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Process KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket messages after a close_notify
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_clnt.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include <time.h>
14 #include <assert.h>
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include "statem_locl.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
26
27 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
29
30 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
31 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
32 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
33 WPACKET *pkt);
34
35 /*
36 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
37 *
38 * Return values are:
39 * 1: Yes
40 * 0: No
41 */
42 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
43 {
44 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
45 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
46 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
47 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
48 return 0;
49
50 return 1;
51 }
52
53 /*
54 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
55 *
56 * Return values are:
57 * 1: Yes
58 * 0: No
59 */
60 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
61 {
62 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63
64 /*
65 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
66 * ciphersuite or for SRP
67 */
68 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
69 | SSL_kSRP)) {
70 return 1;
71 }
72
73 return 0;
74 }
75
76 /*
77 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
78 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
79 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
80 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
81 *
82 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
83 * (transition not allowed)
84 */
85 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
86 {
87 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88
89 /*
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
91 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 */
94
95 switch (st->hand_state) {
96 default:
97 break;
98
99 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
100 /*
101 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
102 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
103 */
104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
105 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
106 return 1;
107 }
108 break;
109
110 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
112 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
113 return 1;
114 }
115 break;
116
117 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
118 if (s->hit) {
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
121 return 1;
122 }
123 } else {
124 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
125 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 return 1;
127 }
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
130 return 1;
131 }
132 }
133 break;
134
135 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
138 return 1;
139 }
140 break;
141
142 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
143 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
144 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
145 return 1;
146 }
147 break;
148
149 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
150 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
151 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
152 return 1;
153 }
154 break;
155
156 case TLS_ST_OK:
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 return 1;
160 }
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
163 return 1;
164 }
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
166 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
167 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
168 #endif
169 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
170 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
171 /*
172 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
173 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
174 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
175 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
176 */
177 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
178 /* SSLfatal() already called */
179 return 0;
180 }
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
182 return 1;
183 }
184 }
185 break;
186 }
187
188 /* No valid transition found */
189 return 0;
190 }
191
192 /*
193 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
194 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
195 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
196 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
197 *
198 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
199 * (transition not allowed)
200 */
201 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
202 {
203 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
204 int ske_expected;
205
206 /*
207 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
208 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
209 */
210 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
211 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
212 goto err;
213 return 1;
214 }
215
216 switch (st->hand_state) {
217 default:
218 break;
219
220 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
222 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
223 return 1;
224 }
225
226 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
227 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
229 return 1;
230 }
231 }
232 break;
233
234 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
235 /*
236 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
237 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
238 * HelloRetryRequest.
239 */
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
242 return 1;
243 }
244 break;
245
246 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
247 if (s->hit) {
248 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
251 return 1;
252 }
253 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
255 return 1;
256 }
257 } else {
258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
259 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
260 return 1;
261 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
262 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
263 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
264 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
265 /*
266 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
267 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
268 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
269 * the server is resuming.
270 */
271 s->hit = 1;
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
273 return 1;
274 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
275 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
276 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
278 return 1;
279 }
280 } else {
281 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
282 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
283 if (ske_expected
284 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
285 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
286 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
288 return 1;
289 }
290 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
291 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
293 return 1;
294 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
296 return 1;
297 }
298 }
299 }
300 break;
301
302 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
303 /*
304 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
305 * |ext.status_expected| is set
306 */
307 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
308 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
309 return 1;
310 }
311 /* Fall through */
312
313 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
314 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
315 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
316 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
317 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
319 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
320 return 1;
321 }
322 goto err;
323 }
324 /* Fall through */
325
326 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
328 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
330 return 1;
331 }
332 goto err;
333 }
334 /* Fall through */
335
336 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
337 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
339 return 1;
340 }
341 break;
342
343 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
344 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
347 return 1;
348 }
349 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
351 return 1;
352 }
353 break;
354
355 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
356 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
358 return 1;
359 }
360 break;
361
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
365 return 1;
366 }
367 break;
368
369 case TLS_ST_OK:
370 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
372 return 1;
373 }
374 break;
375 }
376
377 err:
378 /* No valid transition found */
379 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
380 BIO *rbio;
381
382 /*
383 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
384 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
385 */
386 s->init_num = 0;
387 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
388 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
389 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
390 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
391 return 0;
392 }
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
394 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
395 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
396 return 0;
397 }
398
399 /*
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
402 * server.
403 */
404 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
405 {
406 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
407
408 /*
409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
412 */
413 switch (st->hand_state) {
414 default:
415 /* Shouldn't happen */
416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
417 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
419 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
420
421 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
422 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 }
426 /*
427 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
428 * we already sent close_notify
429 */
430 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
431 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
433 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
434 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
435 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
436 }
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439
440 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
441 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
442 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
444 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
445 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
447 else
448 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
449 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451
452 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
453 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 }
457 /* Fall through */
458
459 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
460 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
461 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
462 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464
465 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
466 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
467 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
468 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470
471 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474
475 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
476 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 }
480 /* Fall through */
481
482 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
483 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
484 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487
488 case TLS_ST_OK:
489 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
490 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
491 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 }
493
494 /* Try to read from the server instead */
495 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
496 }
497 }
498
499 /*
500 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
501 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
502 */
503 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
504 {
505 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
506
507 /*
508 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
509 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
510 * later
511 */
512 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
513 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
514
515 switch (st->hand_state) {
516 default:
517 /* Shouldn't happen */
518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
519 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
520 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
521 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
522
523 case TLS_ST_OK:
524 if (!s->renegotiate) {
525 /*
526 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
527 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
528 */
529 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
530 }
531 /* Renegotiation */
532 /* fall thru */
533 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
536
537 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
538 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
539 /*
540 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
541 * actually selected a version yet.
