supported or not known
2024 * -EIDRM → File system is not among allowlisted "common" file systems
2027 if (!(m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].found
||
2028 (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].found
&& FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT
))))
2029 return -ENXIO
; /* Require a root fs or at least a /usr/ fs (the latter is subject to a flag of its own) */
2031 if ((flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_MOUNT_NON_ROOT_ONLY
) == 0) {
2033 /* First mount the root fs. If there's none we use a tmpfs. */
2034 if (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].found
)
2035 r
= mount_partition(PARTITION_ROOT
, m
->partitions
+ PARTITION_ROOT
, where
, NULL
, uid_shift
, uid_range
, flags
);
2037 r
= mount_root_tmpfs(where
, uid_shift
, flags
);
2041 /* For us mounting root always means mounting /usr as well */
2042 r
= mount_partition(PARTITION_USR
, m
->partitions
+ PARTITION_USR
, where
, "/usr", uid_shift
, uid_range
, flags
);
2046 if ((flags
& (DISSECT_IMAGE_VALIDATE_OS
|DISSECT_IMAGE_VALIDATE_OS_EXT
)) != 0) {
2047 /* If either one of the validation flags are set, ensure that the image qualifies
2048 * as one or the other (or both). */
2051 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_VALIDATE_OS
)) {
2052 r
= path_is_os_tree(where
);
2058 if (!ok
&& FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_VALIDATE_OS_EXT
)) {
2059 r
= extension_has_forbidden_content(where
);
2063 r
= path_is_extension_tree(where
, m
->image_name
, FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_SYSEXT_CHECK
));
2076 if (flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_MOUNT_ROOT_ONLY
)
2079 r
= mount_partition(PARTITION_HOME
, m
->partitions
+ PARTITION_HOME
, where
, "/home", uid_shift
, uid_range
, flags
);
2083 r
= mount_partition(PARTITION_SRV
, m
->partitions
+ PARTITION_SRV
, where
, "/srv", uid_shift
, uid_range
, flags
);
2087 r
= mount_partition(PARTITION_VAR
, m
->partitions
+ PARTITION_VAR
, where
, "/var", uid_shift
, uid_range
, flags
);
2091 r
= mount_partition(PARTITION_TMP
, m
->partitions
+ PARTITION_TMP
, where
, "/var/tmp", uid_shift
, uid_range
, flags
);
2095 xbootldr_mounted
= mount_partition(PARTITION_XBOOTLDR
, m
->partitions
+ PARTITION_XBOOTLDR
, where
, "/boot", uid_shift
, uid_range
, flags
);
2096 if (xbootldr_mounted
< 0)
2097 return xbootldr_mounted
;
2099 if (m
->partitions
[PARTITION_ESP
].found
) {
2100 int esp_done
= false;
2102 /* Mount the ESP to /efi if it exists. If it doesn't exist, use /boot instead, but only if it
2103 * exists and is empty, and we didn't already mount the XBOOTLDR partition into it. */
2105 r
= chase("/efi", where
, CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT
, NULL
, NULL
);
2110 /* /efi doesn't exist. Let's see if /boot is suitable then */
2112 if (!xbootldr_mounted
) {
2113 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
2115 r
= chase("/boot", where
, CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT
, &p
, NULL
);
2119 } else if (dir_is_empty(p
, /* ignore_hidden_or_backup= */ false) > 0) {
2120 /* It exists and is an empty directory. Let's mount the ESP there. */
2121 r
= mount_partition(PARTITION_ESP
, m
->partitions
+ PARTITION_ESP
, where
, "/boot", uid_shift
, uid_range
, flags
);
2131 /* OK, let's mount the ESP now to /efi (possibly creating the dir if missing) */
2133 r
= mount_partition(PARTITION_ESP
, m
->partitions
+ PARTITION_ESP
, where
, "/efi", uid_shift
, uid_range
, flags
);
2142 int dissected_image_mount_and_warn(
2147 DissectImageFlags flags
) {
2154 r
= dissected_image_mount(m
, where
, uid_shift
, uid_range
, flags
);
2156 return log_error_errno(r
, "Not root file system found in image.");
2157 if (r
== -EMEDIUMTYPE
)
2158 return log_error_errno(r
, "No suitable os-release/extension-release file in image found.");
2160 return log_error_errno(r
, "Encrypted file system discovered, but decryption not requested.");
2162 return log_error_errno(r
, "File system check on image failed.");
2164 return log_error_errno(r
, "File system already mounted elsewhere.");
2165 if (r
== -EAFNOSUPPORT
)
2166 return log_error_errno(r
, "File system type not supported or not known.");
2168 return log_error_errno(r
, "File system is too uncommon, refused.");
2170 return log_error_errno(r
, "Failed to mount image: %m");
2175 #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP
2176 struct DecryptedPartition
{
2177 struct crypt_device
*device
;
2183 typedef struct DecryptedPartition DecryptedPartition
;
2185 struct DecryptedImage
{
2187 DecryptedPartition
*decrypted
;
2191 static DecryptedImage
* decrypted_image_free(DecryptedImage
*d
) {
2192 #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP
2198 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< d
->n_decrypted
; i
++) {
2199 DecryptedPartition
*p
= d
->decrypted
+ i
;
2201 if (p
->device
&& p
->name
&& !p
->relinquished
) {
2202 _cleanup_free_
char *node
= NULL
;
2204 node
= path_join("/dev/mapper", p
->name
);
2206 r
= btrfs_forget_device(node
);
2207 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENOENT
)
2208 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to forget btrfs device %s, ignoring: %m", node
);
2212 /* Let's deactivate lazily, as the dm volume may be already/still used by other processes. */
2213 r
= sym_crypt_deactivate_by_name(p
->device
, p
->name
, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED
);
2215 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to deactivate encrypted partition %s", p
->name
);
2219 sym_crypt_free(p
->device
);
2229 DEFINE_TRIVIAL_REF_UNREF_FUNC(DecryptedImage
, decrypted_image
, decrypted_image_free
);
2231 #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP
2232 static int decrypted_image_new(DecryptedImage
**ret
) {
2233 _cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp
) DecryptedImage
*d
= NULL
;
2237 d
= new(DecryptedImage
, 1);
2241 *d
= (DecryptedImage
) {
2249 static int make_dm_name_and_node(const void *original_node
, const char *suffix
, char **ret_name
, char **ret_node
) {
2250 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
, *node
= NULL
;
2253 assert(original_node
);
2258 base
= strrchr(original_node
, '/');
2260 base
= original_node
;
2266 name
= strjoin(base
, suffix
);
2269 if (!filename_is_valid(name
))
2272 node
= path_join(sym_crypt_get_dir(), name
);
2276 *ret_name
= TAKE_PTR(name
);
2277 *ret_node
= TAKE_PTR(node
);
2282 static int decrypt_partition(
2283 DissectedPartition
*m
,
2284 const char *passphrase
,
2285 DissectImageFlags flags
,
2286 DecryptedImage
*d
) {
2288 _cleanup_free_
char *node
= NULL
, *name
= NULL
;
2289 _cleanup_(sym_crypt_freep
) struct crypt_device
*cd
= NULL
;
2290 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -EBADF
;
2296 if (!m
->found
|| !m
->node
|| !m
->fstype
)
2299 if (!streq(m
->fstype
, "crypto_LUKS"))
2305 r
= dlopen_cryptsetup();
2309 r
= make_dm_name_and_node(m
->node
, "-decrypted", &name
, &node
);
2313 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC0(d
->decrypted
, d
->n_decrypted
+ 1))
2316 r
= sym_crypt_init(&cd
, m
->node
);
2318 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to initialize dm-crypt: %m");
2320 cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd
);
2322 r
= sym_crypt_load(cd
, CRYPT_LUKS
, NULL
);
2324 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to load LUKS metadata: %m");
2326 r
= sym_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd
