2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include "statem_locl.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
27 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
30 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
31 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
32 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
36 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
42 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
44 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
45 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
46 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
47 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
54 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
60 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
62 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
65 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
66 * ciphersuite or for SRP
68 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
77 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
78 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
79 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
80 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
82 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
83 * (transition not allowed)
85 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
87 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
91 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
95 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
99 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
101 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
102 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
104 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
105 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
110 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
111 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
112 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
117 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
119 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
120 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
124 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
125 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
128 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
129 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
135 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
136 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
137 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
143 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
144 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
149 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
150 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
151 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
157 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
158 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
161 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
162 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
165 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
166 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
167 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
169 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
) {
170 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
172 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
173 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
174 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
175 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
177 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
178 /* SSLfatal() already called */
181 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
188 /* No valid transition found */
193 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
194 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
195 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
196 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
198 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
199 * (transition not allowed)
201 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
203 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
207 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
208 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
210 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
211 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
216 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
220 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
221 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
222 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
226 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
227 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
228 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
234 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
236 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
237 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
240 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
241 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
246 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
248 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
249 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
250 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
253 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
254 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
259 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
261 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
262 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
263 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
264 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
266 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
267 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
268 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
269 * the server is resuming.
272 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
274 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
275 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
276 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
277 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
281 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
282 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
284 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
285 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
286 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
287 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
290 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
291 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
292 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
294 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
295 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
304 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
305 * |ext.status_expected| is set
307 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
308 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
314 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
315 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
316 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
317 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
318 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
319 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
326 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
327 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
328 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
329 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
336 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
337 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
338 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
343 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
344 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
345 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
346 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
349 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
350 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
355 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
356 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
357 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
363 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
364 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
370 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
371 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
378 /* No valid transition found */
379 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
383 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
384 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
387 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
388 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
389 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
390 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
393 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
394 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
,
395 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
404 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
406 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
413 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
415 /* Shouldn't happen */
416 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
417 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
419 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
421 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
422 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
423 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
427 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
428 * we already sent close_notify
430 if (!ossl_assert((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0)) {
431 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
432 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
433 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
434 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
435 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
437 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
440 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
441 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
442 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
443 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
444 else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
445 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
446 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
448 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
449 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
452 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
453 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
454 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
459 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
460 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
461 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
462 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
466 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
467 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
468 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
471 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
472 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
475 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
476 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
477 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
482 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
483 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
484 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
485 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
489 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
490 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
491 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
494 /* Try to read from the server instead */
495 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
500 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
501 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
503 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
505 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
508 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
509 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
513 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
515 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
517 /* Shouldn't happen */
518 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
519 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
520 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
521 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
524 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
526 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
527 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
529 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
534 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
537 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
538 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
540 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
541 * actually selected a version yet.
543 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0)
544 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
546 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
550 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
553 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
555 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
557 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
558 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
559 * because we did early data.
561 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
562 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
563 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
565 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
568 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
571 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
572 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
575 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
576 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
577 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
579 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
583 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
586 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
588 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
589 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
592 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
593 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
594 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
595 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
597 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
598 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
600 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
602 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
603 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
607 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
608 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
611 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
612 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
613 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
614 } else if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
615 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
617 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
618 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
620 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
621 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
623 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
628 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
629 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
630 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
634 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
636 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
637 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
642 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
644 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
647 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
651 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
653 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
656 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
657 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
658 /* SSLfatal() already called */
659 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
661 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
662 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
664 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
665 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
670 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
671 * the client to the server.
673 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
675 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
677 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
679 /* No pre work to be done */
682 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
684 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
685 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
686 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
687 /* SSLfatal() already called */
693 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
694 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
697 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
698 * messages unless we need to.
702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
703 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
704 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
705 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
711 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
713 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
714 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
715 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
717 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
718 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
719 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
722 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
723 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 1);
726 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
727 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
730 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
734 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
735 * client to the server.
