2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
169 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
);
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
173 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_client_method(int ver
)
175 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
176 return (SSLv3_client_method());
181 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method
,
182 ssl_undefined_function
,
183 ssl3_connect
, ssl3_get_client_method
)
185 int ssl3_connect(SSL
*s
)
188 unsigned long Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
189 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
191 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
193 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
197 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
198 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
199 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
200 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
203 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) {
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
210 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
211 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
214 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
215 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
224 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
226 s
->state
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
227 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
231 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
232 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
236 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
238 if ((s
->version
& 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
244 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
249 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
250 s
->type
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
252 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
253 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
257 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
265 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
270 /* setup buffing BIO */
271 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 0)) {
276 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
278 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
280 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
281 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
283 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
285 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
287 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
290 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
291 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
294 ret
= ssl3_client_hello(s
);
297 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
300 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
301 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
302 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
306 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
307 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
308 ret
= ssl3_get_server_hello(s
);
313 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
315 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
316 /* receive renewed session ticket */
317 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
321 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
;
325 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
:
326 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B
:
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
328 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
329 ret
= ssl3_check_finished(s
);
334 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
339 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
343 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
344 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
345 ret
= ssl3_get_server_certificate(s
);
348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
349 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
350 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
;
352 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
355 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
361 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
366 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
367 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
368 ret
= ssl3_get_key_exchange(s
);
371 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
;
375 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
378 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
384 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
:
385 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
:
386 ret
= ssl3_get_certificate_request(s
);
389 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
;
393 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
:
394 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
:
395 ret
= ssl3_get_server_done(s
);
398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
399 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
400 if ((ret
= SRP_Calc_A_param(s
)) <= 0) {
401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
402 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
407 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
408 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
;
410 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
415 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
:
416 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
:
417 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
:
418 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
:
419 ret
= ssl3_send_client_certificate(s
);
422 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
426 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
427 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
428 ret
= ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s
);
432 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
435 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
436 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
439 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
440 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
441 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
442 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
444 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
445 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
;
447 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
449 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
450 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
456 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
:
457 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
:
458 ret
= ssl3_send_client_verify(s
);
461 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
465 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
:
466 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
:
467 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
469 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
);
473 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
474 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
476 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
477 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
479 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
483 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
484 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
485 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
487 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
488 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
490 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
492 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
497 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
498 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
506 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
507 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
508 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
509 ret
= ssl3_send_next_proto(s
);
512 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
516 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
:
517 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
:
518 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
519 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
,
520 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
,
522 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
524 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
527 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
;
530 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
532 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
533 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED
) {
534 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
535 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
536 s
->s3
->delay_buf_pop_ret
= 0;
539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
541 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
543 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
544 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
548 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
554 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
555 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
556 ret
= ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s
);
559 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
563 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
:
564 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
:
565 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_status(s
);
568 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
573 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
:
574 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
:
575 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
576 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
577 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
,
578 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
);
583 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
585 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
589 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
:
590 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
591 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
595 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
596 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
600 /* clean a few things up */
601 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
603 if (s
->init_buf
!= NULL
) {
604 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
609 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
612 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
))
613 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
614 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
620 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
622 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
626 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_connect
;
627 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
630 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
642 /* did we do anything */
643 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
645 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
649 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
650 new_state
= s
->state
;
652 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP
, 1);
653 s
->state
= new_state
;
663 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT
, ret
);
667 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
670 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
679 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
680 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
681 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
682 if ((sess
== NULL
) || (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
683 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
684 !sess
->session_id_length
||
687 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
688 * "ticket" without a session ID.
690 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
692 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
693 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
696 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
697 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
698 int options
= s
->options
;
699 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
700 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
701 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
,
703 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
707 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
709 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
714 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
716 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
717 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
720 * We only support one version: update method
722 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
723 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
724 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
726 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
728 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
730 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
733 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
734 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
736 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
739 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
748 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
749 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
752 /* Do the message type and length last */
753 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
756 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
757 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
758 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
759 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
760 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
761 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
762 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
763 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
766 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
767 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
768 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
769 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
770 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
771 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
772 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
773 * know that is maximum server supports.
774 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
775 * containing version 1.0.
777 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
778 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
779 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
780 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
781 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
782 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
783 * the negotiated version.
