2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
154 #include <openssl/rand.h>
155 #include <openssl/objects.h>
156 #include <openssl/evp.h>
157 #include <openssl/md5.h>
158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
159 # include <openssl/dh.h>
161 #include <openssl/bn.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
163 # include <openssl/engine.h>
166 static int ssl_set_version(SSL
*s
);
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
168 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
);
169 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
171 int (*put_cb
) (const SSL_CIPHER
*,
175 int ssl3_connect(SSL
*s
)
178 unsigned long Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
179 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
181 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
183 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
187 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
188 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
189 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
190 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
193 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) {
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
200 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
201 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
204 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
205 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
214 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
216 s
->state
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
217 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
221 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
222 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
226 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
228 if ((s
->version
>> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
229 && s
->version
!= TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
231 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
236 if (s
->version
!= TLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
237 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
242 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
243 s
->type
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
245 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
246 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
248 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
251 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
253 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
260 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
265 /* setup buffing BIO */
266 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 0)) {
268 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
272 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
274 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
276 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
277 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
279 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
281 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
283 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
286 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
287 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
290 ret
= ssl3_client_hello(s
);
293 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
296 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
297 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
298 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
302 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
303 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
304 ret
= ssl3_get_server_hello(s
);
309 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
310 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
311 /* receive renewed session ticket */
312 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
315 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
;
319 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
:
320 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B
:
321 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
322 ret
= ssl3_check_finished(s
);
327 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
332 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
336 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
337 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
338 ret
= ssl3_get_server_certificate(s
);
342 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
343 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
;
345 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
348 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
354 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
355 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
356 ret
= ssl3_get_key_exchange(s
);
359 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
;
363 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
366 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
368 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
373 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
:
374 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
:
375 ret
= ssl3_get_certificate_request(s
);
378 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
;
382 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
:
383 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
:
384 ret
= ssl3_get_server_done(s
);
387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
388 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
389 if ((ret
= SRP_Calc_A_param(s
)) <= 0) {
390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
391 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
392 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
397 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
398 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
;
400 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
405 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
:
406 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
:
407 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
:
408 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
:
409 ret
= ssl3_send_client_certificate(s
);
412 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
416 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
417 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
418 ret
= ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s
);
422 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
425 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
426 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
429 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
430 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
431 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
432 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
434 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
435 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
;
437 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
439 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
440 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
446 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
:
447 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
:
448 ret
= ssl3_send_client_verify(s
);
451 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
455 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
:
456 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
:
457 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
459 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
);
463 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
464 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
466 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
467 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
469 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
473 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
474 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
475 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
477 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
478 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
480 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
482 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
484 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
488 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
489 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
492 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
498 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
499 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
500 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
501 ret
= ssl3_send_next_proto(s
);
504 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
508 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
:
509 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
:
510 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
511 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
,
512 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
,
514 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
516 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
519 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
;
522 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
524 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
525 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED
) {
526 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
527 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
528 s
->s3
->delay_buf_pop_ret
= 0;
532 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
534 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
535 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
537 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
542 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
543 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
544 ret
= ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s
);
547 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
551 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
:
552 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
:
553 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_status(s
);
556 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
560 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
:
561 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
:
562 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
563 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
564 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
,
565 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
);
570 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
572 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
576 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
:
577 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
578 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
582 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
583 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
587 /* clean a few things up */
588 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
589 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
593 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
596 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
))
597 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
598 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
604 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
606 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
610 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_connect
;
611 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
614 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
627 /* did we do anything */
628 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
630 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
634 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
635 new_state
= s
->state
;
637 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP
, 1);
638 s
->state
= new_state
;
647 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT
, ret
);
652 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
653 * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
654 * Returns 1 on success
657 static int ssl_set_version(SSL
*s
)
659 unsigned long mask
, options
= s
->options
;
661 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
663 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
664 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
665 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
666 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
667 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
668 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
670 mask
= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
| SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
671 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
675 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
676 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
) {
677 if ((options
& mask
) != mask
) {
678 s
->version
= TLS1_1_VERSION
;
680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
684 s
->version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
687 if ((options
& mask
) == mask
) {
688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
691 s
->version
= TLS1_1_VERSION
;
694 mask
&= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
;
695 if ((options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
) && (options
& mask
) != mask
)
696 s
->version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
697 mask
&= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
;
698 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
699 if ((options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
) && (options
& mask
) != mask
)
700 s
->version
= SSL3_VERSION
;
703 if (s
->version
!= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
,
705 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
709 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& FIPS_mode()) {
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE
);
714 } else if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
715 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
716 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
717 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
718 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
,
720 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
724 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
726 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
731 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
733 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
734 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
737 * We only support one version: update method
739 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
740 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
741 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
745 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
750 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
753 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
762 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
763 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
764 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
766 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
767 if (ssl_set_version(s
) == 0)
770 if ((sess
== NULL
) || (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
772 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
773 * "ticket" without a session ID.