, name
, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
, passphrase
, strlen(passphrase
),
2327 ((flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY
) ? CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY
: 0) |
2328 ((flags
& DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_CRYPTO
) ? CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS
: 0));
2330 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to activate LUKS device: %m");
2331 return r
== -EPERM
? -EKEYREJECTED
: r
;
2334 fd
= open(node
, O_RDONLY
|O_NONBLOCK
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_NOCTTY
);
2336 return log_debug_errno(errno
, "Failed to open %s: %m", node
);
2338 d
->decrypted
[d
->n_decrypted
++] = (DecryptedPartition
) {
2339 .name
= TAKE_PTR(name
),
2340 .device
= TAKE_PTR(cd
),
2343 m
->decrypted_node
= TAKE_PTR(node
);
2344 close_and_replace(m
->mount_node_fd
, fd
);
2349 static int verity_can_reuse(
2350 const VeritySettings
*verity
,
2352 struct crypt_device
**ret_cd
) {
2354 /* If the same volume was already open, check that the root hashes match, and reuse it if they do */
2355 _cleanup_free_
char *root_hash_existing
= NULL
;
2356 _cleanup_(sym_crypt_freep
) struct crypt_device
*cd
= NULL
;
2357 struct crypt_params_verity crypt_params
= {};
2358 size_t root_hash_existing_size
;
2365 r
= sym_crypt_init_by_name(&cd
, name
);
2367 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Error opening verity device, crypt_init_by_name failed: %m");
2369 cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd
);
2371 r
= sym_crypt_get_verity_info(cd
, &crypt_params
);
2373 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Error opening verity device, crypt_get_verity_info failed: %m");
2375 root_hash_existing_size
= verity
->root_hash_size
;
2376 root_hash_existing
= malloc0(root_hash_existing_size
);
2377 if (!root_hash_existing
)
2380 r
= sym_crypt_volume_key_get(cd
, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
, root_hash_existing
, &root_hash_existing_size
, NULL
, 0);
2382 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Error opening verity device, crypt_volume_key_get failed: %m");
2383 if (verity
->root_hash_size
!= root_hash_existing_size
||
2384 memcmp(root_hash_existing
, verity
->root_hash
, verity
->root_hash_size
) != 0)
2385 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Error opening verity device, it already exists but root hashes are different.");
2387 #if HAVE_CRYPT_ACTIVATE_BY_SIGNED_KEY
2388 /* Ensure that, if signatures are supported, we only reuse the device if the previous mount used the
2389 * same settings, so that a previous unsigned mount will not be reused if the user asks to use
2390 * signing for the new one, and vice versa. */
2391 if (!!verity
->root_hash_sig
!= !!(crypt_params
.flags
& CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE
))
2392 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Error opening verity device, it already exists but signature settings are not the same.");
2395 *ret_cd
= TAKE_PTR(cd
);
2399 static inline char* dm_deferred_remove_clean(char *name
) {
2403 (void) sym_crypt_deactivate_by_name(NULL
, name
, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED
);
2406 DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(char *, dm_deferred_remove_clean
);
2408 static int validate_signature_userspace(const VeritySettings
*verity
) {
2410 _cleanup_(sk_X509_free_allp
) STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
2411 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **certs
= NULL
;
2412 _cleanup_(PKCS7_freep
) PKCS7
*p7
= NULL
;
2413 _cleanup_free_
char *s
= NULL
;
2414 _cleanup_(BIO_freep
) BIO
*bio
= NULL
; /* 'bio' must be freed first, 's' second, hence keep this order
2415 * of declaration in place, please */
2416 const unsigned char *d
;
2420 assert(verity
->root_hash
);
2421 assert(verity
->root_hash_sig
);
2423 /* Because installing a signature certificate into the kernel chain is so messy, let's optionally do
2424 * userspace validation. */
2426 r
= conf_files_list_nulstr(&certs
, ".crt", NULL
, CONF_FILES_REGULAR
|CONF_FILES_FILTER_MASKED
, CONF_PATHS_NULSTR("verity.d"));
2428 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to enumerate certificates: %m");
2429 if (strv_isempty(certs
)) {
2430 log_debug("No userspace dm-verity certificates found.");
2434 d
= verity
->root_hash_sig
;
2435 p7
= d2i_PKCS7(NULL
, &d
, (long) verity
->root_hash_sig_size
);
2437 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Failed to parse PKCS7 DER signature data.");
2439 s
= hexmem(verity
->root_hash
, verity
->root_hash_size
);
2441 return log_oom_debug();
2443 bio
= BIO_new_mem_buf(s
, strlen(s
));
2445 return log_oom_debug();
2447 sk
= sk_X509_new_null();
2449 return log_oom_debug();
2451 STRV_FOREACH(i
, certs
) {
2452 _cleanup_(X509_freep
) X509
*c
= NULL
;
2453 _cleanup_fclose_
FILE *f
= NULL
;
2455 f
= fopen(*i
, "re");
2457 log_debug_errno(errno
, "Failed to open '%s', ignoring: %m", *i
);
2461 c
= PEM_read_X509(f
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
2463 log_debug("Failed to load X509 certificate '%s', ignoring.", *i
);
2467 if (sk_X509_push(sk
, c
) == 0)
2468 return log_oom_debug();
2473 r
= PKCS7_verify(p7
, sk
, NULL
, bio
, NULL
, PKCS7_NOINTERN
|PKCS7_NOVERIFY
);
2475 log_debug("Userspace PKCS#7 validation succeeded.");
2477 log_debug("Userspace PKCS#7 validation failed: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL
));
2481 log_debug("Not doing client-side validation of dm-verity root hash signatures, OpenSSL support disabled.");
2486 static int do_crypt_activate_verity(
2487 struct crypt_device
*cd
,
2489 const VeritySettings
*verity
) {
2491 bool check_signature
;
2498 if (verity
->root_hash_sig
) {
2499 r
= getenv_bool_secure("SYSTEMD_DISSECT_VERITY_SIGNATURE");
2500 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENXIO
)
2501 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_DISSECT_VERITY_SIGNATURE");
2503 check_signature
= r
!= 0;
2505 check_signature
= false;
2507 if (check_signature
) {
2509 #if HAVE_CRYPT_ACTIVATE_BY_SIGNED_KEY
2510 /* First, if we have support for signed keys in the kernel, then try that first. */
2511 r
= sym_crypt_activate_by_signed_key(
2515 verity
->root_hash_size
,
2516 verity
->root_hash_sig
,
2517 verity
->root_hash_sig_size
,
2518 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY
);
2522 log_debug("Validation of dm-verity signature failed via the kernel, trying userspace validation instead.");
2524 log_debug("Activation of verity device with signature requested, but not supported via the kernel by %s due to missing crypt_activate_by_signed_key(), trying userspace validation instead.",
2525 program_invocation_short_name
);
2528 /* So this didn't work via the kernel, then let's try userspace validation instead. If that
2529 * works we'll try to activate without telling the kernel the signature. */
2531 r
= validate_signature_userspace(verity
);
2535 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOKEY
),
2536 "Activation of signed Verity volume worked neither via the kernel nor in userspace, can't activate.");
2539 return sym_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
2543 verity
->root_hash_size
,
2544 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY
);
2547 static usec_t
verity_timeout(void) {
2548 usec_t t
= 100 * USEC_PER_MSEC
;
2552 /* On slower machines, like non-KVM vm, setting up device may take a long time.