785 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
786 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
789 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
790 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
796 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
799 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
803 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
807 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
808 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
809 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
813 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
814 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
815 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
818 /* Ciphers supported */
819 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]), 0);
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
824 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
826 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
827 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
830 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
831 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
832 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
842 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
845 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
847 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
848 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
852 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
856 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
861 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
863 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
870 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
871 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
875 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
878 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
879 return ssl_do_write(s
);
884 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
886 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
889 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
890 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ok
;
893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
897 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
898 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
903 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
904 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
,
905 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
, -1, 20000, &ok
);
910 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
912 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
913 if (s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0) {
914 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
916 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
918 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
925 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
926 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
931 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
932 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
933 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
934 int hversion
= (p
[0] << 8) | p
[1];
935 int options
= s
->options
;
936 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
937 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
938 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
940 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
941 s
->version
= hversion
;
942 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
944 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
945 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
948 s
->version
= hversion
;
949 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
952 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
955 if ((p
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8)) || (p
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
957 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | p
[1];
958 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
963 /* load the server hello data */
964 /* load the server random */
965 memcpy(s
->s3
->server_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
966 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
970 /* get the session-id */
973 if ((j
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
) || (j
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
)) {
974 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
980 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
981 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
982 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
983 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
984 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
985 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
986 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
987 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
988 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
989 * server wants to resume.
991 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
992 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
993 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
994 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
995 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
996 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
998 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
999 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1000 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
+ j
);
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1003 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1007 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
1009 if (j
!= 0 && j
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1010 && memcmp(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, j
) == 0) {
1011 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1012 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1013 /* actually a client application bug */
1014 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1016 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1022 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1023 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1024 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1025 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1026 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1028 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1029 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1033 s
->session
->session_id_length
= j
;
1034 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, p
, j
); /* j could be 0 */
1037 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
);
1039 /* unknown cipher */
1040 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1044 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1045 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1046 ct
->mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1050 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1053 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1054 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1058 p
+= ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
1060 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1061 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1063 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1064 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1070 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1071 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1072 * set and use it for comparison.
1074 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1075 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1076 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1077 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1079 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1082 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1084 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1087 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1089 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1091 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1093 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1095 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1099 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1100 * using compression.
1102 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1108 if (s
->hit
&& j
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1109 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1111 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1116 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1117 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1121 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, j
);
1123 if ((j
!= 0) && (comp
== NULL
)) {
1124 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1126 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1129 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1134 /* TLS extensions */
1135 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1142 /* wrong packet length */
1143 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1150 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1155 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
1157 int al
, i
, ok
, ret
= -1;
1158 unsigned long n
, nc
, llen
, l
;
1160 const unsigned char *q
, *p
;
1162 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1164 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1165 int need_cert
= 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1168 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1171 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1176 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) ||
1177 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) &&
1178 (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
))) {
1179 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1183 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
1184 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1188 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1190 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1196 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
1197 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1201 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
1203 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
1204 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1206 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1211 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &q
, l
);
1213 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1218 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1220 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1223 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1232 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1233 if ((s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
) && (i
<= 0)
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1235 && !((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1236 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1237 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1239 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1241 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1244 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1247 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1251 sc
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1255 ssl_sess_cert_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
);
1256 s
->session
->sess_cert
= sc
;
1258 sc
->cert_chain
= sk
;
1260 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1261 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1263 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1266 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1269 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1271 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1272 need_cert
= ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1273 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1277 fprintf(stderr
, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey
, x
);
1278 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
));
1279 fprintf(stderr
, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1280 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->name
,
1281 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
,
1282 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
, need_cert
);
1283 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1285 if (need_cert
&& ((pkey
== NULL
) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1289 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1293 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1294 if (need_cert
&& i
< 0) {
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1298 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1303 int exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1304 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
) {
1306 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1308 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1311 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1312 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1314 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1317 X509_free(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
1318 sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
= x
;
1319 sc
->peer_key
= &(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
]);
1321 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1322 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1323 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1325 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1326 sc
->peer_key
= NULL
;
1328 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1329 s
->session
->peer
= NULL
;
1331 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1338 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1340 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1342 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1346 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1349 unsigned char *q
, md_buf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
* 2];
1352 unsigned char *param
, *p
;
1354 long i
, param_len
, n
, alg_k
, alg_a
;