775 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
776 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
777 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
780 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
782 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
785 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
786 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
788 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
791 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
800 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
801 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
804 /* Do the message type and length last */
805 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
808 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
809 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
810 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
811 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
812 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
813 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
814 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
815 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
818 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
819 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
820 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
821 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
822 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
823 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
824 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
825 * know that is maximum server supports.
826 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
827 * containing version 1.0.
829 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
830 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
831 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
832 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
833 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
834 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
835 * the negotiated version.
837 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
838 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
841 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
842 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
848 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
851 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
855 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
859 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
860 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
861 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
865 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
866 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
867 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
870 /* Ciphers supported */
871 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]), 0);
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
876 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
878 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
879 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
882 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
883 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
884 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
890 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
894 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
897 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
899 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
900 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
904 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
907 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
912 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
914 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
920 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
921 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
925 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
928 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
929 return ssl_do_write(s
);
931 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
935 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
937 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
939 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
940 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ok
;
943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
947 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
948 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
952 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
953 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
,
954 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
, -1, 20000, &ok
);
960 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
961 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
962 if (s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0) {
963 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
965 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
967 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
974 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
975 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
980 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
982 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
983 int sversion
= (p
[0] << 8) | p
[1];
985 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
986 #error Code needs updating for new TLS version
988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
989 if ((sversion
== SSL3_VERSION
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
)) {
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
992 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE
);
993 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
996 s
->method
= SSLv3_client_method();
999 if ((sversion
== TLS1_VERSION
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
)) {
1000 s
->method
= TLSv1_client_method();
1001 } else if ((sversion
== TLS1_1_VERSION
) &&
1002 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
)) {
1003 s
->method
= TLSv1_1_client_method();
1004 } else if ((sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
) &&
1005 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
)) {
1006 s
->method
= TLSv1_2_client_method();
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1009 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1012 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
1014 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
1016 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1019 } else if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1020 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
1021 int hversion
= (p
[0] << 8) | p
[1];
1022 int options
= s
->options
;
1023 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
1024 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
1025 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1027 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1028 s
->version
= hversion
;
1029 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1031 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
1032 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1035 s
->version
= hversion
;
1036 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1039 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
1040 } else if ((p
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8)) || (p
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1042 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | p
[1];
1043 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1048 /* load the server hello data */
1049 /* load the server random */
1050 memcpy(s
->s3
->server_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1051 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1055 /* get the session-id */
1058 if ((j
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
) || (j
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
)) {
1059 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1065 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1066 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1067 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1068 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1069 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1070 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1071 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1072 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1073 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1074 * server wants to resume.
1076 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
1077 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
1078 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1079 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1080 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1081 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1083 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1084 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1085 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
+ j
);
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1088 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1093 if (j
!= 0 && j
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1094 && memcmp(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, j
) == 0) {
1095 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1096 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1097 /* actually a client application bug */
1098 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1100 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1106 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1107 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1108 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1109 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1110 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1112 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1113 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1117 s
->session
->session_id_length
= j
;
1118 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, p
, j
); /* j could be 0 */
1121 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
);
1123 /* unknown cipher */
1124 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1128 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1129 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1130 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1132 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= 0;
1134 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1137 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1138 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1142 p
+= ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
1144 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1145 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1147 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1148 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1154 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1155 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1156 * set and use it for comparison.
1158 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1159 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1160 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1161 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1163 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1166 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1168 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1171 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1173 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1175 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1177 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1179 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1183 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1184 * using compression.
