2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
64 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
65 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
66 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
67 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
71 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
77 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
79 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
80 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
81 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
82 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
89 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
95 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
97 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
100 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
101 * ciphersuite or for SRP
103 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
112 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
113 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
114 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
115 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
117 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
118 * (transition not allowed)
120 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
122 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
125 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
126 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
130 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
131 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
132 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
135 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
139 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
140 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
141 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
148 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
149 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
153 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
154 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
157 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
158 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
164 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
165 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
166 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
173 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
174 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
176 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
177 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
182 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
183 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
184 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
191 /* No valid transition found */
196 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
197 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
198 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
199 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
201 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
202 * (transition not allowed)
204 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
206 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
210 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
211 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
213 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
214 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
219 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
223 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
224 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
225 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
229 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
230 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
231 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
237 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
239 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
240 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
241 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
244 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
245 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
249 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
250 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
252 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
253 && s
->tls_session_secret_cb
!= NULL
254 && s
->session
->tlsext_tick
!= NULL
255 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
257 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
258 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
259 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
260 * the server is resuming.
263 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
265 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
266 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
267 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
268 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
272 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
273 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
275 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
276 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
277 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
278 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
281 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
282 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
283 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
285 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
286 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
295 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
296 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
298 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
299 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
304 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
305 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
306 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
307 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
308 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
309 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
310 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
317 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
318 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
319 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
320 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
327 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
328 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
329 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
334 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
335 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
336 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
337 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
340 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
341 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
346 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
347 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
348 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
353 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
354 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
355 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
362 /* No valid transition found */
363 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
364 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
369 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
370 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
373 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
375 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
378 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
379 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
383 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
384 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
385 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
387 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
389 /* Shouldn't happen */
390 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
392 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
393 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
398 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
399 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
400 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
401 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
403 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
404 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
407 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
408 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
409 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
415 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
416 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
418 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
420 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
423 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
424 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
428 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
430 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen */
433 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
436 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
438 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
441 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
443 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
446 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
448 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
449 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
452 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
453 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
454 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
456 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
460 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
465 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
466 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
469 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
470 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
471 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
472 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
474 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
475 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
477 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
479 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
480 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
484 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
485 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
488 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
489 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
490 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
492 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
493 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
495 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
499 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
500 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
501 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
505 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
507 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
508 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
514 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
516 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
519 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
520 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
527 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
528 * the client to the server.
530 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
532 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
534 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
536 /* No pre work to be done */
539 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
542 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
543 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
544 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
550 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
551 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
554 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
555 * messages unless we need to.
559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
560 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
561 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
567 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
570 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
574 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
575 * client to the server.
577 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
579 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
583 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
585 /* No post work to be done */
588 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
589 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
592 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
593 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
598 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
599 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
603 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
604 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
605 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
606 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
608 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
609 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
611 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
613 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
616 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
617 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
624 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
627 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
632 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
636 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
638 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
640 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
643 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
647 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
650 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
651 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
652 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
658 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
662 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
665 * Valid return values are:
669 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
670 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
672 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
674 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
676 /* Shouldn't happen */
679 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
681 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
683 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
684 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
687 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
688 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
689 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
693 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
694 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
697 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
698 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
699 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
702 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
703 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_verify
;
704 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
707 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
708 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
709 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
710 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
713 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
714 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
715 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
723 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
724 * reading. Excludes the message header.
726 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
728 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
730 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
732 /* Shouldn't happen */
735 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
736 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
738 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
739 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
742 return s
->max_cert_list
;
744 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
745 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
747 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
748 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
750 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
752 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
753 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
754 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
756 return s
->max_cert_list
;
758 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
759 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
761 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
762 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
764 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
766 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
767 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
769 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
770 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
772 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
773 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
778 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
780 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
782 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
784 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
786 /* Shouldn't happen */
787 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
789 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
790 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
792 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
793 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
796 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
798 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
799 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
801 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
802 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
804 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
805 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
807 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
808 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
810 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
811 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
813 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
814 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
816 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
817 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
819 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
820 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
825 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
828 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
830 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
832 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
834 /* Shouldn't happen */
837 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
838 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
842 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
843 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
844 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
845 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
846 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
847 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
848 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
851 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
852 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
857 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
862 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
866 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
868 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
869 /* Should not happen */
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
874 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
875 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
881 if ((sess
== NULL
) || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
883 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
884 * "ticket" without a session ID.
