1 /* ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "statem_locl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
168 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
169 static int ssl_set_version(SSL
*s
);
170 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
171 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
176 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
182 static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
184 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
185 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
186 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
187 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
194 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
201 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
203 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
206 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
207 * ciphersuite or for SRP
209 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
218 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
219 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
220 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
221 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
224 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
225 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
227 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
229 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
232 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
233 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
234 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
235 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
239 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
240 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
241 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
247 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
249 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
250 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
251 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
254 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
255 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
259 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
260 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
262 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
263 && s
->tls_session_secret_cb
!= NULL
264 && s
->session
->tlsext_tick
!= NULL
265 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
267 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
268 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
269 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
270 * the server is resuming.
273 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
275 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
276 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
277 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
278 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
282 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
283 if (ske_expected
< 0)
285 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
287 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
288 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
289 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
290 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
293 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
294 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
295 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
297 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
298 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
306 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
307 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
308 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
315 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
316 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
317 if (ske_expected
< 0)
319 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
321 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
322 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
323 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
324 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
331 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
332 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
333 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
334 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
341 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
342 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
343 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
348 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
349 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
&& s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
350 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
352 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
353 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
358 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
359 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
360 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
365 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
366 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
367 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
376 /* No valid transition found */
381 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
382 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
384 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
386 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
388 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
390 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
392 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
393 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
395 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
397 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
400 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
402 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
403 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
406 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
407 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
408 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
410 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
411 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
414 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
415 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
417 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
419 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
420 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
423 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
424 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
425 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
426 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
428 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
429 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
431 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
433 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
434 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
438 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
439 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
442 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
443 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
444 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
446 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
447 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
449 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
453 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
454 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
455 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
459 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
461 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
462 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
468 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
470 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
473 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
474 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
475 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
479 /* Shouldn't happen */
480 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
485 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
486 * the client to the server.
488 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
490 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
492 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
493 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
495 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
496 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
497 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
502 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
504 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
505 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
508 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
509 * messages unless we need to.
513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
514 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
515 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
518 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
521 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
524 /* No pre work to be done */
528 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
532 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
533 * client to the server.
535 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
537 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
541 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
542 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
543 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->d1
->cookie_len
> 0 && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
546 /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
547 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
550 * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
552 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
553 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
557 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
558 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
563 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
564 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
568 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
569 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
570 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
571 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
573 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
574 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
576 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
578 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
581 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
582 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
585 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
589 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
592 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
597 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
601 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
603 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
605 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
608 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
612 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
617 /* No post work to be done */
621 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
625 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
627 * Valid return values are:
631 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
)
633 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
635 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
636 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
637 return tls_construct_client_hello(s
);
640 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s
);
642 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
643 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s
);
645 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
646 return tls_construct_client_verify(s
);
648 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
650 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
652 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
654 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
655 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
656 return tls_construct_next_proto(s
);
658 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
659 return tls_construct_finished(s
,
661 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
663 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
666 /* Shouldn't happen */
674 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
675 * reading. Excludes the message header.
