2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
154 #include <openssl/rand.h>
155 #include <openssl/objects.h>
156 #include <openssl/evp.h>
157 #include <openssl/md5.h>
158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
159 # include <openssl/dh.h>
161 #include <openssl/bn.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
163 # include <openssl/engine.h>
166 static int ssl_set_version(SSL
*s
);
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
169 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
);
171 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
173 int (*put_cb
) (const SSL_CIPHER
*,
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
177 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_client_method(int ver
)
179 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
180 return (SSLv3_client_method());
185 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method
,
186 ssl_undefined_function
,
187 ssl3_connect
, ssl3_get_client_method
)
189 int ssl3_connect(SSL
*s
)
192 unsigned long Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
193 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
195 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
197 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
201 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
202 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
203 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
204 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) {
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
214 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
215 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
218 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
219 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
228 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
230 s
->state
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
231 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
235 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
236 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
240 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
242 if ((s
->version
>> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
243 && s
->version
!= TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
245 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
250 if (s
->version
!= TLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
251 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
256 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
257 s
->type
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
259 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
260 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
262 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
265 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
267 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
274 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
279 /* setup buffing BIO */
280 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 0)) {
282 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
286 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
288 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
290 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
291 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
293 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
295 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
297 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
300 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
301 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
304 ret
= ssl3_client_hello(s
);
307 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
310 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
311 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
312 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
316 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
317 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
318 ret
= ssl3_get_server_hello(s
);
323 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
325 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
326 /* receive renewed session ticket */
327 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
331 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
;
335 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
:
336 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B
:
337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
338 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
339 ret
= ssl3_check_finished(s
);
344 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
349 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
353 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
354 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
355 ret
= ssl3_get_server_certificate(s
);
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
359 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
360 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
;
362 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
365 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
371 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
376 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
377 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
378 ret
= ssl3_get_key_exchange(s
);
381 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
;
385 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
388 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
390 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
395 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
:
396 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
:
397 ret
= ssl3_get_certificate_request(s
);
400 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
;
404 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
:
405 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
:
406 ret
= ssl3_get_server_done(s
);
409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
410 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
411 if ((ret
= SRP_Calc_A_param(s
)) <= 0) {
412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
413 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
414 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
419 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
420 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
;
422 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
427 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
:
428 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
:
429 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
:
430 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
:
431 ret
= ssl3_send_client_certificate(s
);
434 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
438 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
439 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
440 ret
= ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s
);
444 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
447 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
448 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
451 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
452 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
453 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
454 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
456 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
457 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
;
459 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
461 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
462 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
468 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
:
469 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
:
470 ret
= ssl3_send_client_verify(s
);
473 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
477 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
:
478 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
:
479 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
481 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
);
485 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
486 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
488 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
489 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
491 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
495 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
496 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
497 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
499 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
500 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
502 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
504 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
506 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
510 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
511 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
514 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
520 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
521 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
522 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
523 ret
= ssl3_send_next_proto(s
);
526 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
530 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
:
531 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
:
532 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
533 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
,
534 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
,
536 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
538 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
541 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
;
544 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
546 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
547 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED
) {
548 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
549 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
550 s
->s3
->delay_buf_pop_ret
= 0;
553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
555 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
557 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
558 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
562 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
568 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
569 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
570 ret
= ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s
);
573 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
577 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
:
578 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
:
579 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_status(s
);
582 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
587 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
:
588 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
:
589 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
590 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
591 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
,
592 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
);
597 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
599 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
603 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
:
604 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
605 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
609 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
610 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
614 /* clean a few things up */
615 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
616 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
620 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
623 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
))
624 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
625 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
631 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
633 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
637 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_connect
;
638 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
641 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
654 /* did we do anything */
655 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
657 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
661 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
662 new_state
= s
->state
;
664 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP
, 1);
665 s
->state
= new_state
;
674 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT
, ret
);
679 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
680 * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
681 * Returns 1 on success
684 static int ssl_set_version(SSL
*s
)
686 unsigned long mask
, options
= s
->options
;
688 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
690 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
691 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
692 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
693 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
694 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
695 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
697 mask
= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
| SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
698 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
702 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
703 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
) {
704 if ((options
& mask
) != mask
) {
705 s
->version
= TLS1_1_VERSION
;
707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
711 s
->version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
714 if ((options
& mask
) == mask
) {
715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
718 s
->version
= TLS1_1_VERSION
;
721 mask
&= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
;
722 if ((options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
) && (options
& mask
) != mask
)
723 s
->version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
724 mask
&= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
;
725 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
726 if ((options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
) && (options
& mask
) != mask
)
727 s
->version
= SSL3_VERSION
;
730 if (s
->version
!= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
,
732 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
736 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& FIPS_mode()) {
737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE
);
741 } else if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
742 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
743 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
744 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
745 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
,
747 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
751 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
753 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
758 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
760 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
761 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
764 * We only support one version: update method
766 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
767 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
768 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
772 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
777 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
780 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
789 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
790 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
791 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
793 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
794 if (ssl_set_version(s
) == 0)
797 if ((sess
== NULL
) || (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
798 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
799 !sess
->session_id_length
||
802 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
803 * "ticket" without a session ID.