737 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
739 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
743 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
745 /* No post work to be done */
748 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
749 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
750 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
752 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
753 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
754 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
756 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0) {
757 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
758 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
759 /* SSLfatal() already called */
763 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
764 } else if (!statem_flush(s
)) {
768 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
769 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
774 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
776 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
777 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
780 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
783 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
784 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
785 /* SSLfatal() already called */
790 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
791 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
793 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
794 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
796 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
797 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
798 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
800 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
801 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
805 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
806 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
807 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
809 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
810 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
812 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
814 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
819 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
820 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
821 /* SSLfatal() already called */
825 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
829 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
832 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
837 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
841 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
843 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
845 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
848 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
852 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
855 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
856 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
857 /* SSLfatal() already called */
860 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
861 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
862 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
863 /* SSLfatal() already called */
870 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
871 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
873 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
880 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
884 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
887 * Valid return values are:
891 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
892 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
894 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
896 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
898 /* Shouldn't happen */
899 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
900 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
901 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
904 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
906 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
908 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
909 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
912 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
913 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
914 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
917 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
918 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
919 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
922 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
928 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
929 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
932 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
933 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
934 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
937 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
938 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
939 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
942 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
943 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
944 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
945 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
948 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
949 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
950 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
953 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
954 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
955 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
963 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
964 * reading. Excludes the message header.
966 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
968 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
970 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
972 /* Shouldn't happen */
975 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
976 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
978 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
979 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
982 return s
->max_cert_list
;
984 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
985 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
988 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
990 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
991 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
993 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
995 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
996 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
997 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
999 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1001 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1002 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1005 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1007 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1009 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1010 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1012 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1013 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1015 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1016 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1018 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1019 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1024 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1026 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1028 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1030 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1032 /* Shouldn't happen */
1033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1034 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1036 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1039 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
1041 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1042 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
1044 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1045 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1047 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1048 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1051 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1054 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1057 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1060 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
1062 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1063 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1065 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1066 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
1068 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1069 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1071 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1072 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1074 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1075 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1077 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1078 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1083 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1086 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1088 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1090 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1092 /* Shouldn't happen */
1093 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1094 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1095 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1098 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1099 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1100 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1104 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1112 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1113 unsigned char *session_id
;
1115 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
1116 /* Should not happen */
1117 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1118 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1122 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1123 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1124 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1125 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1131 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
, NULL
)
1132 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1133 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1134 && !ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1135 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1139 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1141 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1144 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1145 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1147 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1150 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1157 i
= (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
);
1160 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
),
1161 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1162 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1163 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1168 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1169 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1170 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1171 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1172 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1173 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1174 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1175 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1178 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1179 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1180 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1181 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1182 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1183 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1184 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1185 * know that is maximum server supports.
1186 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1187 * containing version 1.0.
1189 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1190 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1191 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1192 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1193 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1194 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1195 * the negotiated version.
1197 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1198 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1200 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1201 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1202 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1203 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1208 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
1209 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1210 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1211 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0) {
1212 sess_id_len
= sizeof(s
->tmp_session_id
);
1213 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1214 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
1215 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1216 && RAND_bytes(s
->tmp_session_id
, sess_id_len
) <= 0) {
1217 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1218 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1219 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1226 assert(s
->session
->session_id_length
<= sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
));
1227 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1228 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1229 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1230 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, sess_id_len
);
1233 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1234 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, session_id
,
1236 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1237 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1238 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1242 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1243 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1244 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1245 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1246 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1247 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1253 /* Ciphers supported */
1254 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1255 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1256 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1260 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
)) {
1261 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1264 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1265 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1266 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1271 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1272 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1273 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1277 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1278 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1279 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1280 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1281 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1282 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1283 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1284 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1285 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1286 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1292 /* Add the NULL method */
1293 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1294 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1295 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1299 /* TLS extensions */
1300 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1301 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1308 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1313 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1314 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1315 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1316 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1317 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1320 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1321 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1323 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1324 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1327 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1328 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1329 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1330 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1332 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1334 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1337 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1339 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1340 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1343 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1345 /* unknown cipher */
1346 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1347 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1351 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1352 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1354 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1355 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1356 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1360 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1361 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1363 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1364 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1365 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1369 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1370 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1371 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1372 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1373 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1378 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1379 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1380 * set and use it for comparison.
