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Change the default number of NewSessionTickets we send to 2
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_clnt.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include <time.h>
14 #include <assert.h>
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include "statem_locl.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
27 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28
29 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
30 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
31 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
32 WPACKET *pkt);
33
34 /*
35 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
36 *
37 * Return values are:
38 * 1: Yes
39 * 0: No
40 */
41 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 {
43 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
44 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
45 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
46 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
47 return 0;
48
49 return 1;
50 }
51
52 /*
53 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
54 *
55 * Return values are:
56 * 1: Yes
57 * 0: No
58 */
59 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 {
61 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
62
63 /*
64 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
65 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 */
67 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
68 | SSL_kSRP)) {
69 return 1;
70 }
71
72 return 0;
73 }
74
75 /*
76 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
77 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
78 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
79 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 *
81 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
82 * (transition not allowed)
83 */
84 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 {
86 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
87
88 /*
89 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
90 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
91 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
92 */
93
94 switch (st->hand_state) {
95 default:
96 break;
97
98 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 /*
100 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
101 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 */
103 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
104 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
105 return 1;
106 }
107 break;
108
109 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
110 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
111 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
112 return 1;
113 }
114 break;
115
116 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (s->hit) {
118 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
119 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
120 return 1;
121 }
122 } else {
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
125 return 1;
126 }
127 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
128 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
129 return 1;
130 }
131 }
132 break;
133
134 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
135 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
136 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
137 return 1;
138 }
139 break;
140
141 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
142 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
143 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
144 return 1;
145 }
146 break;
147
148 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
151 return 1;
152 }
153 break;
154
155 case TLS_ST_OK:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
158 return 1;
159 }
160 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
161 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
162 return 1;
163 }
164 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
165 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
166 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
167 #endif
168 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
169 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
170 /*
171 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
172 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
173 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
174 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
175 */
176 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
177 /* SSLfatal() already called */
178 return 0;
179 }
180 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
181 return 1;
182 }
183 }
184 break;
185 }
186
187 /* No valid transition found */
188 return 0;
189 }
190
191 /*
192 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
193 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
194 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
195 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
196 *
197 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
198 * (transition not allowed)
199 */
200 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
201 {
202 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
203 int ske_expected;
204
205 /*
206 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
207 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
208 */
209 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
210 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
211 goto err;
212 return 1;
213 }
214
215 switch (st->hand_state) {
216 default:
217 break;
218
219 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
221 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
222 return 1;
223 }
224
225 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
226 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
227 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
228 return 1;
229 }
230 }
231 break;
232
233 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
234 /*
235 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
236 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
237 * HelloRetryRequest.
238 */
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
241 return 1;
242 }
243 break;
244
245 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
246 if (s->hit) {
247 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
250 return 1;
251 }
252 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
253 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
254 return 1;
255 }
256 } else {
257 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
258 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
259 return 1;
260 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
261 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
262 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
263 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
264 /*
265 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
266 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
267 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
268 * the server is resuming.
269 */
270 s->hit = 1;
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
272 return 1;
273 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
274 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
275 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
276 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
277 return 1;
278 }
279 } else {
280 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
281 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
282 if (ske_expected
283 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
284 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
287 return 1;
288 }
289 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
290 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
291 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
292 return 1;
293 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
294 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
295 return 1;
296 }
297 }
298 }
299 break;
300
301 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
302 /*
303 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
304 * |ext.status_expected| is set
305 */
306 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
308 return 1;
309 }
310 /* Fall through */
311
312 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
313 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
314 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
315 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
316 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
317 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
318 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
319 return 1;
320 }
321 goto err;
322 }
323 /* Fall through */
324
325 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
326 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
327 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
329 return 1;
330 }
331 goto err;
332 }
333 /* Fall through */
334
335 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
336 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
338 return 1;
339 }
340 break;
341
342 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
343 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
344 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
345 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
346 return 1;
347 }
348 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
350 return 1;
351 }
352 break;
353
354 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
355 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
356 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
357 return 1;
358 }
359 break;
360
361 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
362 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
363 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
364 return 1;
365 }
366 break;
367
368 case TLS_ST_OK:
369 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
370 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
371 return 1;
372 }
373 break;
374 }
375
376 err:
377 /* No valid transition found */
378 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
379 BIO *rbio;
380
381 /*
382 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
383 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
384 */
385 s->init_num = 0;
386 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
387 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
388 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
389 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
390 return 0;
391 }
392 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
393 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
394 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
395 return 0;
396 }
397
398 /*
399 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
400 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
401 * server.
402 */
403 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
404 {
405 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
406
407 /*
408 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
409 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
410 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
411 */
412 switch (st->hand_state) {
413 default:
414 /* Shouldn't happen */
415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
416 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
417 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
418 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
419
420 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
421 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 }
425 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
427 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
429 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
430
431 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
432 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
433 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
435 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
436 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
438 else
439 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
440 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
442
443 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
444 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447 }
448 /* Fall through */
449
450 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
451 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
452 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
453 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455
456 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
457 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
458 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
459 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
461
462 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
465
466 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
467 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470 }
471 /* Fall through */
472
473 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
474 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
475 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
478
479 case TLS_ST_OK:
480 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
483 }
484
485 /* Try to read from the server instead */
486 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
487 }
488 }
489
490 /*
491 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
492 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
493 */
494 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
495 {
496 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
497
498 /*
499 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
500 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
501 * later
502 */
503 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
504 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
505
506 switch (st->hand_state) {
507 default:
508 /* Shouldn't happen */
509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
510 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
511 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
512 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
513
514 case TLS_ST_OK:
515 if (!s->renegotiate) {
516 /*
517 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
518 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
519 */
520 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
521 }
522 /* Renegotiation */
523 /* fall thru */
524 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
525 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527
528 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
529 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
530 /*
531 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
532 * actually selected a version yet.