542 */
543 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
544 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
545 else
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 }
549 /*
550 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
551 * we will be sent
552 */
553 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
554
555 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
556 /*
557 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
558 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
559 * because we did early data.
560 */
561 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
562 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
564 else
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
567
568 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
570
571 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
574
575 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
576 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
578 else
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581
582 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
585
586 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
587 /*
588 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
589 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
590 */
591 /*
592 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
593 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
594 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
595 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
596 */
597 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
599 } else {
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
601 }
602 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
604 }
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606
607 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
610
611 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
612 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
614 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
616 } else {
617 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
619 #else
620 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
622 else
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
624 #endif
625 }
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
627
628 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
629 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
630 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 #endif
633
634 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
635 if (s->hit) {
636 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
637 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
638 } else {
639 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
640 }
641
642 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
643 if (s->hit) {
644 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646 } else {
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
649 }
650
651 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
652 /*
653 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
654 * convenient time.
655 */
656 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
657 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
658 /* SSLfatal() already called */
659 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
660 }
661 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
662 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
663 }
664 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
665 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
666 }
667 }
668
669 /*
670 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
671 * the client to the server.
672 */
673 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
674 {
675 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
676
677 switch (st->hand_state) {
678 default:
679 /* No pre work to be done */
680 break;
681
682 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
683 s->shutdown = 0;
684 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
685 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
686 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
687 /* SSLfatal() already called */
688 return WORK_ERROR;
689 }
690 }
691 break;
692
693 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
694 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
695 if (s->hit) {
696 /*
697 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
698 * messages unless we need to.
699 */
700 st->use_timer = 0;
701 }
702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
703 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
704 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
705 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
706 }
707 #endif
708 }
709 break;
710
711 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
712 /*
713 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
714 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
715 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
716 */
717 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
718 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
719 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
720 /* Fall through */
721
722 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
723 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
724
725 case TLS_ST_OK:
726 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
727 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
728 }
729
730 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
731 }
732
733 /*
734 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
735 * client to the server.
736 */
737 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
738 {
739 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
740
741 s->init_num = 0;
742
743 switch (st->hand_state) {
744 default:
745 /* No post work to be done */
746 break;
747
748 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
749 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
750 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
751 /*
752 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
753 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
754 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
755 */
756 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
757 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
758 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
759 /* SSLfatal() already called */
760 return WORK_ERROR;
761 }
762 }
763 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
764 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
765 return WORK_MORE_A;
766 }
767
768 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
769 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
770 s->first_packet = 1;
771 }
772 break;
773
774 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
775 /*
776 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
777 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
778 */
779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
780 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
781 break;
782
783 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
784 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
785 /* SSLfatal() already called */
786 return WORK_ERROR;
787 }
788 break;
789
790 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
791 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
792 break;
793 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
794 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
795 /*
796 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
797 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
798 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
799 */
800 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
801 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
802 return WORK_ERROR;
803 break;
804 }
805 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
806 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
807 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
808 #else
809 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
810 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
811 else
812 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
813 #endif
814 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
816 return WORK_ERROR;
817 }
818
819 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
820 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
821 /* SSLfatal() already called */
822 return WORK_ERROR;
823 }
824
825 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
827 if (s->hit) {
828 /*
829 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
830 * no SCTP used.
831 */
832 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
833 0, NULL);
834 }
835 #endif
836
837 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
838 }
839 break;
840
841 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
843 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
844 /*
845 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
846 * no SCTP used.
847 */
848 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
849 0, NULL);
850 }
851 #endif
852 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
853 return WORK_MORE_B;
854
855 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
856 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
857 /* SSLfatal() already called */
858 return WORK_ERROR;
859 }
860 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
861 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
862 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
863 /* SSLfatal() already called */
864 return WORK_ERROR;
865 }
866 }
867 }
868 break;
869
870 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
871 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
872 return WORK_MORE_A;
873 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
875 return WORK_ERROR;
876 }
877 break;
878 }
879
880 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
881 }
882
883 /*
884 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
885 * client
886 *
887 * Valid return values are:
888 * 1: Success
889 * 0: Error
890 */
891 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
892 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
893 {
894 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
895
896 switch (st->hand_state) {
897 default:
898 /* Shouldn't happen */
899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
900 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
901 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
902 return 0;
903
904 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
905 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
906 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
907 else
908 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
909 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
910 break;
911
912 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
913 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
914 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
915 break;
916
917 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
918 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
919 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
920 break;
921
922 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
923 *confunc = NULL;
924 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
925 break;
926
927 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
928 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
929 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
930 break;
931
932 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
933 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
934 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
935 break;
936
937 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
938 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
939 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
940 break;
941
942 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
943 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
944 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
945 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
946 break;
947 #endif
948 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
949 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
950 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
951 break;
952
953 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
954 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
955 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
956 break;
957 }
958
959 return 1;
960 }
961
962 /*
963 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
964 * reading. Excludes the message header.