677 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
679 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
681 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
682 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
683 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
685 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
686 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
689 return s
->max_cert_list
;
691 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
692 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
694 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
695 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
697 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
698 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
700 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
701 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
703 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
704 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
706 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
707 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
709 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
710 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
713 /* Shouldn't happen */
721 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
723 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
725 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
727 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
728 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
729 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
731 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
732 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
735 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
737 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
738 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
740 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
741 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
743 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
744 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
746 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
747 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
749 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
750 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
752 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
753 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
755 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
756 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
759 /* Shouldn't happen */
763 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
767 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
770 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
772 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
774 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
776 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
777 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
778 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
779 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
780 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
781 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
782 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
783 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
786 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
787 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
794 /* Shouldn't happen */
799 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
800 * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
801 * Returns 1 on success
804 static int ssl_set_version(SSL
*s
)
806 unsigned long mask
, options
= s
->options
;
808 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
810 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
811 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
812 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
813 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
814 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
815 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
817 mask
= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
| SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
818 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
822 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
823 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
) {
824 if ((options
& mask
) != mask
) {
825 s
->version
= TLS1_1_VERSION
;
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
831 s
->version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
834 if ((options
& mask
) == mask
) {
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
838 s
->version
= TLS1_1_VERSION
;
841 mask
&= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
;
842 if ((options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
) && (options
& mask
) != mask
)
843 s
->version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
844 mask
&= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
;
845 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
846 if ((options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
) && (options
& mask
) != mask
)
847 s
->version
= SSL3_VERSION
;
850 if (s
->version
!= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
,
852 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
856 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& FIPS_mode()) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE
);
861 } else if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
862 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
863 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
864 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
865 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
,
867 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
871 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
873 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
878 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
880 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
881 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
884 * We only support one version: update method
886 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
887 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
888 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
892 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
897 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
900 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
908 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
910 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
912 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
913 if (ssl_set_version(s
) == 0)
916 if ((sess
== NULL
) || (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
918 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
919 * "ticket" without a session ID.
921 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
922 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
923 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
926 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
928 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
931 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
932 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
934 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
937 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
946 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
947 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
950 /* Do the message type and length last */
951 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
954 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
955 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
956 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
957 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
958 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
959 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
960 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
961 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
964 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
965 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
966 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
967 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
968 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
969 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
970 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
971 * know that is maximum server supports.
972 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
973 * containing version 1.0.
975 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
976 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
977 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
978 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
979 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
980 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
981 * the negotiated version.
983 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
984 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
987 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
988 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
994 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
997 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1001 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
1005 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1006 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1007 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1011 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
1012 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
1013 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
1016 /* Ciphers supported */
1017 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]));
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
1022 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
1024 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
1025 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
1028 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
1029 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
1030 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
1036 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1040 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1043 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1045 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
1046 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1050 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
1052 /* TLS extensions */
1053 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1058 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
1060 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1066 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
1067 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1074 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1078 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1081 unsigned int cookie_len
;
1084 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1085 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1086 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1091 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1092 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1093 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1098 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1099 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1103 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1105 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1107 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1108 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1109 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1112 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1114 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1115 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1117 size_t session_id_len
;
1118 unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1119 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1120 unsigned int compression
;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1125 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1126 unsigned int sversion
;
1128 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1129 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1134 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
1135 #error Code needs updating for new TLS version
1137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1138 if ((sversion
== SSL3_VERSION
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
)) {
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1141 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE
);
1142 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1145 s
->method
= SSLv3_client_method();
1148 if ((sversion
== TLS1_VERSION
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
)) {
1149 s
->method
= TLSv1_client_method();
1150 } else if ((sversion
== TLS1_1_VERSION
) &&
1151 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
)) {
1152 s
->method
= TLSv1_1_client_method();
1153 } else if ((sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
) &&
1154 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
)) {
1155 s
->method
= TLSv1_2_client_method();
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1158 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1161 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
1163 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
1165 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1168 } else if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1169 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
1170 unsigned int hversion
;
1173 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &hversion
)) {
1174 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1179 options
= s
->options
;
1180 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
1181 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
1182 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1184 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1185 s
->version
= hversion
;
1186 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1188 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
1189 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1192 s
->version
= hversion
;
1193 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1196 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
1198 unsigned char *vers
;
1200 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &vers
, 2)) {
1201 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1205 if ((vers
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8))
1206 || (vers
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1208 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | vers
[1];
1209 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1214 /* load the server hello data */
1215 /* load the server random */
1216 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1217 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1224 /* Get the session-id. */
1225 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1226 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1230 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1231 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1232 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1233 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1238 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1240 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1245 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1246 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1247 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1248 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1249 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1250 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1251 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1252 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1253 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1254 * server wants to resume.