533 */
534 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
536 else
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
539 }
540 /*
541 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
542 * we will be sent
543 */
544 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
545
546 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
547 /*
548 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
549 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
550 * because we did early data.
551 */
552 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
553 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
555 else
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558
559 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
560 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
561
562 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
564 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
565
566 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
567 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
569 else
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
572
573 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576
577 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
578 /*
579 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
580 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
581 */
582 /*
583 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
584 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
585 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
586 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
587 */
588 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
590 } else {
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
592 }
593 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
595 }
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
597
598 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
601
602 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
603 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
605 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
606 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
607 } else {
608 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
610 #else
611 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
613 else
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
615 #endif
616 }
617 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618
619 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
620 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 #endif
624
625 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
626 if (s->hit) {
627 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
628 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
629 } else {
630 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
631 }
632
633 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
634 if (s->hit) {
635 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
636 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
637 } else {
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
640 }
641
642 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
643 /*
644 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
645 * convenient time.
646 */
647 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
648 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
650 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
651 }
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
654 }
655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
656 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
657 }
658 }
659
660 /*
661 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
662 * the client to the server.
663 */
664 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
665 {
666 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
667
668 switch (st->hand_state) {
669 default:
670 /* No pre work to be done */
671 break;
672
673 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
674 s->shutdown = 0;
675 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
676 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
677 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
679 return WORK_ERROR;
680 }
681 }
682 break;
683
684 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
685 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 if (s->hit) {
687 /*
688 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
689 * messages unless we need to.
690 */
691 st->use_timer = 0;
692 }
693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
694 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
695 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
696 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
697 }
698 #endif
699 }
700 break;
701
702 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
703 /*
704 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
705 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
706 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
707 */
708 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
709 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
710 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
711 /* Fall through */
712
713 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
714 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
715
716 case TLS_ST_OK:
717 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
718 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
719 }
720
721 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
722 }
723
724 /*
725 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
726 * client to the server.
727 */
728 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
729 {
730 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
731
732 s->init_num = 0;
733
734 switch (st->hand_state) {
735 default:
736 /* No post work to be done */
737 break;
738
739 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
740 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
741 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
742 /*
743 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
744 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
745 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
746 */
747 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
748 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
749 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
751 return WORK_ERROR;
752 }
753 }
754 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
755 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
756 return WORK_MORE_A;
757 }
758
759 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
760 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
761 s->first_packet = 1;
762 }
763 break;
764
765 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
766 /*
767 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
768 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
769 */
770 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
771 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
772 break;
773
774 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
775 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
776 /* SSLfatal() already called */
777 return WORK_ERROR;
778 }
779 break;
780
781 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
782 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
783 break;
784 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
785 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
786 /*
787 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
788 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
789 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
790 */
791 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
792 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
793 return WORK_ERROR;
794 break;
795 }
796 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
798 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
799 #else
800 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
801 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
802 else
803 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
804 #endif
805 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
806 /* SSLfatal() already called */
807 return WORK_ERROR;
808 }
809
810 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
811 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
813 return WORK_ERROR;
814 }
815
816 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
818 if (s->hit) {
819 /*
820 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
821 * no SCTP used.
822 */
823 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
824 0, NULL);
825 }
826 #endif
827
828 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
829 }
830 break;
831
832 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
834 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
835 /*
836 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
837 * no SCTP used.
838 */
839 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
840 0, NULL);
841 }
842 #endif
843 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
844 return WORK_MORE_B;
845
846 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
847 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
848 /* SSLfatal() already called */
849 return WORK_ERROR;
850 }
851 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
852 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
853 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
855 return WORK_ERROR;
856 }
857 }
858 }
859 break;
860
861 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
862 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
863 return WORK_MORE_A;
864 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
866 return WORK_ERROR;
867 }
868 break;
869 }
870
871 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
872 }
873
874 /*
875 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
876 * client
877 *
878 * Valid return values are:
879 * 1: Success
880 * 0: Error
881 */
882 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
883 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
884 {
885 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
886
887 switch (st->hand_state) {
888 default:
889 /* Shouldn't happen */
890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
891 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
892 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
893 return 0;
894
895 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
896 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
897 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
898 else
899 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
900 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
901 break;
902
903 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
904 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
905 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
906 break;
907
908 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
909 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
910 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
911 break;
912
913 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
914 *confunc = NULL;
915 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
916 break;
917
918 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
919 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
920 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
921 break;
922
923 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
924 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
925 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
926 break;
927
928 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
929 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
930 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
931 break;
932
933 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
934 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
937 break;
938 #endif
939 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
942 break;
943
944 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
945 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
946 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
947 break;
948 }
949
950 return 1;
951 }
952
953 /*
954 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
955 * reading. Excludes the message header.
