2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #include "../packet_locl.h"
22 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
23 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
24 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
25 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
27 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
28 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
31 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
34 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
35 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
38 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
40 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
43 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
44 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
49 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
51 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
52 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
58 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
59 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
61 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
63 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
64 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
67 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
70 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
72 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
73 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
74 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
75 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
76 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
79 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
80 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
82 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
85 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
86 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
88 size_t curr_rec
= 0, num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl
);
89 const SSL3_RECORD
*rr
= rl
->rrec
;
91 while (curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]))
94 return curr_rec
< num_recs
;
97 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
99 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
100 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
103 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
105 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
108 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
110 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
113 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
117 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
120 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
121 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
122 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
124 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
130 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
132 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
135 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
137 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
140 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
142 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
143 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
144 return "read header";
145 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
147 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
154 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
156 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
157 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
161 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
169 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
171 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
175 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
176 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
177 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
178 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
179 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
180 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
181 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
183 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
190 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
192 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
196 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
197 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
198 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
202 /* start with empty packet ... */
205 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
210 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
211 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
212 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
218 * overrun can be triggered.
220 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
224 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
225 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
229 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
230 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
235 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
236 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
237 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
238 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
247 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
249 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
255 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
262 /* else we need to read more data */
264 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) { /* does not happen */
265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
269 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
270 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
271 /* ignore max parameter */
276 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
277 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
285 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
286 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
291 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
292 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
293 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
294 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
304 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
306 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
311 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
312 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
313 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
315 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
317 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
321 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
324 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
325 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
331 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
332 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
334 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
337 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
339 size_t n
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
340 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
341 size_t max_send_fragment
, nw
;
343 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
347 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
348 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
350 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
351 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
352 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
353 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
354 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
355 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
356 * report the error in a way the user will notice
358 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
359 || ((wb
->left
!= 0) && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
364 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
365 && !early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, NULL
))
371 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
372 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
375 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
376 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
377 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
387 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
388 * will happen with non blocking IO
391 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
394 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
395 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
398 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
400 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
402 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
403 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
404 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
405 * compromise is considered worthy.
407 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
408 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
409 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
410 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
411 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
412 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
413 unsigned char aad
[13];
414 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
418 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
419 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
420 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
422 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
423 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
425 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
426 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
427 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
429 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
434 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
438 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
439 /* free jumbo buffer */
440 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
447 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
448 /* free jumbo buffer */
449 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
453 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
454 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
456 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
461 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
462 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
464 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
466 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
468 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
469 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
476 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
477 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
478 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
479 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
480 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
481 /* free jumbo buffer */
482 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
486 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
487 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
490 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
491 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
492 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
495 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
496 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
498 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
504 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
505 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
506 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
507 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
509 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
511 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
512 /* free jumbo buffer */
513 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
515 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
519 /* free jumbo buffer */
520 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
521 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
529 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
530 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
531 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
539 split_send_fragment
= s
->split_send_fragment
;
541 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
542 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
543 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
546 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
547 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
549 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
556 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
557 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
558 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
559 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
561 if (s
->max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
> s
->max_send_fragment
562 || split_send_fragment
== 0) {
564 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
565 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
572 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
578 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
579 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
582 if (n
/ numpipes
>= s
->max_send_fragment
) {
584 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
587 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
588 pipelens
[j
] = s
->max_send_fragment
;
591 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
592 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
593 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
594 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
595 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
601 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
604 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
605 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
610 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
611 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
613 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
614 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
616 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
618 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
620 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
622 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
631 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
632 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
633 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
635 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
636 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
639 unsigned char *recordstart
;
640 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
641 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
646 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
649 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
650 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
652 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
653 * will happen with non blocking IO
655 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
))
656 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
658 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
659 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
660 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
663 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
666 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
)
667 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0))
670 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
675 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
676 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
677 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
680 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
681 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
687 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
689 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
691 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
692 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
695 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
697 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
698 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
699 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
702 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
705 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
710 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
711 /* insufficient space */
712 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
717 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
720 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
721 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
722 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
724 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
725 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
726 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
728 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
729 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
731 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
732 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
733 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
734 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
735 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
739 } else if (prefix_len
) {
740 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
741 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0],
742 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
743 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
744 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
745 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
746 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
751 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
754 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
755 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
756 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
757 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
759 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
760 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt
, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
761 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
762 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, align
, NULL
)) {
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
770 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
771 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)) {
772 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
773 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
774 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
775 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
778 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
779 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
780 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
781 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
782 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
787 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
788 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof wr
);
789 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
790 unsigned int version
= SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_VERSION
: s
->version
;
791 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
793 unsigned int rectype
;
798 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
);
800 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
803 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
)
804 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
808 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
809 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
811 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
812 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
813 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
815 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
];
816 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
817 maxcomplen
+= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
819 /* write the header */
820 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
821 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, version
)
822 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
824 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, eivlen
, NULL
))
826 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
832 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
833 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, compressdata
);
834 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, pipelens
[j
]);
835 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr
, (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
836 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
839 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
843 /* first we compress */
844 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
846 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
848 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, thiswr
)
849 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, thiswr
->length
, NULL
)) {
850 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
854 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, thiswr
->input
, thiswr
->length
)) {
855 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
858 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
861 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
864 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, type
)) {
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
868 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, 1);
870 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
871 rlen
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
872 if (rlen
< SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
) {
874 size_t max_padding
= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
- rlen
;
875 if (s
->record_padding_cb
!= NULL
) {
876 padding
= s
->record_padding_cb(s
, type
, rlen
, s
->record_padding_arg
);
877 } else if (s
->block_padding
> 0) {
878 size_t mask
= s
->block_padding
- 1;
881 /* optimize for power of 2 */
882 if ((s
->block_padding
& mask
) == 0)
883 remainder
= rlen
& mask
;
885 remainder
= rlen
% s
->block_padding
;
886 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
890 padding
= s
->block_padding
- remainder
;
893 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
894 if (padding
> max_padding
)
895 padding
= max_padding
;
896 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt
, 0, padding
)) {
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
900 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, padding
);
906 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
907 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
911 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
914 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
915 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
922 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
923 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
924 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
926 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
929 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
932 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)) {
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
937 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
938 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
;
940 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, recordstart
);
941 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr
);
942 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, len
);
945 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
946 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
) {
948 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
949 * send early data - so we need to use the the tls13enc function.