805 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
807 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
808 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
811 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
813 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
816 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
817 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
819 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
822 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
831 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
832 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
835 /* Do the message type and length last */
836 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
839 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
840 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
841 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
842 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
843 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
844 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
845 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
846 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
849 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
850 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
851 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
852 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
853 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
854 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
855 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
856 * know that is maximum server supports.
857 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
858 * containing version 1.0.
860 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
861 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
862 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
863 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
864 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
865 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
866 * the negotiated version.
868 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
869 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
872 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
873 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
879 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
882 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
886 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
890 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
891 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
892 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
896 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
897 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
898 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
901 /* Ciphers supported */
902 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]), 0);
904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
907 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
909 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
910 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
913 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
914 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
915 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
921 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
925 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
928 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
930 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
931 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
935 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
939 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
944 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
946 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
953 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
954 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
958 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
961 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
962 return ssl_do_write(s
);
964 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
968 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
970 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
973 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
974 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ok
;
977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
981 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
982 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
987 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
988 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
,
989 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
, -1, 20000, &ok
);
994 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
996 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
997 if (s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0) {
998 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1000 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
1002 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1009 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
1010 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1015 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1017 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1018 int sversion
= (p
[0] << 8) | p
[1];
1020 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
1021 #error Code needs updating for new TLS version
1023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1024 if ((sversion
== SSL3_VERSION
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
)) {
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1027 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE
);
1028 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1031 s
->method
= SSLv3_client_method();
1034 if ((sversion
== TLS1_VERSION
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
)) {
1035 s
->method
= TLSv1_client_method();
1036 } else if ((sversion
== TLS1_1_VERSION
) &&
1037 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
)) {
1038 s
->method
= TLSv1_1_client_method();
1039 } else if ((sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
) &&
1040 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
)) {
1041 s
->method
= TLSv1_2_client_method();
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1044 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1047 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
1049 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
1051 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1054 } else if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1055 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
1056 int hversion
= (p
[0] << 8) | p
[1];
1057 int options
= s
->options
;
1058 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
1059 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
1060 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1062 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1063 s
->version
= hversion
;
1064 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1066 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
1067 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1070 s
->version
= hversion
;
1071 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1074 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
1075 } else if ((p
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8)) || (p
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1077 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | p
[1];
1078 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1083 /* load the server hello data */
1084 /* load the server random */
1085 memcpy(s
->s3
->server_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1086 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1090 /* get the session-id */
1093 if ((j
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
) || (j
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
)) {
1094 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1100 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1101 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1102 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1103 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1104 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1105 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1106 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1107 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1108 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1109 * server wants to resume.
1111 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
1112 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
1113 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1114 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1115 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1116 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1118 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1119 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1120 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
+ j
);
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1123 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1127 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
1129 if (j
!= 0 && j
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1130 && memcmp(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, j
) == 0) {
1131 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1132 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1133 /* actually a client application bug */
1134 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1136 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1142 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1143 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1144 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1145 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1146 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1148 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1149 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1153 s
->session
->session_id_length
= j
;
1154 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, p
, j
); /* j could be 0 */
1157 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
);
1159 /* unknown cipher */
1160 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1164 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1165 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1166 ct
->mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1170 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1173 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1174 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1178 p
+= ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
1180 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1181 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1183 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1184 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1190 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1191 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1192 * set and use it for comparison.
1194 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1195 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1196 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1197 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1199 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1202 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1204 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1207 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1209 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1211 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1213 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1215 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1219 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1220 * using compression.