956 */
957 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
958 {
959 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
960
961 switch (st->hand_state) {
962 default:
963 /* Shouldn't happen */
964 return 0;
965
966 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
967 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
968
969 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
970 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
971
972 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
973 return s->max_cert_list;
974
975 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
976 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
977
978 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
979 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
980
981 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
982 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
983
984 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
985 /*
986 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
987 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
988 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
989 */
990 return s->max_cert_list;
991
992 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
993 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
994
995 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
996 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
997 return 3;
998 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
999
1000 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1001 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1002
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1004 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1005
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1007 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1008
1009 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1010 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1011 }
1012 }
1013
1014 /*
1015 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1016 */
1017 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1018 {
1019 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1020
1021 switch (st->hand_state) {
1022 default:
1023 /* Shouldn't happen */
1024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1025 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1027 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1028
1029 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1030 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1031
1032 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1033 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1034
1035 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1036 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1037
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1039 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1040
1041 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1042 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1043
1044 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1045 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1046
1047 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1048 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1049
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1051 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1052
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1054 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1055
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1057 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1058
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1060 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1061
1062 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1063 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1064
1065 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1066 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1067
1068 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1069 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1070 }
1071 }
1072
1073 /*
1074 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1075 * from the server
1076 */
1077 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1078 {
1079 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1080
1081 switch (st->hand_state) {
1082 default:
1083 /* Shouldn't happen */
1084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1085 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1086 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1087 return WORK_ERROR;
1088
1089 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1090 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1091 }
1092 }
1093
1094 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1095 {
1096 unsigned char *p;
1097 size_t sess_id_len;
1098 int i, protverr;
1099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1100 SSL_COMP *comp;
1101 #endif
1102 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1103 unsigned char *session_id;
1104
1105 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1106 /* Should not happen */
1107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1108 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1109 return 0;
1110 }
1111
1112 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1113 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1114 if (protverr != 0) {
1115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1116 protverr);
1117 return 0;
1118 }
1119
1120 if (sess == NULL
1121 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1122 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1123 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1124 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1125 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1126 return 0;
1127 }
1128 }
1129 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1130
1131 p = s->s3->client_random;
1132
1133 /*
1134 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1135 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1136 */
1137 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1138 size_t idx;
1139 i = 1;
1140 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1141 if (p[idx]) {
1142 i = 0;
1143 break;
1144 }
1145 }
1146 } else {
1147 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1148 }
1149
1150 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1151 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1153 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 return 0;
1155 }
1156
1157 /*-
1158 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1159 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1160 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1161 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1162 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1163 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1164 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1165 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1166 * 1.0.
1167 *
1168 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1169 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1170 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1171 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1172 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1173 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1174 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1175 * know that is maximum server supports.
1176 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1177 * containing version 1.0.
1178 *
1179 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1180 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1181 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1182 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1183 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1184 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1185 * the negotiated version.
1186 *
1187 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1188 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1189 */
1190 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1191 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1194 return 0;
1195 }
1196
1197 /* Session ID */
1198 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1199 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1200 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1201 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1202 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1203 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1204 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1205 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1206 && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1208 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 return 0;
1211 }
1212 } else {
1213 sess_id_len = 0;
1214 }
1215 } else {
1216 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1217 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1218 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1219 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1220 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1221 }
1222 }
1223 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1224 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1225 sess_id_len))
1226 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1228 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 return 0;
1230 }
1231
1232 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1233 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1234 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1235 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1236 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1238 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1239 return 0;
1240 }
1241 }
1242
1243 /* Ciphers supported */
1244 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1246 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 return 0;
1248 }
1249
1250 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1251 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1252 return 0;
1253 }
1254 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1256 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 return 0;
1258 }
1259
1260 /* COMPRESSION */
1261 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1263 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 return 0;
1265 }
1266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1267 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1268 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1269 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1270 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1271 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1272 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1273 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1275 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1276 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1277 return 0;
1278 }
1279 }
1280 }
1281 #endif
1282 /* Add the NULL method */
1283 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1286 return 0;
1287 }
1288
1289 /* TLS extensions */
1290 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1292 return 0;
1293 }
1294
1295 return 1;
1296 }
1297
1298 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1299 {
1300 size_t cookie_len;
1301 PACKET cookiepkt;
1302
1303 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1304 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1306 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1307 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1308 }
1309
1310 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1311 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1313 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1314 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1315 }
1316
1317 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1319 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1320 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1321 }
1322 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1323
1324 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1325 }
1326
1327 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1328 {
1329 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1330 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1331 int i;
1332
1333 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1334 if (c == NULL) {
1335 /* unknown cipher */
1336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1337 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1338 return 0;
1339 }
1340 /*
1341 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1342 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1343 */
1344 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1346 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1347 return 0;
1348 }
1349
1350 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1351 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1352 if (i < 0) {
1353 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1355 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1356 return 0;
1357 }
1358
1359 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1360 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1361 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1363 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1364 return 0;
1365 }
1366
1367 /*
1368 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1369 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1370 * set and use it for comparison.
1371 */
1372 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1373 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1374 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1375 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1376 /*
1377 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1378 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1379 */
1380 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1381 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1383 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1384 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1385 return 0;
1386 }
1387 } else {
1388 /*
1389 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1390 * ciphersuite.
1391 */
1392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1393 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1394 return 0;
1395 }
1396 }
1397 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1398
1399 return 1;
1400 }
1401
1402 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1403 {
1404 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1405 size_t session_id_len;
1406 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1407 int hrr = 0;
1408 unsigned int compression;
1409 unsigned int sversion;
1410 unsigned int context;
1411 int discard;
1412 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1414 SSL_COMP *comp;
1415 #endif
1416
1417 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1419 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1420 goto err;
1421 }
1422
1423 /* load the server random */
1424 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1425 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1426 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1427 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1428 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1429 hrr = 1;
1430 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1432 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1433 goto err;
1434 }
1435 } else {
1436 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1438 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1439 goto err;
1440 }
1441 }
1442
1443 /* Get the session-id. */
1444 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1446 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1447 goto err;
1448 }
1449 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1450 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1451 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1453 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1454 goto err;
1455 }
1456
1457 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1459 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1460 goto err;
1461 }
1462
1463 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1465 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1466 goto err;
1467 }
1468
1469 /* TLS extensions */
1470 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1471 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1472 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1473 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1475 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1476 goto err;
1477 }
1478
1479 if (!hrr) {
1480 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1481 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1482 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1483 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1485 goto err;
1486 }
1487
1488 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1489 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1490 goto err;
1491 }
1492 }
1493
1494 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1495 if (compression != 0) {
1496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1497 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1498 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1499 goto err;
1500 }
1501
1502 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1503 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1504 session_id_len) != 0) {
1505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1506 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1507 goto err;
1508 }
1509 }
1510
1511 if (hrr) {
1512 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1513 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1514 goto err;
1515 }
1516
1517 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1518 }
1519
1520 /*
1521 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1522 * are appropriate for this version.
