2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
64 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
65 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
66 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
67 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
71 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
77 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
79 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
80 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
81 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
82 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
89 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
95 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
97 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
100 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
101 * ciphersuite or for SRP
103 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
112 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
113 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
114 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
115 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
117 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
118 * (transition not allowed)
120 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
122 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
125 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
126 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
130 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
131 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
132 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
135 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
139 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
140 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
141 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
148 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
149 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
153 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
154 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
157 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
158 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
164 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
165 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
166 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
173 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
174 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
176 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
177 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
182 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
183 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
184 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
191 /* No valid transition found */
196 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
197 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
198 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
199 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
201 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
202 * (transition not allowed)
204 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
206 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
210 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
211 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
213 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
214 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
219 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
223 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
224 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
225 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
229 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
230 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
231 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
237 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
239 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
240 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
241 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
244 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
245 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
249 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
250 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
252 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
253 && s
->tls_session_secret_cb
!= NULL
254 && s
->session
->tlsext_tick
!= NULL
255 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
257 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
258 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
259 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
260 * the server is resuming.
263 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
265 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
266 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
267 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
268 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
272 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
273 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
275 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
276 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
277 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
278 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
281 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
282 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
283 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
285 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
286 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
295 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
296 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
298 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
299 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
304 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
305 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
306 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
307 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
308 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
309 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
310 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
317 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
318 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
319 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
320 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
327 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
328 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
329 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
334 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
335 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
336 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
337 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
340 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
341 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
346 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
347 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
348 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
353 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
354 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
355 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
362 /* No valid transition found */
363 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
364 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
369 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
370 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
373 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
375 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
378 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
379 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
383 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
384 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
385 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
387 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
389 /* Shouldn't happen */
390 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
392 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
393 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
398 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
399 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
400 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
401 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
403 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
404 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
407 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
408 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
409 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
415 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
416 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
418 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
420 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
423 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
424 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
428 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
430 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen */
433 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
436 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
438 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
441 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
443 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
446 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
448 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
449 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
452 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
453 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
454 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
456 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
460 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
465 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
466 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
469 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
470 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
471 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
472 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
474 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
475 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
477 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
479 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
480 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
484 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
485 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
488 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
489 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
490 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
492 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
493 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
495 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
499 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
500 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
501 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
505 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
507 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
508 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
514 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
516 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
519 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
520 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
527 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
528 * the client to the server.
530 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
532 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
534 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
536 /* No pre work to be done */
539 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
542 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
543 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
544 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
550 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
551 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
554 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
555 * messages unless we need to.
559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
560 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
561 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
567 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
570 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
574 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
575 * client to the server.
577 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
579 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
583 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
585 /* No post work to be done */
588 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
589 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
592 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
593 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
598 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
599 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
603 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
604 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
605 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
606 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
608 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
609 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
611 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
613 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
616 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
617 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
624 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
627 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
632 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
636 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
638 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
640 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
643 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
647 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
650 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
651 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
652 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
658 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
662 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
665 * Valid return values are:
669 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
670 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
672 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
674 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
676 /* Shouldn't happen */
679 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
681 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
683 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
684 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
687 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
688 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
689 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
693 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
694 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
697 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
698 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
699 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
702 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
703 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_verify
;
704 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
707 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
708 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
709 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
710 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
713 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
714 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
715 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
723 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
724 * reading. Excludes the message header.
726 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
728 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
730 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
732 /* Shouldn't happen */
735 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
736 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
738 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
739 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
742 return s
->max_cert_list
;
744 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
745 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
747 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
748 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
750 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
752 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
753 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
754 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
756 return s
->max_cert_list
;
758 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
759 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
761 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
762 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
764 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
766 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
767 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
769 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
770 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
772 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
773 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
778 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
780 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
782 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
784 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
786 /* Shouldn't happen */
787 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
789 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
790 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
792 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
793 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
796 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
798 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
799 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
801 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
802 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
804 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
805 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
807 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
808 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
810 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
811 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
813 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
814 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
816 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
817 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
819 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
820 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
825 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
828 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
830 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
832 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
834 /* Shouldn't happen */
837 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
838 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
842 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
843 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
844 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
845 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
846 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
847 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
848 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
851 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
852 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
857 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
862 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
866 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
868 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
869 /* Should not happen */
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
874 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
875 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
881 if ((sess
== NULL
) || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
883 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
884 * "ticket" without a session ID.