1222 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1228 if (s
->hit
&& j
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1229 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1231 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1236 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1237 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1241 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, j
);
1243 if ((j
!= 0) && (comp
== NULL
)) {
1244 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1246 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1249 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1254 /* TLS extensions */
1255 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1262 /* wrong packet length */
1263 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1270 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1272 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1276 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
1278 int al
, i
, ok
, ret
= -1, exp_idx
;
1279 unsigned long n
, nc
, llen
, l
;
1281 const unsigned char *q
, *p
;
1283 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1285 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1287 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1290 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1295 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1296 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1300 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
1301 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1305 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1307 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1313 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
1314 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1318 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
1320 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
1321 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1323 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1328 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &q
, l
);
1330 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1335 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1337 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1340 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1349 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1350 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1351 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1353 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1356 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1359 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1363 sc
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1367 ssl_sess_cert_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
);
1368 s
->session
->sess_cert
= sc
;
1370 sc
->cert_chain
= sk
;
1372 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1373 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1375 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1378 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1381 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1383 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1387 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1391 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1396 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1400 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1401 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
) {
1403 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1405 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1408 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1409 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1411 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1414 X509_free(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
1415 sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
= x
;
1416 sc
->peer_key
= &(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
]);
1418 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1419 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1420 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1421 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1428 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1430 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1432 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1434 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1438 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1441 unsigned char *q
, md_buf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
* 2];
1444 unsigned char *param
, *p
;
1446 long i
, param_len
, n
, alg_k
, alg_a
;
1447 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1448 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1456 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1457 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1458 EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1460 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
1463 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1466 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1467 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1469 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1470 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1471 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1472 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1476 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1478 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1480 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1483 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) {
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1485 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1490 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1491 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1494 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1495 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1496 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1497 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1500 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1504 param
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1505 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
!= NULL
) {
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1507 RSA_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
);
1508 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= NULL
;
1510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1511 DH_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1512 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1515 EC_KEY_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
);
1516 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= NULL
;
1519 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1522 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1525 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1527 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1530 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1531 char tmp_id_hint
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
1534 if (param_len
> n
) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1541 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1542 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1543 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1546 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1547 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1551 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1553 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH
);
1559 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1560 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1561 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1563 memcpy(tmp_id_hint
, p
, i
);
1564 memset(tmp_id_hint
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
1565 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1566 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint
);
1567 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
1568 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1576 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1578 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1580 if (param_len
> n
) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1586 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH
);
1592 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1598 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1606 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH
);
1612 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1618 if (1 > n
- param_len
) {
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1624 i
= (unsigned int)(p
[0]);
1627 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH
);
1633 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.s
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1639 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1647 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH
);
1653 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.B
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1660 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1665 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1666 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1667 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1669 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1670 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1674 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1675 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1677 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1678 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1682 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1684 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1685 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1686 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1687 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1691 if ((rsa
= RSA_new()) == NULL
) {
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1697 if (param_len
> n
) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1703 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH
);
1709 if ((rsa
->n
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->n
)) == NULL
) {
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1715 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1723 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH
);
1729 if ((rsa
->e
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->e
)) == NULL
) {
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1736 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1737 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1739 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1740 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1745 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1748 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1752 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
1753 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1759 if (param_len
> n
) {
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1765 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH
);
1771 if ((dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1777 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1785 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH
);
1791 if ((dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1797 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1805 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH
);
1811 if ((dh
->pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1818 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1819 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1823 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1824 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1826 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1827 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1831 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1832 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1834 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1835 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1838 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1840 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1843 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1846 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
) {
1848 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1850 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1856 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1857 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1858 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1862 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1863 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1864 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1867 if (param_len
> n
) {
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1872 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1873 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1875 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, p
, 3)) {
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1880 if ((curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p
+ 2))) == 0) {
1881 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1883 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1887 ngroup
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid
);
1888 if (ngroup
== NULL
) {
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1892 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh
, ngroup
) == 0) {
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1896 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup
);
1898 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
);
1900 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1901 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1902 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1904 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1910 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1911 if (((srvr_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) ||
1912 ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)) {
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1917 encoded_pt_len
= *p
; /* length of encoded point */
1920 if ((encoded_pt_len
> n
- param_len
) ||
1921 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, srvr_ecpoint
,
1922 p
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
) == 0)) {
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1926 param_len
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1929 p
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1932 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1933 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1937 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1938 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1940 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1941 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1943 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1944 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1946 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1947 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
1949 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1950 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh
, srvr_ecpoint
);
1951 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= ecdh
;
1953 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1955 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1956 srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1958 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1962 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1964 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1966 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1968 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1974 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
1981 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1994 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1997 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1999 if ((i
!= n
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
2000 /* wrong packet length */
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2005 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2011 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
2012 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
2013 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
2014 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
2015 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2017 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2019 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
2020 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, &size
);
2024 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
, p
, n
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
);
2026 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
2032 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2039 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
2040 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2042 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2044 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
2045 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx
, p
, (int)n
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2047 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2053 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
2054 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2055 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2056 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
2057 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2061 /* still data left over */
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2067 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2068 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2071 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2073 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2081 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2082 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
2085 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2086 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2090 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2093 unsigned long n
, nc
, l
;
2094 unsigned int llen
, ctype_num
, i
;
2095 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2096 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
2098 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2100 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2101 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
,
2102 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
,
2103 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
2108 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2110 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
2111 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
2113 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2114 * wont be doing client auth.