1355 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1356 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1364 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1365 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1366 EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1368 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
1371 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1374 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1375 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1377 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1378 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1379 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1380 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1384 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1386 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1388 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1391 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) {
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1393 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1398 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1399 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1402 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1403 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1404 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1405 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1408 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1412 param
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1413 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
!= NULL
) {
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1415 RSA_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
);
1416 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= NULL
;
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1419 DH_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1420 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1423 EC_KEY_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
);
1424 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= NULL
;
1427 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1430 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1433 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1435 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1438 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1439 char tmp_id_hint
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
1442 if (param_len
> n
) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1449 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1450 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1451 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1454 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1455 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1459 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1461 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH
);
1467 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1468 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1469 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1471 memcpy(tmp_id_hint
, p
, i
);
1472 memset(tmp_id_hint
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
1473 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1474 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint
);
1475 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
1476 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1484 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1486 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1488 if (param_len
> n
) {
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1494 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH
);
1500 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.N
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1506 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1514 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH
);
1520 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1526 if (1 > n
- param_len
) {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1532 i
= (unsigned int)(p
[0]);
1535 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH
);
1541 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.s
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1547 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1555 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH
);
1561 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.B
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1568 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1573 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1574 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1575 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1577 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1578 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1582 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1583 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1585 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1586 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1590 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1592 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1593 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1594 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1595 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1599 if ((rsa
= RSA_new()) == NULL
) {
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1605 if (param_len
> n
) {
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1611 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH
);
1617 if (!(rsa
->n
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->n
))) {
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1623 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1631 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH
);
1637 if (!(rsa
->e
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->e
))) {
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1644 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1645 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1647 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1648 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1653 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1656 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1660 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
1661 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1667 if (param_len
> n
) {
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1673 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH
);
1679 if (!(dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1685 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1693 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH
);
1699 if (!(dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1705 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1713 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH
);
1719 if (!(dh
->pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1726 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1727 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1731 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1732 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1734 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1735 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1739 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1740 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1742 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1743 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1746 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1748 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1751 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1754 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
) {
1756 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1758 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1764 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1765 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1766 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1770 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1771 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1772 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1775 if (param_len
> n
) {
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1780 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1781 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1783 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, p
, 3)) {
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1788 if ((curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p
+ 2))) == 0) {
1789 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1791 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1795 ngroup
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid
);
1796 if (ngroup
== NULL
) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1800 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh
, ngroup
) == 0) {
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1804 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup
);
1806 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
);
1808 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1809 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1810 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1812 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1818 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1819 if (((srvr_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) ||
1820 ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)) {
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1825 encoded_pt_len
= *p
; /* length of encoded point */
1828 if ((encoded_pt_len
> n
- param_len
) ||
1829 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, srvr_ecpoint
,
1830 p
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
) == 0)) {
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1834 param_len
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1837 p
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1840 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1841 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1845 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1846 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1848 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1849 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1851 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1852 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1854 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1855 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
1857 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1858 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh
, srvr_ecpoint
);
1859 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= ecdh
;
1861 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1863 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1864 srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1866 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1870 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1872 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1874 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1876 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1882 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
1889 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1902 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1905 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1907 if ((i
!= n
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
1908 /* wrong packet length */
1909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1913 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1919 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1920 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1921 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1922 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1923 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1925 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1927 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1928 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, &size
);
1932 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
, p
, n
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
);
1934 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
1940 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1947 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1948 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1950 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1952 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1953 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx
, p
, (int)n
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1955 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1961 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1962 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1963 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1964 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
1965 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1969 /* still data left over */
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1975 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1976 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1979 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1981 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1989 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1990 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1993 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1997 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2000 unsigned long n
, nc
, l
;
2001 unsigned int llen
, ctype_num
, i
;
2002 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2003 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
2005 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2007 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2008 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
,
2009 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
,
2010 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
2015 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2017 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
2018 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
2020 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2021 * wont be doing client auth.