1382 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1383 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1384 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1385 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1387 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1388 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1390 if (ssl_md(c
->algorithm2
)
1391 != ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1393 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1394 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1399 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1402 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1403 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1407 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1412 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1414 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1415 size_t session_id_len
;
1416 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1418 unsigned int compression
;
1419 unsigned int sversion
;
1420 unsigned int context
;
1421 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1426 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1427 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1428 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1432 /* load the server random */
1433 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1434 && sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1435 && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1436 && memcmp(hrrrandom
, PACKET_data(pkt
), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) == 0) {
1437 s
->hello_retry_request
= SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
1439 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1440 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1441 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1445 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1446 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1447 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1452 /* Get the session-id. */
1453 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1455 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1458 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1459 if (session_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1460 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1461 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1462 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1466 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1467 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1468 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1472 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1473 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1474 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1478 /* TLS extensions */
1479 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0 && !hrr
) {
1480 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1481 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1482 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1483 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1489 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
1490 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1491 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1492 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1493 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1497 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, extensions
)) {
1498 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1503 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || hrr
) {
1504 if (compression
!= 0) {
1505 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1506 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1507 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1511 if (session_id_len
!= s
->tmp_session_id_len
1512 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->tmp_session_id
,
1513 session_id_len
) != 0) {
1514 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1515 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID
);
1521 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1522 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1526 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s
, &extpkt
);
1530 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1531 * are appropriate for this version.
1533 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1534 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1535 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s
, context
, extensions
)) {
1536 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1537 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1543 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1545 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1546 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1548 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1549 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1550 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1551 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1555 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1556 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1557 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1558 extensions
, NULL
, 0)) {
1559 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1564 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1565 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1566 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1567 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1568 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1569 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1570 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1571 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1572 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1573 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1575 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1576 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1577 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1579 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1580 * backwards compat reasons
1582 int master_key_length
;
1583 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1584 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1587 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1588 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1589 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1590 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1591 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1593 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1594 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1599 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1600 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1601 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1602 session_id_len
) == 0)
1607 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1608 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1609 /* actually a client application bug */
1610 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1611 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1612 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1617 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1618 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1619 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1620 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1621 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1623 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1625 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1626 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1627 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
);
1628 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1629 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1634 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1636 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1637 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1638 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1639 * used for resumption.
1641 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1642 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1643 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1644 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1645 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1650 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1651 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1652 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1653 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1657 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1660 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1661 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1663 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1664 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1668 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1669 if (compression
!= 0) {
1670 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1671 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1675 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1676 * using compression.
1678 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1679 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1680 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1684 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1685 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1686 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1689 if (compression
== 0)
1691 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1692 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1693 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1696 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1699 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1700 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1701 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1704 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1708 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1709 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1714 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1715 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1716 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1719 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1722 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1723 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1725 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1726 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1728 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1729 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1734 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1735 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1736 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1741 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1742 * we're done with this message
1745 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1746 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1747 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1748 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1752 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1753 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1755 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1756 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1759 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
,
1762 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1765 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1766 * should not be used.