2553 * Let's make the timeout configurable. */
2555 e
= getenv("SYSTEMD_DISSECT_VERITY_TIMEOUT_SEC");
2559 r
= parse_sec(e
, &t
);
2562 "Failed to parse timeout specified in $SYSTEMD_DISSECT_VERITY_TIMEOUT_SEC, "
2563 "using the default timeout (%s).",
2564 FORMAT_TIMESPAN(t
, USEC_PER_MSEC
));
2569 static int verity_partition(
2570 PartitionDesignator designator
,
2571 DissectedPartition
*m
,
2572 DissectedPartition
*v
,
2573 const VeritySettings
*verity
,
2574 DissectImageFlags flags
,
2575 DecryptedImage
*d
) {
2577 _cleanup_(sym_crypt_freep
) struct crypt_device
*cd
= NULL
;
2578 _cleanup_(dm_deferred_remove_cleanp
) char *restore_deferred_remove
= NULL
;
2579 _cleanup_free_
char *node
= NULL
, *name
= NULL
;
2580 _cleanup_close_
int mount_node_fd
= -EBADF
;
2584 assert(v
|| (verity
&& verity
->data_path
));
2586 if (!verity
|| !verity
->root_hash
)
2588 if (!((verity
->designator
< 0 && designator
== PARTITION_ROOT
) ||
2589 (verity
->designator
== designator
)))
2592 if (!m
->found
|| !m
->node
|| !m
->fstype
)
2594 if (!verity
->data_path
) {
2595 if (!v
->found
|| !v
->node
|| !v
->fstype
)
2598 if (!streq(v
->fstype
, "DM_verity_hash"))
2602 r
= dlopen_cryptsetup();
2606 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE
)) {
2607 /* Use the roothash, which is unique per volume, as the device node name, so that it can be reused */
2608 _cleanup_free_
char *root_hash_encoded
= NULL
;
2610 root_hash_encoded
= hexmem(verity
->root_hash
, verity
->root_hash_size
);
2611 if (!root_hash_encoded
)
2614 r
= make_dm_name_and_node(root_hash_encoded
, "-verity", &name
, &node
);
2616 r
= make_dm_name_and_node(m
->node
, "-verity", &name
, &node
);
2620 r
= sym_crypt_init(&cd
, verity
->data_path
?: v
->node
);
2624 cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd
);
2626 r
= sym_crypt_load(cd
, CRYPT_VERITY
, NULL
);
2630 r
= sym_crypt_set_data_device(cd
, m
->node
);
2634 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC0(d
->decrypted
, d
->n_decrypted
+ 1))
2637 /* If activating fails because the device already exists, check the metadata and reuse it if it matches.
2638 * In case of ENODEV/ENOENT, which can happen if another process is activating at the exact same time,
2639 * retry a few times before giving up. */
2640 for (unsigned i
= 0; i
< N_DEVICE_NODE_LIST_ATTEMPTS
; i
++) {
2641 _cleanup_(sym_crypt_freep
) struct crypt_device
*existing_cd
= NULL
;
2642 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -EBADF
;
2644 /* First, check if the device already exists. */
2645 fd
= open(node
, O_RDONLY
|O_NONBLOCK
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_NOCTTY
);
2646 if (fd
< 0 && !ERRNO_IS_DEVICE_ABSENT(errno
))
2647 return log_debug_errno(errno
, "Failed to open verity device %s: %m", node
);
2649 goto check
; /* The device already exists. Let's check it. */
2651 /* The symlink to the device node does not exist yet. Assume not activated, and let's activate it. */
2652 r
= do_crypt_activate_verity(cd
, name
, verity
);
2654 goto try_open
; /* The device is activated. Let's open it. */
2655 /* libdevmapper can return EINVAL when the device is already in the activation stage.
2656 * There's no way to distinguish this situation from a genuine error due to invalid
2657 * parameters, so immediately fall back to activating the device with a unique name.