965 */
966 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
967 {
968 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
969
970 switch (st->hand_state) {
971 default:
972 /* Shouldn't happen */
973 return 0;
974
975 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
976 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
977
978 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
979 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
980
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
982 return s->max_cert_list;
983
984 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
985 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
986
987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
988 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
989
990 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
991 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
992
993 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
994 /*
995 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
996 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
997 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
998 */
999 return s->max_cert_list;
1000
1001 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1002 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1003
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1005 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1006 return 3;
1007 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1008
1009 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1010 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1011
1012 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1013 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1014
1015 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1016 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1017
1018 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1019 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1020 }
1021 }
1022
1023 /*
1024 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1025 */
1026 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1027 {
1028 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1029
1030 switch (st->hand_state) {
1031 default:
1032 /* Shouldn't happen */
1033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1034 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1036 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1037
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1039 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1040
1041 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1042 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1043
1044 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1045 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1046
1047 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1048 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1049
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1051 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1052
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1054 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1055
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1057 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1058
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1060 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1061
1062 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1063 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1064
1065 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1066 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1067
1068 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1069 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1070
1071 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1072 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1073
1074 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1075 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1076
1077 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1078 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1079 }
1080 }
1081
1082 /*
1083 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1084 * from the server
1085 */
1086 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1087 {
1088 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1089
1090 switch (st->hand_state) {
1091 default:
1092 /* Shouldn't happen */
1093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1094 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1095 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1096 return WORK_ERROR;
1097
1098 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1099 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1100 }
1101 }
1102
1103 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1104 {
1105 unsigned char *p;
1106 size_t sess_id_len;
1107 int i, protverr;
1108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1109 SSL_COMP *comp;
1110 #endif
1111 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1112 unsigned char *session_id;
1113
1114 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1115 /* Should not happen */
1116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1117 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1118 return 0;
1119 }
1120
1121 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1122 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1123 if (protverr != 0) {
1124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1125 protverr);
1126 return 0;
1127 }
1128
1129 if (sess == NULL
1130 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1131 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1132 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1133 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1134 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1135 return 0;
1136 }
1137 }
1138 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1139
1140 p = s->s3->client_random;
1141
1142 /*
1143 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1144 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1145 */
1146 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1147 size_t idx;
1148 i = 1;
1149 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1150 if (p[idx]) {
1151 i = 0;
1152 break;
1153 }
1154 }
1155 } else {
1156 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1157 }
1158
1159 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1160 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1162 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1163 return 0;
1164 }
1165
1166 /*-
1167 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1168 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1169 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1170 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1171 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1172 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1173 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1174 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1175 * 1.0.
1176 *
1177 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1178 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1179 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1180 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1181 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1182 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1183 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1184 * know that is maximum server supports.
1185 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1186 * containing version 1.0.
1187 *
1188 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1189 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1190 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1191 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1192 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1193 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1194 * the negotiated version.
1195 *
1196 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1197 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1198 */
1199 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1200 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1202 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 return 0;
1204 }
1205
1206 /* Session ID */
1207 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1208 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1209 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1210 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1211 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1212 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1213 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1214 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1215 && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1217 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1219 return 0;
1220 }
1221 } else {
1222 sess_id_len = 0;
1223 }
1224 } else {
1225 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1226 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1227 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1228 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1229 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1230 }
1231 }
1232 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1233 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1234 sess_id_len))
1235 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1236 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1238 return 0;
1239 }
1240
1241 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1242 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1243 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1244 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1245 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1247 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 return 0;
1249 }
1250 }
1251
1252 /* Ciphers supported */
1253 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1255 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1256 return 0;
1257 }
1258
1259 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1260 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1261 return 0;
1262 }
1263 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1265 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1266 return 0;
1267 }
1268
1269 /* COMPRESSION */
1270 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1272 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1273 return 0;
1274 }
1275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1276 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1277 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1278 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1279 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1280 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1281 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1282 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1284 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1286 return 0;
1287 }
1288 }
1289 }
1290 #endif
1291 /* Add the NULL method */
1292 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1294 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1295 return 0;
1296 }
1297
1298 /* TLS extensions */
1299 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1300 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1301 return 0;
1302 }
1303
1304 return 1;
1305 }
1306
1307 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1308 {
1309 size_t cookie_len;
1310 PACKET cookiepkt;
1311
1312 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1313 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1315 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1316 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1317 }
1318
1319 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1320 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1322 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1323 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1324 }
1325
1326 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1328 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1329 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1330 }
1331 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1332
1333 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1334 }
1335
1336 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1337 {
1338 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1339 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1340 int i;
1341
1342 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1343 if (c == NULL) {
1344 /* unknown cipher */
1345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1346 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1347 return 0;
1348 }
1349 /*
1350 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1351 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1352 */
1353 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1355 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1356 return 0;
1357 }
1358
1359 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1360 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1361 if (i < 0) {
1362 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1364 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1365 return 0;
1366 }
1367
1368 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1369 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1370 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1372 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1373 return 0;
1374 }
1375
1376 /*
1377 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1378 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1379 * set and use it for comparison.
1380 */
1381 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1382 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1383 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1384 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1385 /*
1386 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1387 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1388 */
1389 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1390 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1392 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1393 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1394 return 0;
1395 }
1396 } else {
1397 /*
1398 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1399 * ciphersuite.
1400 */
1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1402 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1403 return 0;
1404 }
1405 }
1406 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1407
1408 return 1;
1409 }
1410
1411 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1412 {
1413 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1414 size_t session_id_len;
1415 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1416 int hrr = 0;
1417 unsigned int compression;
1418 unsigned int sversion;
1419 unsigned int context;
1420 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1422 SSL_COMP *comp;
1423 #endif
1424
1425 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1427 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1428 goto err;
1429 }
1430
1431 /* load the server random */
1432 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1433 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1434 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1435 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1436 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1437 hrr = 1;
1438 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1440 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1441 goto err;
1442 }
1443 } else {
1444 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1446 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1447 goto err;
1448 }
1449 }
1450
1451 /* Get the session-id. */
1452 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1454 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1455 goto err;
1456 }
1457 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1458 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1459 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1461 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1462 goto err;
1463 }
1464
1465 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1467 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1468 goto err;
1469 }
1470
1471 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1473 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1474 goto err;
1475 }
1476
1477 /* TLS extensions */
1478 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1479 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1480 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1481 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1483 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1484 goto err;
1485 }
1486
1487 if (!hrr) {
1488 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1489 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1490 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1491 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1492 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1493 goto err;
1494 }
1495
1496 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1497 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1498 goto err;
1499 }
1500 }
1501
1502 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1503 if (compression != 0) {
1504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1505 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1506 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1507 goto err;
1508 }
1509
1510 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1511 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1512 session_id_len) != 0) {
1513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1514 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1515 goto err;
1516 }
1517 }
1518
1519 if (hrr) {
1520 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1521 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1522 goto err;
1523 }
1524
1525 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1526 }
1527
1528 /*
1529 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1530 * are appropriate for this version.
