2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_local.h"
18 #include "internal/packet.h"
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
38 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
47 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
49 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
50 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
72 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
86 size_t curr_rec
= 0, num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl
);
87 const SSL3_RECORD
*rr
= rl
->rrec
;
89 while (curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]))
92 return curr_rec
< num_recs
;
95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
97 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
103 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
108 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
115 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
118 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
122 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
130 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
140 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
142 return "read header";
143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
154 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
167 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
175 * s->s3.rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
181 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
188 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
)) {
191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
196 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
197 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
198 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
202 /* start with empty packet ... */
205 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
210 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
211 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
212 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
218 * overrun can be triggered.
220 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
224 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
225 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
229 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
230 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
235 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
236 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
237 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
238 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
247 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
249 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
255 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
262 /* else we need to read more data */
264 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) {
265 /* does not happen */
266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
271 * Ktls always reads full records.
272 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS.
274 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s
->rbio
) && !s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
275 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
276 /* ignore max parameter */
281 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
282 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
290 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3.rbuf.buf and
291 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
296 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
297 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
298 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
299 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
303 && !BIO_should_retry(s
->rbio
)
304 && BIO_eof(s
->rbio
)) {
305 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF
) {
306 SSL_set_shutdown(s
, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
);
307 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
;
309 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
310 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING
);
314 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
320 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
322 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
327 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
328 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
329 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
331 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
333 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
337 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
340 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
341 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
347 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
348 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
350 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
353 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
355 size_t n
, max_send_fragment
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
356 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
359 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
363 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
364 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
366 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
367 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
368 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
369 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
370 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
371 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
372 * report the error in a way the user will notice
374 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
375 || ((wb
->left
!= 0) && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
376 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
380 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
381 && !early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, 1)) {
382 /* SSLfatal() already called */
389 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
390 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
393 if (wb
->left
== 0 && (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
394 || s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0))
395 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
398 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
399 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
402 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
403 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
404 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
405 /* SSLfatal() already called */
414 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
415 * will happen with non blocking IO
418 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
419 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
422 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
423 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
426 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
428 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
430 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
431 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
432 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
433 * compromise is considered worthy.
435 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
436 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
)) &&
437 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
438 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
439 (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
) == 0) &&
440 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
441 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
442 unsigned char aad
[13];
443 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
447 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
448 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
449 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
451 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
452 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
454 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
455 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
456 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
458 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
463 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
464 /* SSLfatal() already called */
467 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
468 /* free jumbo buffer */
469 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
476 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
477 /* free jumbo buffer */
478 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
482 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
) {
483 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
485 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
486 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
491 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
492 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
494 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
496 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
498 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
499 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
506 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
507 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
508 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
509 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
510 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
511 /* free jumbo buffer */
512 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
516 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
517 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
520 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
521 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
522 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
525 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
526 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
528 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
534 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
535 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
536 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
537 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
539 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
541 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
542 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
543 /* free jumbo buffer */
544 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
546 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
550 /* free jumbo buffer */
551 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
552 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
559 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
560 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
561 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
562 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
570 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
571 split_send_fragment
= ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s
);
573 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
574 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
575 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
578 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
579 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
581 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
584 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
588 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
589 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
590 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
591 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
593 if (max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
== 0
594 || split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
596 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
597 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
599 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
604 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
610 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
611 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
614 if (n
/ numpipes
>= max_send_fragment
) {
616 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
619 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
620 pipelens
[j
] = max_send_fragment
;
623 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
624 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
625 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
626 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
627 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
633 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
636 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
637 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
638 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
643 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
644 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
646 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
647 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
649 s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
= 0;
652 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
) != 0
654 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
656 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
665 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
666 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
667 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
669 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
670 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
673 unsigned char *recordstart
;
674 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
675 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
680 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
683 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
684 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
686 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
687 * will happen with non blocking IO
689 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
690 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
691 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
694 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
695 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
) {
696 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
698 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
701 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
704 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
) {
705 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0)) {
706 /* SSLfatal() already called */
711 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
716 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
717 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
718 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
721 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
722 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
724 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
730 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
732 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
) {
734 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
735 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
738 if (s
->s3
.need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
740 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
741 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
742 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
745 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
748 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
750 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
755 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
756 /* insufficient space */
757 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
762 s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
= 1;
765 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
767 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to
768 * discard the const qualifier.