2658 * Improvements in libcrypsetup can ensure this never happens:
2659 * https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/merge_requests/96 */
2660 if (r
== -EINVAL
&& FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE
))
2662 if (r
== -ENODEV
) /* Volume is being opened but not ready, crypt_init_by_name would fail, try to open again */
2665 -EEXIST
, /* Volume has already been opened and ready to be used. */
2666 -EBUSY
/* Volume is being opened but not ready, crypt_init_by_name() can fetch details. */))
2667 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to activate verity device %s: %m", node
);
2670 if (!restore_deferred_remove
){
2671 /* To avoid races, disable automatic removal on umount while setting up the new device. Restore it on failure. */
2672 r
= dm_deferred_remove_cancel(name
);
2673 /* -EBUSY and -ENXIO: the device has already been removed or being removed. We cannot
2674 * use the device, try to open again. See target_message() in drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c
2675 * and dm_cancel_deferred_remove() in drivers/md/dm.c */
2676 if (IN_SET(r
, -EBUSY
, -ENXIO
))
2679 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to disable automated deferred removal for verity device %s: %m", node
);
2681 restore_deferred_remove
= strdup(name
);
2682 if (!restore_deferred_remove
)
2683 return log_oom_debug();
2686 r
= verity_can_reuse(verity
, name
, &existing_cd
);
2687 /* Same as above, -EINVAL can randomly happen when it actually means -EEXIST */
2688 if (r
== -EINVAL
&& FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE
))
2691 -ENOENT
, /* Removed?? */
2692 -EBUSY
, /* Volume is being opened but not ready, crypt_init_by_name() can fetch details. */
2693 -ENODEV
/* Volume is being opened but not ready, crypt_init_by_name() would fail, try to open again. */ ))
2696 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to check if existing verity device %s can be reused: %m", node
);
2699 /* devmapper might say that the device exists, but the devlink might not yet have been
2700 * created. Check and wait for the udev event in that case. */
2701 r
= device_wait_for_devlink(node
, "block", verity_timeout(), NULL
);
2702 /* Fallback to activation with a unique device if it's taking too long */
2703 if (r
== -ETIMEDOUT
&& FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE
))
2706 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to wait device node symlink %s: %m", node
);
2711 /* Now, the device is activated and devlink is created. Let's open it. */
2712 fd
= open(node
, O_RDONLY
|O_NONBLOCK
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_NOCTTY
);
2714 if (!ERRNO_IS_DEVICE_ABSENT(errno
))
2715 return log_debug_errno(errno
, "Failed to open verity device %s: %m", node
);
2717 /* The device has already been removed?? */
2722 mount_node_fd
= TAKE_FD(fd
);
2724 crypt_free_and_replace(cd
, existing_cd
);
2729 /* Device is being removed by another process. Let's wait for a while. */
2730 (void) usleep(2 * USEC_PER_MSEC
);
2733 /* All trials failed or a conflicting verity device exists. Let's try to activate with a unique name. */
2734 if (FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE
)) {
2735 /* Before trying to activate with unique name, we need to free crypt_device object.
2736 * Otherwise, we get error from libcryptsetup like the following:
2738 * systemd[1234]: Cannot use device /dev/loop5 which is in use (already mapped or mounted).
2743 return verity_partition(designator
, m
, v
, verity
, flags
& ~DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE
, d
);
2746 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBUSY
), "All attempts to activate verity device %s failed.", name
);
2749 /* Everything looks good and we'll be able to mount the device, so deferred remove will be re-enabled at that point. */
2750 restore_deferred_remove
= mfree(restore_deferred_remove
);
2752 d
->decrypted
[d
->n_decrypted
++] = (DecryptedPartition
) {
2753 .name
= TAKE_PTR(name
),
2754 .device
= TAKE_PTR(cd
),
2757 m
->decrypted_node
= TAKE_PTR(node
);
2758 close_and_replace(m
->mount_node_fd
, mount_node_fd
);
2764 int dissected_image_decrypt(
2766 const char *passphrase
,
2767 const VeritySettings
*verity
,
2768 DissectImageFlags flags
) {
2770 #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP
2771 _cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp
) DecryptedImage
*d
= NULL
;
2776 assert(!verity
|| verity
->root_hash
|| verity
->root_hash_size
== 0);
2780 * = 0 → There was nothing to decrypt
2781 * > 0 → Decrypted successfully
2782 * -ENOKEY → There's something to decrypt but no key was supplied
2783 * -EKEYREJECTED → Passed key was not correct
2786 if (verity
&& verity
->root_hash
&& verity
->root_hash_size
< sizeof(sd_id128_t
))
2789 if (!m
->encrypted
&& !m
->verity_ready
)
2792 #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP
2793 r
= decrypted_image_new(&d
);
2797 for (PartitionDesignator i
= 0; i
< _PARTITION_DESIGNATOR_MAX
; i
++) {
2798 DissectedPartition
*p
= m
->partitions
+ i
;
2799 PartitionDesignator k
;
2804 r
= decrypt_partition(p
, passphrase
, flags
, d
);
2808 k
= partition_verity_of(i
);
2810 r
= verity_partition(i
, p
, m
->partitions
+ k
, verity
, flags
| DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE
, d
);
2815 if (!p
->decrypted_fstype
&& p
->mount_node_fd
>= 0 && p
->decrypted_node
) {
2816 r
= probe_filesystem_full(p
->mount_node_fd
, p
->decrypted_node
, 0, UINT64_MAX
, &p
->decrypted_fstype
);
2817 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EUCLEAN
)
2822 m
->decrypted_image
= TAKE_PTR(d
);
2830 int dissected_image_decrypt_interactively(
2832 const char *passphrase
,
2833 const VeritySettings
*verity
,
2834 DissectImageFlags flags
) {
2836 _cleanup_strv_free_erase_
char **z
= NULL
;
2843 r
= dissected_image_decrypt(m
, passphrase
, verity
, flags
);
2846 if (r
== -EKEYREJECTED
)
2847 log_error_errno(r
, "Incorrect passphrase, try again!");
2848 else if (r
!= -ENOKEY
)
2849 return log_error_errno(r
, "Failed to decrypt image: %m");
2852 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EKEYREJECTED
),
2853 "Too many retries.");
2857 r