1531 */
1532 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1533 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1534 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1536 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1537 goto err;
1538 }
1539
1540 s->hit = 0;
1541
1542 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1543 /*
1544 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1545 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1546 */
1547 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1549 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1550 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1551 goto err;
1552 }
1553
1554 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1555 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1556 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1557 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1558 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1559 goto err;
1560 }
1561 } else {
1562 /*
1563 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1564 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1565 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1566 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1567 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1568 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1569 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1570 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1571 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1572 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1573 */
1574 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1575 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1576 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1577 /*
1578 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1579 * backwards compat reasons
1580 */
1581 int master_key_length;
1582 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1583 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1584 &master_key_length,
1585 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1586 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1587 && master_key_length > 0) {
1588 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1589 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1590 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1591 } else {
1592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1593 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 goto err;
1595 }
1596 }
1597
1598 if (session_id_len != 0
1599 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1600 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1601 session_id_len) == 0)
1602 s->hit = 1;
1603 }
1604
1605 if (s->hit) {
1606 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1607 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1608 /* actually a client application bug */
1609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1610 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1611 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1612 goto err;
1613 }
1614 } else {
1615 /*
1616 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1617 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1618 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1619 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1620 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1621 */
1622 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1623 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1624 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1625 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1626 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1627 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1628 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1629 goto err;
1630 }
1631 }
1632
1633 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1634 /*
1635 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1636 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1637 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1638 * used for resumption.
1639 */
1640 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1641 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1642 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1643 if (session_id_len > 0)
1644 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1645 session_id_len);
1646 }
1647 }
1648
1649 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1650 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1652 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1653 goto err;
1654 }
1655 /*
1656 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1657 * version.
1658 */
1659 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1660 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1661
1662 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1663 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1664 goto err;
1665 }
1666
1667 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1668 if (compression != 0) {
1669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1670 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1671 goto err;
1672 }
1673 /*
1674 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1675 * using compression.
1676 */
1677 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1679 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1680 goto err;
1681 }
1682 #else
1683 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1685 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1686 goto err;
1687 }
1688 if (compression == 0)
1689 comp = NULL;
1690 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1692 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1693 goto err;
1694 } else {
1695 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1696 }
1697
1698 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1700 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1701 goto err;
1702 } else {
1703 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1704 }
1705 #endif
1706
1707 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1708 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1709 goto err;
1710 }
1711
1712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1713 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1714 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1715 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1716
1717 /*
1718 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1719 * no SCTP used.
1720 */
1721 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1722 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1723
1724 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1725 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1726 labelbuffer,
1727 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1730 goto err;
1731 }
1732
1733 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1734 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1735 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1736 }
1737 #endif
1738
1739 /*
1740 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1741 * we're done with this message
1742 */
1743 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1744 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1745 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1746 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1747 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1748 goto err;
1749 }
1750
1751 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1752 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1753 err:
1754 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1755 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1756 }
1757
1758 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1759 PACKET *extpkt)
1760 {
1761 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1762
1763 /*
1764 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1765 * should not be used.
1766 */
1767 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1768 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1769
1770 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1771 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1772 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1773 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1774 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1775 goto err;
1776 }
1777
1778 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1779 extensions = NULL;
1780
1781 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1782 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1783 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1784 #endif
1785 ) {
1786 /*
1787 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1788 * ClientHello will not change
1789 */
1790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1791 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1792 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1793 goto err;
1794 }
1795
1796 /*
1797 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1798 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1799 */
1800 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1801 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1802 goto err;
1803 }
1804
1805 /*
1806 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1807 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1808 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1809 * for HRR messages.
1810 */
1811 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1812 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1814 goto err;
1815 }
1816
1817 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1818 err:
1819 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1820 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1821 }
1822
1823 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1824 {
1825 int i;
1826 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1827 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1828 X509 *x = NULL;
1829 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1830 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1831 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1832 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1833 unsigned int context = 0;
1834 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1835
1836 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1838 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1839 goto err;
1840 }
1841
1842 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1843 || context != 0
1844 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1845 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1846 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1848 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1849 goto err;
1850 }
1851 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1852 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1853 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1855 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1856 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1857 goto err;
1858 }
1859
1860 certstart = certbytes;
1861 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1862 if (x == NULL) {
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1864 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1865 goto err;
1866 }
1867 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1869 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1870 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1871 goto err;
1872 }
1873
1874 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1875 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1876 PACKET extensions;
1877
1878 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1880 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1881 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1882 goto err;
1883 }
1884 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1885 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1886 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1887 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1888 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1889 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1890 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1891 /* SSLfatal already called */
1892 goto err;
1893 }
1894 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1895 }
1896
1897 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1899 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1900 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1901 goto err;
1902 }
1903 x = NULL;
1904 }
1905
1906 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1907 /*
1908 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1909 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1910 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1911 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1912 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1913 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1914 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1915 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1916 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1917 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1918 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1919 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1920 */
1921 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1922 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1923 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1924 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1925 goto err;
1926 }
1927 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1928 if (i > 1) {
1929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1930 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1931 goto err;
1932 }
1933
1934 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1935 /*
1936 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1937 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1938 */
1939 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1940 sk = NULL;
1941
1942 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1943
1944 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1945 x = NULL;
1946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1947 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1948 goto err;
1949 }
1950
1951 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1952 x = NULL;
1953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1954 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1955 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1956 goto err;
1957 }
1958 /*
1959 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1960 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1961 * type.