1523 */
1524 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1525 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1526 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1528 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1529 goto err;
1530 }
1531
1532 s->hit = 0;
1533
1534 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1535 /*
1536 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1537 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1538 */
1539 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1541 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1542 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1543 goto err;
1544 }
1545
1546 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1547 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1548 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1549 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1550 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1551 goto err;
1552 }
1553 } else {
1554 /*
1555 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1556 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1557 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1558 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1559 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1560 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1561 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1562 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1563 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1564 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1565 */
1566 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1567 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1568 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1569 /*
1570 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1571 * backwards compat reasons
1572 */
1573 int master_key_length;
1574 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1575 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1576 &master_key_length,
1577 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1578 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1579 && master_key_length > 0) {
1580 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1581 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1582 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1583 } else {
1584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1585 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 goto err;
1587 }
1588 }
1589
1590 if (session_id_len != 0
1591 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1592 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1593 session_id_len) == 0)
1594 s->hit = 1;
1595 }
1596
1597 if (s->hit) {
1598 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1599 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1600 /* actually a client application bug */
1601 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1602 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1603 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1604 goto err;
1605 }
1606 } else {
1607 /*
1608 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1609 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1610 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1611 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1612 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1613 */
1614 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1615 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1616 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1617 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1618 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
1619 s->session_ctx->lock);
1620 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1621 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1622 goto err;
1623 }
1624 }
1625
1626 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1627 /*
1628 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1629 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1630 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1631 * used for resumption.
1632 */
1633 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1634 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1635 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1636 if (session_id_len > 0)
1637 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1638 session_id_len);
1639 }
1640 }
1641
1642 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1643 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1645 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1646 goto err;
1647 }
1648 /*
1649 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1650 * version.
1651 */
1652 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1653 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1654
1655 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1656 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1657 goto err;
1658 }
1659
1660 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1661 if (compression != 0) {
1662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1663 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1664 goto err;
1665 }
1666 /*
1667 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1668 * using compression.
1669 */
1670 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1672 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1673 goto err;
1674 }
1675 #else
1676 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1678 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1679 goto err;
1680 }
1681 if (compression == 0)
1682 comp = NULL;
1683 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1685 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1686 goto err;
1687 } else {
1688 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1689 }
1690
1691 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1693 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1694 goto err;
1695 } else {
1696 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1697 }
1698 #endif
1699
1700 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1702 goto err;
1703 }
1704
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1706 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1707 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1708 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1709
1710 /*
1711 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1712 * no SCTP used.
1713 */
1714 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1715 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1716
1717 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1718 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1719 labelbuffer,
1720 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1723 goto err;
1724 }
1725
1726 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1727 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1728 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1729 }
1730 #endif
1731
1732 /*
1733 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1734 * we're done with this message
1735 */
1736 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1737 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1738 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1739 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1741 goto err;
1742 }
1743
1744 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1745 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1746 err:
1747 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1748 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1749 }
1750
1751 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1752 PACKET *extpkt)
1753 {
1754 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1755
1756 /*
1757 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1758 * should not be used.
1759 */
1760 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1761 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1762
1763 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1764 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1765 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1766 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1767 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1768 goto err;
1769 }
1770
1771 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1772 extensions = NULL;
1773
1774 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1775 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1776 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1777 #endif
1778 ) {
1779 /*
1780 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1781 * ClientHello will not change
1782 */
1783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1784 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1785 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1786 goto err;
1787 }
1788
1789 /*
1790 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1791 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1792 */
1793 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1794 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1795 goto err;
1796 }
1797
1798 /*
1799 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1800 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1801 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1802 * for HRR messages.
1803 */
1804 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1805 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1806 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1807 goto err;
1808 }
1809
1810 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1811 err:
1812 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1813 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1814 }
1815
1816 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1817 {
1818 int i;
1819 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1820 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1821 X509 *x = NULL;
1822 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1823 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1824 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1825 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1826 unsigned int context = 0;
1827 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1828
1829 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1831 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1832 goto err;
1833 }
1834
1835 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1836 || context != 0
1837 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1838 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1839 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1841 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1842 goto err;
1843 }
1844 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1845 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1846 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1848 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1849 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1850 goto err;
1851 }
1852
1853 certstart = certbytes;
1854 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1855 if (x == NULL) {
1856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1857 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1858 goto err;
1859 }
1860 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1862 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1863 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1864 goto err;
1865 }
1866
1867 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1868 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1869 PACKET extensions;
1870
1871 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1873 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1874 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1875 goto err;
1876 }
1877 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1878 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1879 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1880 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1881 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1882 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1883 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1884 /* SSLfatal already called */
1885 goto err;
1886 }
1887 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1888 }
1889
1890 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1892 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1893 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1894 goto err;
1895 }
1896 x = NULL;
1897 }
1898
1899 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1900 /*
1901 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1902 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1903 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1904 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1905 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1906 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1907 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1908 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1909 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1910 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1911 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1912 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1913 */
1914 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1915 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1916 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1917 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1918 goto err;
1919 }
1920 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1921 if (i > 1) {
1922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1923 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1924 goto err;
1925 }
1926
1927 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1928 /*
1929 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1930 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1931 */
1932 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1933 sk = NULL;
1934
1935 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1936
1937 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1938 x = NULL;
1939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1940 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1941 goto err;
1942 }
1943
1944 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1945 x = NULL;
1946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1947 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1948 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1949 goto err;
1950 }
1951 /*
1952 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1953 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1954 * type.