1186 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1192 if (s
->hit
&& j
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1193 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1195 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1200 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1201 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1205 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, j
);
1207 if ((j
!= 0) && (comp
== NULL
)) {
1208 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1210 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1213 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1217 /* TLS extensions */
1218 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1224 /* wrong packet length */
1225 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1232 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1234 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1238 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
1240 int al
, i
, ok
, ret
= -1, exp_idx
;
1241 unsigned long n
, nc
, llen
, l
;
1243 const unsigned char *q
, *p
;
1245 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1247 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1249 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1252 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1257 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1258 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1262 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
1263 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1267 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1269 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1275 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
1276 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1280 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
1282 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
1283 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1285 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1290 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &q
, l
);
1292 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1297 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1299 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1302 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1311 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1312 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1313 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1315 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1318 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1321 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1325 sc
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1329 ssl_sess_cert_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
);
1330 s
->session
->sess_cert
= sc
;
1332 sc
->cert_chain
= sk
;
1334 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1335 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1337 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1340 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1343 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1345 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1349 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1353 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1358 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1362 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1363 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
) {
1365 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1367 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1370 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1371 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1373 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1376 X509_free(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
1377 sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
= x
;
1378 sc
->peer_key
= &(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
]);
1380 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1381 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1382 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1383 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1390 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1392 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1394 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1396 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1400 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1403 unsigned char *q
, md_buf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
* 2];
1406 unsigned char *param
, *p
;
1408 long i
, param_len
, n
, alg_k
, alg_a
;
1409 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1410 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1418 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1419 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1420 EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1422 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
1425 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1428 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1429 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1431 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1432 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1433 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1434 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1438 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1440 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1442 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1445 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) {
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1447 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1452 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1453 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1456 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1457 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1458 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1459 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1462 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1466 param
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1467 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
!= NULL
) {
1468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1469 RSA_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
);
1470 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= NULL
;
1472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1473 DH_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1474 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1477 EC_KEY_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
);
1478 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= NULL
;
1481 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1484 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1487 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1489 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1492 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1493 char tmp_id_hint
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
1496 if (param_len
> n
) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1503 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1504 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1505 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1508 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1509 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1513 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1515 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH
);
1521 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1522 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1523 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1525 memcpy(tmp_id_hint
, p
, i
);
1526 memset(tmp_id_hint
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
1527 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1528 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint
);
1529 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
1530 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1538 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1540 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1542 if (param_len
> n
) {
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1548 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH
);
1554 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1560 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1568 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH
);
1574 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1580 if (1 > n
- param_len
) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1586 i
= (unsigned int)(p
[0]);
1589 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH
);
1595 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.s
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1601 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1609 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH
);
1615 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.B
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1622 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1627 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1628 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1629 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1631 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1632 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1636 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1637 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1639 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1640 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1644 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1646 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1647 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1648 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1649 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1653 if ((rsa
= RSA_new()) == NULL
) {
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1659 if (param_len
> n
) {
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1665 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH
);
1671 if ((rsa
->n
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->n
)) == NULL
) {
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1677 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1685 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH
);
1691 if ((rsa
->e
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->e
)) == NULL
) {
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1698 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1699 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1701 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1702 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1707 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1710 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1714 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
1715 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1721 if (param_len
> n
) {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1727 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH
);
1733 if ((dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1739 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1747 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH
);
1753 if ((dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1759 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1767 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH
);
1773 if ((dh
->pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1780 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1781 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1785 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1786 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1788 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1789 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1793 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1794 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1796 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1797 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1800 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1802 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1805 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1808 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
) {
1810 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1812 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
1813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1818 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1819 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1820 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1824 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1825 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1826 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1829 if (param_len
> n
) {
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1834 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1835 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1837 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, p
, 3)) {
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1842 if ((curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p
+ 2))) == 0) {
1843 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1845 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1849 ngroup
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid
);
1850 if (ngroup
== NULL
) {
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1854 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh
, ngroup
) == 0) {
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1858 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup
);
1860 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
);
1862 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1863 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1864 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1866 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1872 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1873 if (((srvr_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) ||
1874 ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)) {
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1879 encoded_pt_len
= *p
; /* length of encoded point */
1882 if ((encoded_pt_len
> n
- param_len
) ||
1883 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, srvr_ecpoint
,
1884 p
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
) == 0)) {
1885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1888 param_len
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1891 p
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1894 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1895 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1899 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1900 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1902 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1903 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1905 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1906 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1908 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1909 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
1911 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1912 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh
, srvr_ecpoint
);
1913 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= ecdh
;
1915 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1917 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1918 srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1920 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1924 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1926 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1928 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1930 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1936 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
1943 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1956 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1959 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1961 if ((i
!= n
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
1962 /* wrong packet length */
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1967 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1973 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1974 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1975 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1976 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1977 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1979 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1981 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1982 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, &size
);
1986 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
, p
, n
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
);
1988 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
1994 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2001 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
2002 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2004 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2006 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
2007 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx
, p
, (int)n
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2009 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2015 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
2016 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2017 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2018 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
2019 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2023 /* still data left over */
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2029 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2030 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2033 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2035 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2043 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2044 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
2047 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2048 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2052 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2055 unsigned long n
, nc
, l
;
2056 unsigned int llen
, ctype_num
, i
;
2057 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2058 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
2060 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2062 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2063 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
,
2064 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
,
2065 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
2070 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2072 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
2073 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
2075 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2076 * wont be doing client auth.