1962 */
1963 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1964 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1965 x = NULL;
1966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1967 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1968 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1969 goto err;
1970 }
1971 }
1972 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1973
1974 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1975 X509_up_ref(x);
1976 s->session->peer = x;
1977 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1978 x = NULL;
1979
1980 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1981 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1982 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1983 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1984 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1985 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1986 goto err;
1987 }
1988
1989 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1990
1991 err:
1992 X509_free(x);
1993 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1994 return ret;
1995 }
1996
1997 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1998 {
1999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2000 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
2001
2002 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2003
2004 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
2005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2006 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2007 return 0;
2008 }
2009
2010 /*
2011 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2012 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2013 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2014 * identity.
2015 */
2016 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2018 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2019 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2020 return 0;
2021 }
2022
2023 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2024 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2025 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2026 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2027 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2030 return 0;
2031 }
2032
2033 return 1;
2034 #else
2035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2036 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2037 return 0;
2038 #endif
2039 }
2040
2041 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2042 {
2043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2044 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2045
2046 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2047 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2048 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2049 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2051 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2052 return 0;
2053 }
2054
2055 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2056 if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
2057 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2058 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2059 || (s->srp_ctx.g =
2060 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2061 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2062 || (s->srp_ctx.s =
2063 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2064 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2065 || (s->srp_ctx.B =
2066 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2067 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2068 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2069 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2070 return 0;
2071 }
2072
2073 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2074 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2075 return 0;
2076 }
2077
2078 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2079 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2080 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2081
2082 return 1;
2083 #else
2084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2086 return 0;
2087 #endif
2088 }
2089
2090 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2091 {
2092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2093 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2094 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2095
2096 DH *dh = NULL;
2097 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2098
2099 int check_bits = 0;
2100
2101 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2102 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2103 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2105 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2106 return 0;
2107 }
2108
2109 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2110 dh = DH_new();
2111
2112 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2113 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2114 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2115 goto err;
2116 }
2117
2118 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2119 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2120 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2121 NULL);
2122 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2123 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2124 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2126 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2127 goto err;
2128 }
2129
2130 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2131 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2133 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2134 goto err;
2135 }
2136
2137 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2139 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2140 goto err;
2141 }
2142 p = g = NULL;
2143
2144 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2146 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2147 goto err;
2148 }
2149
2150 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2152 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2153 goto err;
2154 }
2155 bnpub_key = NULL;
2156
2157 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2159 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2160 goto err;
2161 }
2162
2163 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2165 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2166 goto err;
2167 }
2168
2169 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2170
2171 /*
2172 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2173 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2174 */
2175 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2176 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2177 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2178
2179 return 1;
2180
2181 err:
2182 BN_free(p);
2183 BN_free(g);
2184 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2185 DH_free(dh);
2186 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2187
2188 return 0;
2189 #else
2190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2192 return 0;
2193 #endif
2194 }
2195
2196 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2197 {
2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2199 PACKET encoded_pt;
2200 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2201
2202 /*
2203 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2204 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2205 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2206 */
2207 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2209 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2210 return 0;
2211 }
2212 /*
2213 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2214 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2215 */
2216 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2217 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2219 SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2220 return 0;
2221 }
2222
2223 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2225 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2226 return 0;
2227 }
2228
2229 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2231 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2232 return 0;
2233 }
2234
2235 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2236 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2237 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2239 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2240 return 0;
2241 }
2242
2243 /*
2244 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2245 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2246 * and ECDSA.
2247 */
2248 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2249 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2250 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2251 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2252 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2253
2254 return 1;
2255 #else
2256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2257 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2258 return 0;
2259 #endif
2260 }
2261
2262 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2263 {
2264 long alg_k;
2265 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2266 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2267 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2268 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2269
2270 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2271
2272 save_param_start = *pkt;
2273
2274 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2275 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2276 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2277 #endif
2278
2279 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2280 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2281 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2282 goto err;
2283 }
2284 }
2285
2286 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2287 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2288 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2289 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2291 goto err;
2292 }
2293 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2294 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2295 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 goto err;
2297 }
2298 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2299 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2300 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2301 goto err;
2302 }
2303 } else if (alg_k) {
2304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2305 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2306 goto err;
2307 }
2308
2309 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2310 if (pkey != NULL) {
2311 PACKET params;
2312 int maxsig;
2313 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2314 unsigned char *tbs;
2315 size_t tbslen;
2316 int rv;
2317
2318 /*
2319 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2320 * equals the length of the parameters.
