2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
64 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
65 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
70 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
76 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
78 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
79 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
80 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
81 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
88 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
95 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
97 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
100 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
101 * ciphersuite or for SRP
103 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
112 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
113 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
114 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
115 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
118 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
119 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
121 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
123 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
126 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
127 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
128 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
129 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
133 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
134 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
135 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
141 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
143 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
144 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
145 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
148 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
149 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
153 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
154 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
156 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
157 && s
->tls_session_secret_cb
!= NULL
158 && s
->session
->tlsext_tick
!= NULL
159 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
161 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
162 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
163 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
164 * the server is resuming.
167 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
169 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
170 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
171 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
172 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
176 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
177 if (ske_expected
< 0)
179 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
181 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
182 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
183 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
184 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
187 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
188 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
189 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
191 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
192 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
201 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
202 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
204 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
205 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
210 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
211 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
212 if (ske_expected
< 0)
214 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
216 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
217 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
218 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
219 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
226 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
227 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
228 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
229 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
236 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
237 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
238 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
243 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
244 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
245 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
246 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
249 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
250 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
255 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
256 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
257 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
262 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
263 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
264 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
273 /* No valid transition found */
278 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
279 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
281 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
283 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
285 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
287 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
289 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
290 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
292 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
294 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
297 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
299 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
300 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
301 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
303 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
304 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
305 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
307 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
308 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
311 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
312 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
314 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
316 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
317 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
320 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
321 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
322 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
323 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
325 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
326 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
328 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
330 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
331 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
333 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
335 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
336 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
337 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
339 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
340 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
341 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
343 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
346 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
348 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
350 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
351 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
352 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
353 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
356 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
358 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
359 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
360 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
362 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
365 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
367 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
368 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
370 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
371 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
372 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
376 /* Shouldn't happen */
377 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
382 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
383 * the client to the server.
385 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
387 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
389 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
392 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
393 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
394 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
399 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
401 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
402 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
405 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
406 * messages unless we need to.
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
411 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
412 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
415 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
418 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
421 /* No pre work to be done */
425 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
429 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
430 * client to the server.
432 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
434 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
438 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
439 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
440 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
443 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
444 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
449 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
450 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
454 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
455 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
456 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
457 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
459 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
460 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
462 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
464 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
467 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
468 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
471 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
475 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
478 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
483 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
487 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
489 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
491 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
494 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
498 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
503 /* No post work to be done */
507 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
511 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
513 * Valid return values are:
517 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
)
519 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
521 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
522 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
523 return tls_construct_client_hello(s
);
526 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s
);
528 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
529 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s
);
531 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
532 return tls_construct_client_verify(s
);
534 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
536 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
538 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
540 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
541 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
542 return tls_construct_next_proto(s
);
544 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
545 return tls_construct_finished(s
,
547 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
549 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
552 /* Shouldn't happen */
560 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
561 * reading. Excludes the message header.
563 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
565 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
567 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
568 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
569 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
571 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
572 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
575 return s
->max_cert_list
;
577 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
578 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
580 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
581 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
583 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
584 /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
585 * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
586 * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
588 return s
->max_cert_list
;
590 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
591 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
593 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
594 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
596 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
597 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
599 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
600 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
603 /* Shouldn't happen */
611 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
613 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
615 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
617 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
618 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
619 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
621 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
622 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
625 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
627 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
628 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
630 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
631 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
633 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
634 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
636 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
637 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
639 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
640 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
642 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
643 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
645 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
646 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
649 /* Shouldn't happen */
653 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
657 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
660 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
662 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
664 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
666 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
667 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
668 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
669 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
670 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
671 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
672 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
673 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
676 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
677 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
684 /* Shouldn't happen */
688 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
691 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
700 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
702 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
704 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
705 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
711 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
712 !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
714 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
715 * "ticket" without a session ID.