951 if (tls13_enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
954 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
958 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
964 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
965 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &origlen
)
966 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
967 || origlen
> thiswr
->length
968 || (thiswr
->length
> origlen
969 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
,
970 thiswr
->length
- origlen
, NULL
))) {
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
974 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
977 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
978 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
982 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, mac_size
);
985 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)
986 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt
)) {
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
991 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
992 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
993 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
994 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
995 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
996 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
998 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
999 unsigned char ctype
= type
;
1001 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
,
1002 &ctype
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1006 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt
)) {
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1012 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1013 * is thiswr->length long
1015 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for
1017 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
1019 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1021 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1025 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1029 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
1033 /* now let's set up wb */
1034 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
1035 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
));
1039 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1042 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
1043 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
1044 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
1045 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
1047 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1048 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
1050 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
1051 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
1055 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1057 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1059 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
1063 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1067 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
1068 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
1069 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
1070 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1076 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1077 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1078 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1083 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1084 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1085 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1086 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1087 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1088 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1089 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1096 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1097 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1098 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1099 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1101 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1102 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1104 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1105 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1107 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1108 * using a datagram service
1110 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1114 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1115 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1120 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1121 * 'type' is one of the following:
1123 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1124 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1125 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1127 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1128 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1130 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1131 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1132 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1133 * argument is non NULL.
1134 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1135 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1136 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1137 * Change cipher spec protocol
1138 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1140 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1141 * Handshake protocol
1142 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1143 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1144 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1145 * Application data protocol
1146 * none of our business
1148 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1149 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1152 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1155 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1157 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1159 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1160 /* Not initialized yet */
1161 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1165 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1166 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1168 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1173 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1174 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1176 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1177 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1182 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1185 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1188 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1189 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1190 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1192 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1193 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1200 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1203 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1204 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1205 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1214 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1217 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1218 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1219 * rr[i].data, - data
1220 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1221 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1223 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1224 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1227 /* get new records if necessary */
1228 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1229 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1232 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1233 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1234 /* Shouldn't happen */
1235 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1240 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1242 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1244 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1245 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1249 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1253 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1254 * record that isn't an alert.
1256 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1257 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1258 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1260 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1262 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1263 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1264 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1265 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1271 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1274 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1275 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1276 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1280 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1281 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1282 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
1283 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1285 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1286 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1287 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1290 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1291 * doing a handshake for the first time
1293 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1294 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1295 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1300 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1301 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1302 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1303 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1308 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1309 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1316 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1317 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1319 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1321 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1324 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1325 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1326 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1328 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1329 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1330 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1331 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1332 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1333 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1336 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1337 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1342 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1343 && totalbytes
< len
);
1344 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1345 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1348 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1349 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1350 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1351 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1352 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1357 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1358 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1359 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1363 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1365 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1367 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1368 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1369 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1370 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1372 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1377 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1378 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1380 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1381 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1382 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1383 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1385 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1386 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1392 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1393 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1396 size_t dest_maxlen
= 0;
1397 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1398 size_t *dest_len
= NULL
;
1400 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1401 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1402 dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1403 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1406 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1407 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1408 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1409 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1411 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1412 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
,
1413 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
), n
);
1414 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1415 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -n
);
1417 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1418 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1420 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1421 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1426 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1427 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1431 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1432 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1433 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1436 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1437 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1438 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1440 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1441 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1442 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1443 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1444 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1445 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1446 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1449 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1450 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
1451 unsigned char *alert_bytes
= SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)
1452 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
);
1455 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1456 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
1457 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
1458 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
1459 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
1464 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1465 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, s
,
1466 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1468 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1469 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1470 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1471 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1474 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1475 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1478 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1479 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1480 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1482 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1483 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1484 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1489 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1490 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1494 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1495 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1497 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && alert_descr
!= SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
1498 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1503 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1504 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1505 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1506 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1507 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1508 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1510 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1511 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1515 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1518 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1519 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1521 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1522 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1523 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1524 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1525 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1528 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1536 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1538 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1539 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1540 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1544 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1545 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1551 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1552 * protocol violation)
1554 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1555 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1556 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
1558 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1559 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1561 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1570 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1571 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1572 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1577 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1578 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1579 /* no read-ahead left? */
1582 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1583 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1584 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1585 * problems in the blocking world
1587 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1588 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1589 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1590 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1597 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1600 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1601 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1602 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1603 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1604 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1606 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1609 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1611 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1613 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1614 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1615 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1617 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1620 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1622 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1623 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1624 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1625 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1626 * started), we will indulge it.
1628 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1629 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1631 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1633 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1634 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1635 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1636 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1637 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1638 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1641 if (!early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1642 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, &al
))
1644 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1647 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1655 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1659 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1663 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1671 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1672 * format and false otherwise.
1674 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1676 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1680 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1682 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1684 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);