2321 */
2322 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
2323 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2324 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2326 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2327 goto err;
2328 }
2329
2330 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2331 unsigned int sigalg;
2332
2333 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2335 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2336 goto err;
2337 }
2338 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2339 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2340 goto err;
2341 }
2342 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2344 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2345 goto err;
2346 }
2347
2348 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2350 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2351 goto err;
2352 }
2353 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2354 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2355 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2356 #endif
2357
2358 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2359 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2361 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2362 goto err;
2363 }
2364 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2365 if (maxsig < 0) {
2366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2367 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2368 goto err;
2369 }
2370
2371 /*
2372 * Check signature length
2373 */
2374 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2375 /* wrong packet length */
2376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2378 goto err;
2379 }
2380
2381 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2382 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2384 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2385 goto err;
2386 }
2387
2388 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2390 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2391 goto err;
2392 }
2393 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2394 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2395 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2396 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2398 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2399 goto err;
2400 }
2401 }
2402 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(&params),
2403 PACKET_remaining(&params));
2404 if (tbslen == 0) {
2405 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2406 goto err;
2407 }
2408
2409 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2410 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2411 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2412 if (rv <= 0) {
2413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2414 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2415 goto err;
2416 }
2417 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2418 md_ctx = NULL;
2419 } else {
2420 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2421 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2422 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2423 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2424 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2426 SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2427 }
2428 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2429 goto err;
2430 }
2431 /* still data left over */
2432 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2434 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2435 goto err;
2436 }
2437 }
2438
2439 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2440 err:
2441 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2442 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2443 }
2444
2445 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2446 {
2447 size_t i;
2448
2449 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2450 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2451 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2452
2453 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2454 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2455 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2456
2457 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2458 /*
2459 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2460 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2461 * we just ignore it
2462 */
2463 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2464 }
2465
2466 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2467 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2468 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2469 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2470 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2471 s->pha_context = NULL;
2472
2473 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2474 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2476 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2477 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2478 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2479 }
2480
2481 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2483 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2484 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2485 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2486 }
2487 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2488 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2489 &rawexts, NULL, 1)
2490 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2491 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2492 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2493 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2494 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2495 }
2496 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2497 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2499 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2500 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2501 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2502 }
2503 } else {
2504 PACKET ctypes;
2505
2506 /* get the certificate types */
2507 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2509 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2510 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2511 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2512 }
2513
2514 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2516 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2517 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2518 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2519 }
2520
2521 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2522 PACKET sigalgs;
2523
2524 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2526 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2527 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2528 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2529 }
2530
2531 /*
2532 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2533 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2534 */
2535 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2537 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2538 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2539 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2540 }
2541 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2543 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2544 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2545 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2546 }
2547 }
2548
2549 /* get the CA RDNs */
2550 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2551 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2552 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2553 }
2554 }
2555
2556 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2558 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2559 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2560 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2561 }
2562
2563 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2564 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2565
2566 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2567 }
2568
2569 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2570 {
2571 unsigned int ticklen;
2572 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2573 unsigned int sess_len;
2574 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2575 PACKET nonce;
2576
2577 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2578
2579 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2580 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2581 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2582 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2583 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2584 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2585 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2587 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2588 goto err;
2589 }
2590
2591 /*
2592 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2593 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2594 * be 0 here in that instance
2595 */
2596 if (ticklen == 0)
2597 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2598
2599 /*
2600 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2601 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2602 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2603 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2604 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2605 * cache.
2606 */
2607 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2608 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2609
2610 /*
2611 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2612 * one
2613 */
2614 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2616 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2617 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2618 goto err;
2619 }
2620
2621 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2622 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2623 /*
2624 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2625 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2626 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2627 */
2628 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2629 }
2630
2631 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2632 s->session = new_sess;
2633 }
2634
2635 /*
2636 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2637 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2638 */
2639 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2640
2641 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2642 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2643 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2644
2645 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2646 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2648 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2649 goto err;
2650 }
2651 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2653 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2654 goto err;
2655 }
2656
2657 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2658 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2659 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2660
2661 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2662 PACKET extpkt;
2663
2664 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2665 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2667 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2668 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2669 goto err;
2670 }
2671
2672 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2673 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2674 NULL, 1)
2675 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2676 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2677 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2679 goto err;
2680 }
2681 }
2682
2683 /*
2684 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2685 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2686 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2687 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2688 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2689 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2690 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2691 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2692 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2693 */
2694 /*
2695 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2696 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2697 */
2698 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2699 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2700 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2702 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2703 goto err;
2704 }
2705 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2706 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2707
2708 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2709 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2710 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2711 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2712 size_t hashlen;
2713 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2714
2715 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2716 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2718 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2719 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2720 goto err;
2721 }
2722 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2723
2724 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2725 nonce_label,
2726 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2727 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2728 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2729 s->session->master_key,
2730 hashlen)) {
2731 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2732 goto err;
2733 }
2734 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2735
2736 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2737 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2738 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2739 }
2740
2741 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2742 err:
2743 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2744 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2745 }
2746
2747 /*
2748 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2749 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2750 */
2751 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2752 {
2753 size_t resplen;
2754 unsigned int type;
2755
2756 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2757 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2758 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2759 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2760 return 0;
2761 }
2762 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2763 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2765 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2766 return 0;
2767 }
2768 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2769 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2771 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2772 return 0;
2773 }
2774 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2776 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2777 return 0;
2778 }
2779 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2780
2781 return 1;
2782 }
2783
2784
2785 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2786 {
2787 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2788 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2789 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2790 }
2791
2792 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2793 }
2794
2795 /*
2796 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2797 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2798 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2799 * on failure.
2800 */
2801 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2802 {
2803 /*
2804 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2805 * the server
2806 */
2807 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2808 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2809 return 0;
2810 }
2811
2812 /*
2813 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2814 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2815 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2816 */
2817 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2818 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2819 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2820
2821 if (ret == 0) {
2822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2823 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2824 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2825 return 0;
2826 }
2827 if (ret < 0) {
2828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2829 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2830 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2831 return 0;
2832 }
2833 }
2834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2835 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2836 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2837 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2838 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2839 return 0;
2840 }
2841 }
2842 #endif
2843
2844 return 1;
2845 }
2846
2847 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2848 {
2849 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2850 /* should contain no data */
2851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2852 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2853 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2854 }
2855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2856 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2857 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2859 SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2860 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2861 }
2862 }
2863 #endif
2864
2865 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2866 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2867 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2868 }
2869
2870 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2871 }
2872
2873 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2874 {
2875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2876 int ret = 0;
2877 /*
2878 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2879 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2880 * strnlen.
