2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
170 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_client_method(int ver
)
172 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
173 return (SSLv3_client_method());
178 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method
,
179 ssl_undefined_function
,
180 ssl3_connect
, ssl3_get_client_method
)
182 int ssl3_connect(SSL
*s
)
185 unsigned long Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
186 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
188 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
190 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
194 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
195 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
196 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
197 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
200 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
))
203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
205 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
206 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
209 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
210 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
219 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
221 s
->state
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
222 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
227 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
231 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
233 if ((s
->version
& 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
239 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
244 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
245 s
->type
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
247 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
248 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
252 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
260 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
265 /* setup buffing BIO */
266 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 0)) {
271 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
273 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
275 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
276 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
278 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
280 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
282 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
285 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
286 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
289 ret
= ssl3_client_hello(s
);
292 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
295 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
296 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
297 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
301 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
302 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
303 ret
= ssl3_get_server_hello(s
);
308 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
310 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
311 /* receive renewed session ticket */
312 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
316 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
;
320 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
:
321 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B
:
322 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
326 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
327 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
328 ret
= ssl3_get_server_certificate(s
);
331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
332 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
333 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
;
335 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
338 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
344 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
349 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
350 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
351 ret
= ssl3_get_key_exchange(s
);
354 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
;
358 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
361 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
367 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
:
368 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
:
369 ret
= ssl3_get_certificate_request(s
);
372 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
;
376 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
:
377 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
:
378 ret
= ssl3_get_server_done(s
);
381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
382 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
383 if ((ret
= SRP_Calc_A_param(s
)) <= 0) {
384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
385 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
390 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
391 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
;
393 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
398 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
:
399 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
:
400 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
:
401 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
:
402 ret
= ssl3_send_client_certificate(s
);
405 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
409 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
410 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
411 ret
= ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s
);
415 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
418 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
419 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
422 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
423 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
424 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
425 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
427 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
428 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
;
430 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
432 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
433 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
439 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
:
440 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
:
441 ret
= ssl3_send_client_verify(s
);
444 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
448 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
:
449 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
:
450 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
452 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
);
456 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
457 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
459 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
460 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
462 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
466 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
467 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
468 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
470 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
471 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
473 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
475 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
480 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
481 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
489 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
490 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
491 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
492 ret
= ssl3_send_next_proto(s
);
495 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
499 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
:
500 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
:
501 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
502 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
,
503 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
,
505 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
507 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
510 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
;
513 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
515 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
516 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED
) {
517 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
518 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
519 s
->s3
->delay_buf_pop_ret
= 0;
522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
524 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
526 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
527 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
531 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
537 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
538 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
539 ret
= ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s
);
542 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
546 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
:
547 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
:
548 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_status(s
);
551 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
556 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
:
557 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
:
558 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
559 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
,
560 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
);
565 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
567 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
571 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
:
572 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
573 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
577 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
578 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
582 /* clean a few things up */
583 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
585 if (s
->init_buf
!= NULL
) {
586 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
591 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
594 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
))
595 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
596 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
602 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
604 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
608 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_connect
;
609 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
612 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
624 /* did we do anything */
625 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
627 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
631 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
632 new_state
= s
->state
;
634 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP
, 1);
635 s
->state
= new_state
;
645 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT
, ret
);
649 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
652 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
661 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
662 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
663 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
664 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
665 (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
666 !sess
->session_id_length
|| (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
667 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
670 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
671 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
672 int options
= s
->options
;
673 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
674 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
675 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
,
677 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
681 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
683 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
688 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
690 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
691 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
694 * We only support one version: update method
696 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
697 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
698 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
700 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
702 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
704 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
707 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
708 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
710 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
713 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
722 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
723 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
726 /* Do the message type and length last */
727 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
730 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
731 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
732 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
733 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
734 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
735 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
736 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
737 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
740 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
741 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
742 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
743 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
744 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
745 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
746 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
747 * know that is maximum server supports.
748 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
749 * containing version 1.0.
751 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
752 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
753 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
754 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
755 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
756 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
757 * the negotiated version.