= ask_password_auto("Please enter image passphrase:", NULL
, "dissect", "dissect", "dissect.passphrase", USEC_INFINITY
, 0, &z
);
2859 return log_error_errno(r
, "Failed to query for passphrase: %m");
2865 static int decrypted_image_relinquish(DecryptedImage
*d
) {
2868 /* Turns on automatic removal after the last use ended for all DM devices of this image, and sets a
2869 * boolean so that we don't clean it up ourselves either anymore */
2871 #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP
2874 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< d
->n_decrypted
; i
++) {
2875 DecryptedPartition
*p
= d
->decrypted
+ i
;
2877 if (p
->relinquished
)
2880 r
= sym_crypt_deactivate_by_name(NULL
, p
->name
, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED
);
2882 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to mark %s for auto-removal: %m", p
->name
);
2884 p
->relinquished
= true;
2891 int dissected_image_relinquish(DissectedImage
*m
) {
2896 if (m
->decrypted_image
) {
2897 r
= decrypted_image_relinquish(m
->decrypted_image
);
2903 loop_device_relinquish(m
->loop
);
2908 static char *build_auxiliary_path(const char *image
, const char *suffix
) {
2915 e
= endswith(image
, ".raw");
2917 return strjoin(e
, suffix
);
2919 n
= new(char, e
- image
+ strlen(suffix
) + 1);
2923 strcpy(mempcpy(n
, image
, e
- image
), suffix
);
2927 void verity_settings_done(VeritySettings
*v
) {
2930 v
->root_hash
= mfree(v
->root_hash
);
2931 v
->root_hash_size
= 0;
2933 v
->root_hash_sig
= mfree(v
->root_hash_sig
);
2934 v
->root_hash_sig_size
= 0;
2936 v
->data_path
= mfree(v
->data_path
);
2939 int verity_settings_load(
2940 VeritySettings
*verity
,
2942 const char *root_hash_path
,
2943 const char *root_hash_sig_path
) {
2945 _cleanup_free_
void *root_hash
= NULL
, *root_hash_sig
= NULL
;
2946 size_t root_hash_size
= 0, root_hash_sig_size
= 0;
2947 _cleanup_free_
char *verity_data_path
= NULL
;
2948 PartitionDesignator designator
;
2953 assert(verity
->designator
< 0 || IN_SET(verity
->designator
, PARTITION_ROOT
, PARTITION_USR
));
2955 /* If we are asked to load the root hash for a device node, exit early */
2956 if (is_device_path(image
))
2959 r
= getenv_bool_secure("SYSTEMD_DISSECT_VERITY_SIDECAR");
2960 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENXIO
)
2961 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_DISSECT_VERITY_SIDECAR, ignoring: %m");
2965 designator
= verity
->designator
;
2967 /* We only fill in what isn't already filled in */
2969 if (!verity
->root_hash
) {
2970 _cleanup_free_
char *text
= NULL
;
2972 if (root_hash_path
) {
2973 /* If explicitly specified it takes precedence */
2974 r
= read_one_line_file(root_hash_path
, &text
);
2979 designator
= PARTITION_ROOT
;
2981 /* Otherwise look for xattr and separate file, and first for the data for root and if
2982 * that doesn't exist for /usr */
2984 if (designator
< 0 || designator
== PARTITION_ROOT
) {
2985 r
= getxattr_malloc(image
, "user.verity.roothash", &text
);
2987 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
2989 if (r
!= -ENOENT
&& !ERRNO_IS_XATTR_ABSENT(r
))
2992 p
= build_auxiliary_path(image
, ".roothash");
2996 r
= read_one_line_file(p
, &text
);
2997 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENOENT
)
3002 designator
= PARTITION_ROOT
;
3005 if (!text
&& (designator
< 0 || designator
== PARTITION_USR
)) {
3006 /* So in the "roothash" xattr/file name above the "root" of course primarily
3007 * refers to the root of the Verity Merkle tree. But coincidentally it also
3008 * is the hash for the *root* file system, i.e. the "root" neatly refers to
3009 * two distinct concepts called "root". Taking benefit of this happy
3010 * coincidence we call the file with the root hash for the /usr/ file system
3011 * `usrhash`, because `usrroothash` or `rootusrhash` would just be too
3012 * confusing. We thus drop the reference to the root of the Merkle tree, and
3013 * just indicate which file system it's about. */
3014 r
= getxattr_malloc(image
, "user.verity.usrhash", &text
);
3016 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3018 if (r
!= -ENOENT
&& !ERRNO_IS_XATTR_ABSENT(r
))
3021 p
= build_auxiliary_path(image
, ".usrhash");
3025 r
= read_one_line_file(p
, &text
);
3026 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENOENT
)
3031 designator
= PARTITION_USR
;
3036 r
= unhexmem(text
, strlen(text
), &root_hash
, &root_hash_size
);
3039 if (root_hash_size
< sizeof(sd_id128_t
))
3044 if ((root_hash
|| verity
->root_hash
) && !verity
->root_hash_sig
) {
3045 if (root_hash_sig_path
) {
3046 r
= read_full_file(root_hash_sig_path
, (char**) &root_hash_sig
, &root_hash_sig_size
);
3047 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENOENT
)
3051 designator
= PARTITION_ROOT
;
3053 if (designator
< 0 || designator
== PARTITION_ROOT
) {
3054 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3056 /* Follow naming convention recommended by the relevant RFC:
3057 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5751#section-3.2.1 */
3058 p
= build_auxiliary_path(image
, ".roothash.p7s");
3062 r
= read_full_file(p
, (char**) &root_hash_sig
, &root_hash_sig_size
);
3063 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENOENT
)
3066 designator
= PARTITION_ROOT
;
3069 if (!root_hash_sig
&& (designator
< 0 || designator
== PARTITION_USR
)) {
3070 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3072 p
= build_auxiliary_path(image
, ".usrhash.p7s");
3076 r
= read_full_file(p
, (char**) &root_hash_sig
, &root_hash_sig_size
);
3077 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENOENT
)
3080 designator
= PARTITION_USR
;
3084 if (root_hash_sig
&& root_hash_sig_size
== 0) /* refuse empty size signatures */
3088 if (!verity
->data_path
) {
3089 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3091 p
= build_auxiliary_path(image
, ".verity");
3095 if (access(p
, F_OK
) < 0) {
3096 if (errno
!= ENOENT
)
3099 verity_data_path
= TAKE_PTR(p
);
3103 verity
->root_hash
= TAKE_PTR(root_hash
);
3104 verity
->root_hash_size
= root_hash_size
;
3107 if (root_hash_sig
) {
3108 verity
->root_hash_sig
= TAKE_PTR(root_hash_sig
);
3109 verity
->root_hash_sig_size
= root_hash_sig_size
;
3112 if (verity_data_path
