2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
64 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
65 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
70 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
76 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
78 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
79 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
80 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
81 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
88 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
94 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
96 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
99 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
100 * ciphersuite or for SRP
102 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
111 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
112 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
113 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
114 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
117 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
118 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
120 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
122 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
125 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
126 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
127 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
128 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
132 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
133 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
134 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
140 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
142 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
143 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
144 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
147 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
148 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
152 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
153 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
155 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
156 && s
->tls_session_secret_cb
!= NULL
157 && s
->session
->tlsext_tick
!= NULL
158 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
160 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
161 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
162 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
163 * the server is resuming.
166 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
168 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
169 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
170 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
171 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
175 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
176 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
178 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
179 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
180 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
181 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
184 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
185 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
186 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
188 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
189 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
198 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
199 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
201 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
202 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
207 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
208 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
209 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
211 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
212 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
213 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
214 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
221 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
222 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
223 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
224 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
231 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
232 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
233 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
238 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
239 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
240 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
241 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
244 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
245 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
250 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
251 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
252 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
257 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
258 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
259 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
269 /* No valid transition found */
270 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
276 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
277 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
279 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
281 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
283 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
285 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
287 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
288 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
290 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
292 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
295 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
297 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
298 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
299 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
301 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
302 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
303 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
305 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
306 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
309 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
310 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
312 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
314 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
315 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
318 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
319 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
320 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
321 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
323 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
324 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
326 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
328 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
329 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
333 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
334 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
335 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
337 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
338 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
339 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
341 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
342 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
346 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
348 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
349 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
350 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
351 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
354 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
356 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
357 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
358 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
360 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
363 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
365 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
366 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
368 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
369 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
370 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
374 /* Shouldn't happen */
375 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
380 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
381 * the client to the server.
383 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
385 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
387 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
388 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
390 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
391 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
392 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
393 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
399 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
400 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
403 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
404 * messages unless we need to.
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
409 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
410 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
413 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
416 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
419 /* No pre work to be done */
423 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
427 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
428 * client to the server.
430 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
432 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
436 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
438 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
441 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
442 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
447 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
448 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
452 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
453 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
454 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
455 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
457 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
458 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
460 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
462 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
465 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
466 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
469 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
473 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
476 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
481 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
485 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
487 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
489 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
492 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
496 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
501 /* No post work to be done */
505 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
509 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
511 * Valid return values are:
515 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
)
517 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
519 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
520 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
521 return tls_construct_client_hello(s
);
524 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s
);
526 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
527 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s
);
529 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
530 return tls_construct_client_verify(s
);
532 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
534 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
536 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
538 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
539 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
540 return tls_construct_next_proto(s
);
542 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
543 return tls_construct_finished(s
,
545 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
547 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
550 /* Shouldn't happen */
558 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
559 * reading. Excludes the message header.
561 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
563 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
565 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
566 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
567 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
569 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
570 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
573 return s
->max_cert_list
;
575 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
576 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
578 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
579 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
581 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
582 /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
583 * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
584 * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
586 return s
->max_cert_list
;
588 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
589 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
591 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
592 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
594 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
595 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
597 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
598 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
601 /* Shouldn't happen */
609 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
611 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
613 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
615 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
616 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
617 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
619 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
620 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
623 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
625 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
626 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
628 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
629 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
631 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
632 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
634 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
635 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
637 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
638 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
640 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
641 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
643 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
644 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
647 /* Shouldn't happen */
651 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
655 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
658 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
660 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
662 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
663 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
664 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
667 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
668 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
669 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
670 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
671 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
672 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
673 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
674 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
677 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
678 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
685 /* Shouldn't happen */
689 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
692 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
701 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
703 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
705 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
706 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
712 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
713 !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
715 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
716 * "ticket" without a session ID.
718 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
719 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
720 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
723 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
725 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
728 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
729 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
731 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
734 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
743 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
744 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
747 /* Do the message type and length last */
748 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
751 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
752 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
753 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
754 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
755 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
756 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
757 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
758 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
761 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
762 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
763 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
764 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
765 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
766 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
767 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
768 * know that is maximum server supports.
769 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
770 * containing version 1.0.
772 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
773 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
774 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
775 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
776 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
777 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
778 * the negotiated version.