886 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
887 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
888 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
891 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
893 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
896 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
897 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
899 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
902 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
911 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
915 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
916 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
917 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
918 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
919 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
920 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
921 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
922 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
925 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
926 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
927 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
928 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
929 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
930 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
931 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
932 * know that is maximum server supports.
933 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
934 * containing version 1.0.
936 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
937 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
938 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
939 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
940 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
941 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
942 * the negotiated version.
944 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
945 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
947 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
948 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
957 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
958 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
959 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
960 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
962 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
967 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
968 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
969 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
970 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
971 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
977 /* Ciphers supported */
978 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
982 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
983 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
))
985 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
991 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
996 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
997 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
998 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
999 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1000 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1007 /* Add the NULL method */
1008 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1013 /* TLS extensions */
1014 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1015 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1023 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1029 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1030 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1031 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1036 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1037 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1038 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1043 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1044 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1048 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1050 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1052 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1053 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1054 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1057 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1059 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1060 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1061 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1062 size_t session_id_len
;
1063 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1064 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1065 unsigned int compression
;
1066 unsigned int sversion
;
1067 unsigned int context
;
1069 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1074 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1075 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1080 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
1081 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1082 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
1087 /* load the server hello data */
1088 /* load the server random */
1089 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1090 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1097 /* Get the session-id. */
1098 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1099 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1100 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1104 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1105 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1106 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1107 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1109 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1113 PACKET_null_init(&session_id
);
1117 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1119 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1124 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1125 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1126 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1127 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1128 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1129 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1130 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1131 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1132 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1133 * server wants to resume.
1135 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1136 && s
->tls_session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
1137 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1139 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1140 * backwards compat reasons
1142 int master_key_length
;
1143 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1144 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1147 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)
1148 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1149 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1150 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1151 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1154 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1159 if (session_id_len
!= 0 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1160 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1161 session_id_len
) == 0) {
1162 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1163 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1164 /* actually a client application bug */
1165 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1167 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1173 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1174 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1175 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1176 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1177 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1179 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1180 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1181 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1186 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1187 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1188 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1189 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1190 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1194 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1195 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1196 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1199 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1203 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1205 /* unknown cipher */
1206 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1211 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1214 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1215 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1217 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1218 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1220 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1221 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1226 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1227 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1229 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1230 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1236 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1237 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1238 * set and use it for comparison.
1240 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1241 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1242 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1243 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1245 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1248 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1249 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1251 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1252 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1254 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1261 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1262 if (compression
!= 0) {
1263 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1265 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1269 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1270 * using compression.
1272 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1277 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1278 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1280 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1283 if (compression
== 0)
1285 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1286 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1290 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1293 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1294 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1296 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1299 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1303 /* TLS extensions */
1304 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1305 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1306 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)) {
1307 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1312 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1313 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1314 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, context
, &extensions
, &al
)
1315 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, &al
))
1318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1319 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1320 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1321 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1324 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1327 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1328 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1330 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1331 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1333 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
1336 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1337 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1338 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1343 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1344 * we're done with this message
1347 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1348 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1349 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)
1350 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1351 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1352 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
1357 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1358 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1360 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1361 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1362 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1363 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1366 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1368 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1369 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1371 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1372 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1373 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1375 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1380 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1381 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1382 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1386 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1387 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1388 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1389 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1391 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1395 certstart
= certbytes
;
1396 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1398 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1402 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1403 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1405 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1408 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1415 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1417 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1418 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1419 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1420 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1421 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1422 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1423 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1424 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1425 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1426 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1427 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1428 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1430 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1431 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1433 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1436 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1439 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1443 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1445 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1446 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1448 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1451 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1454 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1456 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1460 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1464 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1469 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1473 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1474 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1475 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1476 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1477 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1479 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1481 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1484 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1486 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1488 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1489 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1492 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1496 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1498 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1501 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1505 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1508 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1510 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1512 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1513 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1519 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1520 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1521 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1524 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1525 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1530 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1531 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1532 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1533 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1534 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1535 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1542 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1547 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1550 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1552 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1553 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1554 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1555 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1556 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1561 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1563 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1564 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1566 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1567 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1569 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1570 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1572 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1573 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1574 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1579 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1580 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1585 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1586 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1587 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1592 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1597 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1600 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1601 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1604 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1606 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1607 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1608 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1609 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1614 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1617 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1618 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1623 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1624 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1625 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1627 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1628 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
1629 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1630 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1635 if (BN_is_zero(p
) || BN_is_zero(g
) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1636 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1641 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1642 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1648 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
1649 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1655 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1656 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1661 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
1662 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1667 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
1670 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1671 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1673 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1674 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1675 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1684 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1689 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1694 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1698 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
1700 unsigned int curve_flags
;
1701 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1704 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1705 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1706 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1708 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1709 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1714 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1715 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1717 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1718 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1723 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2), &curve_flags
);
1725 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1726 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
1728 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1732 if ((curve_flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
) {
1733 EVP_PKEY
*key
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1735 if (key
== NULL
|| !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key
, curve_nid
)) {
1736 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1741 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= key
;
1743 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1744 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
1746 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
1747 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
1748 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
1749 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1751 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1754 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1758 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1759 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1764 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
1765 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1766 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
1767 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1773 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1774 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1777 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1778 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1779 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
1780 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1781 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1786 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1791 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1795 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1796 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
1798 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1800 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
1802 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1803 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
1804 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1807 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1808 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
1812 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1813 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1814 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1815 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1817 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1818 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1820 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1821 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1824 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1829 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1833 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1837 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1838 * equals the length of the parameters.