)
3113 verity
->data_path
= TAKE_PTR(verity_data_path
);
3115 if (verity
->designator
< 0)
3116 verity
->designator
= designator
;
3121 int dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
3124 VeritySettings
*verity
) {
3126 _cleanup_free_
void *root_hash
= NULL
, *root_hash_sig
= NULL
;
3127 _cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp
) JsonVariant
*v
= NULL
;
3128 size_t root_hash_size
, root_hash_sig_size
;
3129 _cleanup_free_
char *buf
= NULL
;
3130 PartitionDesignator d
;
3131 DissectedPartition
*p
;
3132 JsonVariant
*rh
, *sig
;
3141 if (verity
->root_hash
&& verity
->root_hash_sig
) /* Already loaded? */
3144 r
= getenv_bool_secure("SYSTEMD_DISSECT_VERITY_EMBEDDED");
3145 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENXIO
)
3146 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_DISSECT_VERITY_EMBEDDED, ignoring: %m");
3150 d
= partition_verity_sig_of(verity
->designator
< 0 ? PARTITION_ROOT
: verity
->designator
);
3153 p
= m
->partitions
+ d
;
3156 if (p
->offset
== UINT64_MAX
|| p
->size
== UINT64_MAX
)
3159 if (p
->size
> 4*1024*1024) /* Signature data cannot possible be larger than 4M, refuse that */
3162 buf
= new(char, p
->size
+1);
3166 n
= pread(fd
, buf
, p
->size
, p
->offset
);
3169 if ((uint64_t) n
!= p
->size
)
3172 e
= memchr(buf
, 0, p
->size
);
3174 /* If we found a NUL byte then the rest of the data must be NUL too */
3175 if (!memeqzero(e
, p
->size
- (e
- buf
)))
3176 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Signature data contains embedded NUL byte.");
3180 r
= json_parse(buf
, 0, &v
, NULL
, NULL
);
3182 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to parse signature JSON data: %m");
3184 rh
= json_variant_by_key(v
, "rootHash");
3186 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Signature JSON object lacks 'rootHash' field.");
3187 if (!json_variant_is_string(rh
))
3188 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "'rootHash' field of signature JSON object is not a string.");
3190 r
= unhexmem(json_variant_string(rh
), SIZE_MAX
, &root_hash
, &root_hash_size
);
3192 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to parse root hash field: %m");
3194 /* Check if specified root hash matches if it is specified */
3195 if (verity
->root_hash
&&
3196 memcmp_nn(verity
->root_hash
, verity
->root_hash_size
, root_hash
, root_hash_size
) != 0) {
3197 _cleanup_free_
char *a
= NULL
, *b
= NULL
;
3199 a
= hexmem(root_hash
, root_hash_size
);
3200 b
= hexmem(verity
->root_hash
, verity
->root_hash_size
);
3202 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Root hash in signature JSON data (%s) doesn't match configured hash (%s).", strna(a
), strna(b
));
3205 sig
= json_variant_by_key(v
, "signature");
3207 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Signature JSON object lacks 'signature' field.");
3208 if (!json_variant_is_string(sig
))
3209 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "'signature' field of signature JSON object is not a string.");
3211 r
= unbase64mem(json_variant_string(sig
), SIZE_MAX
, &root_hash_sig
, &root_hash_sig_size
);
3213 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to parse signature field: %m");
3215 free_and_replace(verity
->root_hash
, root_hash
);
3216 verity
->root_hash_size
= root_hash_size
;
3218 free_and_replace(verity
->root_hash_sig
, root_hash_sig
);
3219 verity
->root_hash_sig_size
= root_hash_sig_size
;
3224 int dissected_image_acquire_metadata(DissectedImage
*m
, DissectImageFlags extra_flags
) {
3231 META_INITRD_RELEASE
,
3232 META_EXTENSION_RELEASE
,
3233 META_HAS_INIT_SYSTEM
,
3237 static const char *const paths
[_META_MAX
] = {
3238 [META_HOSTNAME
] = "/etc/hostname\0",
3239 [META_MACHINE_ID
] = "/etc/machine-id\0",
3240 [META_MACHINE_INFO
] = "/etc/machine-info\0",
3241 [META_OS_RELEASE
] = ("/etc/os-release\0"
3242 "/usr/lib/os-release\0"),
3243 [META_INITRD_RELEASE
] = ("/etc/initrd-release\0"
3244 "/usr/lib/initrd-release\0"),
3245 [META_EXTENSION_RELEASE
] = "extension-release\0", /* Used only for logging. */
3246 [META_HAS_INIT_SYSTEM
] = "has-init-system\0", /* ditto */
3249 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **machine_info
= NULL
, **os_release
= NULL
, **initrd_release
= NULL
, **extension_release
= NULL
;
3250 _cleanup_close_pair_
int error_pipe
[2] = PIPE_EBADF
;
3251 _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep
) char *t
= NULL
;
3252 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp
) pid_t child
= 0;
3253 sd_id128_t machine_id
= SD_ID128_NULL
;
3254 _cleanup_free_
char *hostname
= NULL
;
3255 unsigned n_meta_initialized
= 0;
3256 int fds
[2 * _META_MAX
], r
, v
;
3257 int has_init_system
= -1;
3260 BLOCK_SIGNALS(SIGCHLD
);
3264 for (; n_meta_initialized
< _META_MAX
; n_meta_initialized
++) {
3265 if (!paths
[n_meta_initialized
]) {
3266 fds
[2*n_meta_initialized
] = fds
[2*n_meta_initialized
+1] = -EBADF
;
3270 if (pipe2(fds
+ 2*n_meta_initialized
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0) {
3276 r
= mkdtemp_malloc("/tmp/dissect-XXXXXX", &t
);
3280 if (pipe2(error_pipe
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0) {
3285 r
= safe_fork("(sd-dissect)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS
|FORK_DEATHSIG
|FORK_NEW_MOUNTNS
|FORK_MOUNTNS_SLAVE
, &child
);
3289 /* Child in a new mount namespace */
3290 error_pipe
[0] = safe_close(error_pipe
[0]);
3292 r
= dissected_image_mount(
3298 DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY
|
3299 DISSECT_IMAGE_MOUNT_ROOT_ONLY
|
3300 DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT
);
3302 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to mount dissected image: %m");
3306 for (unsigned k
= 0; k
< _META_MAX
; k
++) {
3307 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -ENOENT
;
3312 fds
[2*k
] = safe_close(fds
[2*k
]);
3316 case META_EXTENSION_RELEASE
:
3317 /* As per the os-release spec, if the image is an extension it will have a file
3318 * named after the image name in extension-release.d/ - we use the image name
3319 * and try to resolve it with the extension-release helpers, as sometimes
3320 * the image names are mangled on deployment and do not match anymore.