780 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
781 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
784 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
785 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
791 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
794 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
798 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
802 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
803 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
804 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
808 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
809 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
810 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
813 /* Ciphers supported */
814 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]));
816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
819 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
821 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
822 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
825 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
826 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
827 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
833 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
837 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
840 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
842 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
843 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
847 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
850 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
855 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
857 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
863 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
864 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
871 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
875 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
878 unsigned int cookie_len
;
881 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
882 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
883 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
884 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
888 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
889 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
890 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
895 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
896 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
900 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
902 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
904 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
905 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
906 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
909 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
911 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
914 size_t session_id_len
;
915 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
916 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
917 unsigned int compression
;
918 unsigned int sversion
;
920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
924 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
925 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
930 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
932 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
937 /* load the server hello data */
938 /* load the server random */
939 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
940 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
947 /* Get the session-id. */
948 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
949 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
953 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
954 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
955 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
956 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
961 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
963 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
968 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
969 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
970 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
971 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
972 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
973 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
974 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
975 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
976 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
977 * server wants to resume.
979 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
980 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
981 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
982 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
983 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
984 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
986 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
987 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
988 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
991 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
996 if (session_id_len
!= 0 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
997 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
998 session_id_len
) == 0) {
999 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1000 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1001 /* actually a client application bug */
1002 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1004 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1010 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1011 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1012 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1013 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1014 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1016 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1017 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1018 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1023 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1024 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1025 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1026 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1030 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1031 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1032 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1035 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1039 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1041 /* unknown cipher */
1042 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1047 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1050 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1051 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1053 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1054 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1056 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1057 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1062 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1063 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1065 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1066 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1072 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1073 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1074 * set and use it for comparison.
1076 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1077 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1078 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1079 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1081 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1084 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1085 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1087 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1089 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1092 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1093 if (compression
!= 0) {
1094 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1096 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1100 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1101 * using compression.
1103 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1108 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1109 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1111 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1114 if (compression
== 0)
1116 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1117 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1121 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1124 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1125 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1127 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1130 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1134 /* TLS extensions */
1135 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1140 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1141 /* wrong packet length */
1142 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1148 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1149 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1150 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1153 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1156 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1157 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1159 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1160 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1162 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
1166 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1167 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1168 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1172 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1174 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1176 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1177 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1180 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1182 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1183 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1185 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1186 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1187 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1189 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1194 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1195 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1196 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1200 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1201 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1202 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1203 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1205 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1209 certstart
= certbytes
;
1210 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1212 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1216 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1217 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1219 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1222 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1229 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1230 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) && i
<= 0) {
1231 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1233 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1236 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1239 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1243 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1245 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1246 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1248 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1251 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1254 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1256 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1260 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1264 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1269 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1273 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1274 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1275 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1276 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1277 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1279 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1281 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1284 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1286 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1288 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1289 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1292 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1296 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1298 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1301 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1305 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1308 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1310 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1312 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1313 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1319 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1320 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1321 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1324 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1325 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1330 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1331 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1332 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1333 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1334 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1335 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1342 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1347 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1350 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1352 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1353 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1354 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1355 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1356 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1362 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1363 PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1365 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1366 PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1368 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1369 PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1371 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1372 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1373 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1378 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1379 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1384 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1385 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1386 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1391 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1396 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1399 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1400 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1403 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1405 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1406 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1407 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1408 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1413 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1416 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1417 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1422 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1423 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1425 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
),
1427 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1428 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1433 if (BN_is_zero(p
) || BN_is_zero(g
) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1434 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1439 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1440 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1446 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
1447 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1453 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1454 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1459 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
1460 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1465 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
1468 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1469 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1471 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1472 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1473 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1482 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1487 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1492 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1496 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
1498 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1501 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1502 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1503 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1505 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1506 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1511 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1512 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1514 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1515 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1520 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2));
1521 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1522 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
1524 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1528 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1529 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
1531 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
1532 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
1533 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
1534 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1536 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1539 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1542 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1543 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1548 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
),
1549 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1550 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
), NULL
) == 0) {
1551 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1557 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1558 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1561 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1562 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1563 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
1564 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1565 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1570 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1575 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1579 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1580 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
1582 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1584 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
1586 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1587 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
1588 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1591 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1592 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
1596 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1597 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1598 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1599 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1601 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1602 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1604 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1605 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1608 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1613 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1617 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1621 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1622 * equals the length of the parameters.