886 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
887 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
888 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
891 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
893 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
896 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
897 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
899 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
902 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
911 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
915 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
916 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
917 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
918 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
919 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
920 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
921 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
922 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
925 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
926 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
927 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
928 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
929 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
930 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
931 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
932 * know that is maximum server supports.
933 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
934 * containing version 1.0.
936 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
937 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
938 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
939 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
940 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
941 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
942 * the negotiated version.
944 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
945 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
947 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
948 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
957 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
958 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
959 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
960 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
962 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
967 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
968 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
969 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
970 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
971 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
977 /* Ciphers supported */
978 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
982 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
983 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
))
985 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
991 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
996 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
997 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
998 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
999 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1000 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1007 /* Add the NULL method */
1008 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1013 /* TLS extensions */
1014 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, &al
)) {
1015 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1023 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1029 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1030 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1031 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1036 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1037 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1038 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1043 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1044 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1048 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1050 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1052 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1053 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1054 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1057 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1059 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1060 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1061 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1062 size_t session_id_len
;
1063 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1064 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1065 unsigned int compression
;
1066 unsigned int sversion
;
1067 unsigned int context
;
1069 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1074 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1075 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1080 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
1081 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1082 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
1087 /* load the server hello data */
1088 /* load the server random */
1089 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1090 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1097 /* Get the session-id. */
1098 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1099 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1100 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1104 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1105 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1106 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1107 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1109 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1116 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1118 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1123 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1124 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1125 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1126 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1127 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1128 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1129 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1130 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1131 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1132 * server wants to resume.
1134 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1135 && s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&& s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
1136 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1138 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1139 * backwards compat reasons
1141 int master_key_length
;
1142 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1143 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1146 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)
1147 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1148 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1149 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1150 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1153 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1158 if (session_id_len
!= 0 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1159 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1160 session_id_len
) == 0) {
1161 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1162 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1163 /* actually a client application bug */
1164 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1166 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1172 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1173 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1174 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1175 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1176 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1178 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1179 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1180 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1185 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1186 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1187 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1188 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1192 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1193 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1194 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1197 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1201 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1203 /* unknown cipher */
1204 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1209 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1212 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1213 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1215 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1216 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1218 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1219 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1224 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1225 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1227 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1228 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1234 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1235 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1236 * set and use it for comparison.
1238 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1239 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1240 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1241 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1243 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1246 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1247 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1249 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1250 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1252 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1259 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1260 if (compression
!= 0) {
1261 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1263 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1267 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1268 * using compression.
1270 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1275 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1276 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1278 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1281 if (compression
== 0)
1283 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1284 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1288 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1291 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1292 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1294 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1297 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1301 /* TLS extensions */
1302 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1303 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1304 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)) {
1305 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1310 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1311 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1312 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, context
, &extensions
, &al
)
1313 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, &al
))
1316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1317 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1318 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1319 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1322 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1325 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1326 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1328 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1329 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1331 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
1334 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1335 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1336 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1341 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1342 * we're done with this message
1345 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1346 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1347 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)
1348 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1349 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1350 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
1355 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1356 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1358 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1359 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1360 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1361 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1364 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1366 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1367 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1369 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1370 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1371 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1373 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1378 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1379 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1380 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1384 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1385 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1386 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1387 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1389 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1393 certstart
= certbytes
;
1394 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1396 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1400 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1401 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1403 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1406 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1413 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1415 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1416 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1417 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1418 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1419 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1420 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1421 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1422 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1423 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1424 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1425 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1426 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1428 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1429 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1431 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1434 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1437 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1441 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1443 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1444 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1446 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1449 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1452 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1454 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1458 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1462 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1467 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1471 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1472 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1473 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1474 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1475 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1477 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1479 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1482 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1484 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1486 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1487 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1490 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1494 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1496 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1499 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1503 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1506 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1508 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1510 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1511 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1517 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1518 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1519 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1522 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1523 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1528 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1529 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1530 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1531 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1532 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1533 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1540 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1545 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1548 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1550 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1551 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1552 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1553 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1554 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1559 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1561 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1562 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1564 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1565 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1567 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1568 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1570 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1571 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1572 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1577 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1578 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1583 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1584 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1585 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1590 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1595 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1598 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1599 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1602 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1604 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1605 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1606 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1607 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1612 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1615 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1616 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1621 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1622 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1623 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1625 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1626 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
1627 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1628 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1633 if (BN_is_zero(p
) || BN_is_zero(g
) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1634 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1639 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1640 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1646 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
1647 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1653 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1654 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1659 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
1660 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1665 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
1668 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1669 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1671 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1672 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1673 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1682 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1687 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1692 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1696 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
1698 unsigned int curve_flags
;
1699 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1702 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1703 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1704 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1706 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1707 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1712 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1713 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1715 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1716 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1721 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2), &curve_flags
);
1723 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1724 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
1726 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1730 if ((curve_flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
) {
1731 EVP_PKEY
*key
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1733 if (key
== NULL
|| !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key
, curve_nid
)) {
1734 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1739 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= key
;
1741 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1742 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
1744 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
1745 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
1746 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
1747 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1749 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1752 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1756 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1757 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1762 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
1763 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1764 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
1765 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1771 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1772 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1775 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1776 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1777 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
1778 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1779 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1784 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1789 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1793 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1794 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
1796 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1798 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
1800 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1801 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
1802 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1805 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1806 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
1810 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1811 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1812 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1813 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1815 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1816 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1818 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1819 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1822 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1827 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1831 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1835 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1836 * equals the length of the parameters.