2078 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2079 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
2085 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
2086 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2091 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2092 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2093 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) {
2094 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2096 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER
);
2101 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2103 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2108 /* get the certificate types */
2110 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2111 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2112 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2113 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2114 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2115 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2119 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, p
, ctype_num
);
2120 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
2121 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2123 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2124 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = p
[i
];
2126 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2129 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2132 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
+ 2) > n
) {
2133 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2135 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2138 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2139 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2140 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
2141 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2143 if ((llen
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, p
, llen
)) {
2144 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2146 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2149 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2150 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2157 /* get the CA RDNs */
2160 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
) != n
) {
2161 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2166 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
2168 if ((l
+ nc
+ 2) > llen
) {
2169 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG
);
2176 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &q
, l
)) == NULL
) {
2177 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2183 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2185 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2188 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2197 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2198 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2199 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2200 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2201 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2207 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2209 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2213 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2215 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2218 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2220 int ok
, al
, ret
= 0, ticklen
;
2222 const unsigned char *p
;
2225 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2226 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
,
2227 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
,
2228 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, 16384, &ok
);
2234 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2235 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2240 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2242 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2243 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2244 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2246 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2249 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2251 * Remove the old session from the cache
2253 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE
) {
2254 if (s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2255 s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb(s
->session_ctx
,
2258 /* We carry on if this fails */
2259 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2263 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2264 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2269 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2270 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2273 n2l(p
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
);
2275 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2276 if (ticklen
+ 6 != n
) {
2277 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2281 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2282 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2283 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2284 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2288 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, p
, ticklen
);
2289 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2291 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2292 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2293 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2294 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2295 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2296 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2297 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2298 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2299 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2301 EVP_Digest(p
, ticklen
,
2302 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2303 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2307 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2309 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2313 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
2316 unsigned long resplen
, n
;
2317 const unsigned char *p
;
2319 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2320 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
,
2321 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
,
2322 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
, 16384, &ok
);
2327 /* need at least status type + length */
2328 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2332 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2333 if (*p
++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2334 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2339 if (resplen
+ 4 != n
) {
2340 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2344 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2345 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= BUF_memdup(p
, resplen
);
2346 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
) {
2347 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2351 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2352 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2354 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2356 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2361 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2368 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2369 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2373 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL
*s
)
2378 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2379 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2380 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
,
2381 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
,
2382 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 30, &ok
);
2387 /* should contain no data */
2388 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2390 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2397 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2401 unsigned long alg_k
;
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2404 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2407 EC_KEY
*clnt_ecdh
= NULL
;
2408 const EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2409 EVP_PKEY
*srvr_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2410 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2411 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2412 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2414 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2417 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
2418 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2420 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2422 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2426 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2428 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2429 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2433 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2435 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2438 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2442 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
)
2443 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
2446 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2447 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].
