2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_local.h"
18 #include "internal/packet.h"
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
38 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
47 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
49 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
50 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
72 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
86 size_t curr_rec
= 0, num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl
);
87 const SSL3_RECORD
*rr
= rl
->rrec
;
89 while (curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]))
92 return curr_rec
< num_recs
;
95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
97 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
103 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
108 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
115 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
118 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
122 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
130 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
140 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
142 return "read header";
143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
154 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
167 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
175 * s->s3.rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
181 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
188 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
)) {
191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
196 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
197 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
198 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
202 /* start with empty packet ... */
205 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
210 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
211 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
212 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
218 * overrun can be triggered.
220 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
224 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
225 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
229 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
230 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
235 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
236 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
237 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
238 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
247 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
249 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
255 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
262 /* else we need to read more data */
264 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) {
265 /* does not happen */
266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,
267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
272 * Ktls always reads full records.
273 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS.
275 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s
->rbio
) && !s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
276 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
277 /* ignore max parameter */
282 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
283 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
291 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3.rbuf.buf and
292 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
297 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
298 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
299 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
300 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
304 && !BIO_should_retry(s
->rbio
)
305 && BIO_eof(s
->rbio
)) {
306 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF
) {
307 SSL_set_shutdown(s
, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
);
308 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
;
310 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,
311 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING
);
315 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,
316 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
322 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
324 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
329 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
330 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
331 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
333 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
335 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
339 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
342 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
343 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
349 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
350 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
352 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
355 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
357 size_t n
, max_send_fragment
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
358 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
361 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
365 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
366 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
368 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
369 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
370 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
371 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
372 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
373 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
374 * report the error in a way the user will notice
376 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
377 || ((wb
->left
!= 0) && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
383 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
384 && !early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, 1)) {
385 /* SSLfatal() already called */
392 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
393 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
396 if (wb
->left
== 0 && (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
397 || s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0))
398 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
401 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
402 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
405 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
406 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
407 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
408 /* SSLfatal() already called */
417 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
418 * will happen with non blocking IO
421 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
422 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
425 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
426 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
429 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
431 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
433 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
434 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
435 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
436 * compromise is considered worthy.
438 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
439 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
)) &&
440 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
441 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
442 (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
) == 0) &&
443 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
444 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
445 unsigned char aad
[13];
446 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
450 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
451 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
452 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
454 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
455 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
457 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
458 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
459 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
461 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
466 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
470 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
471 /* free jumbo buffer */
472 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
479 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
480 /* free jumbo buffer */
481 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
485 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
) {
486 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
488 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
489 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
494 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
495 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
497 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
499 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
501 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
502 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
509 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
510 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
511 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
512 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
513 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
514 /* free jumbo buffer */
515 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
519 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
520 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
523 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
524 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
525 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
528 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
529 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
531 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
537 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
538 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
539 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
540 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
542 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
544 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
545 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
546 /* free jumbo buffer */
547 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
549 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
553 /* free jumbo buffer */
554 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
555 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
562 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
563 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
564 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
565 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
573 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
574 split_send_fragment
= ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s
);
576 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
577 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
578 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
581 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
582 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
584 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
587 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
588 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
592 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
593 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
594 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
595 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
597 if (max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
== 0
598 || split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
600 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
601 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
603 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
609 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
615 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
616 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
619 if (n
/ numpipes
>= max_send_fragment
) {
621 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
624 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
625 pipelens
[j
] = max_send_fragment
;
628 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
629 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
630 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
631 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
632 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
638 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
641 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
642 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
643 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
648 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
649 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
651 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
652 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
654 s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
= 0;
657 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
) != 0
659 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
661 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
670 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
671 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
672 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
674 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
675 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
678 unsigned char *recordstart
;
679 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
680 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
685 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
688 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
689 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
691 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
692 * will happen with non blocking IO
694 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
695 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
696 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
699 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
700 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
) {
701 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
703 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
706 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
709 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
) {
710 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0)) {
711 /* SSLfatal() already called */
716 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
721 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
722 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
723 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
726 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
727 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
729 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
736 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
738 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
) {
740 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
741 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
744 if (s
->s3
.need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
746 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
747 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
748 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
751 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
754 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
756 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
761 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
762 /* insufficient space */
763 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
769 s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
= 1;
772 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
774 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to
775 * discard the const qualifier.
