1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
119 #include "record_locl.h"
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
138 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
141 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
145 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
147 /* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
148 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
153 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
155 memset(rl
->alert_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->alert_fragment
));
156 rl
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
157 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
158 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
162 rl
->wpend_buf
= NULL
;
164 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
165 for(pipes
= 0; pipes
< rl
->numwpipes
; pipes
++)
166 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->wbuf
[pipes
]);
168 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
170 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
171 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
174 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
177 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
179 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
180 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
181 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
182 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
183 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
186 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
188 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
191 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
193 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
194 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
-1]) != 0;
197 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, const unsigned char *buf
, int len
)
199 rl
->packet_length
= len
;
201 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
202 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
203 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl
->s
))
207 rl
->packet
= SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl
->rbuf
);
208 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl
->rbuf
, buf
, len
);
213 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
215 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
218 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
220 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
223 int ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
228 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
231 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
232 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
233 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
235 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
241 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
243 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
246 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
248 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
251 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
255 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
256 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
259 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
262 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
272 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
276 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
277 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
280 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
283 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
293 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
, int clearold
)
296 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
297 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
298 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
299 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
300 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
301 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
302 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
312 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
314 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
318 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
319 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
320 align
= (0-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
324 /* start with empty packet ... */
327 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
329 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
332 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
333 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
334 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
336 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
337 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
338 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
339 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
340 * overrun can be triggered.
342 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
346 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
347 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
348 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
352 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
353 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
356 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
357 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
359 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
363 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
365 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
371 /* else we need to read more data */
373 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
374 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
376 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
377 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
379 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) { /* len > 0 */
380 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
381 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
382 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
385 if (n
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) { /* does not happen */
386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
390 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
391 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
392 /* ignore max parameter */
397 if (max
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
398 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
403 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
404 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
409 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
410 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
411 i
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
419 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
421 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
426 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
427 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
428 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
430 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
432 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
436 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
439 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
440 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
446 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
447 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
449 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
451 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
453 unsigned int n
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
454 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
455 unsigned int max_send_fragment
, nw
;
456 unsigned int u_len
= (unsigned int)len
;
458 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH
);
466 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
467 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
469 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
470 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
471 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
472 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
473 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
474 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
475 * report the error in a way the user will notice
477 if ((unsigned int)len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
) {
478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
485 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
486 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
496 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
497 * will happen with non blocking IO
500 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
);
502 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
503 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
506 tot
+= i
; /* this might be last fragment */
508 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
510 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
511 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
512 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
513 * compromise is considered worthy.
515 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
516 u_len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
517 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
518 !SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
519 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
520 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
521 unsigned char aad
[13];
522 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
525 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
526 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
527 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
529 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
530 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
532 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
533 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
534 max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
536 if (u_len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
541 wb
->buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(packlen
);
542 if (wb
->buf
== NULL
) {
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
547 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
548 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
555 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
556 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
561 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
562 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
564 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
569 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
570 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
572 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
574 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
576 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
577 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
584 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
585 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
586 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
588 if (packlen
<= 0 || packlen
> (int)wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
589 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
594 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
595 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
598 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
599 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
600 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
603 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
604 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
606 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
612 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
613 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
614 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
615 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
617 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
);
619 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
620 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
);
623 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
627 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
636 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
637 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
638 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
645 split_send_fragment
= s
->split_send_fragment
;
647 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
648 * 1 pipeline. Similaraly if the cipher does not support pipelined
649 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
652 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
653 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
655 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
662 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
663 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
664 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
665 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
667 if (s
->max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
> s
->max_send_fragment
668 || split_send_fragment
== 0) {
670 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
671 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
678 unsigned int pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
679 unsigned int numpipes
, j
;
684 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
685 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
688 if (n
/ numpipes
>= s
->max_send_fragment
) {
690 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
693 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
694 pipelens
[j
] = s
->max_send_fragment
;
697 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
698 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
699 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
700 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
701 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
707 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0);
709 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
710 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
715 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
716 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
718 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
719 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
721 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
723 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
725 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
735 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
736 unsigned int *pipelens
, unsigned int numpipes
,
737 int create_empty_fragment
)
739 unsigned char *outbuf
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], *plen
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
740 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
741 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
747 unsigned int totlen
= 0;
750 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
751 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
753 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
754 * will happen with non blocking IO
756 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
))
757 return (ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
));
759 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
760 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
761 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
764 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
767 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
)
768 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
))
771 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
776 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
777 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
778 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
779 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
782 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
788 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
790 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
792 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
793 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
796 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
798 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
799 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
800 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
803 unsigned int tmppipelen
= 0;
805 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1);
810 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
))
812 /* insufficient space */
813 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
818 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
821 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
822 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
823 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
825 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
826 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
827 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
829 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
830 align
= (0-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
832 outbuf
[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + align
;
833 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
834 } else if (prefix_len
) {
835 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
836 outbuf
[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
839 for (j
=0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
840 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
841 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
842 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
843 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
845 outbuf
[j
] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + align
;
846 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
850 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
851 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
)) {
852 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
853 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
854 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
858 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
859 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
860 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
861 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
)
862 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
870 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
871 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof wr
);
872 for (j
=0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
873 /* write the header */
874 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = type
& 0xff;
875 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr
[j
], type
);
877 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = (s
->version
>> 8);
879 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
880 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
882 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
883 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
884 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = 0x1;
886 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
888 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
892 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
893 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr
[j
], outbuf
[j
] + eivlen
);
894 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr
[j
], (int)pipelens
[j
]);
895 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr
[j
], (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
896 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
899 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
902 /* first we compress */
903 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
904 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, &wr
[j
])) {
905 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
909 memcpy(wr
[j
].data
, wr
[j
].input
, wr
[j
].length
);
910 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
914 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
915 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