759 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
760 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
763 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
764 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
770 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
773 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
777 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
781 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
782 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
783 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
787 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
788 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
789 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
792 /* Ciphers supported */
793 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]), 0);
795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
798 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
800 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
801 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
804 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
805 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
806 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
812 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
816 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
819 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
821 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
822 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
826 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
830 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
835 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
837 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
844 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
);
845 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
848 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
849 return ssl_do_write(s
);
854 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
856 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
859 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
860 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ok
;
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
867 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
868 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
873 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
874 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
,
875 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
, -1, 20000, &ok
);
880 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
882 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
883 if (s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0) {
884 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
886 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
888 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
895 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
896 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
901 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
902 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
903 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
904 int hversion
= (p
[0] << 8) | p
[1];
905 int options
= s
->options
;
906 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
907 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
908 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
910 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
911 s
->version
= hversion
;
912 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
914 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
915 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
918 s
->version
= hversion
;
919 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
922 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
925 if ((p
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8)) || (p
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
927 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | p
[1];
928 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
933 /* load the server hello data */
934 /* load the server random */
935 memcpy(s
->s3
->server_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
936 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
940 /* get the session-id */
943 if ((j
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
) || (j
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
)) {
944 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
950 * check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared
953 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
954 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
955 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
956 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
957 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
959 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
960 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
961 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
+ j
);
965 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
967 if (!s
->hit
&& j
!= 0 && j
== s
->session
->session_id_length
968 && memcmp(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, j
) == 0) {
969 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
970 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
971 /* actually a client application bug */
972 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
974 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
979 /* a miss or crap from the other end */
982 * If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new SSL_SESSION so
983 * we don't stuff up other people
985 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
986 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
990 s
->session
->session_id_length
= j
;
991 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, p
, j
); /* j could be 0 */
994 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
);
997 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1001 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1002 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1003 ct
->mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1007 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1010 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1011 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1015 p
+= ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
1017 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1018 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1020 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1021 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1027 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1028 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1029 * set and use it for comparison.
1031 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1032 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1033 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1034 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1036 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1039 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1041 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1044 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1046 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1048 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1050 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1052 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1056 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1057 * using compression.
1059 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1065 if (s
->hit
&& j
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1066 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1068 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1073 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1074 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1078 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, j
);
1080 if ((j
!= 0) && (comp
== NULL
)) {
1081 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1083 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1086 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1091 /* TLS extensions */
1092 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1099 /* wrong packet length */
1100 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1107 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1112 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
1114 int al
, i
, ok
, ret
= -1;
1115 unsigned long n
, nc
, llen
, l
;
1117 const unsigned char *q
, *p
;
1119 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1121 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1122 int need_cert
= 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1125 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1128 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1133 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) ||
1134 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) &&
1135 (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
))) {
1136 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1140 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
1141 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1145 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1147 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1153 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
1154 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1158 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
1160 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
1161 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1163 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1168 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &q
, l
);
1170 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1175 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1177 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1180 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1189 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1190 if ((s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
) && (i
<= 0)
1191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1192 && !((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1193 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1194 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1196 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1198 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1201 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1204 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1208 sc
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1212 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
)
1213 ssl_sess_cert_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
);
1214 s
->session
->sess_cert
= sc
;
1216 sc
->cert_chain
= sk
;
1218 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1219 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1221 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1224 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1227 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1229 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1230 need_cert
= ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1231 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1235 fprintf(stderr
, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey
, x
);
1236 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
));
1237 fprintf(stderr
, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1238 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->name
,
1239 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
,
1240 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
, need_cert
);
1241 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1243 if (need_cert
&& ((pkey
== NULL
) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))) {
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1247 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1251 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1252 if (need_cert
&& i
< 0) {
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1256 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1261 int exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1262 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
) {
1264 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1266 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1269 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1270 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1272 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1275 if (sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
!= NULL
)
1276 X509_free(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
1277 sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
= x
;
1278 sc
->peer_key
= &(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
]);
1280 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
1281 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1282 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1283 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1285 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1286 sc
->peer_key
= NULL
;
1288 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
1289 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1290 s
->session
->peer
= NULL
;
1292 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1298 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1301 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1303 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1307 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1310 unsigned char *q
, md_buf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
* 2];
1313 unsigned char *param
, *p
;
1315 long i
, param_len
, n
, alg_k
, alg_a
;
1316 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1317 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1325 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1326 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1327 EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1329 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