769 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when
772 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0], (unsigned char *)buf
);
773 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0], 0);
774 SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0], 1);
775 goto wpacket_init_complete
;
778 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
779 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
780 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
782 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
783 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
784 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
786 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
787 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
789 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
790 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
791 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
792 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
793 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
797 } else if (prefix_len
) {
798 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
799 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0],
800 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
801 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
802 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
803 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
804 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
809 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
812 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
813 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
814 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
815 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
817 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
818 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt
, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
819 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
820 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, align
, NULL
)) {
821 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
828 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
829 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)) {
830 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
831 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
832 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
833 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
836 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
837 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
838 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
839 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
840 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
844 wpacket_init_complete
:
847 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
848 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof(wr
));
849 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
850 unsigned int version
= (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
852 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
854 unsigned int rectype
;
860 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
863 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)
864 && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
865 && (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
!= ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
866 || type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
))
867 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
870 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, rectype
);
873 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
874 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
876 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
878 && TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
879 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
880 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
881 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr
, version
);
883 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
];
884 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
885 maxcomplen
+= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
888 * When using offload kernel will write the header.
889 * Otherwise write the header now
891 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)
892 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
893 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, version
)
894 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
896 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, eivlen
, NULL
))
898 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
900 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
904 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
905 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, compressdata
);
906 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, pipelens
[j
]);
907 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr
, (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
908 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
911 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
915 /* first we compress */
916 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
917 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, thiswr
)
918 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, thiswr
->length
, NULL
)) {
919 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
923 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
924 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr
[j
]);
926 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, thiswr
->input
, thiswr
->length
)) {
927 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
930 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
934 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)
935 && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)
936 && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
937 && (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
!= ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
938 || type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
939 size_t rlen
, max_send_fragment
;
941 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, type
)) {
942 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
945 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, 1);
947 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
948 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
949 rlen
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
950 if (rlen
< max_send_fragment
) {
952 size_t max_padding
= max_send_fragment
- rlen
;
953 if (s
->record_padding_cb
!= NULL
) {
954 padding
= s
->record_padding_cb(s
, type
, rlen
, s
->record_padding_arg
);
955 } else if (s
->block_padding
> 0) {
956 size_t mask
= s
->block_padding
- 1;
959 /* optimize for power of 2 */
960 if ((s
->block_padding
& mask
) == 0)
961 remainder
= rlen
& mask
;
963 remainder
= rlen
% s
->block_padding
;
964 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
968 padding
= s
->block_padding
- remainder
;
971 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
972 if (padding
> max_padding
)
973 padding
= max_padding
;
974 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt
, 0, padding
)) {
975 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
976 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
979 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, padding
);
985 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
986 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
990 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
993 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
994 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
995 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1001 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
1002 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
1003 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
1005 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
1006 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
,
1007 SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
1010 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
1013 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)) {
1014 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1018 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
1019 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
;
1020 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, recordstart
);
1021 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr
);
1022 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, len
);
1026 if (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
== ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
) {
1028 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
1029 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
1031 if (tls13_enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1, NULL
, mac_size
) < 1) {
1032 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s
)) {
1033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1038 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
1039 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1, NULL
,
1041 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s
)) {
1042 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1049 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
1055 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
))
1058 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1059 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &origlen
)
1060 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1061 || origlen
> thiswr
->length
1062 || (thiswr
->length
> origlen
1063 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
,
1064 thiswr
->length
- origlen
,
1066 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1069 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
1072 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
1073 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
1074 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1077 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, mac_size
);
1080 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)
1081 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt
)) {
1082 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1086 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
1087 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
1088 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1089 s
->msg_callback(1, thiswr
->rec_version
, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
1090 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1091 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1093 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
1094 unsigned char ctype
= type
;
1096 s
->msg_callback(1, thiswr
->rec_version
, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
,
1097 &ctype
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1101 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt
)) {
1102 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1106 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */
1107 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
1109 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1111 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1115 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1116 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1119 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
1125 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1126 * is thiswr->length long
1128 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for
1131 /* now let's set up wb */
1132 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
1133 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
));
1137 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1140 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
1141 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
1142 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
1143 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
1145 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1146 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
1148 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
1149 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
1153 /* if s->s3.wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1155 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1157 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
1161 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1165 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
1166 || (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)
1167 && (s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
))
1168 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1169 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1174 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1175 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1176 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1181 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1182 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1185 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages,
1186 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO
1188 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
) && type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
1189 i
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1192 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s
->wbio
, type
);
1194 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1195 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1196 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1197 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1198 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1202 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1207 * When an empty fragment is sent on a connection using KTLS,
1208 * it is sent as a write of zero bytes. If this zero byte
1209 * write succeeds, i will be 0 rather than a non-zero value.