776 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when
779 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0], (unsigned char *)buf
);
780 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0], 0);
781 SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0], 1);
782 goto wpacket_init_complete
;
785 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
786 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
787 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
789 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
790 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
791 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
793 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
794 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
796 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
797 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
798 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
799 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
800 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
801 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
805 } else if (prefix_len
) {
806 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
807 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0],
808 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
809 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
810 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
811 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
812 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
813 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
818 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
821 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
822 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
823 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
824 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
826 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
827 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt
, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
828 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
829 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, align
, NULL
)) {
830 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
838 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
839 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)) {
840 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
841 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
842 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
843 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
846 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
847 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
848 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
849 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
850 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
854 wpacket_init_complete
:
857 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
858 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof(wr
));
859 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
860 unsigned int version
= (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
862 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
864 unsigned int rectype
;
870 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
873 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)
874 && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
875 && (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
!= ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
876 || type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
))
877 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
880 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, rectype
);
883 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
884 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
886 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
888 && TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
889 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
890 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
891 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr
, version
);
893 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
];
894 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
895 maxcomplen
+= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
898 * When using offload kernel will write the header.
899 * Otherwise write the header now
901 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)
902 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
903 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, version
)
904 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
906 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, eivlen
, NULL
))
908 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
910 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
911 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
915 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
916 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, compressdata
);
917 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, pipelens
[j
]);
918 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr
, (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
919 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
922 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
926 /* first we compress */
927 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
928 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, thiswr
)
929 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, thiswr
->length
, NULL
)) {
930 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
931 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
935 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
936 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr
[j
]);
938 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, thiswr
->input
, thiswr
->length
)) {
939 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
943 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
947 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)
948 && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)
949 && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
950 && (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
!= ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
951 || type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
952 size_t rlen
, max_send_fragment
;
954 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, type
)) {
955 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
959 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, 1);
961 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
962 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
963 rlen
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
964 if (rlen
< max_send_fragment
) {
966 size_t max_padding
= max_send_fragment
- rlen
;
967 if (s
->record_padding_cb
!= NULL
) {
968 padding
= s
->record_padding_cb(s
, type
, rlen
, s
->record_padding_arg
);
969 } else if (s
->block_padding
> 0) {
970 size_t mask
= s
->block_padding
- 1;
973 /* optimize for power of 2 */
974 if ((s
->block_padding
& mask
) == 0)
975 remainder
= rlen
& mask
;
977 remainder
= rlen
% s
->block_padding
;
978 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
982 padding
= s
->block_padding
- remainder
;
985 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
986 if (padding
> max_padding
)
987 padding
= max_padding
;
988 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt
, 0, padding
)) {
989 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
990 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
993 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, padding
);
999 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
1000 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
1004 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
1007 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
1008 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
1009 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1010 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1016 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
1017 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
1018 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
1020 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
1021 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
,
1022 SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
1025 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
1028 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)) {
1029 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1034 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
1035 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
;
1036 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, recordstart
);
1037 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr
);
1038 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, len
);
1042 if (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
== ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
) {
1044 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
1045 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
1047 if (tls13_enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1, NULL
, mac_size
) < 1) {
1048 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s
)) {
1049 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1050 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1055 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
1056 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1, NULL
,
1058 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s
)) {
1059 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1060 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1067 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
1073 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
))
1076 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1077 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &origlen
)
1078 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1079 || origlen
> thiswr
->length
1080 || (thiswr
->length
> origlen
1081 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
,
1082 thiswr
->length
- origlen
,
1084 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1088 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
1091 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
1092 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
1093 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1094 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1097 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, mac_size
);
1100 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)
1101 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt
)) {
1102 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1103 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1107 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
1108 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
1109 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1110 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
1111 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1112 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1114 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
1115 unsigned char ctype
= type
;
1117 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
,
1118 &ctype
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1122 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt
)) {
1123 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1124 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1128 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */
1129 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
1131 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1133 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1137 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1138 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1139 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1142 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
1148 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1149 * is thiswr->length long
1151 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for
1154 /* now let's set up wb */
1155 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
1156 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
));
1160 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1163 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
1164 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
1165 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
1166 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
1168 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1169 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
1171 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
1172 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
1176 /* if s->s3.wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1178 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1180 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
1184 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1188 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
1189 || (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)
1190 && (s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
))
1191 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1192 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,
1193 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1198 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1199 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1200 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1205 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1206 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1209 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages,
1210 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO
1212 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
) && type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
1213 i
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1218 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)
1219 && type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
1220 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s
->wbio
, type
);
1222 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1223 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1224 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1225 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1226 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1230 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,
1234 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1235 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1236 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1237 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1239 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1240 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1242 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1243 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1245 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1246 * using a datagram service
1248 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1252 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1253 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1258 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1259 * 'type' is one of the following:
1261 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1262 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1263 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1265 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1266 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1268 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1269 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1270 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1271 * argument is non NULL.