1955 */
1956 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1957 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1958 x = NULL;
1959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1960 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1961 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1962 goto err;
1963 }
1964 }
1965 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1966
1967 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1968 X509_up_ref(x);
1969 s->session->peer = x;
1970 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1971 x = NULL;
1972
1973 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1974 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1975 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1976 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1977 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1978 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1979 goto err;
1980 }
1981
1982 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1983
1984 err:
1985 X509_free(x);
1986 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1987 return ret;
1988 }
1989
1990 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1991 {
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1993 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1994
1995 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1996
1997 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1999 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2000 return 0;
2001 }
2002
2003 /*
2004 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2005 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2006 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2007 * identity.
2008 */
2009 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2011 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2012 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2013 return 0;
2014 }
2015
2016 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2017 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2018 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2019 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2020 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2021 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2022 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2023 return 0;
2024 }
2025
2026 return 1;
2027 #else
2028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2030 return 0;
2031 #endif
2032 }
2033
2034 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2035 {
2036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2037 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2038
2039 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2040 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2041 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2042 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2044 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2045 return 0;
2046 }
2047
2048 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2049 if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
2050 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2051 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2052 || (s->srp_ctx.g =
2053 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2054 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2055 || (s->srp_ctx.s =
2056 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2057 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2058 || (s->srp_ctx.B =
2059 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2060 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2062 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2063 return 0;
2064 }
2065
2066 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2067 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2068 return 0;
2069 }
2070
2071 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2072 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2073 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2074
2075 return 1;
2076 #else
2077 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2078 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2079 return 0;
2080 #endif
2081 }
2082
2083 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2084 {
2085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2086 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2087 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2088
2089 DH *dh = NULL;
2090 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2091
2092 int check_bits = 0;
2093
2094 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2095 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2096 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2098 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2099 return 0;
2100 }
2101
2102 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2103 dh = DH_new();
2104
2105 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2107 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2108 goto err;
2109 }
2110
2111 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2112 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2113 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2114 NULL);
2115 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2116 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2117 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2119 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2120 goto err;
2121 }
2122
2123 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2124 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2126 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2127 goto err;
2128 }
2129
2130 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2131 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2132 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2133 goto err;
2134 }
2135 p = g = NULL;
2136
2137 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2139 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2140 goto err;
2141 }
2142
2143 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2144 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2145 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2146 goto err;
2147 }
2148 bnpub_key = NULL;
2149
2150 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2152 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2153 goto err;
2154 }
2155
2156 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2158 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2159 goto err;
2160 }
2161
2162 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2163
2164 /*
2165 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2166 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2167 */
2168 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2169 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2170 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2171
2172 return 1;
2173
2174 err:
2175 BN_free(p);
2176 BN_free(g);
2177 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2178 DH_free(dh);
2179 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2180
2181 return 0;
2182 #else
2183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2184 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2185 return 0;
2186 #endif
2187 }
2188
2189 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2190 {
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2192 PACKET encoded_pt;
2193 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2194
2195 /*
2196 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2197 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2198 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2199 */
2200 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2202 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2203 return 0;
2204 }
2205 /*
2206 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2207 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2208 */
2209 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2210 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2212 SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2213 return 0;
2214 }
2215
2216 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2218 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2219 return 0;
2220 }
2221
2222 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2224 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2225 return 0;
2226 }
2227
2228 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2229 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2230 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2232 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2233 return 0;
2234 }
2235
2236 /*
2237 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2238 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2239 * and ECDSA.
2240 */
2241 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2242 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2243 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2244 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2245 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2246
2247 return 1;
2248 #else
2249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2250 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2251 return 0;
2252 #endif
2253 }
2254
2255 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2256 {
2257 long alg_k;
2258 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2259 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2260 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2261 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2262
2263 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2264
2265 save_param_start = *pkt;
2266
2267 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2268 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2269 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2270 #endif
2271
2272 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2273 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2275 goto err;
2276 }
2277 }
2278
2279 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2280 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2281 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2282 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2283 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2284 goto err;
2285 }
2286 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2287 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2288 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2289 goto err;
2290 }
2291 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2292 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2293 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2294 goto err;
2295 }
2296 } else if (alg_k) {
2297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2299 goto err;
2300 }
2301
2302 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2303 if (pkey != NULL) {
2304 PACKET params;
2305 int maxsig;
2306 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2307 unsigned char *tbs;
2308 size_t tbslen;
2309 int rv;
2310
2311 /*
2312 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2313 * equals the length of the parameters.