717 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
718 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
719 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
722 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
724 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
727 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
728 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
730 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
733 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
742 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
743 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
746 /* Do the message type and length last */
747 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
750 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
751 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
752 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
753 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
754 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
755 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
756 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
757 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
760 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
761 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
762 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
763 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
764 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
765 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
766 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
767 * know that is maximum server supports.
768 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
769 * containing version 1.0.
771 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
772 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
773 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
774 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
775 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
776 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
777 * the negotiated version.
779 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
780 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
783 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
784 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
790 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
793 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
794 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
797 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
801 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
802 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
803 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
807 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
808 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
809 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
812 /* Ciphers supported */
813 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]));
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
818 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
820 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
821 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
824 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
825 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
826 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
832 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
836 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
839 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
841 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
842 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
846 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
849 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
854 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
856 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
862 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
863 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
870 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
874 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
877 unsigned int cookie_len
;
880 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
881 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
882 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
887 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
888 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
889 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
894 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
895 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
899 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
901 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
903 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
904 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
905 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
908 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
910 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
913 size_t session_id_len
;
914 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
915 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
916 unsigned int compression
;
917 unsigned int sversion
;
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
923 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
924 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
929 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
931 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
936 /* load the server hello data */
937 /* load the server random */
938 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
939 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
946 /* Get the session-id. */
947 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
948 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
952 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
953 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
954 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
955 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
960 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
962 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
967 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
968 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
969 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
970 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
971 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
972 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
973 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
974 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
975 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
976 * server wants to resume.
978 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
979 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
980 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
981 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
982 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
983 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
985 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
986 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
987 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
990 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
995 if (session_id_len
!= 0 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
996 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
997 session_id_len
) == 0) {
998 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
999 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1000 /* actually a client application bug */
1001 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1003 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1009 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1010 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1011 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1012 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1013 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1015 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1016 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1021 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1022 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1023 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1024 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1028 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1029 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1030 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1033 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1037 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1039 /* unknown cipher */
1040 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1045 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1048 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1049 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1051 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1052 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1054 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1055 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1060 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1061 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1063 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1064 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1070 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1071 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1072 * set and use it for comparison.
1074 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1075 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1076 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1077 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1079 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1082 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1083 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1085 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1087 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1090 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1091 if (compression
!= 0) {
1092 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1094 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1098 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1099 * using compression.
1101 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1106 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1107 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1109 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1112 if (compression
== 0)
1114 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1115 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1119 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1122 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1123 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1125 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1128 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1132 /* TLS extensions */
1133 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
)) {
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1138 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1139 /* wrong packet length */
1140 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1146 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1147 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1148 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1151 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1154 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1155 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1157 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1158 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1160 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
1164 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1165 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1166 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1170 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1172 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1174 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1175 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1178 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1180 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1181 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1183 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1184 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1185 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1187 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1192 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1193 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1194 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1198 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1199 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1200 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1201 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1203 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1207 certstart
= certbytes
;
1208 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1210 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1214 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1215 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1217 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1220 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1227 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1228 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) && i
<= 0) {
1229 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1231 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1234 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1237 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1241 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1243 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1244 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1246 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1249 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1252 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1254 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1258 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1262 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1267 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1271 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1272 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1273 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1274 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1275 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1277 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1279 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1282 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1284 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1286 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1287 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1290 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1294 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1296 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1299 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1303 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1308 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1309 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1314 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1316 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
1318 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1319 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1320 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1325 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1327 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
1329 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1330 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
1331 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1334 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1336 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1339 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1340 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1341 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1342 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1348 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1349 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1350 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1353 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1354 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1359 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1360 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1361 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1362 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1363 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1364 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1369 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1370 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1372 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1374 * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
1379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1380 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1381 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1382 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1383 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1384 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1385 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1391 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1392 PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1394 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1395 PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1397 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1398 PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1400 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1401 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1406 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1411 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1412 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1413 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1415 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1417 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1418 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1419 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1422 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1424 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1425 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1426 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1431 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1434 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1435 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1440 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1441 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1443 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
),
1445 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1450 if (BN_is_zero(p
) || BN_is_zero(g
) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1455 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1456 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1461 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
1462 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1467 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1468 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1473 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
1474 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1479 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
1487 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
1491 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1492 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1494 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1495 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1496 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1498 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1501 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1503 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
1507 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1508 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1509 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1511 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1516 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1517 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1519 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1524 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2));
1525 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1526 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1528 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1532 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1533 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
1535 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
1536 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
1537 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
1538 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1542 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1545 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1550 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
),
1551 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1552 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
), NULL
) == 0) {
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1558 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1559 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1563 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1564 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1565 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1567 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1568 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1569 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1571 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1573 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1577 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1579 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1583 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1584 * equals the length of the parameters.