3321 * Unlike other paths this is not fixed, and the image name
3322 * can be mangled on deployment, so by calling into the helper
3323 * we allow a fallback that matches on the first extension-release
3324 * file found in the directory, if one named after the image cannot
3325 * be found first. */
3326 r
= open_extension_release(t
, m
->image_name
, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, NULL
, &fd
);
3328 fd
= r
; /* Propagate the error. */
3331 case META_HAS_INIT_SYSTEM
: {
3334 FOREACH_STRING(init
,
3335 "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd", /* systemd on /usr merged system */
3336 "/lib/systemd/systemd", /* systemd on /usr non-merged systems */
3337 "/sbin/init") { /* traditional path the Linux kernel invokes */
3339 r
= chase(init
, t
, CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT
, NULL
, NULL
);
3342 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to resolve %s, ignoring: %m", init
);
3349 r
= loop_write(fds
[2*k
+1], &found
, sizeof(found
), false);
3357 NULSTR_FOREACH(p
, paths
[k
]) {
3358 fd
= chase_and_open(p
, t
, CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT
, O_RDONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_NOCTTY
, NULL
);
3365 log_debug_errno(fd
, "Failed to read %s file of image, ignoring: %m", paths
[k
]);
3366 fds
[2*k
+1] = safe_close(fds
[2*k
+1]);
3370 r
= copy_bytes(fd
, fds
[2*k
+1], UINT64_MAX
, 0);
3374 fds
[2*k
+1] = safe_close(fds
[2*k
+1]);
3377 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
3380 /* Let parent know the error */
3381 (void) write(error_pipe
[1], &r
, sizeof(r
));
3382 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
3385 error_pipe
[1] = safe_close(error_pipe
[1]);
3387 for (unsigned k
= 0; k
< _META_MAX
; k
++) {
3388 _cleanup_fclose_
FILE *f
= NULL
;
3393 fds
[2*k
+1] = safe_close(fds
[2*k
+1]);
3395 f
= take_fdopen(&fds
[2*k
], "r");
3404 r
= read_etc_hostname_stream(f
, &hostname
);
3406 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to read /etc/hostname of image: %m");
3410 case META_MACHINE_ID
: {
3411 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
3413 r
= read_line(f
, LONG_LINE_MAX
, &line
);
3415 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to read /etc/machine-id of image: %m");
3417 r
= sd_id128_from_string(line
, &machine_id
);
3419 log_debug_errno(r
, "Image contains invalid /etc/machine-id: %s", line
);
3421 log_debug("/etc/machine-id file of image is empty.");
3422 else if (streq(line
, "uninitialized"))
3423 log_debug("/etc/machine-id file of image is uninitialized (likely aborted first boot).");
3425 log_debug("/etc/machine-id file of image has unexpected length %i.", r
);
3430 case META_MACHINE_INFO
:
3431 r
= load_env_file_pairs(f
, "machine-info", &machine_info
);
3433 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to read /etc/machine-info of image: %m");
3437 case META_OS_RELEASE
:
3438 r
= load_env_file_pairs(f
, "os-release", &os_release
);
3440 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to read OS release file of image: %m");
3444 case META_INITRD_RELEASE
:
3445 r
= load_env_file_pairs(f
, "initrd-release", &initrd_release
);
3447 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to read initrd release file of image: %m");
3451 case META_EXTENSION_RELEASE
:
3452 r
= load_env_file_pairs(f
, "extension-release", &extension_release
);
3454 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to read extension release file of image: %m");
3458 case META_HAS_INIT_SYSTEM
: {
3463 nr
= fread(&b
, 1, sizeof(b
), f
);
3464 if (nr
!= sizeof(b
))
3465 log_debug_errno(errno_or_else(EIO
), "Failed to read has-init-system boolean: %m");
3467 has_init_system
= b
;
3473 r
= wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-dissect)", child
, 0);
3478 n
= read(error_pipe
[0], &v
, sizeof(v
));
3482 return v
; /* propagate error sent to us from child */
3486 if (r
!= EXIT_SUCCESS
)
3489 free_and_replace(m
->hostname
, hostname
);
3490 m
->machine_id
= machine_id
;
3491 strv_free_and_replace(m
->machine_info
, machine_info
);
3492 strv_free_and_replace(m
->os_release
, os_release
);
3493 strv_free_and_replace(m
->initrd_release
, initrd_release
);
3494 strv_free_and_replace(m
->extension_release
, extension_release
);
3495 m
->has_init_system
= has_init_system
;
3498 for (unsigned k
= 0; k
< n_meta_initialized
; k
++)
3499 safe_close_pair(fds
+ 2*k
);
3504 Architecture
dissected_image_architecture(DissectedImage
*img
) {
3507 if (img
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].found
&&
3508 img
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].architecture
>= 0)
3509 return img
->partitions
[PARTITION_ROOT
].architecture
;
3511 if (img
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].found
&&
3512 img
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].architecture
>= 0)
3513 return img
->partitions
[PARTITION_USR
].architecture
;
3515 return _ARCHITECTURE_INVALID
;
3518 int dissect_loop_device(
3520 const VeritySettings
*verity
,
3521 const MountOptions
*mount_options
,
3522 const ImagePolicy
*image_policy
,
3523 DissectImageFlags flags
,
3524 DissectedImage
**ret
) {
3527 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp
) DissectedImage
*m
= NULL
;
3532 r
= dissected_image_new(loop
->backing_file
?: loop
->node
, &m
);
3536 m
->loop
= loop_device_ref(loop
);
3537 m
->sector_size
= m
->loop
->sector_size
;
3539 r
= dissect_image(m
, loop
->fd
, loop
->node
, verity
, mount_options
, image_policy
, flags
);
3552 int dissect_loop_device_and_warn(
3554 const VeritySettings
*verity
,
3555 const MountOptions
*mount_options
,
3556 const ImagePolicy
*image_policy
,
3557 DissectImageFlags flags
,
3558 DissectedImage
**ret
) {
3562 return dissect_log_error(
3563 dissect_loop_device(loop
, verity
, mount_options
, image_policy
, flags
, ret
),
3564 loop
->backing_file
?: loop
->node
,
3569 bool dissected_image_verity_candidate(const DissectedImage
*image
, PartitionDesignator partition_designator
) {
3572 /* Checks if this partition could theoretically do Verity. For non-partitioned images this only works
3573 * if there's an external verity file supplied, for which we can consult .has_verity. For partitioned
3574 * images we only check the partition type.
3576 * This call is used to decide whether to suppress or show a verity column in tabular output of the
3579 if (image
->single_file_system
)
3580 return partition_designator
== PARTITION_ROOT
&& image
->has_verity
;
3582 return partition_verity_of(partition_designator
) >= 0;
3585 bool dissected_image_verity_ready(const DissectedImage
*image
, PartitionDesignator partition_designator
) {
3586 PartitionDesignator k
;
3590 /* Checks if this partition has verity data available that we can activate. For non-partitioned this
3591 * works for the root partition, for others only if the associated verity partition was found. */
3593 if (!image
->verity_ready
)
3596 if (image
->single_file_system
)
3597 return partition_designator
== PARTITION_ROOT
;
3599 k
= partition_verity_of(partition_designator
);
3600 return k
>= 0 && image
->partitions
[k
].found
;
3603 bool dissected_image_verity_sig_ready(const DissectedImage
*image
, PartitionDesignator partition_designator
) {
3604 PartitionDesignator k
;
3608 /* Checks if this partition has verity signature data available that we can use. */
3610 if (!image
->verity_sig_ready
)
3613 if (image
->single_file_system
)
3614 return partition_designator
== PARTITION_ROOT
;
3616 k
= partition_verity_sig_of(partition_designator
);
3617 return k
>= 0 && image
->partitions
[k
].found
;
3620 MountOptions
* mount_options_free_all(MountOptions
*options
) {
3623 while ((m
= options
)) {
3624 LIST_REMOVE(mount_options
, options
, m
);
3632 const char* mount_options_from_designator(const MountOptions
*options
, PartitionDesignator designator
) {
3633 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options
, m
, options
)
3634 if (designator
== m
->partition_designator
&& !isempty(m
->options
))
3640 int mount_image_privately_interactively(
3642 const ImagePolicy
*image_policy
,