2023 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2024 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
2030 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
2031 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2036 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2037 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2038 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) {
2039 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2041 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER
);
2046 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2048 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2053 /* get the certificate types */
2055 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2056 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2057 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2058 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2059 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2060 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2064 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, p
, ctype_num
);
2065 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
2066 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2068 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2069 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = p
[i
];
2071 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2074 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2077 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
+ 2) > n
) {
2078 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2080 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2083 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2084 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2085 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].digest
= NULL
;
2086 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].valid_flags
= 0;
2088 if ((llen
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, p
, llen
)) {
2089 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2091 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2094 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2095 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2102 /* get the CA RDNs */
2105 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
) != n
) {
2106 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2111 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
2113 if ((l
+ nc
+ 2) > llen
) {
2114 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG
);
2121 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &q
, l
)) == NULL
) {
2122 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2128 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2130 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2133 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2142 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2143 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2144 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2145 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2146 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2151 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2155 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2157 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2161 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2163 int ok
, al
, ret
= 0, ticklen
;
2165 const unsigned char *p
;
2168 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2169 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
,
2170 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
,
2171 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, 16384, &ok
);
2177 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2178 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2183 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2184 n2l(p
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
);
2186 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2187 if (ticklen
+ 6 != n
) {
2188 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2192 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2193 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2194 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2195 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2199 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, p
, ticklen
);
2200 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2202 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2203 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2204 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2205 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2206 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2207 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2208 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2209 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2210 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2212 EVP_Digest(p
, ticklen
,
2213 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2214 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2218 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2223 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
2226 unsigned long resplen
, n
;
2227 const unsigned char *p
;
2229 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2230 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
,
2231 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
,
2232 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
, 16384, &ok
);
2237 /* need at least status type + length */
2238 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2242 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2243 if (*p
++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2244 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2249 if (resplen
+ 4 != n
) {
2250 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2254 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2255 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= BUF_memdup(p
, resplen
);
2256 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
) {
2257 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2261 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2262 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2264 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2266 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2271 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2278 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2283 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL
*s
)
2288 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2289 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2290 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
,
2291 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
,
2292 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 30, &ok
);
2297 /* should contain no data */
2298 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2306 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2310 unsigned long alg_k
;
2311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2313 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2317 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2319 EC_KEY
*clnt_ecdh
= NULL
;
2320 const EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2321 EVP_PKEY
*srvr_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2322 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2323 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2324 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2326 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2329 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
2330 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2332 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2334 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2338 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2340 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2341 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2345 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2347 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2350 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2354 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
)
2355 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
2358 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2359 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].
2361 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2362 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2364 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2367 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2368 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2371 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2372 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2373 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2377 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2378 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2380 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen
, pms
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2382 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2384 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2389 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2393 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2394 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2401 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2402 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2403 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2404 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2405 krb5_data
*enc_ticket
;
2406 krb5_data authenticator
, *authp
= NULL
;
2407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2408 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2409 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2410 unsigned char tmp_buf
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2411 unsigned char epms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2412 int padl
, outl
= sizeof(epms
);
2414 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2417 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2419 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2422 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2424 authp
= &authenticator
;
2425 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2427 krb5rc
= kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, authp
, &kssl_err
);
2428 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2433 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc
);
2434 if (krb5rc
&& kssl_err
.text
)
2435 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2438 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2441 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2447 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2448 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2450 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2451 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2452 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2453 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2454 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2456 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2457 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2458 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2459 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2461 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2462 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2463 * optional authenticator omitted.