1256 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
1257 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
1258 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1259 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1260 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1261 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1263 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1264 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1265 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1268 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1273 if (session_id_len
!= 0 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1274 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1275 session_id_len
) == 0) {
1276 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1277 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1278 /* actually a client application bug */
1279 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1281 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1287 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1288 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1289 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1290 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1291 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1293 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1294 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1299 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1300 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1301 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1305 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1307 /* unknown cipher */
1308 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1312 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1313 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1314 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1316 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= 0;
1317 /* Skip TLS v1.0 ciphersuites if SSLv3 */
1318 if ((c
->algorithm_ssl
& SSL_TLSV1
) && s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
1319 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
|= SSL_TLSV1
;
1321 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1324 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1325 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1330 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1331 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1333 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1334 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1340 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1341 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1342 * set and use it for comparison.
1344 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1345 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1346 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1347 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1349 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1352 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1353 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1355 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1357 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1360 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1361 if (compression
!= 0) {
1362 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1364 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1368 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1369 * using compression.
1371 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1376 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1377 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1379 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1382 if (compression
== 0)
1384 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1385 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1389 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1392 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1393 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1395 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1398 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1402 /* TLS extensions */
1403 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
)) {
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1408 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1409 /* wrong packet length */
1410 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1416 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1417 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1418 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1421 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1424 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1425 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1427 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1428 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1430 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
1434 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1435 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1436 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1440 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1442 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1444 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1445 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1448 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1450 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1451 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1453 unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1454 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1455 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1457 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1462 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1463 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1464 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1468 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1469 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1470 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1471 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1473 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1477 certstart
= certbytes
;
1478 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1480 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1484 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1485 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1487 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1490 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1497 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1498 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1499 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1501 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1504 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1507 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1511 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1513 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1514 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1516 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1519 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1522 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1524 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1528 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1532 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1537 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1541 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1542 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1543 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1544 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1545 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1547 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1549 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1552 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1554 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1556 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1557 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1560 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1564 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1566 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1568 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1570 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1574 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1579 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1580 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1588 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1590 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
1592 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1593 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1594 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1599 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1601 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1604 DH_free(s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1605 s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1608 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
1609 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1612 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1614 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1617 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1618 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1619 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1620 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1626 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1627 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1628 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1631 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1632 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1637 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1638 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1639 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1640 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1641 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1642 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1647 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1648 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1650 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1652 * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
1657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1658 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1659 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1660 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1661 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1662 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1663 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1669 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1670 PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1672 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1673 PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1675 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1676 PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1678 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1679 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1684 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1689 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1690 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1691 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1693 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1695 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1696 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1698 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1699 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1700 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1705 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1710 if ((dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1711 PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1712 || (dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1713 PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1715 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1716 PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1721 if (BN_is_zero(dh
->p
) || BN_is_zero(dh
->g
) || BN_is_zero(dh
->pub_key
)) {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1726 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1727 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1731 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1732 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1733 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1735 s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1738 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1741 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1743 unsigned char *ecparams
;
1747 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1748 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1749 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1751 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1756 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1757 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1759 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1764 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2));
1765 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1766 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1768 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1772 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1773 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
1775 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
1776 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
1777 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
1778 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1782 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1785 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1790 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
),
1791 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1792 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
), NULL
) == 0) {
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1798 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1799 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1803 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1804 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1805 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1807 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1808 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1809 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1811 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1813 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1817 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1819 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1823 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1824 * equals the length of the parameters.