1624 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
1625 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
1626 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
1627 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1632 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1633 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
1635 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sigalgs
, 2)) {
1636 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1640 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sigalgs
, pkey
);
1642 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1644 } else if (rv
== 0) {
1645 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1649 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1651 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
1652 md
= EVP_md5_sha1();
1657 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
1658 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1659 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1663 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1665 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1671 * Check signature length
1673 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
1674 /* wrong packet length */
1675 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1680 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1681 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1682 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1687 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1688 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1689 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1690 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1691 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1692 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
1693 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
1694 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1695 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1699 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
1700 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), pkey
) <= 0) {
1702 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1703 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1707 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1709 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1710 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1711 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1712 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1713 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
1714 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1715 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1718 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1722 /* still data left over */
1723 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1724 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1730 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1733 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1734 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1735 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1738 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1740 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1741 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
1742 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1743 const unsigned char *data
;
1744 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
1745 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1747 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1752 /* get the certificate types */
1753 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
1754 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
1755 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1759 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
1760 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
1761 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
1762 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1763 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
1764 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1768 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
1769 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
1770 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
1772 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
1773 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
1775 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1776 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1777 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, list_len
)) {
1778 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1780 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1784 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1785 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1786 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
1787 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1789 if ((list_len
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, list_len
)) {
1790 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1792 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
1795 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1796 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1801 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
1804 /* get the CA RDNs */
1805 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1806 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
1807 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1812 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1813 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
1814 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
1815 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1817 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1821 namestart
= namebytes
;
1823 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
1824 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
1825 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1830 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
1831 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1833 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1836 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1843 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
1844 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
1845 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
1846 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
1847 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
1850 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1853 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1856 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
1860 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
1862 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
1865 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1868 unsigned int ticklen
;
1869 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1871 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
1872 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
1873 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
) {
1874 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1879 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
1881 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1883 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1884 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
1885 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
1887 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
1890 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
1892 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
1894 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1897 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
1898 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1903 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
1904 s
->session
= new_sess
;
1907 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
1908 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
1910 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
1911 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
) {
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1915 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
)) {
1916 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1921 s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1922 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
1924 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
1925 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
1926 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
1927 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
1928 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
1929 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
1930 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
1931 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
1932 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
1934 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
,
1935 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
1936 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1940 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1942 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1944 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1945 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1948 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1951 unsigned long resplen
;
1954 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
1955 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1956 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
1960 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &resplen
)
1961 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
1962 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1966 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
1967 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
== NULL
) {
1968 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1972 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, resplen
)) {
1973 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1977 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
1978 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1980 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1981 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1982 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1985 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1987 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1988 /* should contain no data */
1989 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1991 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1992 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1996 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1997 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
1999 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2000 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2001 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2007 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2010 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2011 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2012 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2013 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2017 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2018 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2019 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2021 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1 && s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2023 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2025 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
2026 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2028 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2029 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2032 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2034 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2039 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2040 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2041 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2042 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2043 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2049 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2050 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2051 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2052 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2055 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2058 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
,
2059 size_t *pskhdrlen
, int *al
)
2061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2064 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2065 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2068 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2069 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2070 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2071 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2072 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2075 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2077 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2081 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2083 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2084 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2087 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2089 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2091 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2093 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2094 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2098 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2099 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2101 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2105 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2106 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2107 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2109 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2113 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2114 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2115 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2117 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2118 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2120 s2n(identitylen
, *p
);
2121 memcpy(*p
, identity
, identitylen
);
2122 *pskhdrlen
= 2 + identitylen
;
2128 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2129 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2130 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2131 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2136 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2141 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2145 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2146 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2148 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2151 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2153 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2159 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2160 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2165 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2166 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2169 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2173 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2174 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2175 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0) {
2180 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2181 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2183 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2184 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2185 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2189 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, *p
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2194 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2197 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2199 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2203 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2204 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2209 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2210 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2214 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2215 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2220 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2225 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2229 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2230 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2232 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2237 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
, NID_undef
);
2238 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2240 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2242 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2246 /* send off the data */
2247 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2248 *len
= BN_num_bytes(pub_key
);