2466 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2467 s2n(enc_ticket
->length
, p
);
2468 memcpy(p
, enc_ticket
->data
, enc_ticket
->length
);
2469 p
+= enc_ticket
->length
;
2470 n
= enc_ticket
->length
+ 2;
2472 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2473 if (authp
&& authp
->length
) {
2474 s2n(authp
->length
, p
);
2475 memcpy(p
, authp
->data
, authp
->length
);
2477 n
+= authp
->length
+ 2;
2483 s2n(0, p
); /* null authenticator length */
2487 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2488 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2492 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2493 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2494 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2498 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2499 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2500 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2501 * kssl_ctx->length);
2502 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2505 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2506 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
);
2507 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, epms
, &outl
, pms
, pmslen
);
2508 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(epms
[outl
]), &padl
);
2510 if (outl
> (int)sizeof epms
) {
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2515 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2517 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2519 memcpy(p
, epms
, outl
);
2522 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms
, outl
);
2525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2526 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2527 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2528 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
2530 if (scert
== NULL
) {
2531 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2533 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2537 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
)
2538 dh_srvr
= scert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2540 /* we get them from the cert */
2541 int idx
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
2542 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2545 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
2547 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2548 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2550 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
) {
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2552 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2556 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2557 /* Use client certificate key */
2558 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2561 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2562 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2564 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2568 /* generate a new random key */
2569 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2573 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2580 pmslen
= DH_size(dh_clnt
);
2581 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2586 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2587 * clear it out afterwards
2590 n
= DH_compute_key(pms
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2591 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2601 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2604 /* send off the data */
2605 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2607 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2613 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2618 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2619 const EC_GROUP
*srvr_group
= NULL
;
2621 int ecdh_clnt_cert
= 0;
2624 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2625 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2627 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2632 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2633 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2634 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2636 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) && (s
->cert
!= NULL
)) {
2638 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2639 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2640 * To add such support, one needs to add
2641 * code that checks for appropriate
2642 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2643 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2644 * key on the same curve as the server's
2645 * and the key should be authorized for
2648 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2649 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2652 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2653 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2654 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2655 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2659 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2660 tkey
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
;
2662 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2664 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2665 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
2666 if ((srvr_pub_pkey
== NULL
)
2667 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2668 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2670 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2674 tkey
= srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
;
2677 srvr_group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2678 srvr_ecpoint
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey
);
2680 if ((srvr_group
== NULL
) || (srvr_ecpoint
== NULL
)) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2682 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2686 if ((clnt_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2688 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2692 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh
, srvr_group
)) {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2696 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2698 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2699 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2701 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2702 tkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2703 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2704 if (priv_key
== NULL
) {
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2706 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2709 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2714 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2715 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh
))) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2723 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2724 * clear it out afterwards
2727 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group
);
2728 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2732 pmslen
= (field_size
+ 7) / 8;
2733 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2736 n
= ECDH_compute_key(pms
, pmslen
, srvr_ecpoint
, clnt_ecdh
, NULL
);
2737 if (n
<= 0 || pmslen
!= (size_t)n
) {
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2742 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2743 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2747 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2751 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2752 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2753 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2756 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
2757 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len
* sizeof(unsigned char));
2758 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
2759 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2761 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2765 /* Encode the public key */
2766 n
= EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2767 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2768 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2769 encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
);
2771 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2772 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2774 /* copy the point */
2775 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2776 /* increment n to account for length field */
2780 /* Free allocated memory */
2781 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2782 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2783 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2784 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2786 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2787 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2788 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2789 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2792 unsigned int md_len
;
2794 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2795 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2799 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2804 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2808 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
)].x509
;
2812 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST94
)].x509
;
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2815 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2819 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2820 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2822 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2824 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2825 * certificate key for key exchange
2828 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2830 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2831 /* Generate session key */
2832 if (RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2833 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2835 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2839 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2841 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2842 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2843 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2845 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2852 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2855 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2856 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2857 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
));
2858 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2860 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2862 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
);
2863 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
2864 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2865 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2871 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2873 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2875 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2877 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) < 0) {
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2882 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2884 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2887 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2890 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2891 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2892 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2893 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2894 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2895 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2897 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2898 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
2901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2902 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2903 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2904 /* send off the data */
2905 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2907 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2911 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2914 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2915 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2916 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2918 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2924 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2926 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2927 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2930 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 2];
2931 size_t identity_len
;
2932 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2933 unsigned int psk_len
= 0;
2937 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2939 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2943 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2944 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2945 pmslen
= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4;
2946 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2950 psk_len
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
2951 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2953 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2955 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2957 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2959 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2962 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2963 pmslen
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2964 identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1] = '\0';
2965 identity_len
= strlen(identity
);
2966 if (identity_len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2968 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2971 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2973 memmove(pms
+ psk_len
+ 4, pms
, psk_len
);
2975 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2979 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2980 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
=
2981 BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2982 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
2983 && s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2985 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2989 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2990 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup(identity
);
2991 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2993 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2997 s2n(identity_len
, p
);
2998 memcpy(p
, identity
, identity_len
);
2999 n
= 2 + identity_len
;
3002 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
3004 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3010 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3015 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
3016 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3021 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
3024 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3025 n
= ssl_do_write(s
);
3026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3028 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3030 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3031 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3034 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3035 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s
,
3036 s
->session
->master_key
)) <
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3039 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3045 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3048 s
->cert
->pmslen
= pmslen
;
3050 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3053 pmslen
= s
->cert
->pmslen
;
3056 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3060 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3061 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3063 session
->master_key
,
3065 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3066 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3067 if (s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
3068 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3075 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3078 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3079 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3081 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3082 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3083 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
3084 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
3089 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
3092 unsigned char data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
3094 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3100 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3102 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
) {
3103 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3104 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3105 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3106 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3107 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx
);
3108 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx
, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3109 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3110 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3113 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
3118 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3119 * digest and cached handshake records.