1826 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
1827 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
1828 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
1829 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1834 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1835 unsigned char *sigalgs
;
1837 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sigalgs
, 2)) {
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1841 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sigalgs
, pkey
);
1848 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1850 } else if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
1851 md
= EVP_md5_sha1();
1856 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
1857 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1861 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1868 * Check signature length
1870 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)j
) {
1871 /* wrong packet length */
1872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1875 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1876 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1877 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1878 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1879 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1880 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
1881 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
1882 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1886 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
1887 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), pkey
) <= 0) {
1889 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1894 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1895 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1896 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1897 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
1898 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1902 /* still data left over */
1903 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1908 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1909 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1910 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1912 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1914 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1922 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1924 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1925 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1926 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1929 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1931 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1932 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
1933 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1934 unsigned char *data
;
1935 unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
1936 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1938 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
1939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1943 /* get the certificate types */
1944 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
1945 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
1946 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1950 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
1951 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
1952 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
1953 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1954 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
1955 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1959 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
1960 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
1961 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
1963 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
1964 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
1966 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1967 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1968 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, list_len
)) {
1969 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1971 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1975 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1976 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1977 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
1978 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1980 if ((list_len
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, list_len
)) {
1981 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1983 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
1986 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1987 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1992 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
1995 /* get the CA RDNs */
1996 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1997 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
1998 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2003 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
2004 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
2005 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2006 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2008 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2012 namestart
= namebytes
;
2014 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
2015 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2016 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2021 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2022 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2024 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2027 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2033 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2034 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2035 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2036 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2037 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2040 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2043 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2045 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2049 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2051 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2054 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2057 unsigned int ticklen
;
2058 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2060 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2061 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2062 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
) {
2063 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2068 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2070 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2072 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2073 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2074 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2076 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2079 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2081 * Remove the old session from the cache
2083 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE
) {
2084 if (s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2085 s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb(s
->session_ctx
,
2088 /* We carry on if this fails */
2089 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2093 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2094 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2099 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2100 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2103 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2104 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2106 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2107 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
) {
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2111 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
)) {
2112 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2117 s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2118 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2120 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2121 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2122 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2123 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2124 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2125 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2126 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2127 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2128 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2130 EVP_Digest(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
,
2131 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2132 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2133 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2135 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2137 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2138 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2141 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2144 unsigned long resplen
;
2147 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2148 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2149 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2153 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &resplen
)
2154 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2155 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2159 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2160 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2161 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
== NULL
) {
2162 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2166 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, resplen
)) {
2167 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2171 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2172 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2174 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2176 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2181 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2186 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2188 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2189 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2190 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2193 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2195 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2196 /* should contain no data */
2197 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2199 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2200 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2204 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2205 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2207 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2208 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2209 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2215 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2218 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2219 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2220 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2221 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2225 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2226 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2227 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2228 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2231 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2234 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2239 size_t pskhdrlen
= 0;
2241 unsigned long alg_k
;
2242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2244 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2247 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2248 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2249 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2251 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2253 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2255 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2259 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2262 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2263 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2266 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2268 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2271 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2273 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2277 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2279 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2280 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2283 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2287 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2289 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2292 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2293 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2294 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2296 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2297 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2301 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2302 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2303 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2305 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2308 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2309 s
->session
->psk_identity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2310 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2311 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2315 s2n(identitylen
, p
);
2316 memcpy(p
, identity
, identitylen
);
2317 pskhdrlen
= 2 + identitylen
;
2321 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2323 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2327 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2332 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2336 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2338 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2339 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2343 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2345 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2352 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2353 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2354 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2356 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2357 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2360 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2361 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2363 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2364 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2365 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2369 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2370 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2372 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen
, pms
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2374 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2376 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2381 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2385 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2386 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2393 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2394 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2395 if (s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
)
2396 dh_srvr
= s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2398 /* we get them from the cert */
2399 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2401 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2403 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2404 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2406 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
) {
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2408 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2412 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2413 /* Use client certificate key */
2414 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2417 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2418 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2420 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2424 /* generate a new random key */
2425 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2429 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2436 pmslen
= DH_size(dh_clnt
);
2437 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2442 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2443 * clear it out afterwards
2446 n
= DH_compute_key(pms
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2447 if (s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2457 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2460 /* send off the data */