1272 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1273 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1274 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1275 * Change cipher spec protocol
1276 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1278 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1279 * Handshake protocol
1280 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1281 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1282 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1283 * Application data protocol
1284 * none of our business
1286 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1287 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1290 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1293 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1294 int is_tls13
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
);
1296 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1298 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1299 /* Not initialized yet */
1300 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
)) {
1301 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1306 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1307 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1309 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1310 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1311 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1315 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1316 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1318 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1319 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1324 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1327 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1330 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1331 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1332 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1334 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1335 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1342 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1345 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1346 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1347 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1355 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1358 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1359 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1360 * rr[i].data, - data
1361 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1362 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1364 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1365 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1368 /* get new records if necessary */
1369 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1370 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1372 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1375 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1376 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1377 /* Shouldn't happen */
1378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1379 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1383 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1385 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1387 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1388 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1392 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1395 if (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0
1396 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1397 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1398 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1399 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA
);
1404 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1405 * record that isn't an alert.
1407 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1408 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1409 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1411 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1413 if (s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1414 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1415 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1416 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1417 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1422 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1425 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1426 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1427 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1431 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1432 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1433 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
1436 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1437 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1438 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1441 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1442 * doing a handshake for the first time
1444 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1445 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1446 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1447 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1451 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1452 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1453 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1455 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1459 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1460 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1464 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1465 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1466 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1468 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1469 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1475 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1476 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1478 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1480 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1483 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1484 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1485 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1487 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT
)
1488 OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1489 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1490 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1491 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1492 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1493 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1494 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1497 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1498 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1503 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1504 && totalbytes
< len
);
1505 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1506 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1509 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1510 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1511 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1512 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1513 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1518 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1519 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1520 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1524 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1526 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1528 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1529 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1530 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1531 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1533 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1534 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1538 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1539 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1541 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1542 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
1543 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
1544 * if we are a server.
1546 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1547 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1548 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1553 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1554 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1557 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1558 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
1559 unsigned char *alert_bytes
= SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)
1560 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
);
1563 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1564 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
1565 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
1566 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
1567 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1568 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
1572 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1573 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, s
,
1574 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1576 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1577 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1578 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1579 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1582 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1583 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1586 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
1587 || (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
)) {
1588 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1589 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1591 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1592 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1593 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1594 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1600 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1601 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1603 if (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
1605 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
1606 && (is_tls13
|| alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)) {
1607 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1609 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
|| is_tls13
) {
1612 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1613 s
->s3
.fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1614 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1615 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1616 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1617 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1618 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1619 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1620 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1622 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1624 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1625 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1626 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1627 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1628 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1629 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1631 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1632 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1634 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1635 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
1639 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1640 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1644 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
1645 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1649 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
1650 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
1651 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
1652 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
1653 * sent close_notify.
1655 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1656 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1657 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1659 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
) != 0)
1662 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1663 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1664 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
1665 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
1670 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
1671 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
1672 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
1674 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
1676 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1677 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1678 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1679 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY
);
1685 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
1686 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
1687 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
1688 * that we're just going to discard.
1690 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1691 size_t dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
);
1692 unsigned char *dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1693 size_t *dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1695 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1696 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1697 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1699 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1700 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
,
1701 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
), n
);
1702 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1703 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1705 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1706 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1708 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1709 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1712 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1713 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1714 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1719 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1720 * protocol violation)
1722 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1723 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1724 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
1726 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1727 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1729 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1730 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1738 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1739 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1740 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1745 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1746 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1747 /* no read-ahead left? */
1750 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1751 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1752 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1753 * problems in the blocking world
1755 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1756 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1757 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1758 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1765 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1768 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1769 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1770 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1771 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1772 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1774 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1775 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1777 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1779 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1781 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1782 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1783 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1785 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1786 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1788 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1790 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1791 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1792 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1793 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1794 * started), we will indulge it.
1796 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1797 s
->s3
.in_read_app_data
= 2;
1799 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1801 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1802 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1803 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1804 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1805 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1806 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1809 if (!early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1810 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, 0)) {
1811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1814 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1817 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1818 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1824 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1828 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1836 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1837 * format and false otherwise.
1839 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1841 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1845 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1847 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1849 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);