3121 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3124 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->cert
->key
->digest
;
3125 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3126 if (hdatalen
<= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3132 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3135 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3136 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
3137 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3144 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3147 if (s
->session
->flags
& SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
) {
3148 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3149 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3150 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3151 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3155 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3156 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
, NID_md5
, &(data
[0]));
3157 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, data
,
3158 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
3159 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_RSA_LIB
);
3167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3168 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3169 if (!DSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3170 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3171 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3172 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
)) {
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_DSA_LIB
);
3180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3181 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3182 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3183 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3184 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3185 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) {
3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
3193 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3194 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3195 unsigned char signbuf
[64];
3197 size_t sigsize
= 64;
3198 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3199 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, data
);
3200 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx
, signbuf
, &sigsize
, data
, 32) <= 0) {
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3204 for (i
= 63, j
= 0; i
>= 0; j
++, i
--) {
3205 p
[2 + j
] = signbuf
[i
];
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3213 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3217 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
;
3219 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3220 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3221 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3223 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3224 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3229 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3230 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3231 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3233 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3235 unsigned long alg_k
;
3236 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3238 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3239 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->cert
->key
->digest
)
3242 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3243 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3245 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3246 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3248 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3249 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3250 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3251 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3252 int i
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
3253 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
3254 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3255 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3256 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
3259 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
3261 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3262 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
3263 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
3267 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3272 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3275 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3278 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
) {
3279 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3280 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3281 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3283 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3287 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3290 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3292 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3293 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3295 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3298 /* We need to get a client cert */
3299 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
) {
3301 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3302 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3305 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3307 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3310 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3311 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3312 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3313 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3315 } else if (i
== 1) {
3317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3318 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3323 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3324 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3327 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3328 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3329 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3332 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3336 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3337 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3340 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
) {
3341 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
;
3342 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
3343 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
3344 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3346 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3350 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3351 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3354 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3356 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3360 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3369 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3370 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3372 /* we don't have a certificate */
3373 if ((alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
)) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3376 sc
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3382 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
3384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3385 dh
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
3388 /* This is the passed certificate */
3390 idx
= sc
->peer_cert_type
;
3391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3392 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3393 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, s
) == 0) {
3395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3400 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3402 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3404 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3409 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
3410 i
= X509_certificate_type(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, pkey
);
3411 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3413 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3414 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3416 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3420 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3422 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3427 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) &&
3428 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
) || (rsa
!= NULL
))) {
3429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3430 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3435 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) &&
3436 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKT_EXCH
) || (dh
!= NULL
))) {
3437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY
);
3439 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3440 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3442 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3445 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3446 else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3447 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3449 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3455 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PKT_EXP
)) {
3456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3457 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3459 || RSA_size(rsa
) * 8 >
3460 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3462 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3468 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3470 || DH_size(dh
) * 8 >
3471 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3473 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3480 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
3486 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3493 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3494 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3495 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3496 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3497 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3498 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3499 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3501 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
)
3505 if (s
->version
< TLS1_VERSION
|| !s
->tls_session_secret_cb
||
3506 !s
->session
->tlsext_tick
)
3509 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3510 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3512 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3513 * so permit appropriate message length.
3514 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3515 * and not its length.
3517 s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3520 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3521 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3526 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3528 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
3531 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3532 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3534 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
3541 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3542 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3544 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3547 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
) {
3548 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3549 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3550 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3552 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3553 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3554 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3555 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3556 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3557 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
;
3558 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3562 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3567 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3571 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3572 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3573 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3574 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3579 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3580 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);