2461 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2463 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2472 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2474 if (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2475 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2477 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2478 skey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2480 || (skey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2481 || (skey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2483 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2488 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
, NID_undef
);
2490 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2495 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2496 encoded_pt_len
= EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey
),
2497 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2498 &encodedPoint
, NULL
);
2500 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2505 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2510 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2511 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2513 /* copy the point */
2514 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2515 /* increment n to account for length field */
2518 /* Free allocated memory */
2519 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2521 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2523 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2524 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2525 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2528 unsigned int md_len
;
2529 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2530 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2532 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2533 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2534 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2538 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2543 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2545 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2548 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2552 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2553 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2554 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2556 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2560 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2561 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2562 * certificate key for key exchange
2565 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2567 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
2568 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2569 /* Generate session key */
2570 || RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2571 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2573 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2577 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2579 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2580 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2581 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2583 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2590 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2593 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2594 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2595 EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2596 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2597 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2598 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2599 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2600 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2601 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2603 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2606 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2607 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2608 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2614 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2616 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2618 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2620 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2625 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2627 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2630 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2633 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2634 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2635 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2636 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2637 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2638 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2640 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2641 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
2645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2646 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2647 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2648 /* send off the data */
2649 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2651 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2655 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2658 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2659 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2660 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2662 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2668 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2677 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
2678 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2684 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2685 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2690 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2693 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2694 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2696 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2697 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2700 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2701 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2703 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2707 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
2709 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2714 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2715 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
2717 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2723 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2724 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2726 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2727 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2731 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2732 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2738 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2739 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2740 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2743 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2746 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2747 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2749 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2750 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2751 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
2754 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2755 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2761 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2762 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2766 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
2770 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
2773 unsigned long n
= 0;
2777 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2783 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2784 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2786 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2787 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2791 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2792 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2800 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2802 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2803 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
2804 || (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2805 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2806 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2807 s
->session
->master_key
))
2808 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2813 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2814 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2815 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
2816 BUF_reverse(p
+ 2, NULL
, u
);
2822 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2823 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
2825 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2830 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2833 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2838 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2839 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2840 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2842 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2844 unsigned long alg_k
;
2845 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
2847 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2848 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
2851 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2852 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2854 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
2855 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
2857 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2858 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
2859 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2860 int i
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
2861 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
2862 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2863 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
2864 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
2867 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2869 /* Compare server and client parameters */
2870 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
2871 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2875 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2880 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2883 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2886 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2887 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2888 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
2889 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2891 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2895 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2896 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2899 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2901 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2902 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2904 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2908 /* We need to get a client cert */
2909 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2911 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2912 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2914 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
2916 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2919 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2920 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
2921 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
2923 } else if (i
== 1) {
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2926 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
2930 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2931 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2934 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2935 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2936 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
2937 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2939 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
2940 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2941 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2942 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2948 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2951 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2955 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2957 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
2958 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
2959 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2961 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2962 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2969 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2971 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
2974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2978 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2982 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2984 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2985 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2987 /* we don't have a certificate */
2988 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
2990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2991 dh
= s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2994 /* This is the passed certificate */
2996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2997 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
2998 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
2999 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3006 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3008 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3010 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3015 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3016 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
3017 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3019 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3020 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3022 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3026 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3028 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3033 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
3034 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3036 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3041 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (dh
== NULL
)) {
3042 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3045 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3046 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3048 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3051 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3052 else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3053 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3055 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3063 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3068 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3070 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3073 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3074 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3075 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3077 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3078 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3079 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3080 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3081 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3082 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3089 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3093 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3094 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3095 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3096 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3101 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3102 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3106 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
3112 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3113 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3114 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3120 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
3121 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3122 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3123 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
3125 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3126 if (c
->id
== SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
3127 if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3130 empty_reneg_info_scsv
= 0;
3133 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, p
);
3137 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
3141 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3142 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3143 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3145 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);
3147 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3149 "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
3152 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3153 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3154 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3156 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);