2881 */
2882 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2883 size_t identitylen = 0;
2884 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2885 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2886 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2887 size_t psklen = 0;
2888
2889 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2891 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2892 goto err;
2893 }
2894
2895 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2896
2897 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2898 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2899 psk, sizeof(psk));
2900
2901 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2902 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2903 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2904 goto err;
2905 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2907 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2908 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2909 goto err;
2910 }
2911
2912 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2913 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2915 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2916 goto err;
2917 }
2918
2919 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2920 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2921 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2923 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2924 goto err;
2925 }
2926
2927 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2928 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2929 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2930 tmppsk = NULL;
2931 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2932 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2933 tmpidentity = NULL;
2934
2935 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2937 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2938 goto err;
2939 }
2940
2941 ret = 1;
2942
2943 err:
2944 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2945 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2946 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2947 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2948
2949 return ret;
2950 #else
2951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2952 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2953 return 0;
2954 #endif
2955 }
2956
2957 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2958 {
2959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2960 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2961 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2962 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2963 size_t enclen;
2964 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2965 size_t pmslen = 0;
2966
2967 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2968 /*
2969 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2970 */
2971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2972 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2973 return 0;
2974 }
2975
2976 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2977 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2979 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2980 return 0;
2981 }
2982
2983 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2984 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2985 if (pms == NULL) {
2986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2987 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2988 return 0;
2989 }
2990
2991 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2992 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2993 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2994 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2996 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2997 goto err;
2998 }
2999
3000 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3001 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3003 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3004 goto err;
3005 }
3006 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3007 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3008 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3010 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3011 goto err;
3012 }
3013 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3014 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3015 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3016 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3017 goto err;
3018 }
3019 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3020 pctx = NULL;
3021
3022 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3023 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3025 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3026 goto err;
3027 }
3028
3029 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3030 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3031 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3032 goto err;
3033 }
3034
3035 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3036 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3037
3038 return 1;
3039 err:
3040 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3041 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3042
3043 return 0;
3044 #else
3045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3046 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3047 return 0;
3048 #endif
3049 }
3050
3051 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3052 {
3053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3054 DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
3055 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
3056 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3057 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3058
3059 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3060 if (skey == NULL) {
3061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3062 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3063 goto err;
3064 }
3065
3066 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3067 if (ckey == NULL) {
3068 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3069 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3070 goto err;
3071 }
3072
3073 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3074
3075 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3078 goto err;
3079 }
3080
3081 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3082 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3083 goto err;
3084 }
3085
3086 /* send off the data */
3087 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3088 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3089 &keybytes)) {
3090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3091 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3092 goto err;
3093 }
3094
3095 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3096 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3097
3098 return 1;
3099 err:
3100 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3101 return 0;
3102 #else
3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3104 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3105 return 0;
3106 #endif
3107 }
3108
3109 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3110 {
3111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3112 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3113 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3114 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3115 int ret = 0;
3116
3117 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3118 if (skey == NULL) {
3119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3120 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3121 return 0;
3122 }
3123
3124 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3125 if (ckey == NULL) {
3126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3127 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3128 goto err;
3129 }
3130
3131 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3132 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3133 goto err;
3134 }
3135
3136 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3137 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3138
3139 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3141 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3142 goto err;
3143 }
3144
3145 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3147 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3148 goto err;
3149 }
3150
3151 ret = 1;
3152 err:
3153 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3154 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3155 return ret;
3156 #else
3157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3158 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3159 return 0;
3160 #endif
3161 }
3162
3163 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3164 {
3165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3166 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3167 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3168 X509 *peer_cert;
3169 size_t msglen;
3170 unsigned int md_len;
3171 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3172 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3173 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3174 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3175 size_t pmslen = 0;
3176
3177 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3178 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3179
3180 /*
3181 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3182 */
3183 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3184 if (!peer_cert) {
3185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3186 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3187 return 0;
3188 }
3189
3190 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3191 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3193 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3194 return 0;
3195 }
3196 /*
3197 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3198 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3199 * certificate key for key exchange
3200 */
3201
3202 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3203 pmslen = 32;
3204 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3205 if (pms == NULL) {
3206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3207 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3208 goto err;
3209 }
3210
3211 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3212 /* Generate session key
3213 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3214 */
3215 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3217 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3218 goto err;
3219 };
3220 /*
3221 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3222 * data
3223 */
3224 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3225 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3226 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3227 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3228 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3229 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3230 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3231 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3233 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3234 goto err;
3235 }
3236 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3237 ukm_hash = NULL;
3238 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3239 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3241 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3242 goto err;
3243 }
3244 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3245 /*
3246 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3247 */
3248 msglen = 255;
3249 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3251 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3252 goto err;
3253 }
3254
3255 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3256 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3257 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3259 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3260 goto err;
3261 }
3262
3263 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3264 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3265 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3266
3267 return 1;
3268 err:
3269 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3270 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3271 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3272 return 0;
3273 #else
3274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3275 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3276 return 0;
3277 #endif
3278 }
3279
3280 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3281 {
3282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3283 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3284
3285 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3286 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3287 &abytes)) {
3288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3289 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3290 return 0;
3291 }
3292 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3293
3294 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3295 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3296 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3298 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3299 return 0;
3300 }
3301
3302 return 1;
3303 #else
3304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3305 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3306 return 0;
3307 #endif
3308 }
3309
3310 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3311 {
3312 unsigned long alg_k;
3313
3314 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3315
3316 /*
3317 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3318 * no need to do so here.
3319 */
3320 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3321 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3322 goto err;
3323
3324 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3325 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3326 goto err;
3327 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3328 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3329 goto err;
3330 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3331 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3332 goto err;
3333 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3334 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3335 goto err;
3336 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3337 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3338 goto err;
3339 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3341 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3342 goto err;
3343 }
3344
3345 return 1;
3346 err:
3347 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3348 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3350 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3351 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3352 #endif
3353 return 0;
3354 }
3355
3356 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3357 {
3358 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3359 size_t pmslen = 0;
3360
3361 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3362 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3363
3364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3365 /* Check for SRP */
3366 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3367 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3368 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3369 goto err;
3370 }
3371 return 1;
3372 }
3373 #endif
3374
3375 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3377 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3378 goto err;
3379 }
3380 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3381 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3382 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3383 pms = NULL;
3384 pmslen = 0;
3385 goto err;
3386 }
3387 pms = NULL;
3388 pmslen = 0;
3389
3390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3391 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3392 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3393 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3394
3395 /*
3396 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3397 * used.