1840 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
1841 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
1842 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
1843 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1848 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1849 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
1851 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sigalgs
, 2)) {
1852 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1856 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sigalgs
, pkey
);
1858 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1860 } else if (rv
== 0) {
1861 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1865 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1867 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
1868 md
= EVP_md5_sha1();
1873 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
1874 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1875 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1879 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1881 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1887 * Check signature length
1889 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
1890 /* wrong packet length */
1891 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1893 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1897 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1898 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1899 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1904 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1905 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1906 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1907 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1908 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1909 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
1910 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
1911 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1912 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1916 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1917 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
1918 (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature
),
1921 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1922 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1926 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1928 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1929 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1930 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1931 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1932 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
1933 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1934 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1937 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1941 /* still data left over */
1942 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1943 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1949 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1952 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1953 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1954 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1957 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1959 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1960 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
1961 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1962 const unsigned char *data
;
1963 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
1964 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1966 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
1967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1971 /* get the certificate types */
1972 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
1973 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
1974 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1978 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
1979 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
1980 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
1981 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1982 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
1983 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1987 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
1988 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
1989 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
1991 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
1992 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
1994 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1995 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1996 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, list_len
)) {
1997 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1999 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2003 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2004 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2005 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
2006 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2008 if ((list_len
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, list_len
)) {
2009 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2011 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2014 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2015 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2020 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
2023 /* get the CA RDNs */
2024 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
2025 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
2026 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2031 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
2032 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
2033 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2034 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2036 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2040 namestart
= namebytes
;
2042 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
2043 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2044 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2049 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2050 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2052 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2055 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2062 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2063 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2064 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2065 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2066 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2069 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2072 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2075 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2079 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2081 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2084 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2087 unsigned int ticklen
;
2088 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2089 unsigned int sess_len
;
2091 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2092 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2093 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
) {
2094 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2099 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2101 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2103 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2104 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2105 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2107 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2110 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2112 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2114 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2117 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2118 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2123 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2124 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2127 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2128 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2130 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2131 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
) {
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2135 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
)) {
2136 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2141 s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2142 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2144 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2145 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2146 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2147 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2148 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2149 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2150 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2151 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2152 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2155 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2156 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2158 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
,
2159 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2160 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2164 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2165 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2167 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2169 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2170 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2173 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2179 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2180 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2181 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2185 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2186 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2187 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2191 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2192 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
== NULL
) {
2193 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2197 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, resplen
)) {
2198 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2202 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2203 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2205 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2206 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2207 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2211 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2212 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2213 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2216 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
2219 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2222 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2223 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2228 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2229 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2230 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2232 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2233 && s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2235 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2237 *al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2239 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2243 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2245 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2250 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2251 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2252 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2253 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2262 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2264 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2266 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2267 /* should contain no data */
2268 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2273 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2274 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2282 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2284 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
2287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2288 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2289 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2290 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2291 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2294 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2297 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2298 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2299 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2302 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2307 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2308 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2311 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2312 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2313 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2314 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2315 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2318 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2320 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2324 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2326 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2327 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2330 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2332 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2334 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2336 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2337 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2341 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2342 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2344 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2348 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2349 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2350 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2352 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2356 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2357 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2358 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2360 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2361 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2364 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2366 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2373 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2374 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2375 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2376 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2381 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2386 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2389 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2390 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2391 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2393 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2396 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2398 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2404 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2405 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2410 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2411 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2414 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2418 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2419 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2420 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2421 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2425 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2426 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2430 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2431 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2432 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2436 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2437 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2441 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2444 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2446 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2450 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2451 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2456 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2457 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2461 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2462 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2467 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2472 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2476 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2477 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2478 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2480 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2484 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2488 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2490 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0)
2493 /* send off the data */
2494 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2495 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
), &keybytes
))