1838 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
1839 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
1840 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
1841 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1846 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1847 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
1849 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sigalgs
, 2)) {
1850 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1854 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sigalgs
, pkey
);
1856 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1858 } else if (rv
== 0) {
1859 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1863 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1865 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
1866 md
= EVP_md5_sha1();
1871 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
1872 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1873 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1877 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1879 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1885 * Check signature length
1887 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
1888 /* wrong packet length */
1889 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1891 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1895 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1896 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1897 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1902 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1903 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1904 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1905 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1906 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1907 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
1908 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
1909 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1910 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1914 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1915 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
1916 (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature
),
1919 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1920 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1924 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1926 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1927 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1928 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1929 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1930 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
1931 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1932 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1935 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1939 /* still data left over */
1940 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1941 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1947 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1950 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1951 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1952 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1955 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1957 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1958 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
1959 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1960 const unsigned char *data
;
1961 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
1962 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1964 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
1965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1969 /* get the certificate types */
1970 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
1971 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
1972 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1976 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
1977 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
1978 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
1979 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1980 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
1981 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1985 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
1986 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
1987 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
1989 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
1990 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
1992 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1993 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1994 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, list_len
)) {
1995 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1997 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2001 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2002 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2003 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
2004 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2006 if ((list_len
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, list_len
)) {
2007 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2009 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2012 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2013 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2018 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
2021 /* get the CA RDNs */
2022 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
2023 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
2024 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2029 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
2030 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
2031 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2032 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2034 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2038 namestart
= namebytes
;
2040 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
2041 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2042 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2047 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2048 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2050 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2053 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2060 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2061 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2062 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2063 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2064 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2067 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2070 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2073 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2077 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2079 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2082 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2085 unsigned int ticklen
;
2086 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2087 unsigned int sess_len
;
2089 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2090 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2091 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
) {
2092 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2097 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2099 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2101 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2102 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2103 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2105 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2108 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2110 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2112 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2115 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2116 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2121 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2122 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2125 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2126 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2128 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2129 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
) {
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2133 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
)) {
2134 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2139 s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2140 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2142 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2143 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2144 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2145 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2146 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2147 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2148 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2149 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2150 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2153 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2154 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2156 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
,
2157 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2158 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2162 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2163 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2165 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2167 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2168 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2171 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2177 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2178 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2179 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2183 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2184 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2185 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2189 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2190 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
== NULL
) {
2191 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2195 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, resplen
)) {
2196 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2200 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2201 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2203 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2204 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2205 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2209 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2210 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2211 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2214 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
2217 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2220 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2221 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2226 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2227 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2228 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2230 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1 && s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2232 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2234 *al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2236 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2240 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2242 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2247 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2248 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2249 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2250 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2259 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2261 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2263 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2264 /* should contain no data */
2265 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2270 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2271 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2279 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2281 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
2284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2285 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2286 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2287 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2288 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2291 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2294 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2295 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2296 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2299 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2304 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2305 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2308 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2309 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2310 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2311 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2312 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2315 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2317 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2321 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2323 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2324 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2327 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2329 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2331 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2333 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2334 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2338 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2339 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2341 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2345 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2346 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2347 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2349 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2353 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2354 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2355 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2357 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2358 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2361 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2363 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2370 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2371 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2372 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2373 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2378 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2383 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2386 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2387 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2388 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2390 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2393 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2395 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2401 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2402 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2407 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2408 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2411 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2415 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2416 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2417 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2418 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2422 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2423 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2427 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2428 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2429 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2433 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2434 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2438 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2441 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2443 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2447 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2448 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2453 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2454 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2458 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2459 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2464 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2469 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2473 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2474 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2475 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2477 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2481 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2485 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2487 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0)
2490 /* send off the data */
2491 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2492 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
), &keybytes
))