2250 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, *p
);
2252 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2257 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2262 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2265 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2266 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2267 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2269 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2270 if ((skey
== NULL
) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey
) == NULL
) {
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2275 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
, NID_undef
);
2277 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2282 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2283 encoded_pt_len
= EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey
),
2284 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2285 &encodedPoint
, NULL
);
2287 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2292 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2295 *len
= encoded_pt_len
;
2297 /* length of encoded point */
2300 /* copy the point */
2301 memcpy(*p
, encodedPoint
, *len
);
2302 /* increment len to account for length field */
2305 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2309 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2313 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2318 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2321 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2322 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2325 unsigned int md_len
;
2326 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2327 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2328 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2329 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2332 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2333 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2336 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2338 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2340 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2342 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2346 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2347 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2348 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2353 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2354 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2355 * certificate key for key exchange
2358 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2360 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2362 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2367 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2368 /* Generate session key */
2369 || RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2370 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2375 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2377 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2378 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2379 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2381 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2388 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2391 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2392 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
2393 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2394 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2395 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2396 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2397 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2398 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2399 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2403 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2405 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
2406 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
2407 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2411 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2413 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2415 *((*p
)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2417 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2418 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2422 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2424 *((*p
)++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2427 *((*p
)++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2430 memcpy(*p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2431 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2432 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
2434 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2435 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2437 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2438 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2439 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2443 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2444 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2445 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2449 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2454 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2457 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2458 /* send off the data */
2459 *len
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2461 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, *p
);
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2467 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2468 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2469 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2477 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2482 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2486 size_t pskhdrlen
= 0;
2487 unsigned long alg_k
;
2490 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2492 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2494 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
2495 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, &p
, &pskhdrlen
, &al
))
2498 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2500 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2501 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2503 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2504 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2506 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2507 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2509 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2510 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2512 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2513 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2516 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2523 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, len
)) {
2524 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2532 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2533 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
2534 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2536 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2537 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2539 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2543 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
2545 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2548 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2549 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2553 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2554 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
2556 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2563 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2564 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2568 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2569 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2571 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2580 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2581 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2582 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2585 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2588 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2589 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2591 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2592 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2593 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
2596 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2597 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2603 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2604 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2608 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
2612 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
2615 unsigned long n
= 0;
2619 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2625 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2626 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2628 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2629 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2633 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2634 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2642 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2644 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2645 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
2646 || (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2647 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2648 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2649 s
->session
->master_key
))
2650 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2656 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2657 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2658 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2659 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
2660 BUF_reverse(p
+ 2, NULL
, u
);
2666 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2667 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
2669 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2674 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2677 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2682 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2683 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2684 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2686 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2688 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
2690 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2691 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
2694 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2695 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2697 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
2698 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
2703 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2706 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2709 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2710 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2711 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
2712 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2714 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2718 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2719 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2722 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2724 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2725 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2727 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2731 /* We need to get a client cert */
2732 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2734 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2735 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2737 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
2739 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2742 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2743 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
2744 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
2746 } else if (i
== 1) {
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2749 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
2753 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2754 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2757 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2758 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2759 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
2760 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2762 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
2763 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2764 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2765 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2771 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2774 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2778 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2780 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
2781 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
2782 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2784 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2785 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2792 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2794 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
2797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2801 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2802 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2804 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2805 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2807 /* we don't have a certificate */
2808 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
2811 /* This is the passed certificate */
2813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2814 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
2815 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
2816 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
2823 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2825 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2829 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2830 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
2832 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
2833 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2835 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2839 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2841 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2846 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
2847 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2849 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
2853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2854 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
2855 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2863 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2868 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
2870 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
2873 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
2874 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
2875 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2877 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
2878 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
2879 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
2880 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
2881 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
2882 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
2889 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
2892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
2893 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
2894 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
2895 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
2896 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
2901 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
2902 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
2906 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
2910 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2912 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
2913 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
2914 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
2920 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
2921 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2922 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2923 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
2925 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, p
);
2929 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
2933 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
2934 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2935 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2937 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);
2940 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
2941 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2942 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2944 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);