1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
119 #include "record_locl.h"
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
138 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
141 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
145 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
147 /* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
148 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
153 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
155 memset(rl
->alert_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->alert_fragment
));
156 rl
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
157 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
158 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
162 rl
->wpend_buf
= NULL
;
164 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
165 for(pipes
= 0; pipes
< rl
->numwpipes
; pipes
++)
166 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->wbuf
[pipes
]);
168 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
170 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
171 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
174 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
177 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
179 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
180 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
181 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
182 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
183 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
186 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
188 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
191 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
193 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
194 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
-1]) != 0;
197 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, const unsigned char *buf
, int len
)
199 rl
->packet_length
= len
;
201 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
202 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
203 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl
->s
))
207 rl
->packet
= SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl
->rbuf
);
208 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl
->rbuf
, buf
, len
);
213 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
215 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
218 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
220 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
223 int ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
228 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
231 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
232 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
233 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
235 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
241 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
243 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
246 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
248 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
251 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
253 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
254 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
255 return "read header";
256 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
258 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
265 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
267 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
268 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
270 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
272 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
279 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
, int clearold
)
282 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
283 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
284 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
285 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
286 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
287 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
288 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
298 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
300 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
304 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
305 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
306 align
= (0-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
310 /* start with empty packet ... */
313 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
315 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
318 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
319 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
320 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
322 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
323 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
324 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
325 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
326 * overrun can be triggered.
328 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
332 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
333 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
334 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
338 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
339 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
342 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
343 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
345 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
349 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
351 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
357 /* else we need to read more data */
359 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
360 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
362 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
363 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
365 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) { /* len > 0 */
366 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
367 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
368 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
371 if (n
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) { /* does not happen */
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
376 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
377 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
378 /* ignore max parameter */
383 if (max
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
384 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
389 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
390 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
395 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
396 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
397 i
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
405 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
407 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
412 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
413 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
414 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
416 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
418 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
422 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
425 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
426 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
432 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
433 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
435 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
437 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
439 unsigned int n
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
440 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
441 unsigned int max_send_fragment
, nw
;
442 unsigned int u_len
= (unsigned int)len
;
444 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH
);
452 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
453 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
455 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
456 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
457 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
458 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
459 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
460 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
461 * report the error in a way the user will notice
463 if ((unsigned int)len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
) {
464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
471 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
472 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
482 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
483 * will happen with non blocking IO
486 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
);
488 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
489 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
492 tot
+= i
; /* this might be last fragment */
494 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
496 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
497 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
498 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
499 * compromise is considered worthy.
501 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
502 u_len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
503 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
504 !SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
505 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
506 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
507 unsigned char aad
[13];
508 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
511 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
512 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
513 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
515 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
516 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
518 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
519 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
520 max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
522 if (u_len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
527 wb
->buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(packlen
);
528 if (wb
->buf
== NULL
) {
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
533 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
534 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
541 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
542 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
547 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
548 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
550 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
555 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
556 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
558 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
560 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
562 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
563 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
570 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
571 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
572 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
574 if (packlen
<= 0 || packlen
> (int)wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
575 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
580 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
581 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
584 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
585 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
586 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
589 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
590 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
592 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
598 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
599 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
600 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
601 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
603 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
);
605 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
606 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
);
609 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
613 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
622 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
623 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
624 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
631 split_send_fragment
= s
->split_send_fragment
;
633 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
634 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
635 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
638 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
639 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
641 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
648 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
649 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
650 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
651 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
653 if (s
->max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
> s
->max_send_fragment
654 || split_send_fragment
== 0) {
656 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
657 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
664 unsigned int pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
665 unsigned int numpipes
, j
;
670 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
671 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
674 if (n
/ numpipes
>= s
->max_send_fragment
) {
676 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
679 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
680 pipelens
[j
] = s
->max_send_fragment
;
683 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
684 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
685 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
686 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
687 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
693 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0);
695 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
696 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
701 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
702 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
704 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
705 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
707 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
709 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
711 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
721 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
722 unsigned int *pipelens
, unsigned int numpipes
,
723 int create_empty_fragment
)
725 unsigned char *outbuf
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], *plen
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
726 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
727 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
733 unsigned int totlen
= 0;
736 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
737 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
739 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
740 * will happen with non blocking IO
742 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
))
743 return (ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
));
745 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
746 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
747 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
750 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
753 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
)
754 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
))
757 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
762 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
763 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
764 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
765 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
768 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
774 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
776 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
778 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
779 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
782 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
784 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
785 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
786 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
789 unsigned int tmppipelen
= 0;
791 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1);
796 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
))
798 /* insufficient space */
799 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
804 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
807 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
808 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
809 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
811 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
812 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
813 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
815 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
816 align
= (0-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
818 outbuf
[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + align
;
819 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
820 } else if (prefix_len
) {
821 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
822 outbuf
[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
825 for (j
=0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
826 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
827 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
828 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
829 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
831 outbuf
[j
] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + align
;
832 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
836 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
837 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
)) {
838 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
839 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
840 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
844 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
845 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
846 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
847 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
)
848 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
856 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
857 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof wr
);
858 for (j
=0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
859 /* write the header */
860 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = type
& 0xff;
861 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr
[j
], type
);
863 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = (s
->version
>> 8);
865 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
866 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
868 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
869 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
870 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = 0x1;
872 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
874 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
878 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
879 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr
[j
], outbuf
[j
] + eivlen
);
880 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr
[j
], (int)pipelens
[j
]);
881 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr
[j
], (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
882 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
885 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
888 /* first we compress */
889 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
890 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, &wr
[j
])) {
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
895 memcpy(wr
[j
].data
, wr
[j
].input
, wr
[j
].length
);
896 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
900 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
901 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