1586 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
1587 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
1588 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
1589 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1594 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1595 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
1597 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sigalgs
, 2)) {
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1601 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sigalgs
, pkey
);
1608 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1610 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
1611 md
= EVP_md5_sha1();
1616 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
1617 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1621 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1628 * Check signature length
1630 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)j
) {
1631 /* wrong packet length */
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1635 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1636 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1637 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1638 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1639 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1640 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
1641 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
1642 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1646 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
1647 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), pkey
) <= 0) {
1649 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1654 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1655 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1656 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1657 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
1658 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1662 /* still data left over */
1663 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1668 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1669 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1671 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1677 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1679 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1680 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1681 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1684 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1686 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1687 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
1688 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1689 const unsigned char *data
;
1690 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
1691 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1693 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1698 /* get the certificate types */
1699 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
1700 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
1701 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1705 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
1706 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
1707 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
1708 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1709 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
1710 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1714 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
1715 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
1716 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
1718 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
1719 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
1721 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1722 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1723 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, list_len
)) {
1724 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1726 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1730 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1731 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1732 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
1733 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1735 if ((list_len
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, list_len
)) {
1736 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1738 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
1741 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1742 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1747 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
1750 /* get the CA RDNs */
1751 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1752 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
1753 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1758 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1759 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
1760 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
1761 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1763 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1767 namestart
= namebytes
;
1769 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
1770 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
1771 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1776 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
1777 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1779 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1782 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1789 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
1790 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
1791 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
1792 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
1793 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
1796 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1799 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1802 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
1806 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
1808 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
1811 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1814 unsigned int ticklen
;
1815 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1817 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
1818 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
1819 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
) {
1820 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1825 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
1827 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1829 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1830 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
1831 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
1833 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
1836 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
1838 * Remove the old session from the cache
1840 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE
) {
1841 if (s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1842 s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb(s
->session_ctx
,
1845 /* We carry on if this fails */
1846 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1850 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
1851 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1856 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
1857 s
->session
= new_sess
;
1860 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
1861 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
1863 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
1864 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
) {
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1868 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
)) {
1869 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1874 s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1875 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
1877 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
1878 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
1879 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
1880 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
1881 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
1882 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
1883 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
1884 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
1885 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
1887 EVP_Digest(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
,
1888 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
1889 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
1890 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1892 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1894 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1895 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1898 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1901 unsigned long resplen
;
1904 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
1905 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1906 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
1910 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &resplen
)
1911 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
1912 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1916 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
1917 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
== NULL
) {
1918 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1919 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1922 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, resplen
)) {
1923 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1927 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
1928 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1930 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1931 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1932 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1935 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1937 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1938 /* should contain no data */
1939 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1941 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1942 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1946 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1947 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
1949 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1950 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1951 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1957 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
1960 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
1961 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1962 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1963 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1967 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
1968 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
1969 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
1971 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1 && s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
!= NULL
) {
1973 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
1975 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
1976 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
1978 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
1979 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1982 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1984 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1989 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
1990 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
1991 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1992 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1993 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1999 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2000 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2001 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2002 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2005 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2008 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2013 size_t pskhdrlen
= 0;
2015 unsigned long alg_k
;
2016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2018 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2019 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2021 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2022 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2025 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2026 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2028 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2030 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2032 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2036 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2039 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2040 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2043 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2045 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2048 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2050 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2054 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2056 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2057 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2060 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2062 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2064 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2066 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2069 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2070 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2071 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2073 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2074 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2078 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2079 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2080 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2082 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2085 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2086 s
->session
->psk_identity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2087 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2088 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2092 s2n(identitylen
, p
);
2093 memcpy(p
, identity
, identitylen
);
2094 pskhdrlen
= 2 + identitylen
;