1332 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1335 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1336 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1338 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1339 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1340 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1341 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1345 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1347 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1349 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1352 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1354 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1359 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1360 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1363 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1364 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1365 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
1366 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1367 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1370 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1374 param
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1375 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
!= NULL
) {
1376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1377 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
) {
1378 RSA_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
);
1379 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= NULL
;
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1383 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
) {
1384 DH_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1385 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1389 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
) {
1390 EC_KEY_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
);
1391 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= NULL
;
1395 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1398 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1401 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1403 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1406 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1407 char tmp_id_hint
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
1410 if (param_len
> n
) {
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1417 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1418 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1419 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1422 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1423 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1427 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1429 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH
);
1435 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1436 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1437 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1439 memcpy(tmp_id_hint
, p
, i
);
1440 memset(tmp_id_hint
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
1441 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
1442 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1443 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint
);
1444 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
1445 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1453 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1455 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1457 if (param_len
> n
) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1463 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH
);
1469 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.N
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1475 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1483 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH
);
1489 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1495 if (1 > n
- param_len
) {
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1501 i
= (unsigned int)(p
[0]);
1504 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH
);
1510 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.s
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1516 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1524 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH
);
1530 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.B
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1537 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1542 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1543 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1544 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1546 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1547 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1551 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1552 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1554 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1555 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1559 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1561 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1562 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1563 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1564 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1568 if ((rsa
= RSA_new()) == NULL
) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1574 if (param_len
> n
) {
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1580 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH
);
1586 if (!(rsa
->n
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->n
))) {
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1592 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1600 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH
);
1606 if (!(rsa
->e
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->e
))) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1613 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1614 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1616 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1617 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1622 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1625 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1629 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
1630 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1636 if (param_len
> n
) {
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1642 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH
);
1648 if (!(dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1654 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1662 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH
);
1668 if (!(dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1674 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1682 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH
);
1688 if (!(dh
->pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1695 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1696 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1700 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1701 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1703 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1704 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1708 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1709 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1711 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1712 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1715 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1717 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1719 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)) {
1720 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1722 SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER
);
1725 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1728 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
) {
1730 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1732 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1738 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1739 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1740 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1744 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1745 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1746 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1749 if (param_len
> n
) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1754 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1755 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1757 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, p
, 3)) {
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1762 if ((curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p
+ 2))) == 0) {
1763 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1765 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1769 ngroup
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid
);
1770 if (ngroup
== NULL
) {
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1774 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh
, ngroup
) == 0) {
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1778 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup
);
1780 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
);
1782 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1783 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1784 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1786 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1792 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1793 if (((srvr_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) ||
1794 ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)) {
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1799 encoded_pt_len
= *p
; /* length of encoded point */
1802 if ((encoded_pt_len
> n
- param_len
) ||
1803 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, srvr_ecpoint
,
1804 p
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
) == 0)) {
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1808 param_len
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1811 p
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1814 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1815 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1819 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1820 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1822 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1823 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1825 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1826 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1828 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1829 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
1831 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1832 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh
, srvr_ecpoint
);
1833 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= ecdh
;
1835 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1837 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1838 srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1840 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1844 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1846 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1848 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1850 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1856 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
1863 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1876 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1879 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1881 if ((i
!= n
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
1882 /* wrong packet length */
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1887 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1893 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1894 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1895 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1896 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1897 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1899 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1901 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1902 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, &size
);
1906 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
, p
, n
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
);
1908 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
1914 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1921 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1922 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1924 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1926 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1927 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx
, p
, (int)n
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1929 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1935 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1936 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1937 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1938 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
1939 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1943 /* still data left over */
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1949 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1950 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1953 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1955 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1965 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1966 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1970 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1974 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1977 unsigned long n
, nc
, l
;
1978 unsigned int llen
, ctype_num
, i
;
1979 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1980 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
1982 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1984 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1985 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
,
1986 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
,
1987 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1992 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
1994 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
1995 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1997 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
1998 * wont be doing client auth.