2314 */
2315 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
2316 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2317 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2319 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2320 goto err;
2321 }
2322
2323 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2324 unsigned int sigalg;
2325
2326 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2328 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2329 goto err;
2330 }
2331 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2332 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2333 goto err;
2334 }
2335 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2337 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2338 goto err;
2339 }
2340
2341 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2344 goto err;
2345 }
2346 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2347 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2348 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2349 #endif
2350
2351 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2352 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2354 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2355 goto err;
2356 }
2357 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2358 if (maxsig < 0) {
2359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2361 goto err;
2362 }
2363
2364 /*
2365 * Check signature length
2366 */
2367 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2368 /* wrong packet length */
2369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2370 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2371 goto err;
2372 }
2373
2374 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2375 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2378 goto err;
2379 }
2380
2381 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2383 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2384 goto err;
2385 }
2386 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2387 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2388 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2389 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2391 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2392 goto err;
2393 }
2394 }
2395 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(&params),
2396 PACKET_remaining(&params));
2397 if (tbslen == 0) {
2398 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2399 goto err;
2400 }
2401
2402 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2403 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2404 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2405 if (rv <= 0) {
2406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2407 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2408 goto err;
2409 }
2410 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2411 md_ctx = NULL;
2412 } else {
2413 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2414 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2415 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2416 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2417 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2419 SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2420 }
2421 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2422 goto err;
2423 }
2424 /* still data left over */
2425 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2427 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2428 goto err;
2429 }
2430 }
2431
2432 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2433 err:
2434 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2435 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2436 }
2437
2438 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2439 {
2440 size_t i;
2441
2442 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2443 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2444 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2445
2446 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2447 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2448 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2449
2450 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2451 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2452 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2453 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2454 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2455 s->pha_context = NULL;
2456
2457 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2458 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2460 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2461 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2462 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2463 }
2464
2465 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2467 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2468 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2469 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2470 }
2471 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2472 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2473 &rawexts, NULL, 1)
2474 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2475 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2476 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2477 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2478 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2479 }
2480 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2481 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2483 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2484 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2485 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2486 }
2487 } else {
2488 PACKET ctypes;
2489
2490 /* get the certificate types */
2491 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2493 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2494 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2495 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2496 }
2497
2498 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2500 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2501 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2502 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2503 }
2504
2505 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2506 PACKET sigalgs;
2507
2508 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2510 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2511 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2512 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2513 }
2514
2515 /*
2516 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2517 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2518 */
2519 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2521 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2522 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2523 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2524 }
2525 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2527 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2528 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2529 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2530 }
2531 }
2532
2533 /* get the CA RDNs */
2534 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2535 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2536 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2537 }
2538 }
2539
2540 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2542 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2543 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2544 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2545 }
2546
2547 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2548 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2549
2550 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2551 }
2552
2553 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2554 {
2555 unsigned int ticklen;
2556 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2557 unsigned int sess_len;
2558 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2559 PACKET nonce;
2560
2561 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2562 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2563 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2564 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2565 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2566 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2567 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2568 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2569 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2570 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2572 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2573 goto err;
2574 }
2575
2576 /*
2577 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2578 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2579 * be 0 here in that instance
2580 */
2581 if (ticklen == 0)
2582 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2583
2584 /*
2585 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2586 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2587 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2588 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2589 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2590 * cache.
2591 */
2592 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2593 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2594 /*
2595 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2596 * one
2597 */
2598 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2600 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2601 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2602 goto err;
2603 }
2604
2605 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2606 s->session = new_sess;
2607 }
2608
2609 /*
2610 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2611 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2612 */
2613 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2614
2615 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2616 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2617 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2618
2619 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2620 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2622 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2623 goto err;
2624 }
2625 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2627 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2628 goto err;
2629 }
2630
2631 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2632 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2633 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2634
2635 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2636 PACKET extpkt;
2637
2638 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2639 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2640 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2641 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2642 &exts, NULL, 1)
2643 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2644 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2645 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2646 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2647 goto err;
2648 }
2649 }
2650
2651 /*
2652 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2653 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2654 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2655 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2656 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2657 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2658 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2659 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2660 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2661 */
2662 /*
2663 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2664 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2665 */
2666 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2667 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2668 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2670 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2671 goto err;
2672 }
2673 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2674
2675 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2676 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2677 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2678 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2679 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2680 }
2681
2682 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2683 err:
2684 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2685 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2686 }
2687
2688 /*
2689 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2690 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2691 */
2692 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2693 {
2694 size_t resplen;
2695 unsigned int type;
2696
2697 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2698 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2700 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2701 return 0;
2702 }
2703 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2704 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2706 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2707 return 0;
2708 }
2709 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2710 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2712 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2713 return 0;
2714 }
2715 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2717 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2718 return 0;
2719 }
2720 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2721
2722 return 1;
2723 }
2724
2725
2726 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2727 {
2728 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2729 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2730 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2731 }
2732
2733 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2734 }
2735
2736 /*
2737 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2738 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2739 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2740 * on failure.
2741 */
2742 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2743 {
2744 /*
2745 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2746 * the server
2747 */
2748 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2749 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2750 return 0;
2751 }
2752
2753 /*
2754 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2755 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2756 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2757 */
2758 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2759 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2760 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2761
2762 if (ret == 0) {
2763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2764 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2765 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2766 return 0;
2767 }
2768 if (ret < 0) {
2769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2770 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2771 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2772 return 0;
2773 }
2774 }
2775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2776 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2777 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2778 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2779 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2780 return 0;
2781 }
2782 }
2783 #endif
2784
2785 return 1;
2786 }
2787
2788 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2789 {
2790 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2791 /* should contain no data */
2792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2793 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2794 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2795 }
2796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2797 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2798 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2800 SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2801 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2802 }
2803 }
2804 #endif
2805
2806 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2807 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2808 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2809 }
2810
2811 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2812 }
2813
2814 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2815 {
2816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2817 int ret = 0;
2818 /*
2819 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2820 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2821 * strnlen.