2449 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2450 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2452 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2455 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2456 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2459 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2460 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2461 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2465 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2466 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2468 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen
, pms
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2470 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2472 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2477 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2481 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2482 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2489 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2490 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2491 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
2493 if (scert
== NULL
) {
2494 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2496 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2500 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
)
2501 dh_srvr
= scert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2503 /* we get them from the cert */
2504 int idx
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
2505 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2508 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
2510 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2511 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2513 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
) {
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2519 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2520 /* Use client certificate key */
2521 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2524 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2525 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2527 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2531 /* generate a new random key */
2532 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2536 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2543 pmslen
= DH_size(dh_clnt
);
2544 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2549 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2550 * clear it out afterwards
2553 n
= DH_compute_key(pms
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2554 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2564 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2567 /* send off the data */
2568 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2570 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2576 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2581 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2582 const EC_GROUP
*srvr_group
= NULL
;
2584 int ecdh_clnt_cert
= 0;
2587 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2588 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2590 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2595 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2596 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2597 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2599 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) && (s
->cert
!= NULL
)) {
2601 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2602 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2603 * To add such support, one needs to add
2604 * code that checks for appropriate
2605 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2606 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2607 * key on the same curve as the server's
2608 * and the key should be authorized for
2611 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2612 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2615 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2616 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2617 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2618 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2622 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2623 tkey
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
;
2625 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2627 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2628 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
2629 if ((srvr_pub_pkey
== NULL
)
2630 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2631 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2633 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2637 tkey
= srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
;
2640 srvr_group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2641 srvr_ecpoint
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey
);
2643 if ((srvr_group
== NULL
) || (srvr_ecpoint
== NULL
)) {
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2645 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2649 if ((clnt_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2651 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2655 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh
, srvr_group
)) {
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2659 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2661 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2662 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2664 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2665 tkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2666 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2667 if (priv_key
== NULL
) {
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2669 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2672 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2677 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2678 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh
))) {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2686 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2687 * clear it out afterwards
2690 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group
);
2691 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2695 pmslen
= (field_size
+ 7) / 8;
2696 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2699 n
= ECDH_compute_key(pms
, pmslen
, srvr_ecpoint
, clnt_ecdh
, NULL
);
2700 if (n
<= 0 || pmslen
!= (size_t)n
) {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2705 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2706 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2710 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2714 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2715 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2716 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2719 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
2720 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len
* sizeof(unsigned char));
2721 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
2722 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2724 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2728 /* Encode the public key */
2729 n
= EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2730 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2731 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2732 encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
);
2734 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2735 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2737 /* copy the point */
2738 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2739 /* increment n to account for length field */
2743 /* Free allocated memory */
2744 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2745 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2746 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2747 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2749 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2750 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2751 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2752 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2755 unsigned int md_len
;
2757 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2758 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2762 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2767 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2771 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
)].x509
;
2775 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST94
)].x509
;
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2778 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2782 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2783 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2785 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2787 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2788 * certificate key for key exchange
2791 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2793 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2794 /* Generate session key */
2795 if (RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2796 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2798 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2802 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2804 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2805 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2806 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2808 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2815 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2818 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2819 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2820 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
));
2821 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2823 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2825 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
);
2826 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
2827 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2828 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2834 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2836 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2838 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2840 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) < 0) {
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2845 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2847 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2850 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2853 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2854 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2855 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2856 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2857 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2858 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2860 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2861 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
2864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2865 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2866 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2867 /* send off the data */
2868 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2870 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2874 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2877 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2878 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2879 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2881 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2887 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2889 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2890 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2893 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 2];
2894 size_t identity_len
;
2895 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2896 unsigned int psk_len
= 0;
2900 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2902 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2906 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2907 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2908 pmslen
= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4;
2909 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2913 psk_len
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
2914 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2916 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2918 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2920 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2922 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2925 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2926 pmslen
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2927 identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1] = '\0';
2928 identity_len
= strlen(identity
);
2929 if (identity_len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2931 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2934 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2936 memmove(pms
+ psk_len
+ 4, pms
, psk_len
);
2938 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2942 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2943 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
=
2944 BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2945 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
2946 && s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2948 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2952 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2953 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup(identity
);
2954 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2956 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2960 s2n(identity_len
, p
);
2961 memcpy(p
, identity
, identity_len
);
2962 n
= 2 + identity_len
;
2965 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2967 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2973 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2978 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
2979 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2984 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2987 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
2988 n
= ssl_do_write(s
);
2989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2991 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2993 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
2994 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
2997 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2998 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s
,
2999 s
->session
->master_key
)) <
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3002 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3008 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3010 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3011 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3013 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3015 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3016 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3019 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3023 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3024 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3026 session
->master_key
,
3028 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3029 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3030 if (s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
3031 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3038 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3041 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3042 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3044 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3045 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3046 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
3047 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
3049 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3053 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
3056 unsigned char data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
3058 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3064 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3066 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
) {
3067 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3068 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3069 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3070 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3071 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx
);
3072 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx
, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3073 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3074 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3077 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
3082 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3083 * digest and cached handshake records.