2495 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2496 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2500 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2503 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2507 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2510 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2511 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2512 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2515 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2521 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2527 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2532 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2533 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2535 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2540 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2547 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2548 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2552 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2557 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2560 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2561 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2564 unsigned int md_len
;
2565 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2566 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2567 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2568 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2571 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2572 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2575 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2577 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2579 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2581 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2585 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2586 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2587 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2592 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2593 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2594 * certificate key for key exchange
2597 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2599 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2601 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2606 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2607 /* Generate session key
2608 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2610 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
2611 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2616 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2619 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2620 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
2621 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2622 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2623 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2624 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2625 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2626 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2627 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2631 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2633 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
2634 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
2635 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2639 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2641 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2644 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2645 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2650 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
2651 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
2652 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
2653 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2658 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2659 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2660 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2664 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2665 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2666 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2670 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2675 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2678 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
2680 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
2681 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2686 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
2688 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2689 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2690 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2698 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2703 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2705 unsigned long alg_k
;
2708 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2710 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
2711 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2714 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2715 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2717 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2718 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2720 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2721 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2723 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2724 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2726 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2727 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2729 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2730 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2738 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2739 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
2740 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2742 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2743 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2748 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
2750 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2753 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2754 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2758 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2759 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
2761 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2768 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2769 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2773 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2774 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2776 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2785 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2786 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2787 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2790 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2793 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2794 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2796 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2797 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2798 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
2801 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2802 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2808 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2809 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2813 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2816 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
2817 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
2821 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
2823 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2828 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2830 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2831 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2836 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt
, pkey
, md
)) {
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2841 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2843 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
));
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2848 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2849 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
2850 || (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2851 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2852 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2853 s
->session
->master_key
))
2854 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &u
, pkey
)) {
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2860 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2861 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2862 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2863 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
2864 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, u
);
2868 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, u
)) {
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2873 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2874 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
2878 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2882 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2883 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2888 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2889 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2890 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2892 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2894 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
2896 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2897 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
2900 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2901 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2903 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
2904 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
2909 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2912 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2915 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2916 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2917 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
2918 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2920 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2924 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2925 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2928 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2930 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2931 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2933 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2937 /* We need to get a client cert */
2938 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2940 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2941 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2943 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
2945 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2948 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2949 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
2950 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
2952 } else if (i
== 1) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2955 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
2959 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2960 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2963 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2964 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2965 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
2966 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2968 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
2969 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2970 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2971 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2977 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2980 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2984 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2986 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
2987 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2990 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2997 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2999 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3006 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3007 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3009 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3010 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3012 /* we don't have a certificate */
3013 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3016 /* This is the passed certificate */
3018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3019 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
3020 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3021 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3028 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3030 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3034 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3035 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
3037 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3038 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3040 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3044 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3046 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3050 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3051 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
3052 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3054 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3058 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3059 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3060 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3068 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3073 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3075 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3076 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3078 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3079 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3081 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
)
3082 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3087 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3091 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3096 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3098 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3100 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3102 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
3103 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3109 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we are processing Encrypted Extensions and
3110 * Certificate extensions as part of this one message. Later we need to
3111 * split out the Certificate extensions into the Certificate message
3113 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3114 EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
3115 | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
, &al
)
3116 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
3117 EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
3118 | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3122 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3123 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3126 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3127 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3128 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3129 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3132 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3136 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3137 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3138 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3139 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3144 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3145 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3149 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3152 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
;
3153 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3154 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3155 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3160 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3161 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3162 # error Max cipher length too short
3165 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3166 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3169 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3170 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3173 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3176 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3178 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3181 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3182 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3184 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3185 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3186 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
3189 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3203 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3204 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3205 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3207 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3212 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3213 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3214 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3216 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);