3643 DissectImageFlags flags
,
3644 char **ret_directory
,
3646 LoopDevice
**ret_loop_device
) {
3648 _cleanup_(verity_settings_done
) VeritySettings verity
= VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT
;
3649 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp
) LoopDevice
*d
= NULL
;
3650 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp
) DissectedImage
*dissected_image
= NULL
;
3651 _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep
) char *created_dir
= NULL
;
3652 _cleanup_free_
char *temp
= NULL
;
3655 /* Mounts an OS image at a temporary place, inside a newly created mount namespace of our own. This
3656 * is used by tools such as systemd-tmpfiles or systemd-firstboot to operate on some disk image
3660 assert(ret_directory
);
3661 assert(ret_loop_device
);
3663 /* We intend to mount this right-away, hence add the partitions if needed and pin them. */
3664 flags
|= DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES
|
3665 DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES
;
3667 r
= verity_settings_load(&verity
, image
, NULL
, NULL
);
3669 return log_error_errno(r
, "Failed to load root hash data: %m");
3671 r
= tempfn_random_child(NULL
, program_invocation_short_name
, &temp
);
3673 return log_error_errno(r
, "Failed to generate temporary mount directory: %m");
3675 r
= loop_device_make_by_path(
3677 FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY
) ? O_RDONLY
: O_RDWR
,
3678 /* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX
,
3679 FLAGS_SET(flags
, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE
) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN
,
3683 return log_error_errno(r
, "Failed to set up loopback device for %s: %m", image
);
3685 r
= dissect_loop_device_and_warn(
3688 /* mount_options= */ NULL
,
3695 r
= dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(dissected_image
, d
->fd
, &verity
);
3699 r
= dissected_image_decrypt_interactively(dissected_image
, NULL
, &verity
, flags
);
3703 r
= detach_mount_namespace();
3705 return log_error_errno(r
, "Failed to detach mount namespace: %m");
3707 r
= mkdir_p(temp
, 0700);
3709 return log_error_errno(r
, "Failed to create mount point: %m");
3711 created_dir
= TAKE_PTR(temp
);
3713 r
= dissected_image_mount_and_warn(dissected_image
, created_dir
, UID_INVALID
, UID_INVALID
, flags
);
3717 r
= loop_device_flock(d
, LOCK_UN
);
3721 r
= dissected_image_relinquish(dissected_image
);
3723 return log_error_errno(r
, "Failed to relinquish DM and loopback block devices: %m");
3726 _cleanup_close_
int dir_fd
= -EBADF
;
3728 dir_fd
= open(created_dir
, O_CLOEXEC
|O_DIRECTORY
);
3730 return log_error_errno(errno
, "Failed to open mount point directory: %m");
3732 *ret_dir_fd
= TAKE_FD(dir_fd
);
3735 *ret_directory
= TAKE_PTR(created_dir
);
3736 *ret_loop_device
= TAKE_PTR(d
);
3741 static bool mount_options_relax_extension_release_checks(const MountOptions
*options
) {
3745 return string_contains_word(mount_options_from_designator(options
, PARTITION_ROOT
), ",", "x-systemd.relax-extension-release-check") ||
3746 string_contains_word(mount_options_from_designator(options
, PARTITION_USR
), ",", "x-systemd.relax-extension-release-check") ||
3747 string_contains_word(options
->options
, ",", "x-systemd.relax-extension-release-check");
3750 int verity_dissect_and_mount(
3754 const MountOptions
*options
,
3755 const ImagePolicy
*image_policy
,
3756 const char *required_host_os_release_id
,
3757 const char *required_host_os_release_version_id
,
3758 const char *required_host_os_release_sysext_level
,
3759 const char *required_sysext_scope
) {
3761 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp
) LoopDevice
*loop_device
= NULL
;
3762 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp
) DissectedImage
*dissected_image
= NULL
;
3763 _cleanup_(verity_settings_done
) VeritySettings verity
= VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT
;
3764 DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags
;
3765 bool relax_extension_release_check
;
3771 relax_extension_release_check
= mount_options_relax_extension_release_checks(options
);
3773 /* We might get an FD for the image, but we use the original path to look for the dm-verity files */
3774 r
= verity_settings_load(&verity
, src
, NULL
, NULL
);
3776 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to load root hash: %m");
3778 dissect_image_flags
= (verity
.data_path
? DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE
: 0) |
3779 (relax_extension_release_check
? DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_SYSEXT_CHECK
: 0) |
3780 DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES
|
3781 DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES
;
3783 /* Note that we don't use loop_device_make here, as the FD is most likely O_PATH which would not be
3784 * accepted by LOOP_CONFIGURE, so just let loop_device_make_by_path reopen it as a regular FD. */
3785 r
= loop_device_make_by_path(
3786 src_fd
>= 0 ? FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(src_fd
) : src
,
3787 /* open_flags= */ -1,
3788 /* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX
,
3789 verity
.data_path
? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN
,
3793 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to create loop device for image: %m");
3795 r
= dissect_loop_device(
3800 dissect_image_flags
,
3802 /* No partition table? Might be a single-filesystem image, try again */
3803 if (!verity
.data_path
&& r
== -ENOPKG
)
3804 r
= dissect_loop_device(
3809 dissect_image_flags
| DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE
,
3812 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
3814 r
= dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(dissected_image
, loop_device
->fd
, &verity
);
3818 r
= dissected_image_decrypt(
3822 dissect_image_flags
);
3824 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
3826 r
= mkdir_p_label(dest
, 0755);
3828 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to create destination directory %s: %m", dest
);
3829 r
= umount_recursive(dest
, 0);
3831 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to umount under destination directory %s: %m", dest
);
3833 r
= dissected_image_mount(dissected_image
, dest
, UID_INVALID
, UID_INVALID
, dissect_image_flags
);
3835 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to mount image: %m");
3837 r
= loop_device_flock(loop_device
, LOCK_UN
);
3839 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to unlock loopback device: %m");
3841 /* If we got os-release values from the caller, then we need to match them with the image's
3842 * extension-release.d/ content. Return -EINVAL if there's any mismatch.
3843 * First, check the distro ID. If that matches, then check the new SYSEXT_LEVEL value if
3844 * available, or else fallback to VERSION_ID. If neither is present (eg: rolling release),
3845 * then a simple match on the ID will be performed. */
3846 if (required_host_os_release_id
) {
3847 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **extension_release
= NULL
;
3849 assert(!isempty(required_host_os_release_id
));
3851 r
= load_extension_release_pairs(dest
, dissected_image
->image_name
, relax_extension_release_check
, &extension_release
);
3853 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to parse image %s extension-release metadata: %m", dissected_image
->image_name
);
3855 r
= extension_release_validate(
3856 dissected_image
->image_name
,
3857 required_host_os_release_id
,
3858 required_host_os_release_version_id
,
3859 required_host_os_release_sysext_level
,
3860 required_sysext_scope
,
3863 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE
), "Image %s extension-release metadata does not match the root's", dissected_image
->image_name
);
3865 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to compare image %s extension-release metadata with the root's os-release: %m", dissected_image
->image_name
);
3868 r
= dissected_image_relinquish(dissected_image
);
3870 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to relinquish dissected image: %m");