2000 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2001 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
2007 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
2008 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2013 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2014 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2015 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) {
2016 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2018 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER
);
2023 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2025 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2030 /* get the certificate types */
2032 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
) {
2033 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2034 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2036 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2037 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2038 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2039 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2043 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, p
, ctype_num
);
2044 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
2045 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2047 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2048 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = p
[i
];
2050 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2053 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2056 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
+ 2) > n
) {
2057 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2059 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2062 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2063 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2064 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].digest
= NULL
;
2065 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].valid_flags
= 0;
2067 if ((llen
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, p
, llen
)) {
2068 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2070 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2073 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2074 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2081 /* get the CA RDNs */
2084 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
) != n
) {
2085 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2090 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
2092 if ((l
+ nc
+ 2) > llen
) {
2093 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG
);
2100 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &q
, l
)) == NULL
) {
2101 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2107 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2109 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2112 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2121 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2122 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2123 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2124 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
!= NULL
)
2125 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2126 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2132 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2136 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2138 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2142 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2144 int ok
, al
, ret
= 0, ticklen
;
2146 const unsigned char *p
;
2149 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2150 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
,
2151 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
,
2152 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, 16384, &ok
);
2158 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2159 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2164 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2165 n2l(p
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
);
2167 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2168 if (ticklen
+ 6 != n
) {
2169 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2173 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2174 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2175 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2177 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2178 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2182 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, p
, ticklen
);
2183 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2185 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2186 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2187 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2188 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2189 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2190 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2191 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2192 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2193 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2195 EVP_Digest(p
, ticklen
,
2196 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2197 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2201 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2206 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
2209 unsigned long resplen
, n
;
2210 const unsigned char *p
;
2212 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2213 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
,
2214 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
,
2215 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
, 16384, &ok
);
2220 /* need at least status type + length */
2221 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2225 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2226 if (*p
++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2227 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2232 if (resplen
+ 4 != n
) {
2233 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2237 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
)
2238 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2239 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= BUF_memdup(p
, resplen
);
2240 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
) {
2241 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2245 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2246 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2248 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2250 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2255 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2262 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2267 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL
*s
)
2272 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2273 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2274 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
,
2275 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
,
2276 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 30, &ok
);
2281 /* should contain no data */
2282 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2290 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2294 unsigned long alg_k
;
2295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2297 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2301 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2303 EC_KEY
*clnt_ecdh
= NULL
;
2304 const EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2305 EVP_PKEY
*srvr_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2306 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2307 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2308 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2310 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2313 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
2314 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2316 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2318 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2322 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2324 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2325 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2329 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2331 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2334 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2338 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
)
2339 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
2342 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2343 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].
2345 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2346 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2351 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2352 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2355 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2356 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2357 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2361 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2362 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2364 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen
, pms
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2366 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2368 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2373 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2377 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2378 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2385 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2386 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2387 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2388 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2389 krb5_data
*enc_ticket
;
2390 krb5_data authenticator
, *authp
= NULL
;
2391 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2392 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2393 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2394 unsigned char tmp_buf
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2395 unsigned char epms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2396 int padl
, outl
= sizeof(epms
);
2398 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2401 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2403 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2406 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2408 authp
= &authenticator
;
2409 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2411 krb5rc
= kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, authp
, &kssl_err
);
2412 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2417 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc
);
2418 if (krb5rc
&& kssl_err
.text
)
2419 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2422 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2425 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2431 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2432 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2434 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2435 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2436 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2437 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2438 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2440 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2441 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2442 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2443 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2445 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2446 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2447 * optional authenticator omitted.