2116 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2117 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
2123 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
2124 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2129 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2130 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2131 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) {
2132 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2134 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER
);
2139 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2141 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2146 /* get the certificate types */
2148 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2149 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2150 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2151 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2152 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2153 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2157 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, p
, ctype_num
);
2158 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
2159 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2161 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2162 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = p
[i
];
2164 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2167 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2170 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
+ 2) > n
) {
2171 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2173 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2176 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2177 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2178 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].digest
= NULL
;
2179 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].valid_flags
= 0;
2181 if ((llen
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, p
, llen
)) {
2182 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2184 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2187 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2188 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2195 /* get the CA RDNs */
2198 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
) != n
) {
2199 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2204 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
2206 if ((l
+ nc
+ 2) > llen
) {
2207 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG
);
2214 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &q
, l
)) == NULL
) {
2215 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2221 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2223 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2226 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2235 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2236 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2237 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2238 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2239 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2245 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2247 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2251 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2253 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2257 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2259 int ok
, al
, ret
= 0, ticklen
;
2261 const unsigned char *p
;
2264 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2265 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
,
2266 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
,
2267 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, 16384, &ok
);
2273 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2274 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2279 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2280 n2l(p
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
);
2282 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2283 if (ticklen
+ 6 != n
) {
2284 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2288 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2289 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2290 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2291 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2295 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, p
, ticklen
);
2296 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2298 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2299 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2300 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2301 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2302 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2303 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2304 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2305 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2306 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2308 EVP_Digest(p
, ticklen
,
2309 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2310 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2314 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2316 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2320 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
2323 unsigned long resplen
, n
;
2324 const unsigned char *p
;
2326 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2327 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
,
2328 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
,
2329 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
, 16384, &ok
);
2334 /* need at least status type + length */
2335 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2339 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2340 if (*p
++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2341 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2346 if (resplen
+ 4 != n
) {
2347 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2351 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2352 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= BUF_memdup(p
, resplen
);
2353 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
) {
2354 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2358 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2359 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2361 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2363 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2368 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2375 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2376 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2381 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL
*s
)
2386 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2387 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2388 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
,
2389 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
,
2390 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 30, &ok
);
2395 /* should contain no data */
2396 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2398 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2405 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2409 unsigned long alg_k
;
2410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2412 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2415 EC_KEY
*clnt_ecdh
= NULL
;
2416 const EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2417 EVP_PKEY
*srvr_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2418 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2419 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2420 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2422 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2425 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
2426 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2428 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2430 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2434 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2436 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2437 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2441 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2443 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2446 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2450 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
)
2451 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
2454 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2455 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].