919 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
920 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &wr
[j
],
921 &(outbuf
[j
][wr
[j
].length
+ eivlen
]), 1) < 0)
923 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], mac_size
);
927 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr
[j
], outbuf
[j
]);
928 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
932 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
934 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], eivlen
);
938 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
941 for (j
=0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
942 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
943 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &wr
[j
],
944 outbuf
[j
] + wr
[j
].length
, 1) < 0)
946 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], mac_size
);
949 /* record length after mac and block padding */
950 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
[j
]), plen
[j
]);
953 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, plen
[j
] - 5, 5, s
,
954 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
957 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
960 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr
[j
], type
); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
961 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
963 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
965 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
969 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
973 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr
);
976 /* now let's set up wb */
977 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
978 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
[j
]));
984 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
987 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
988 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
989 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
990 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
992 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
993 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
);
998 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
999 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
1003 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1004 unsigned int currbuf
= 0;
1007 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> (int)len
)
1008 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
1009 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
1010 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1016 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1017 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1018 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1023 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1024 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1025 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
,
1026 (char *)&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])[
1027 SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1028 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1033 if (i
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1034 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1035 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], i
);
1036 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1038 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1039 return (s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
);
1040 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1041 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1043 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1044 * using a datagram service
1046 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1050 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], i
);
1051 SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(&wb
[currbuf
], -i
);
1056 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1057 * 'type' is one of the following:
1059 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1060 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1061 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1063 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1064 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1066 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1067 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1068 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1069 * argument is non NULL.
1070 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1071 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1072 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1073 * Change cipher spec protocol
1074 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1076 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1077 * Handshake protocol
1078 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1079 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1080 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1081 * Application data protocol
1082 * none of our business
1084 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1088 unsigned int n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, read_bytes
;
1091 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1093 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1095 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1096 /* Not initialized yet */
1097 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1101 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1102 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1104 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1109 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1110 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1112 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1113 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1118 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1121 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1124 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1125 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1126 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1128 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1129 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1135 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1138 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1139 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1140 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1149 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1152 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1153 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1154 * rr[i].data, - data
1155 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1156 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1158 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1159 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1162 /* get new records if necessary */
1163 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1164 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1167 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1168 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1169 /* Shouldn't happen */
1170 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1175 /* Skip over any records we have already used or are zero in length */
1177 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rr
[curr_rec
]) == 0;
1179 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1180 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1184 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1187 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1189 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1190 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1191 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1192 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1198 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1201 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1202 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1203 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1207 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1208 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1209 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
)) {
1211 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1212 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1213 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1216 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1217 * doing a handshake for the first time
1219 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1220 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1221 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1226 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1227 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1228 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1229 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1234 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1235 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1242 if ((unsigned int)len
- read_bytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1243 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1245 n
= (unsigned int)len
- read_bytes
;
1247 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1250 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -n
);
1251 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1252 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1253 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1254 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1257 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1258 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1263 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1264 && read_bytes
< (unsigned int)len
);
1265 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1266 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1267 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1268 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1273 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1274 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1275 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1278 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1279 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1285 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1287 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1289 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1290 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1291 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1292 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1294 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1299 if(s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1300 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1302 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1303 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1304 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1305 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1307 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1308 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1314 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1315 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1318 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
1319 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1320 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
1322 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1323 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1324 dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1325 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1326 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1327 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1328 dest
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1329 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
;
1332 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1333 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1334 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1335 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1337 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1339 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] =
1340 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
)];
1341 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, 1);
1342 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -1);
1345 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1346 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1351 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1352 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1353 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1356 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1358 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1359 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1360 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1361 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1363 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1364 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1365 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[3] != 0)) {
1366 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1371 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1372 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1373 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
, 4, s
,
1374 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1376 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1377 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1378 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
) {
1379 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1380 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
)) {
1381 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1386 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1390 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1391 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1392 /* no read-ahead left? */
1395 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1396 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1397 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1398 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1400 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1401 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1402 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1403 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1410 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1411 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1416 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1417 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1418 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1421 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1422 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1423 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1424 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1425 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1426 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1427 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1428 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1429 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1432 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1433 int alert_level
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[0];
1434 int alert_descr
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[1];
1436 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1438 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1439 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1440 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
, 2, s
,
1441 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1443 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1444 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1445 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1446 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1449 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1450 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1453 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1454 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1455 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1456 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1460 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1461 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1462 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1463 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1464 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1465 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1467 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1468 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1472 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1473 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1476 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1479 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1480 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1482 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1483 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1484 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1485 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
, s
->session
);
1488 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1496 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1498 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1499 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1503 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1504 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1510 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1512 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1513 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1514 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1515 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
)) {
1516 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1520 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1528 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1529 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1530 /* no read-ahead left? */
1533 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1534 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1535 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1536 * problems in the blocking world
1538 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1539 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1540 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1541 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1548 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1551 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1552 * an unexpected message alert.
1554 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->version
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
) {
1555 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1558 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1561 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1563 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1565 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1566 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1567 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1569 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1572 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1574 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1575 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1576 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1577 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1578 * started), we will indulge it.
1580 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1581 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1584 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1592 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1596 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1600 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1608 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1609 * format and false otherwise.
1611 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1613 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1617 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1619 unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1621 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);