3398 */
3399 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3400 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3401
3402 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3403 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3404 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3406 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3407 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3408 goto err;
3409 }
3410
3411 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3412 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3413 }
3414 #endif
3415
3416 return 1;
3417 err:
3418 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3419 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3420 return 0;
3421 }
3422
3423 /*
3424 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3425 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3426 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3427 */
3428 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3429 {
3430 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3431 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3432 return 0;
3433 /*
3434 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3435 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3436 */
3437 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3438 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3439 return 0;
3440 return 1;
3441 }
3442
3443 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3444 {
3445 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3446 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3447 int i;
3448
3449 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3450 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3451 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3452 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3453 if (i < 0) {
3454 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3455 return WORK_MORE_A;
3456 }
3457 if (i == 0) {
3458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3459 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3460 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3461 return WORK_ERROR;
3462 }
3463 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3464 }
3465 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3466 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3467 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3468 }
3469 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3470 }
3471
3472 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3473 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3474 }
3475
3476 /* We need to get a client cert */
3477 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3478 /*
3479 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3480 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3481 */
3482 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3483 if (i < 0) {
3484 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3485 return WORK_MORE_B;
3486 }
3487 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3488 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3489 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3490 i = 0;
3491 } else if (i == 1) {
3492 i = 0;
3493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3494 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3495 }
3496
3497 X509_free(x509);
3498 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3499 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3500 i = 0;
3501 if (i == 0) {
3502 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3503 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3504 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3505 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3506 } else {
3507 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3508 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3509 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3510 return WORK_ERROR;
3511 }
3512 }
3513 }
3514
3515 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3516 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3517 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3518 }
3519
3520 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3522 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3523 return WORK_ERROR;
3524 }
3525
3526 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3527 {
3528 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3529 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3530 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3531 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3533 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3534 return 0;
3535 }
3536 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3538 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3539 return 0;
3540 }
3541 }
3542 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3543 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3544 : s->cert->key)) {
3545 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3546 return 0;
3547 }
3548
3549 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3550 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3551 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3552 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3553 /*
3554 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3555 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3556 */
3557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3558 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3559 return 0;
3560 }
3561
3562 return 1;
3563 }
3564
3565 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3566 {
3567 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3568 size_t idx;
3569 long alg_k, alg_a;
3570
3571 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3572 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3573
3574 /* we don't have a certificate */
3575 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3576 return 1;
3577
3578 /* This is the passed certificate */
3579 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3580
3581 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3582 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3584 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3585 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3586 return 0;
3587 }
3588
3589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3590 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3591 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3592 return 1;
3593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3594 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3595 return 0;
3596 }
3597 #endif
3598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3599 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3601 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3602 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3603 return 0;
3604 }
3605 #endif
3606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3607 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3609 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3610 return 0;
3611 }
3612 #endif
3613
3614 return 1;
3615 }
3616
3617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3618 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3619 {
3620 size_t len, padding_len;
3621 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3622
3623 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3624 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3625
3626 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3627 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3629 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3630 return 0;
3631 }
3632
3633 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3634
3635 return 1;
3636 }
3637 #endif
3638
3639 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3640 {
3641 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3642 /* should contain no data */
3643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3644 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3645 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3646 }
3647
3648 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3649 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3650 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3651 }
3652
3653 /*
3654 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3655 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3656 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3657 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3658 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3659 */
3660 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3661 SSL_renegotiate(s);
3662 else
3663 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3664
3665 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3666 }
3667
3668 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3669 {
3670 PACKET extensions;
3671 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3672
3673 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3674 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3676 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3677 goto err;
3678 }
3679
3680 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3681 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3682 NULL, 1)
3683 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3684 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3685 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3686 goto err;
3687 }
3688
3689 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3690 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3691
3692 err:
3693 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3694 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3695 }
3696
3697 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3698 {
3699 int i = 0;
3700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3701 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3702 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3703 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3704 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3705 if (i != 0)
3706 return i;
3707 }
3708 #endif
3709 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3710 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3711 return i;
3712 }
3713
3714 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3715 {
3716 int i;
3717 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3718 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3719
3720 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3721 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3723 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3724 return 0;
3725 }
3726
3727 if (sk == NULL) {
3728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3730 return 0;
3731 }
3732
3733 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3734 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3735 # error Max cipher length too short
3736 # endif
3737 /*
3738 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3739 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3740 * use TLS v1.2
3741 */
3742 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3743 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3744 else
3745 #endif
3746 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3747 maxlen = 0xfffe;
3748
3749 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3750 maxlen -= 2;
3751 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3752 maxlen -= 2;
3753
3754 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3755 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3756
3757 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3758 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3759 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3760 continue;
3761
3762 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3765 return 0;
3766 }
3767
3768 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3769 if (!maxverok) {
3770 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3771 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3772 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3773 maxverok = 1;
3774 } else {
3775 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3776 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3777 maxverok = 1;
3778 }
3779 }
3780
3781 totlen += len;
3782 }
3783
3784 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3786 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3787
3788 if (!maxverok)
3789 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3790 "SSL/TLS version");
3791
3792 return 0;
3793 }
3794
3795 if (totlen != 0) {
3796 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3797 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3798 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3799 };
3800 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3801 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3802 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3803 return 0;
3804 }
3805 }
3806 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3807 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3808 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3809 };
3810 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3812 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3813 return 0;
3814 }
3815 }
3816 }
3817
3818 return 1;
3819 }
3820
3821 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3822 {
3823 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3824 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3826 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3827 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3828 return 0;
3829 }
3830
3831 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3832 return 1;
3833 }
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