3085 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3088 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
3089 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3090 if (hdatalen
<= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3096 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3099 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3100 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
3101 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3108 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3111 if (s
->session
->flags
& SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
) {
3112 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3113 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3114 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3115 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3119 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3120 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
, NID_md5
, &(data
[0]));
3121 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, data
,
3122 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
3123 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_RSA_LIB
);
3131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3132 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3133 if (!DSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3134 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3135 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3136 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
)) {
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_DSA_LIB
);
3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3145 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3146 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3147 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3148 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3149 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) {
3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
3157 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3158 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3159 unsigned char signbuf
[64];
3161 size_t sigsize
= 64;
3162 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3163 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, data
);
3164 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx
, signbuf
, &sigsize
, data
, 32) <= 0) {
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3168 for (i
= 63, j
= 0; i
>= 0; j
++, i
--) {
3169 p
[2 + j
] = signbuf
[i
];
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3177 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
3178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3181 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
;
3183 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3184 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3185 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3187 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3188 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3189 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3194 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3195 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3196 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3198 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3200 unsigned long alg_k
;
3201 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3203 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3204 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
3207 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3208 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3210 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3211 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3213 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3214 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3215 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3216 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3217 int i
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
3218 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
3219 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3220 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3221 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
3224 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
3226 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3227 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
3228 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
3232 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3237 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3240 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3243 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
) {
3244 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3245 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3246 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3248 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3252 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3253 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3256 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3258 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3259 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3261 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3264 /* We need to get a client cert */
3265 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
) {
3267 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3268 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3271 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3273 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3276 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3277 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3278 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3279 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3281 } else if (i
== 1) {
3283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3284 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3288 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3289 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3292 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3293 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3294 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3297 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3298 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
3299 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3300 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3306 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3307 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3310 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
) {
3311 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
;
3312 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
3313 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
3314 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3316 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3317 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3321 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3322 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3325 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3327 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3331 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3341 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3342 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3344 /* we don't have a certificate */
3345 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3348 sc
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3354 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
3356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3357 dh
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
3360 /* This is the passed certificate */
3362 idx
= sc
->peer_cert_type
;
3363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3364 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3365 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, s
) == 0) {
3367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3372 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3374 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3376 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3381 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
3382 pkey_bits
= EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey
);
3383 i
= X509_certificate_type(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, pkey
);
3384 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3386 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3387 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3389 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3393 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3395 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3400 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) &&
3401 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
) || (rsa
!= NULL
))) {
3402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3403 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3408 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) &&
3409 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKT_EXCH
) || (dh
!= NULL
))) {
3410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY
);
3412 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3413 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3415 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3418 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3419 else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3420 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3422 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3428 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
3429 pkey_bits
> SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3431 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3433 || RSA_size(rsa
) * 8 >
3434 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3436 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3442 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3444 || DH_size(dh
) * 8 >
3445 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3447 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3454 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
3460 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3466 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3467 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3468 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3469 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3470 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3471 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3472 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3474 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
)
3478 if (s
->version
< TLS1_VERSION
|| !s
->tls_session_secret_cb
||
3479 !s
->session
->tlsext_tick
)
3482 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3483 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3485 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3486 * so permit appropriate message length.
3487 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3488 * and not its length.
3490 s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3493 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3494 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3499 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3501 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
3504 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3505 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3507 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
3514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3515 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3517 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3520 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
) {
3521 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3522 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3523 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3525 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3526 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3527 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3528 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3529 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3530 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
;
3531 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3535 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3539 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3543 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3544 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3545 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3546 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3551 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3552 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3556 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
3558 int (*put_cb
) (const SSL_CIPHER
*,
3564 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3565 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3566 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3572 put_cb
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char
;
3574 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
3575 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3576 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3577 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
3579 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3580 if (c
->id
== SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
3581 if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3584 empty_reneg_info_scsv
= 0;
3591 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
3595 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3596 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3597 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3599 j
= put_cb(&scsv
, p
);
3601 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3603 "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
3606 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3607 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3608 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3610 j
= put_cb(&scsv
, p
);