2822 */
2823 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2824 size_t identitylen = 0;
2825 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2826 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2827 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2828 size_t psklen = 0;
2829
2830 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2831 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2832 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2833 goto err;
2834 }
2835
2836 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2837
2838 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2839 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2840 psk, sizeof(psk));
2841
2842 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2844 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2845 goto err;
2846 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2848 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2849 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2850 goto err;
2851 }
2852
2853 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2854 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2856 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2857 goto err;
2858 }
2859
2860 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2861 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2862 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2864 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2865 goto err;
2866 }
2867
2868 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2869 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2870 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2871 tmppsk = NULL;
2872 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2873 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2874 tmpidentity = NULL;
2875
2876 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2879 goto err;
2880 }
2881
2882 ret = 1;
2883
2884 err:
2885 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2886 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2887 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2888 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2889
2890 return ret;
2891 #else
2892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2893 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2894 return 0;
2895 #endif
2896 }
2897
2898 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2899 {
2900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2901 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2902 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2903 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2904 size_t enclen;
2905 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2906 size_t pmslen = 0;
2907
2908 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2909 /*
2910 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2911 */
2912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2913 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2914 return 0;
2915 }
2916
2917 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2918 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2920 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2921 return 0;
2922 }
2923
2924 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2925 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2926 if (pms == NULL) {
2927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2928 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2929 return 0;
2930 }
2931
2932 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2933 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2934 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2935 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2937 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2938 goto err;
2939 }
2940
2941 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2942 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2944 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2945 goto err;
2946 }
2947 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2948 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2949 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2951 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2952 goto err;
2953 }
2954 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2955 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2957 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2958 goto err;
2959 }
2960 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2961 pctx = NULL;
2962
2963 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2964 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2966 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2967 goto err;
2968 }
2969
2970 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2971 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2972 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2973 goto err;
2974 }
2975
2976 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2977 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2978
2979 return 1;
2980 err:
2981 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2982 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2983
2984 return 0;
2985 #else
2986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2987 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2988 return 0;
2989 #endif
2990 }
2991
2992 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2993 {
2994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2995 DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
2996 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2997 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2998 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2999
3000 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3001 if (skey == NULL) {
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3003 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3004 goto err;
3005 }
3006
3007 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3008 if (ckey == NULL) {
3009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3010 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3011 goto err;
3012 }
3013
3014 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3015
3016 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3019 goto err;
3020 }
3021
3022 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3023 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3024 goto err;
3025 }
3026
3027 /* send off the data */
3028 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3029 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3030 &keybytes)) {
3031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3033 goto err;
3034 }
3035
3036 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3037 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3038
3039 return 1;
3040 err:
3041 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3042 return 0;
3043 #else
3044 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3045 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3046 return 0;
3047 #endif
3048 }
3049
3050 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3051 {
3052 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3053 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3054 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3055 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3056 int ret = 0;
3057
3058 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3059 if (skey == NULL) {
3060 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3061 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3062 return 0;
3063 }
3064
3065 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3066 if (ckey == NULL) {
3067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3068 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3069 goto err;
3070 }
3071
3072 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3073 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3074 goto err;
3075 }
3076
3077 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3078 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3079
3080 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3082 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3083 goto err;
3084 }
3085
3086 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3088 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3089 goto err;
3090 }
3091
3092 ret = 1;
3093 err:
3094 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3095 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3096 return ret;
3097 #else
3098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3099 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3100 return 0;
3101 #endif
3102 }
3103
3104 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3105 {
3106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3107 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3108 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3109 X509 *peer_cert;
3110 size_t msglen;
3111 unsigned int md_len;
3112 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3113 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3114 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3115 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3116 size_t pmslen = 0;
3117
3118 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3119 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3120
3121 /*
3122 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3123 */
3124 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3125 if (!peer_cert) {
3126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3127 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3128 return 0;
3129 }
3130
3131 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3132 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3134 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3135 return 0;
3136 }
3137 /*
3138 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3139 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3140 * certificate key for key exchange
3141 */
3142
3143 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3144 pmslen = 32;
3145 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3146 if (pms == NULL) {
3147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3148 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3149 goto err;
3150 }
3151
3152 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3153 /* Generate session key
3154 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3155 */
3156 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3158 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3159 goto err;
3160 };
3161 /*
3162 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3163 * data
3164 */
3165 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3166 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3167 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3168 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3169 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3170 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3171 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3172 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3174 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3175 goto err;
3176 }
3177 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3178 ukm_hash = NULL;
3179 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3180 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3182 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3183 goto err;
3184 }
3185 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3186 /*
3187 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3188 */
3189 msglen = 255;
3190 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3192 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3193 goto err;
3194 }
3195
3196 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3197 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3198 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3200 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3201 goto err;
3202 }
3203
3204 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3205 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3206 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3207
3208 return 1;
3209 err:
3210 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3211 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3212 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3213 return 0;
3214 #else
3215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3216 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3217 return 0;
3218 #endif
3219 }
3220
3221 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3222 {
3223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3224 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3225
3226 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3227 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3228 &abytes)) {
3229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3230 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3231 return 0;
3232 }
3233 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3234
3235 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3236 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3237 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3239 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3240 return 0;
3241 }
3242
3243 return 1;
3244 #else
3245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3246 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3247 return 0;
3248 #endif
3249 }
3250
3251 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3252 {
3253 unsigned long alg_k;
3254
3255 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3256
3257 /*
3258 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3259 * no need to do so here.
3260 */
3261 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3262 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3263 goto err;
3264
3265 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3266 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3267 goto err;
3268 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3269 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3270 goto err;
3271 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3272 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3273 goto err;
3274 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3275 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3276 goto err;
3277 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3278 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3279 goto err;
3280 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3282 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3283 goto err;
3284 }
3285
3286 return 1;
3287 err:
3288 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3289 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3291 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3292 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3293 #endif
3294 return 0;
3295 }
3296
3297 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3298 {
3299 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3300 size_t pmslen = 0;
3301
3302 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3303 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3304
3305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3306 /* Check for SRP */
3307 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3308 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3309 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3310 goto err;
3311 }
3312 return 1;
3313 }
3314 #endif
3315
3316 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3318 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3319 goto err;
3320 }
3321 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3322 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3323 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3324 pms = NULL;
3325 pmslen = 0;
3326 goto err;
3327 }
3328 pms = NULL;
3329 pmslen = 0;
3330
3331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3332 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3333 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3334 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3335
3336 /*
3337 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3338 * used.