2498 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2499 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2503 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2506 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2510 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2513 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2514 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2515 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2518 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2524 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2530 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2535 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2536 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2538 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2543 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2550 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2551 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2555 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2560 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2563 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2564 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2567 unsigned int md_len
;
2568 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2569 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2570 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2571 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2574 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2575 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2578 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2580 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2582 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2584 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2588 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2589 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2590 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2595 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2596 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2597 * certificate key for key exchange
2600 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2602 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2604 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2609 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2610 /* Generate session key
2611 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2613 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
2614 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2619 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2622 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2623 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
2624 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2625 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2626 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2627 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2628 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2629 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2630 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2634 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2636 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
2637 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
2638 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2642 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2644 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2647 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2648 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2653 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
2654 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
2655 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
2656 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2661 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2662 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2663 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2667 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2668 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2669 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2673 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2678 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2681 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
2683 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
2684 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2689 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
2691 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2692 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2693 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2701 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2706 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2708 unsigned long alg_k
;
2711 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2713 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
2714 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2717 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2718 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2720 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2721 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2723 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2724 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2726 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2727 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2729 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2730 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2732 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2733 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2741 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2742 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
2743 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2745 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2746 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2751 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
2753 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2756 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2757 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2761 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2762 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
2764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2771 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2772 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2776 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2777 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2779 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2788 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2789 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2790 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2793 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2796 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2797 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2799 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2800 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2801 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
2804 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2805 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2811 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2812 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2816 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2819 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
2820 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
2824 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
2826 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2831 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2833 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2834 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2839 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt
, pkey
, md
)) {
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2844 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2846 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
));
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2851 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2852 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
2853 || (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2854 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2855 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2856 s
->session
->master_key
))
2857 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &u
, pkey
)) {
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2863 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2864 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2865 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2866 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
2867 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, u
);
2871 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, u
)) {
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2876 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2877 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
2881 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2885 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2886 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2891 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2892 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2893 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2895 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2897 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
2899 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2900 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
2903 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2904 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2906 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
2907 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
2912 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2915 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2918 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2919 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2920 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
2921 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2923 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2927 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2928 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2931 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2933 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2934 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2936 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2940 /* We need to get a client cert */
2941 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2943 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2944 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2946 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
2948 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2951 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2952 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
2953 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
2955 } else if (i
== 1) {
2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2958 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
2962 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2963 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2966 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2967 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2968 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
2969 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2971 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
2972 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2973 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2974 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2980 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2983 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2987 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2989 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
2990 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2993 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3000 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3002 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3009 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3010 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3012 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3013 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3015 /* we don't have a certificate */
3016 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3019 /* This is the passed certificate */
3021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3022 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
3023 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3024 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3031 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3033 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3037 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3038 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
3040 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3041 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3043 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3047 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3049 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3054 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
3055 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3057 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3062 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3063 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3071 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3076 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3078 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3079 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3081 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3082 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3084 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
)
3085 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3090 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3094 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3099 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3101 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3103 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3105 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
3106 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3112 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we are processing Encrypted Extensions and
3113 * Certificate extensions as part of this one message. Later we need to
3114 * split out the Certificate extensions into the Certificate message
3116 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3117 EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
3118 | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3120 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
3121 EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
3122 | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3126 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3127 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3130 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3131 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3132 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3133 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3136 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3140 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3141 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3142 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3143 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3148 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3149 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3153 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3156 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
;
3157 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3158 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3159 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3164 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3165 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3166 # error Max cipher length too short
3169 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3170 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3173 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3174 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3177 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3180 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3182 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3185 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3186 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3188 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3189 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3190 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
3193 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3207 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3208 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3209 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3211 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3216 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3217 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3218 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3220 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);