2450 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2451 s2n(enc_ticket
->length
, p
);
2452 memcpy(p
, enc_ticket
->data
, enc_ticket
->length
);
2453 p
+= enc_ticket
->length
;
2454 n
= enc_ticket
->length
+ 2;
2456 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2457 if (authp
&& authp
->length
) {
2458 s2n(authp
->length
, p
);
2459 memcpy(p
, authp
->data
, authp
->length
);
2461 n
+= authp
->length
+ 2;
2467 s2n(0, p
); /* null authenticator length */
2471 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2472 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2476 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2477 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2478 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2482 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2483 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2484 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2485 * kssl_ctx->length);
2486 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2489 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2490 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
);
2491 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, epms
, &outl
, pms
, pmslen
);
2492 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(epms
[outl
]), &padl
);
2494 if (outl
> (int)sizeof epms
) {
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2496 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2499 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2501 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2503 memcpy(p
, epms
, outl
);
2506 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms
, outl
);
2509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2510 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2511 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2512 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
2514 if (scert
== NULL
) {
2515 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2517 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2521 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
)
2522 dh_srvr
= scert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2524 /* we get them from the cert */
2525 int idx
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
2526 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2529 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
2531 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2532 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2534 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
) {
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2536 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2540 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2541 /* Use client certificate key */
2542 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2545 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2546 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2548 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2552 /* generate a new random key */
2553 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2557 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2564 pmslen
= DH_size(dh_clnt
);
2565 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2570 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2571 * clear it out afterwards
2574 n
= DH_compute_key(pms
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2575 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2585 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2588 /* send off the data */
2589 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2591 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2597 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2602 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2603 const EC_GROUP
*srvr_group
= NULL
;
2605 int ecdh_clnt_cert
= 0;
2608 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2609 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2611 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2616 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2617 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2618 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2620 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) && (s
->cert
!= NULL
)) {
2622 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2623 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2624 * To add such support, one needs to add
2625 * code that checks for appropriate
2626 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2627 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2628 * key on the same curve as the server's
2629 * and the key should be authorized for
2632 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2633 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2636 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2637 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2638 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2639 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2643 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2644 tkey
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
;
2646 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2648 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2649 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
2650 if ((srvr_pub_pkey
== NULL
)
2651 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2652 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2654 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2658 tkey
= srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
;
2661 srvr_group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2662 srvr_ecpoint
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey
);
2664 if ((srvr_group
== NULL
) || (srvr_ecpoint
== NULL
)) {
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2666 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2670 if ((clnt_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2672 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2676 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh
, srvr_group
)) {
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2680 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2682 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2683 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2685 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2686 tkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2687 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2688 if (priv_key
== NULL
) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2690 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2693 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2698 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2699 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh
))) {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2707 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2708 * clear it out afterwards
2711 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group
);
2712 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2716 pmslen
= (field_size
+ 7) / 8;
2717 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2720 n
= ECDH_compute_key(pms
, pmslen
, srvr_ecpoint
, clnt_ecdh
, NULL
);
2721 if (n
<= 0 || pmslen
!= (size_t)n
) {
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2726 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2727 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2731 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2735 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2736 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2737 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2740 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
2741 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len
* sizeof(unsigned char));
2742 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
2743 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2745 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2749 /* Encode the public key */
2750 n
= EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2751 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2752 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2753 encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
);
2755 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2756 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2758 /* copy the point */
2759 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2760 /* increment n to account for length field */
2764 /* Free allocated memory */
2765 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2766 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
2767 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2768 if (clnt_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2769 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2770 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2772 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2773 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2774 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2775 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2778 unsigned int md_len
;
2780 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2781 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2785 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2790 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2794 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
)].x509
;
2798 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST94
)].x509
;
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2801 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2805 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2806 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2808 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2810 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2811 * certificate key for key exchange
2814 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2816 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2817 /* Generate session key */
2818 RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
);
2820 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2822 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2823 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2824 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2826 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2833 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2836 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2837 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2838 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
));
2839 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2841 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2843 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
);
2844 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
2845 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2846 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2852 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2854 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2856 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2858 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) < 0) {
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2863 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2865 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2868 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2871 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2872 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2873 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2874 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2875 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2876 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2878 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2879 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
2882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2883 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2884 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2885 /* send off the data */
2886 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2888 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2892 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2895 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2896 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2897 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2898 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2900 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2906 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2908 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2909 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2912 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 2];
2913 size_t identity_len
;
2914 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2915 unsigned int psk_len
= 0;
2919 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2921 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2925 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2926 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2927 pmslen
= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4;
2928 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2932 psk_len
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
2933 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2935 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2937 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2939 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2941 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2944 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2945 pmslen
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2946 identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1] = '\0';
2947 identity_len
= strlen(identity
);
2948 if (identity_len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2950 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2953 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2955 memmove(pms
+ psk_len
+ 4, pms
, psk_len
);
2957 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2961 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2962 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2963 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
=
2964 BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2965 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
2966 && s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2968 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2972 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2973 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2974 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup(identity
);
2975 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2977 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2981 s2n(identity_len
, p
);
2982 memcpy(p
, identity
, identity_len
);
2983 n
= 2 + identity_len
;
2986 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2988 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2994 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2999 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
);
3000 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
3003 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3004 n
= ssl_do_write(s
);
3005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3007 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3009 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3010 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3013 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3014 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s
,
3015 s
->session
->master_key
)) <
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3024 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3027 s
->cert
->pmslen
= pmslen
;
3029 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3032 pmslen
= s
->cert
->pmslen
;
3035 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3039 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3040 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3042 session
->master_key
,
3044 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms
, pmslen
);
3046 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3050 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3054 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms
, pmslen
);
3056 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3058 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3059 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3060 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
3061 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3062 if (clnt_ecdh
!= NULL
)
3063 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
3064 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
3069 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
3072 unsigned char data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
3074 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3080 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3082 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
) {
3083 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3084 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3085 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3086 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3087 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx
);
3088 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx
, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3089 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3090 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3093 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
3098 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3099 * digest and cached handshake records.