905 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
906 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &wr
[j
],
907 &(outbuf
[j
][wr
[j
].length
+ eivlen
]), 1) < 0)
909 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], mac_size
);
913 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr
[j
], outbuf
[j
]);
914 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
918 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
920 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], eivlen
);
924 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
927 for (j
=0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
928 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
929 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &wr
[j
],
930 outbuf
[j
] + wr
[j
].length
, 1) < 0)
932 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], mac_size
);
935 /* record length after mac and block padding */
936 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
[j
]), plen
[j
]);
939 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, plen
[j
] - 5, 5, s
,
940 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
943 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
946 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr
[j
], type
); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
947 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
949 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
951 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
955 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
959 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr
);
962 /* now let's set up wb */
963 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
964 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
[j
]));
970 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
973 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
974 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
975 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
976 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
978 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
979 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
);
984 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
985 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
989 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
990 unsigned int currbuf
= 0;
993 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> (int)len
)
994 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
995 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
996 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1002 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1003 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1004 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1009 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1010 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1011 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
,
1012 (char *)&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])[
1013 SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1014 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1019 if (i
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1020 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1021 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], i
);
1022 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1024 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1025 return (s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
);
1026 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1027 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1029 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1030 * using a datagram service
1032 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1036 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], i
);
1037 SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(&wb
[currbuf
], -i
);
1042 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1043 * 'type' is one of the following:
1045 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1046 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1047 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1049 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1050 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1052 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1053 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1054 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1055 * argument is non NULL.
1056 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1057 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1058 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1059 * Change cipher spec protocol
1060 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1062 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1063 * Handshake protocol
1064 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1065 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1066 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1067 * Application data protocol
1068 * none of our business
1070 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1074 unsigned int n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, read_bytes
;
1077 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1079 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1081 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1082 /* Not initialized yet */
1083 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1087 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1088 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1090 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1095 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1096 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1098 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1099 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1104 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1107 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1110 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1111 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1112 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1114 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1115 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1121 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1124 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1125 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1126 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1135 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1138 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1139 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1140 * rr[i].data, - data
1141 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1142 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1144 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1145 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1148 /* get new records if necessary */
1149 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1150 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1153 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1154 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1155 /* Shouldn't happen */
1156 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1161 /* Skip over any records we have already used or are zero in length */
1163 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rr
[curr_rec
]) == 0;
1165 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1166 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1170 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1173 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1175 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1176 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1177 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1178 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1184 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1187 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1188 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1189 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1193 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1194 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1195 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
)) {
1197 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1198 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1199 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1202 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1203 * doing a handshake for the first time
1205 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1206 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1207 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1212 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1213 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1214 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1215 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1220 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1221 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1228 if ((unsigned int)len
- read_bytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1229 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1231 n
= (unsigned int)len
- read_bytes
;
1233 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1236 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -n
);
1237 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1238 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1239 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1240 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1243 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1244 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1249 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1250 && read_bytes
< (unsigned int)len
);
1251 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1252 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1253 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1254 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1259 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1260 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1261 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1264 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1265 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1271 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1273 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1275 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1276 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1277 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1278 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1280 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1285 if(s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1286 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1288 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1289 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1290 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1291 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1293 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1294 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1300 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1301 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1304 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
1305 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1306 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
1308 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1309 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1310 dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1311 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1312 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1313 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1314 dest
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1315 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
;
1318 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1319 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1320 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1321 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1323 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1325 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] =
1326 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
)];
1327 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, 1);
1328 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -1);
1331 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1332 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1337 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1338 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1339 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1342 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1344 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1345 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1346 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1347 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1349 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1350 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1351 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[3] != 0)) {
1352 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1357 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1358 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1359 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
, 4, s
,
1360 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1362 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1363 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1364 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
) {
1365 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1366 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
)) {
1367 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1372 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1376 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1377 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1378 /* no read-ahead left? */
1381 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1382 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1383 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1384 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1386 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1387 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1388 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1389 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1396 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1397 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1402 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1403 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1404 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1407 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1408 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1409 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1410 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1411 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1412 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1413 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1414 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1415 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1418 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1419 int alert_level
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[0];
1420 int alert_descr
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[1];
1422 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1424 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1425 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1426 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
, 2, s
,
1427 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1429 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1430 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1431 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1432 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1435 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1436 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1439 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1440 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1441 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1442 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1446 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1447 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1448 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1449 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1450 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1451 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1453 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1454 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1458 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1459 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1462 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1465 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1466 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1468 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1469 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1470 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1471 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
, s
->session
);
1474 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1482 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1484 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1485 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1489 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1490 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1496 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1498 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1499 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1500 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1501 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
)) {
1502 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1506 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1514 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1515 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1516 /* no read-ahead left? */
1519 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1520 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1521 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1522 * problems in the blocking world
1524 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1525 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1526 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1527 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1534 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1537 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1538 * an unexpected message alert.
1540 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->version
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
) {
1541 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1544 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1547 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1549 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1551 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1552 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1553 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1555 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1558 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1560 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1561 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1562 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1563 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1564 * started), we will indulge it.
1566 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1567 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1570 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1578 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1582 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1586 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1594 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1595 * format and false otherwise.
1597 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1599 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1603 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1605 unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1607 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);