1210 * Treat i == 0 as success rather than an error for zero byte
1211 * writes to permit this case.
1213 if (i
>= 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1214 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1215 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1216 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1218 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1219 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1221 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1222 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1224 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1225 * using a datagram service
1227 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1231 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1232 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1237 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1238 * 'type' is one of the following:
1240 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1241 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1242 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1244 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1245 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1247 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1248 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1249 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1250 * argument is non NULL.
1251 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1252 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1253 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1254 * Change cipher spec protocol
1255 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1257 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1258 * Handshake protocol
1259 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1260 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1261 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1262 * Application data protocol
1263 * none of our business
1265 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1266 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1269 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1272 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1273 int is_tls13
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
);
1275 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1277 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1278 /* Not initialized yet */
1279 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
)) {
1280 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1285 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1286 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1288 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1289 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1293 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1294 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1296 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1297 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1302 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1305 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1308 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1309 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1310 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1312 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1313 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1320 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1323 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1324 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1325 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1326 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1333 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1336 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1337 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1338 * rr[i].data, - data
1339 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1340 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1342 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1343 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1346 /* get new records if necessary */
1347 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1348 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1350 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1353 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1354 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1355 /* Shouldn't happen */
1356 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1360 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1362 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1364 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1365 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1369 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1372 if (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0
1373 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1374 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1375 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1376 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA
);
1381 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1382 * record that isn't an alert.
1384 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1385 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1386 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1388 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1390 if (s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1391 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1392 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1393 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1394 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1399 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1402 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1403 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1404 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1408 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1409 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1410 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
1413 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1414 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1415 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1418 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1419 * doing a handshake for the first time
1421 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1422 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1423 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1427 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1428 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1429 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1430 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1434 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1435 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1439 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1440 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1441 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1443 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1444 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1450 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1451 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1453 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1455 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1458 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1459 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1460 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1462 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT
)
1463 OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1464 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1465 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1466 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1467 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1468 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1469 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1472 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1473 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1478 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1479 && totalbytes
< len
);
1480 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1481 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1484 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1485 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1486 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1487 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1488 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1493 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1494 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1495 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1499 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1501 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1503 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1504 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1505 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1506 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1508 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1512 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1513 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1515 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1516 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
1517 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
1518 * if we are a server.
1520 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1521 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1526 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1527 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1530 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1531 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
1532 unsigned char *alert_bytes
= SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)
1533 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
);
1536 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1537 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
1538 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
1539 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
1540 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
1544 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1545 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, s
,
1546 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1548 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1549 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1550 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1551 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1554 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1555 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1558 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
1559 || (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
)) {
1560 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1561 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1563 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1564 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1565 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1566 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1572 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1573 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1575 if (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
1577 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
1578 && (is_tls13
|| alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)) {
1579 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1581 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
|| is_tls13
) {
1582 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1583 s
->s3
.fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1584 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
1585 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
,
1586 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr
);
1587 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1588 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1589 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1591 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1593 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1594 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1595 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1596 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1597 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1598 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1600 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1602 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1603 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
1607 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1611 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
1612 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1616 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
1617 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
1618 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
1619 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
1620 * sent close_notify.
1622 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1623 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1624 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1626 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
) != 0)
1629 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1630 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1631 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
1632 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
1637 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
1638 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
1639 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
1641 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
1643 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1644 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1645 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
1646 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY
);
1652 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
1653 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
1654 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
1655 * that we're just going to discard.
1657 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1658 size_t dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
);
1659 unsigned char *dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1660 size_t *dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1662 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1663 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1664 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1666 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1667 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
,
1668 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
), n
);
1669 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1670 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1672 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1673 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1675 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1676 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1679 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1680 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1685 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1686 * protocol violation)
1688 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1689 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1690 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
1692 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1693 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1695 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1696 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1704 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1705 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1706 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1711 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1712 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1713 /* no read-ahead left? */
1716 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1717 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1718 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1719 * problems in the blocking world
1721 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1722 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1723 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1724 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1731 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1734 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1735 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1736 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1737 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1738 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1740 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1742 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1744 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1746 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1747 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1748 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1750 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1752 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1754 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1755 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1756 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1757 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1758 * started), we will indulge it.
1760 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1761 s
->s3
.in_read_app_data
= 2;
1763 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1765 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1766 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1767 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1768 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1769 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1770 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1773 if (!early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1774 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, 0)) {
1775 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1778 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1781 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1787 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1791 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1799 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1800 * format and false otherwise.
1802 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1804 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1808 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1810 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1812 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);