3101 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3104 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->cert
->key
->digest
;
3105 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3106 if (hdatalen
<= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3112 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3115 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3116 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
3117 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3124 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3127 if (s
->session
->flags
& SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
) {
3128 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3129 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3130 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3131 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3135 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3136 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
, NID_md5
, &(data
[0]));
3137 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, data
,
3138 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
3139 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_RSA_LIB
);
3147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3148 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3149 if (!DSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3150 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3151 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3152 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
)) {
3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_DSA_LIB
);
3160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3161 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3162 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3163 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3164 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3165 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) {
3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
3173 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3174 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3175 unsigned char signbuf
[64];
3177 size_t sigsize
= 64;
3178 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3179 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, data
);
3180 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx
, signbuf
, &sigsize
, data
, 32) <= 0) {
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3184 for (i
= 63, j
= 0; i
>= 0; j
++, i
--) {
3185 p
[2 + j
] = signbuf
[i
];
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3193 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
);
3194 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
;
3196 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3197 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3198 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3200 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3201 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3206 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3207 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3208 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3210 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3212 unsigned long alg_k
;
3213 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3215 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3216 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->cert
->key
->digest
)
3219 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3220 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3222 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3223 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3225 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3226 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3227 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3228 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3229 int i
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
3230 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
3231 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3232 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3233 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
3236 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
3238 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3239 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
3240 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
3244 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3249 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3252 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3255 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
) {
3256 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3257 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3258 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3260 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3264 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3267 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3269 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3270 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3272 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3275 /* We need to get a client cert */
3276 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
) {
3278 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3279 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3282 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3284 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3287 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3288 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3289 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3290 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3292 } else if (i
== 1) {
3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3295 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3301 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3302 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3305 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3306 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3307 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3310 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3314 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3315 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3318 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
) {
3319 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
;
3320 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
3321 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
3322 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3324 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3328 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3329 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3332 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3334 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3338 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3347 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3348 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3350 /* we don't have a certificate */
3351 if ((alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
)) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3354 sc
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3360 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
3362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3363 dh
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
3366 /* This is the passed certificate */
3368 idx
= sc
->peer_cert_type
;
3369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3370 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3371 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, s
) == 0) {
3373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3378 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3380 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3382 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3387 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
3388 i
= X509_certificate_type(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, pkey
);
3389 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3391 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3392 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3394 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3398 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3400 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3405 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) &&
3406 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
) || (rsa
!= NULL
))) {
3407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3408 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3413 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) &&
3414 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKT_EXCH
) || (dh
!= NULL
))) {
3415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY
);
3417 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3418 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3420 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3423 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3424 else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3425 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3427 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3433 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PKT_EXP
)) {
3434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3435 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3437 || RSA_size(rsa
) * 8 >
3438 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3440 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3446 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3448 || DH_size(dh
) * 8 >
3449 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3451 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3458 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
3464 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3470 * Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a case
3471 * of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of session
3472 * tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
3475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3476 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3477 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3479 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3482 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
) {
3483 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3484 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3485 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3487 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3488 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3489 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3490 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3491 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3492 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
;
3493 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3497 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3502 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3506 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3507 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3508 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3509 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3514 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3515 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);