2457 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2458 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2460 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2463 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2464 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2467 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2468 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2469 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2473 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2474 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2476 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen
, pms
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2478 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2480 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2485 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2489 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2490 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2497 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2498 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2499 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
2501 if (scert
== NULL
) {
2502 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2504 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2508 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
)
2509 dh_srvr
= scert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2511 /* we get them from the cert */
2512 int idx
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
2513 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2516 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
2518 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2519 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2521 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
) {
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2523 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2527 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2528 /* Use client certificate key */
2529 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2532 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2533 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2535 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2539 /* generate a new random key */
2540 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2544 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2551 pmslen
= DH_size(dh_clnt
);
2552 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2557 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2558 * clear it out afterwards
2561 n
= DH_compute_key(pms
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2562 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2572 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2575 /* send off the data */
2576 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2578 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2584 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2589 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2590 const EC_GROUP
*srvr_group
= NULL
;
2592 int ecdh_clnt_cert
= 0;
2595 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2596 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2598 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2603 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2604 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2605 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2607 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) && (s
->cert
!= NULL
)) {
2609 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2610 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2611 * To add such support, one needs to add
2612 * code that checks for appropriate
2613 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2614 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2615 * key on the same curve as the server's
2616 * and the key should be authorized for
2619 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2620 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2623 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2624 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2625 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2626 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2630 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2631 tkey
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
;
2633 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2635 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2636 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
2637 if ((srvr_pub_pkey
== NULL
)
2638 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2639 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2641 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2645 tkey
= srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
;
2648 srvr_group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2649 srvr_ecpoint
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey
);
2651 if ((srvr_group
== NULL
) || (srvr_ecpoint
== NULL
)) {
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2653 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2657 if ((clnt_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2659 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2663 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh
, srvr_group
)) {
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2667 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2669 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2670 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2672 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2673 tkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2674 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2675 if (priv_key
== NULL
) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2677 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2680 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2685 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2686 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh
))) {
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2694 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2695 * clear it out afterwards
2698 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group
);
2699 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2703 pmslen
= (field_size
+ 7) / 8;
2704 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2707 n
= ECDH_compute_key(pms
, pmslen
, srvr_ecpoint
, clnt_ecdh
, NULL
);
2708 if (n
<= 0 || pmslen
!= (size_t)n
) {
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2713 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2714 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2718 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2722 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2723 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2724 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2727 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
2728 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len
* sizeof(unsigned char));
2729 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
2730 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2732 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2736 /* Encode the public key */
2737 n
= EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2738 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2739 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2740 encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
);
2742 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2743 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2745 /* copy the point */
2746 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2747 /* increment n to account for length field */
2751 /* Free allocated memory */
2752 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2753 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2754 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2755 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2757 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2758 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2759 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2760 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2763 unsigned int md_len
;
2765 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2766 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2770 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2775 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2779 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
)].x509
;
2783 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST94
)].x509
;
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2786 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2790 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2791 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2793 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2795 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2796 * certificate key for key exchange
2799 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2801 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2802 /* Generate session key */
2803 if (RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2804 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2810 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2812 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2813 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2814 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2816 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2823 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2826 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2827 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2828 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
));
2829 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2831 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2833 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
);
2834 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
2835 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2836 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2842 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2844 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2846 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2848 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) < 0) {
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2853 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2855 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2858 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2861 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2862 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2863 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2864 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2865 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2866 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2868 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2869 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
2872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2873 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2874 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2875 /* send off the data */
2876 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2878 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2882 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2885 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2886 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2887 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2889 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2895 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2897 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2898 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2901 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 2];
2902 size_t identity_len
;
2903 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2904 unsigned int psk_len
= 0;
2908 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2910 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2914 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2915 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2916 pmslen
= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4;
2917 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2921 psk_len
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
2922 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2924 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2926 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2928 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2930 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2933 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2934 pmslen
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2935 identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1] = '\0';
2936 identity_len
= strlen(identity
);
2937 if (identity_len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2939 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2942 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2944 memmove(pms
+ psk_len
+ 4, pms
, psk_len
);
2946 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2950 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2951 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
=
2952 BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2953 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
2954 && s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2956 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2960 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2961 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup(identity
);
2962 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2964 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2968 s2n(identity_len
, p
);
2969 memcpy(p
, identity
, identity_len
);
2970 n
= 2 + identity_len
;
2973 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2975 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2981 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2986 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
2987 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2992 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2995 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
2996 n
= ssl_do_write(s
);
2997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2999 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3001 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3002 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3005 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3006 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s
,
3007 s
->session
->master_key
)) <
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3010 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3016 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3019 s
->cert
->pmslen
= pmslen
;
3021 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3024 pmslen
= s
->cert
->pmslen
;
3027 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3031 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3032 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3034 session
->master_key
,
3036 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3037 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3038 if (s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
3039 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3046 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3049 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3050 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3052 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3053 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3054 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
3055 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
3057 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3061 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
3064 unsigned char data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
3066 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3072 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3074 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
) {
3075 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3076 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3077 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3078 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3079 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx
);
3080 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx
, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3081 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3082 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3085 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
3090 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3091 * digest and cached handshake records.