1768 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1769 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1771 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1772 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1773 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1774 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1775 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1779 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1782 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0
1783 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1784 && s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
1788 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1789 * ClientHello will not change
1791 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1792 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1793 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1798 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1799 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1801 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
1802 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1807 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1808 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1809 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1812 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1813 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1814 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1818 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1820 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1821 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1824 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1827 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1828 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1830 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1831 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1832 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1833 size_t chainidx
, certidx
;
1834 unsigned int context
= 0;
1835 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1837 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1838 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1839 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1843 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1845 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1846 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1847 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1848 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1849 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1852 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1853 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1854 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1855 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1856 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1857 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1861 certstart
= certbytes
;
1862 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1864 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
,
1865 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1868 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1869 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1870 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1871 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1875 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1876 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1879 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1880 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1881 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1885 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1886 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1887 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1888 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1889 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1890 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1891 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1892 /* SSLfatal already called */
1895 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1898 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1899 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1900 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1901 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1907 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1909 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1910 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1911 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1912 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1913 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1914 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1915 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1916 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1917 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1918 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1919 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1920 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1922 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1923 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
1924 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1925 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1928 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1930 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1931 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1935 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1937 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1938 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1940 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1943 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1945 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1947 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1948 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1952 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1954 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1955 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1956 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1960 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1961 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1964 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1965 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1967 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1968 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1969 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1973 s
->session
->peer_type
= certidx
;
1975 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1977 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1978 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1981 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1983 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1984 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1985 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1986 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1990 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1994 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1998 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2001 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
2003 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2005 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
2006 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2007 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2012 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2013 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2014 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2017 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2018 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2019 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2020 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2024 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
2025 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2026 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
2027 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
2028 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
2029 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2036 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2037 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2042 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2045 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
2047 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2048 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2049 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
2050 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
2051 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2052 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2056 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2058 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
2059 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
2061 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
2062 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
2064 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
2065 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
2067 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
2068 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2069 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2074 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
2075 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2079 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2080 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2081 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2085 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2086 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2091 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2094 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
2095 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2098 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
2102 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2103 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2104 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
2105 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2106 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2110 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2113 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
2114 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2115 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2119 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2120 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2121 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2123 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2124 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2125 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2126 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2131 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2132 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
2133 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2134 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2138 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2139 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2145 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2146 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2147 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2151 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2152 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2158 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2159 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2160 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2164 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2170 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2173 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2174 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2176 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2177 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2178 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2187 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2191 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2192 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2197 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2201 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2204 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2205 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2206 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2208 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2209 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2210 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2214 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2215 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2217 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2218 || !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
, 1)) {
2219 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2224 if ((s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2225 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2226 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2230 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2231 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2232 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2236 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2237 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2238 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2239 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2245 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2246 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2249 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2250 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2251 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2252 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2253 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2257 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2258 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2263 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2266 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2267 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2268 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2269 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2271 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2273 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2275 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2276 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2277 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2280 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2281 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2287 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2288 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2289 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2290 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2294 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2295 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2296 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2299 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2300 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2301 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2305 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2306 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2310 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2314 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2320 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2321 * equals the length of the parameters.
2323 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2324 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2325 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2326 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2327 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2331 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2332 unsigned int sigalg
;
2334 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2335 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2336 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2339 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2340 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2343 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2344 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2345 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2349 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2350 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2351 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2355 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2356 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2357 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md
));
2360 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2361 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2362 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2363 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2366 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2369 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2374 * Check signature length
2376 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2377 /* wrong packet length */
2378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2379 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2383 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2384 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2385 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2386 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2390 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2395 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2396 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2397 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2398 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2399 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2400 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2404 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2405 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2407 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2411 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2412 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2415 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2416 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2419 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2422 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2423 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2424 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2425 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2426 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2427 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2430 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2433 /* still data left over */
2434 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2435 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2436 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2441 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2443 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2444 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2447 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2451 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2452 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2453 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2455 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2456 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2457 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2459 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
2461 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2462 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2465 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2468 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2469 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2470 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2471 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2472 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2473 s
->pha_context
= NULL
;
2475 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
) ||
2476 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx
, &s
->pha_context
, &s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2477 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2478 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2479 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2480 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2483 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2484 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2485 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2487 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2489 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2490 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2492 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2493 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2494 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2495 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2496 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2498 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2499 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2500 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2501 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2503 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2508 /* get the certificate types */
2509 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2510 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2511 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2512 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2513 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2516 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2517 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2518 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2519 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2520 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2523 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2526 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2527 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2528 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2529 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2530 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2534 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2535 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2537 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
, 0)) {
