2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include "record_locl.h"
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
39 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
48 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
50 memset(rl
->alert_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->alert_fragment
));
51 rl
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
52 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
53 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
59 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
60 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
62 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
64 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
65 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
68 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
71 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
73 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
74 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
75 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
76 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
77 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
80 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
81 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
83 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
86 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
87 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
89 size_t curr_rec
= 0, num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl
);
90 const SSL3_RECORD
*rr
= rl
->rrec
;
92 while (curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]))
95 return curr_rec
< num_recs
;
98 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
100 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
101 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
104 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
106 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
109 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
111 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
114 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
118 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
121 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
122 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
123 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
125 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
131 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
133 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
136 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
138 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
141 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
143 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
144 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
145 return "read header";
146 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
148 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
155 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
157 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
158 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
160 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
162 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
170 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
172 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
176 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
177 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
178 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
179 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
180 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
181 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
182 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
184 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
191 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
193 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
197 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
198 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
199 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
203 /* start with empty packet ... */
206 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
208 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
211 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
212 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
213 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
215 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
216 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
217 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
218 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
219 * overrun can be triggered.
221 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
225 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
226 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
227 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
230 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
231 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
233 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
234 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
236 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
237 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
238 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
239 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
243 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
244 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
247 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
248 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
250 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
254 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
256 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
263 /* else we need to read more data */
265 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) { /* does not happen */
266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
270 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
271 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
272 /* ignore max parameter */
277 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
278 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
286 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
287 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
292 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
293 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
294 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
295 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
305 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
307 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
312 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
313 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
314 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
316 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
318 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
322 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
325 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
326 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
332 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
333 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
335 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
338 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
340 size_t n
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
341 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
342 size_t max_send_fragment
, nw
;
344 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
348 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
349 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
351 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
352 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
353 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
354 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
355 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
356 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
357 * report the error in a way the user will notice
359 if (len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
) {
360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
364 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
365 && !early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, NULL
))
370 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
371 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
381 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
382 * will happen with non blocking IO
385 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
388 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
389 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
392 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
394 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
396 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
397 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
398 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
399 * compromise is considered worthy.
401 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
402 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
403 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
404 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
405 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
406 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
407 unsigned char aad
[13];
408 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
412 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
413 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
414 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
416 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
417 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
419 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
420 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
421 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
423 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
428 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
432 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
433 /* free jumbo buffer */
434 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
441 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
442 /* free jumbo buffer */
443 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
447 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
448 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
450 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
455 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
456 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
458 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
460 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
462 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
463 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
470 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
471 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
472 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
473 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
474 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
475 /* free jumbo buffer */
476 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
480 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
481 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
484 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
485 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
486 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
489 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
490 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
492 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
498 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
499 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
500 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
501 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
503 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
505 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
506 /* free jumbo buffer */
507 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
509 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
513 /* free jumbo buffer */
514 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
515 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
523 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
524 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
525 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
533 split_send_fragment
= s
->split_send_fragment
;
535 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
536 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
537 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
540 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
541 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
543 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
550 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
551 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
552 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
553 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
555 if (s
->max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
> s
->max_send_fragment
556 || split_send_fragment
== 0) {
558 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
559 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
566 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
572 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
573 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
576 if (n
/ numpipes
>= s
->max_send_fragment
) {
578 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
581 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
582 pipelens
[j
] = s
->max_send_fragment
;
585 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
586 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
587 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
588 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
589 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
595 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
598 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
599 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
604 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
605 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
607 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
608 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
610 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
612 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
614 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
616 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
625 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
626 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
627 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
629 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
630 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
633 unsigned char *recordstart
;
634 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
635 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
640 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
643 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
644 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
646 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
647 * will happen with non blocking IO
649 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
))
650 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
652 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
653 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
654 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
657 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
660 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
)
661 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0))
664 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
669 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
670 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
671 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
674 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
675 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
681 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
683 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
685 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
686 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
689 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
691 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
692 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
693 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
696 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
699 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
704 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
705 /* insufficient space */
706 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
711 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
714 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
715 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
716 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
718 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
719 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
720 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
722 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
723 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
725 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
726 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
727 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
728 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
729 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
733 } else if (prefix_len
) {
734 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
735 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0],
736 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
737 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
738 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
739 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
740 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
745 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
748 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
749 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
750 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
751 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
753 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
754 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt
, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
755 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
756 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, align
, NULL
)) {
757 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
764 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
765 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)) {
766 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
767 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
768 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
769 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
772 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
773 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
774 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
775 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
776 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
781 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
782 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof wr
);
783 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
784 unsigned int version
= SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_VERSION
: s
->version
;
785 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
787 unsigned int rectype
;
792 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
);
794 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
797 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
)
798 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
802 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
803 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
805 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
806 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
807 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
809 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
];
810 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
811 maxcomplen
+= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
813 /* write the header */
814 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
815 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, version
)
816 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
818 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, eivlen
, NULL
))
820 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
826 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
827 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, compressdata
);
828 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, pipelens
[j
]);
829 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr
, (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
830 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
833 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
837 /* first we compress */
838 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
840 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
842 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, thiswr
)
843 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, thiswr
->length
, NULL
)) {
844 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
848 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, thiswr
->input
, thiswr
->length
)) {
849 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
852 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
855 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
856 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, type
)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
860 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, 1);
862 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
863 * For now, use no padding
868 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
869 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
873 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
876 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
877 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
884 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
885 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
886 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
888 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
891 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
894 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)) {
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
899 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
900 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
;
902 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, recordstart
);
903 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr
);
904 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, len
);
907 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
) {
909 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
910 * send early data - so we need to use the the tls13enc function.