3093 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3096 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->cert
->key
->digest
;
3097 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3098 if (hdatalen
<= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3104 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3107 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3108 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
3109 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3116 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3119 if (s
->session
->flags
& SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
) {
3120 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3121 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3122 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3123 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3127 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3128 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
, NID_md5
, &(data
[0]));
3129 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, data
,
3130 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
3131 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
3132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_RSA_LIB
);
3139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3140 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3141 if (!DSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3142 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3143 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3144 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
)) {
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_DSA_LIB
);
3152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3153 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3154 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3155 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3156 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3157 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) {
3158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
3165 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3166 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3167 unsigned char signbuf
[64];
3169 size_t sigsize
= 64;
3170 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3171 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, data
);
3172 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx
, signbuf
, &sigsize
, data
, 32) <= 0) {
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3176 for (i
= 63, j
= 0; i
>= 0; j
++, i
--) {
3177 p
[2 + j
] = signbuf
[i
];
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3185 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3189 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
;
3191 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3192 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3193 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3195 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3196 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3197 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3202 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3203 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3204 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3206 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3208 unsigned long alg_k
;
3209 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3211 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3212 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->cert
->key
->digest
)
3215 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3216 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3218 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3219 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3221 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3222 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3223 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3224 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3225 int i
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
3226 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
3227 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3228 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3229 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
3232 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
3234 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3235 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
3236 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
3240 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3245 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3248 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3251 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
) {
3252 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3253 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3254 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3256 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3260 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3261 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3264 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3266 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3267 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3269 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3272 /* We need to get a client cert */
3273 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
) {
3275 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3276 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3279 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3281 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3284 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3285 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3286 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3287 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3289 } else if (i
== 1) {
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3292 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3296 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3297 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3300 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3301 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3302 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3305 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3306 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
3307 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3308 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3314 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3315 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3318 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
) {
3319 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
;
3320 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
3321 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
3322 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3324 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3325 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3329 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3330 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3333 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3335 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3339 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3348 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3349 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3351 /* we don't have a certificate */
3352 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3355 sc
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3361 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
3363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3364 dh
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
3367 /* This is the passed certificate */
3369 idx
= sc
->peer_cert_type
;
3370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3371 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3372 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, s
) == 0) {
3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3379 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3381 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3383 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3388 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
3389 i
= X509_certificate_type(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, pkey
);
3390 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3392 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3393 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3395 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3399 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3401 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3406 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) &&
3407 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
) || (rsa
!= NULL
))) {
3408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3409 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3414 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) &&
3415 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKT_EXCH
) || (dh
!= NULL
))) {
3416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY
);
3418 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3419 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3421 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3424 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3425 else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3426 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3428 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3434 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PKT_EXP
)) {
3435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3436 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3438 || RSA_size(rsa
) * 8 >
3439 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3441 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3447 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3449 || DH_size(dh
) * 8 >
3450 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3452 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3459 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
3465 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3472 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3473 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3474 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3475 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3476 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3477 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3478 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3480 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
)
3484 if (s
->version
< TLS1_VERSION
|| !s
->tls_session_secret_cb
||
3485 !s
->session
->tlsext_tick
)
3488 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3489 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3491 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3492 * so permit appropriate message length.
3493 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3494 * and not its length.
3496 s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3499 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3500 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3505 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3507 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
3510 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3511 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3513 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
3520 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3521 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3523 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3526 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
) {
3527 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3528 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3529 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3531 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3532 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3533 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3534 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3535 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3536 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
;
3537 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3541 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3546 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3550 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3551 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3552 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3553 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3558 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3559 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3563 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
3565 int (*put_cb
) (const SSL_CIPHER
*,
3571 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3572 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3573 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3579 put_cb
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char
;
3581 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
3582 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3583 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3584 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
3586 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3587 if (c
->id
== SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
3588 if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3591 empty_reneg_info_scsv
= 0;
3598 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
3602 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3603 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3604 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3606 j
= put_cb(&scsv
, p
);
3608 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3610 "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
3613 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3614 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3615 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3617 j
= put_cb(&scsv
, p
);