2538 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2539 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2540 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2541 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2543 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2544 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2545 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2546 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2547 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2551 /* get the CA RDNs */
2552 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2553 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2554 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2558 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2559 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2560 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2561 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2562 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2565 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2566 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2569 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2570 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2571 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2572 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2573 * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2576 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
2577 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2579 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2582 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2584 unsigned int ticklen
;
2585 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2586 unsigned int sess_len
;
2587 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2590 PACKET_null_init(&nonce
);
2592 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2594 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2595 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)))
2596 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2597 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
)
2598 : PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)) {
2599 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2600 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2605 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2606 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2607 * be 0 here in that instance
2610 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2613 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2614 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2615 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2616 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2617 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2620 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2621 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2624 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2627 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2628 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2629 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2630 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2634 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0
2635 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2637 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2638 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2639 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2641 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2644 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2645 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2649 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2650 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2652 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2654 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2655 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2656 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2658 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2659 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2660 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2661 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2664 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2665 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2666 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2670 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2671 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2672 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2674 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2677 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2678 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2679 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2680 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2681 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2685 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2686 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, &exts
,
2688 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2689 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2690 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2691 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2697 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2698 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2699 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2700 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2701 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2702 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2703 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2704 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2705 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2708 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2709 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2711 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2712 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2713 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2714 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2718 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2719 s
->session
->not_resumable
= 0;
2721 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2722 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2723 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
2724 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
2726 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
2728 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2729 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
2730 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2731 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2732 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2735 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
2737 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
2739 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
2740 PACKET_data(&nonce
),
2741 PACKET_remaining(&nonce
),
2742 s
->session
->master_key
,
2744 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2747 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
2750 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2751 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2754 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2757 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2761 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2762 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2764 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2769 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2770 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2771 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2772 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2775 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2776 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2777 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2778 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2781 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2782 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2783 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2784 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2787 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2788 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2789 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2792 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2798 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2800 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2801 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2802 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2805 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2809 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2810 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2811 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2814 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
)
2817 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2820 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2821 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2826 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2827 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2828 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2830 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2831 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2832 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2835 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2836 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2837 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2841 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2842 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2843 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2848 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2849 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2850 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2851 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2860 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2862 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2863 /* should contain no data */
2864 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2865 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2866 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2869 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2870 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2871 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2873 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2878 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2879 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2880 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2883 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2886 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2891 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2892 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2895 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2896 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2897 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2898 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2899 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2902 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2903 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2904 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2908 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2910 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2911 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2914 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2915 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2916 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2918 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2919 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2920 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2921 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2925 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2926 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2927 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2932 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2933 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2934 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2935 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2936 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2940 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2941 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2942 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2944 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2945 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2948 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2949 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2950 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2957 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2958 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2959 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2960 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2964 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2965 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2970 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2973 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2974 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2975 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2977 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2980 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2982 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2984 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2985 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2989 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2990 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2991 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2992 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2996 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2997 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2999 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3000 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3004 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
3005 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
3006 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3007 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
3008 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3009 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3013 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3014 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
3015 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3016 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3019 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3020 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
3021 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3022 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3026 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
3027 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3028 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3029 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
3032 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3035 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3036 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3037 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3042 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3043 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
3044 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3048 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3049 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3053 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3054 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3058 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3059 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3064 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3068 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
3069 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3070 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
3072 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
3074 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3075 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3079 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3081 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3082 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3086 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
3088 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
3089 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3090 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3094 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3095 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3099 /* send off the data */
3100 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
3101 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
),
3103 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3104 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3108 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
3109 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3113 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3116 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3117 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3122 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3125 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
3126 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
3127 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3130 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
3132 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3133 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3137 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3139 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3140 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3144 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3145 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3149 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3150 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
3152 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
3153 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3158 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
3159 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3166 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3167 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3170 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3171 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3176 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3179 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3180 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3183 unsigned int md_len
;
3184 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3185 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3186 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3187 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3190 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3191 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3194 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3196 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3198 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3199 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3203 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
3204 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3205 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3206 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3210 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3211 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3212 * certificate key for key exchange
3215 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3217 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3219 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3220 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3224 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3225 /* Generate session key
3226 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3228 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3229 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3230 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3234 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3237 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3238 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3239 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3240 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3241 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3242 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3243 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3244 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3245 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3246 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3249 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3251 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3252 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3253 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3257 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3259 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3262 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3263 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3268 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3269 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3270 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3271 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3272 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3276 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3277 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3278 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3282 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3283 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3284 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3287 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3288 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3293 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3296 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3298 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3299 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3301 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3302 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3305 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3307 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3308 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3309 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3310 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3311 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3317 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3318 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3323 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3325 unsigned long alg_k
;
3327 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3330 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3331 * no need to do so here.