912 if (tls13_enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
915 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
919 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
925 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
926 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &origlen
)
927 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
928 || origlen
> thiswr
->length
929 || (thiswr
->length
> origlen
930 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
,
931 thiswr
->length
- origlen
, NULL
))) {
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
935 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
938 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
939 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
943 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, mac_size
);
946 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)
947 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt
)) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
952 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
953 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
954 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
955 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
956 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
957 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
960 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt
)) {
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
966 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
967 * is thiswr->length long
969 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for
971 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
973 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
975 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
979 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
983 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
987 /* now let's set up wb */
988 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
989 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
));
993 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
996 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
997 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
998 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
999 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
1001 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1002 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
1004 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
1005 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
1009 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1011 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1013 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
1017 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1021 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
1022 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
1023 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
1024 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1030 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1031 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1032 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1037 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1038 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1039 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1040 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1041 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1042 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1043 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1050 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1051 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1052 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1053 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1055 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1056 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1058 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1059 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1061 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1062 * using a datagram service
1064 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1068 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1069 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1074 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1075 * 'type' is one of the following:
1077 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1078 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1079 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1081 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1082 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1084 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1085 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1086 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1087 * argument is non NULL.
1088 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1089 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1090 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1091 * Change cipher spec protocol
1092 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1094 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1095 * Handshake protocol
1096 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1097 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1098 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1099 * Application data protocol
1100 * none of our business
1102 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1103 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1106 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1109 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1111 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1113 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1114 /* Not initialized yet */
1115 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1119 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1120 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1122 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1127 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1128 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1130 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1131 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1136 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1139 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1142 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1143 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1144 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1146 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1147 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1154 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1157 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1158 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1159 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1168 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1171 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1172 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1173 * rr[i].data, - data
1174 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1175 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1177 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1178 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1181 /* get new records if necessary */
1182 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1183 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1186 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1187 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1188 /* Shouldn't happen */
1189 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1194 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1196 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1198 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1199 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1203 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1207 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1208 * record that isn't an alert.
1210 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1211 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1212 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1214 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1216 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1217 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1218 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1219 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1225 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1228 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1229 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1230 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1234 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1235 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1236 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
1237 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1239 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1240 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1241 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1244 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1245 * doing a handshake for the first time
1247 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1248 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1249 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1254 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1255 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1256 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1257 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1262 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1263 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1270 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1271 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1273 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1275 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1278 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1279 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1280 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1282 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1283 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1284 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1285 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1286 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1287 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1290 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1291 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1296 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1297 && totalbytes
< len
);
1298 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1299 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1302 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1303 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1304 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1305 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1306 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1311 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1312 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1313 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1317 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1319 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1321 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1322 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1323 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1324 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1326 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1331 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1332 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1334 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1335 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1336 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1337 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1339 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1340 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1346 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1347 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1350 size_t dest_maxlen
= 0;
1351 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1352 size_t *dest_len
= NULL
;
1354 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1355 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1356 dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1357 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1358 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1359 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1360 dest
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1361 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
;
1364 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1365 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1366 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1367 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1369 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1371 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] =
1372 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
)];
1373 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, 1);
1374 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -1);
1377 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
) {
1378 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1379 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1385 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1386 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1387 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1391 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1392 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1393 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1396 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1397 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1398 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1400 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1401 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1402 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1403 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1404 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1405 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1406 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1409 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1410 int alert_level
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[0];
1411 int alert_descr
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[1];
1413 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1415 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1416 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1417 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
, 2, s
,
1418 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1420 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1421 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1422 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1423 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1426 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1427 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1430 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1431 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1432 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1434 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1435 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1436 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1441 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1442 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1446 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1447 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1448 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1449 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1450 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1451 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1453 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1454 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1457 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
) {
1458 if (!ssl_end_of_early_data_seen(s
)) {
1459 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1461 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
);
1466 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1469 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1470 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1472 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1473 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1474 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1475 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1476 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1479 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1487 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1489 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1490 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1491 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1495 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1496 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1502 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1503 * protocol violation)
1505 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1506 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1508 * To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake
1509 * data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init
1510 * (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be
1513 assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s
));
1514 if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s
)) {
1515 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1520 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1521 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1523 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1531 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1532 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1533 /* no read-ahead left? */
1536 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1537 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1538 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1539 * problems in the blocking world
1541 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1542 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1543 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1544 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1551 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1554 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1555 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1556 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1557 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1558 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1560 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1563 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1565 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1567 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1568 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1569 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1571 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1574 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1576 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1577 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1578 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1579 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1580 * started), we will indulge it.
1582 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1583 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1585 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1587 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1588 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1589 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1590 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1591 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1592 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1595 if (!early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1596 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, &al
))
1598 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1601 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1609 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1613 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1617 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1625 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1626 * format and false otherwise.
1628 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1630 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1634 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1636 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1638 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);