3339 */
3340 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3341 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3342
3343 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3344 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3345 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3347 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3349 goto err;
3350 }
3351
3352 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3353 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3354 }
3355 #endif
3356
3357 return 1;
3358 err:
3359 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3360 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3361 return 0;
3362 }
3363
3364 /*
3365 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3366 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3367 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3368 */
3369 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3370 {
3371 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3372 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3373 return 0;
3374 /*
3375 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3376 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3377 */
3378 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3379 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3380 return 0;
3381 return 1;
3382 }
3383
3384 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3385 {
3386 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3387 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3388 int i;
3389
3390 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3391 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3392 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3393 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3394 if (i < 0) {
3395 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3396 return WORK_MORE_A;
3397 }
3398 if (i == 0) {
3399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3400 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3401 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3402 return WORK_ERROR;
3403 }
3404 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3405 }
3406 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3407 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3408 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3409 }
3410 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3411 }
3412
3413 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3414 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3415 }
3416
3417 /* We need to get a client cert */
3418 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3419 /*
3420 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3421 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3422 */
3423 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3424 if (i < 0) {
3425 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3426 return WORK_MORE_B;
3427 }
3428 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3429 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3430 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3431 i = 0;
3432 } else if (i == 1) {
3433 i = 0;
3434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3435 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3436 }
3437
3438 X509_free(x509);
3439 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3440 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3441 i = 0;
3442 if (i == 0) {
3443 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3444 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3445 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3446 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3447 } else {
3448 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3449 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3450 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3451 return WORK_ERROR;
3452 }
3453 }
3454 }
3455
3456 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3457 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3458 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3459 }
3460
3461 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3463 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3464 return WORK_ERROR;
3465 }
3466
3467 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3468 {
3469 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3470 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3471 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3472 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3474 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3475 return 0;
3476 }
3477 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3478 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3479 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3480 return 0;
3481 }
3482 }
3483 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3484 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3485 : s->cert->key)) {
3486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3487 return 0;
3488 }
3489
3490 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3491 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3492 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3493 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3494 /*
3495 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3496 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3497 */
3498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3499 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3500 return 0;
3501 }
3502
3503 return 1;
3504 }
3505
3506 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3507 {
3508 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3509 size_t idx;
3510 long alg_k, alg_a;
3511
3512 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3513 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3514
3515 /* we don't have a certificate */
3516 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3517 return 1;
3518
3519 /* This is the passed certificate */
3520 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3521
3522 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3523 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3525 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3526 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3527 return 0;
3528 }
3529
3530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3531 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3532 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3533 return 1;
3534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3535 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3536 return 0;
3537 }
3538 #endif
3539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3540 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3542 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3543 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3544 return 0;
3545 }
3546 #endif
3547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3548 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3551 return 0;
3552 }
3553 #endif
3554
3555 return 1;
3556 }
3557
3558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3559 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3560 {
3561 size_t len, padding_len;
3562 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3563
3564 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3565 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3566
3567 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3568 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3570 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3571 return 0;
3572 }
3573
3574 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3575
3576 return 1;
3577 }
3578 #endif
3579
3580 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3581 {
3582 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3583 /* should contain no data */
3584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3585 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3586 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3587 }
3588
3589 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3590 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3591 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3592 }
3593
3594 /*
3595 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3596 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3597 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3598 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3599 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3600 */
3601 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3602 SSL_renegotiate(s);
3603 else
3604 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3605
3606 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3607 }
3608
3609 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3610 {
3611 PACKET extensions;
3612 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3613
3614 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3615 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3617 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3618 goto err;
3619 }
3620
3621 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3622 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3623 NULL, 1)
3624 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3625 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3626 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3627 goto err;
3628 }
3629
3630 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3631 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3632
3633 err:
3634 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3635 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3636 }
3637
3638 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3639 {
3640 int i = 0;
3641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3642 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3643 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3644 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3645 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3646 if (i != 0)
3647 return i;
3648 }
3649 #endif
3650 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3651 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3652 return i;
3653 }
3654
3655 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3656 {
3657 int i;
3658 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3659 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3660
3661 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3662 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3664 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3665 return 0;
3666 }
3667
3668 if (sk == NULL) {
3669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3670 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3671 return 0;
3672 }
3673
3674 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3675 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3676 # error Max cipher length too short
3677 # endif
3678 /*
3679 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3680 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3681 * use TLS v1.2
3682 */
3683 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3684 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3685 else
3686 #endif
3687 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3688 maxlen = 0xfffe;
3689
3690 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3691 maxlen -= 2;
3692 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3693 maxlen -= 2;
3694
3695 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3696 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3697
3698 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3699 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3700 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3701 continue;
3702
3703 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3705 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3706 return 0;
3707 }
3708
3709 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3710 if (!maxverok) {
3711 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3712 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3713 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3714 maxverok = 1;
3715 } else {
3716 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3717 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3718 maxverok = 1;
3719 }
3720 }
3721
3722 totlen += len;
3723 }
3724
3725 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3726 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3727 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3728
3729 if (!maxverok)
3730 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3731 "SSL/TLS version");
3732
3733 return 0;
3734 }
3735
3736 if (totlen != 0) {
3737 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3738 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3739 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3740 };
3741 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3743 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3744 return 0;
3745 }
3746 }
3747 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3748 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3749 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3750 };
3751 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3753 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3754 return 0;
3755 }
3756 }
3757 }
3758
3759 return 1;
3760 }
3761
3762 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3763 {
3764 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3765 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3767 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3768 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3769 return 0;
3770 }
3771
3772 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3773 return 1;
3774 }
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