3333 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3334 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3337 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3338 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3340 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3341 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3343 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3344 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3346 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3347 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3349 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3350 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3352 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3353 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3354 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3360 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3361 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3363 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3364 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3369 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3371 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3374 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3375 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3379 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3380 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3381 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3388 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3389 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3390 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3393 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3394 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3395 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3404 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3405 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3406 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3409 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3412 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3413 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3415 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3416 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3417 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3418 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3419 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3420 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3424 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3425 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3431 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3432 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3437 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3438 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3439 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3441 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3443 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3444 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3447 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3448 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3450 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3451 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3456 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3459 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3462 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3463 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3464 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3465 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3467 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3471 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3472 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3473 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3476 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3478 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
)) {
3479 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3480 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3482 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3485 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3489 /* We need to get a client cert */
3490 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3492 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3493 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3495 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3497 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3500 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3501 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3502 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3504 } else if (i
== 1) {
3506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3507 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3511 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3512 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3515 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3516 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3517 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3518 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3520 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3521 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3522 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3528 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
3529 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3530 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3533 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3534 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3535 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3539 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3541 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3542 if (s
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3543 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3544 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3545 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3546 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3549 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
3550 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3551 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3555 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3556 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3558 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3563 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3564 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3565 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3567 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3568 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3570 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3571 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3578 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3580 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3584 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3585 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3587 /* we don't have a certificate */
3588 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3591 /* This is the passed certificate */
3592 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3594 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3595 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3596 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3597 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3598 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3603 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3604 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3606 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3607 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3612 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3613 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3614 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3615 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3620 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3621 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3622 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3631 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3633 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3634 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3636 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3637 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3639 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3640 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3641 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
,
3642 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3646 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3652 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3654 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3655 /* should contain no data */
3656 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
,
3657 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3658 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3661 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3662 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3663 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3667 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3668 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3669 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3670 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3671 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3676 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3678 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3681 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3684 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3686 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3687 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3688 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3689 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3693 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3694 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3696 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3697 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3698 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3702 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3703 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3706 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3707 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3710 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3714 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3715 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3716 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3717 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3722 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3723 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3727 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3730 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3731 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3733 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3734 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s
)) {
3735 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3736 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
3741 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3742 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3746 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3747 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3748 # error Max cipher length too short
3751 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3752 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3755 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3756 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3759 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3762 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3764 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3767 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3768 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3770 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3771 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3772 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3775 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3776 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3777 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3781 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3783 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3784 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3785 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
))
3788 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
3789 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3797 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3798 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3799 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3802 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3809 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3810 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3811 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3813 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3814 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3815 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3819 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3820 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3821 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3823 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3824 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3825 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3834 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3836 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3837 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3838 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3839 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3840 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3844 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;