2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include "../ssl_local.h"
11 #include "record_local.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 * tls13_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for
16 * internal errors, but not otherwise.
19 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
21 * 1: if the record encryption was successful.
22 * -1: if the record's AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
23 * an internal error occurred.
25 int tls13_enc(SSL
*s
, SSL3_RECORD
*recs
, size_t n_recs
, int sending
)
28 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
], recheader
[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
];
29 size_t ivlen
, taglen
, offset
, loop
, hdrlen
;
30 unsigned char *staticiv
;
33 SSL3_RECORD
*rec
= &recs
[0];
38 /* Should not happen */
39 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Support pipelining */
40 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC
,
41 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
46 ctx
= s
->enc_write_ctx
;
47 staticiv
= s
->write_iv
;
48 seq
= RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s
->rlayer
);
50 ctx
= s
->enc_read_ctx
;
51 staticiv
= s
->read_iv
;
52 seq
= RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s
->rlayer
);
56 * If we're sending an alert and ctx != NULL then we must be forcing
57 * plaintext alerts. If we're reading and ctx != NULL then we allow
58 * plaintext alerts at certain points in the handshake. If we've got this
59 * far then we have already validated that a plaintext alert is ok here.
61 if (ctx
== NULL
|| rec
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
62 memmove(rec
->data
, rec
->input
, rec
->length
);
63 rec
->input
= rec
->data
;
67 ivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
69 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
70 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
) {
71 if (s
->session
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
> 0) {
72 alg_enc
= s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm_enc
;
74 if (!ossl_assert(s
->psksession
!= NULL
75 && s
->psksession
->ext
.max_early_data
> 0)) {
76 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC
,
77 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
80 alg_enc
= s
->psksession
->cipher
->algorithm_enc
;
84 * To get here we must have selected a ciphersuite - otherwise ctx would
87 if (!ossl_assert(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
)) {
88 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC
,
89 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
92 alg_enc
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
;
95 if (alg_enc
& SSL_AESCCM
) {
96 if (alg_enc
& (SSL_AES128CCM8
| SSL_AES256CCM8
))
97 taglen
= EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN
;
99 taglen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN
;
100 if (sending
&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx
, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG
, taglen
,
102 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC
,
103 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
106 } else if (alg_enc
& SSL_AESGCM
) {
107 taglen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN
;
108 } else if (alg_enc
& SSL_CHACHA20
) {
109 taglen
= EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN
;
111 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC
,
112 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
118 * Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as
121 if (rec
->length
< taglen
+ 1)
123 rec
->length
-= taglen
;
127 if (ivlen
< SEQ_NUM_SIZE
) {
128 /* Should not happen */
129 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC
,
130 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
133 offset
= ivlen
- SEQ_NUM_SIZE
;
134 memcpy(iv
, staticiv
, offset
);
135 for (loop
= 0; loop
< SEQ_NUM_SIZE
; loop
++)
136 iv
[offset
+ loop
] = staticiv
[offset
+ loop
] ^ seq
[loop
];
138 /* Increment the sequence counter */
139 for (loop
= SEQ_NUM_SIZE
; loop
> 0; loop
--) {
141 if (seq
[loop
- 1] != 0)
145 /* Sequence has wrapped */
149 /* TODO(size_t): lenu/lenf should be a size_t but EVP doesn't support it */
150 if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, iv
, sending
) <= 0
151 || (!sending
&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx
, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG
,
153 rec
->data
+ rec
->length
) <= 0)) {
158 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt
, recheader
, sizeof(recheader
), 0)
159 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt
, rec
->type
)
160 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt
, rec
->rec_version
)
161 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt
, rec
->length
+ taglen
)
162 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt
, &hdrlen
)
163 || hdrlen
!= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
164 || !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt
)) {
165 WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt
);
170 * For CCM we must explicitly set the total plaintext length before we add
173 if (((alg_enc
& SSL_AESCCM
) != 0
174 && EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx
, NULL
, &lenu
, NULL
,
175 (unsigned int)rec
->length
) <= 0)
176 || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx
, NULL
, &lenu
, recheader
,
177 sizeof(recheader
)) <= 0
178 || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx
, rec
->data
, &lenu
, rec
->input
,
179 (unsigned int)rec
->length
) <= 0
180 || EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx
, rec
->data
+ lenu
, &lenf
) <= 0
181 || (size_t)(lenu
+ lenf
) != rec
->length
) {
186 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx
, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG
, taglen
,
187 rec
->data
+ rec
->length
) <= 0) {
188 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_ENC
,
189 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
192 rec
->length
+= taglen
;