2098 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2100 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2104 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2109 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2113 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2115 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2116 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2120 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2122 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2129 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2130 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2136 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2137 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2138 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2142 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2143 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2145 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2146 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2147 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2152 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, p
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2154 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2158 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2161 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2163 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2167 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2168 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2175 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2178 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2181 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2184 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
, NID_undef
);
2185 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2187 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2189 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2194 /* send off the data */
2195 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2196 n
= BN_num_bytes(pub_key
);
2198 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, p
);
2200 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2206 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2208 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2209 if ((skey
== NULL
) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey
) == NULL
) {
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2215 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
, NID_undef
);
2217 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2222 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2223 encoded_pt_len
= EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey
),
2224 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2225 &encodedPoint
, NULL
);
2227 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2232 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2237 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2238 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2240 /* copy the point */
2241 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2242 /* increment n to account for length field */
2245 /* Free allocated memory */
2246 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2248 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2250 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2251 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2252 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2255 unsigned int md_len
;
2256 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2257 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2258 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2259 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2260 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2264 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2269 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2271 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2274 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2278 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2279 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2281 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2285 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2286 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2287 * certificate key for key exchange
2290 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2292 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
2293 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2294 /* Generate session key */
2295 || RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2296 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2298 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2302 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2304 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2305 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2306 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2308 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2315 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2318 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2319 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2320 EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2321 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2322 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2323 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2324 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2325 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2326 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2328 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2331 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2332 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2333 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2339 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2341 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2343 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2345 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2350 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2352 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2355 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2358 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2359 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2360 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2361 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2362 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2363 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2365 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2370 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2371 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2372 /* send off the data */
2373 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2375 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2379 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2382 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2383 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2384 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2386 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2392 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2401 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
2402 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2408 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2409 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2414 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2417 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2418 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2420 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2423 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2425 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2426 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2429 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2430 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2432 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2436 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
2438 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2441 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2442 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2446 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2447 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
2449 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2456 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2457 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2461 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2462 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2464 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2473 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2474 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2475 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2478 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2481 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2482 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2484 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2485 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2486 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
2489 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2490 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2496 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2497 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2501 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
2505 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
2508 unsigned long n
= 0;
2512 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2518 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2519 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2521 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2522 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2526 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2527 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2535 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2537 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2538 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
2539 || (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2540 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2541 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2542 s
->session
->master_key
))
2543 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2549 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2550 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2551 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2552 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
2553 BUF_reverse(p
+ 2, NULL
, u
);
2559 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2560 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
2562 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2567 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2570 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2575 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2576 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2577 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2579 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2581 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
2583 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2584 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
2587 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2588 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2590 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
2591 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
2596 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2599 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2602 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2603 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2604 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
2605 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2607 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2611 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2612 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2615 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2617 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2618 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2620 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2624 /* We need to get a client cert */
2625 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2627 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2628 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2630 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
2632 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2635 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2636 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
2637 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
2639 } else if (i
== 1) {
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2642 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
2646 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2647 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2650 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2651 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2652 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
2653 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2655 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
2656 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2657 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2658 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2664 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2667 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2671 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2673 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
2674 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
2675 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2677 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2678 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2685 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2687 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
2690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2694 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2695 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2697 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2698 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2700 /* we don't have a certificate */
2701 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
2704 /* This is the passed certificate */
2706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2707 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
2708 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
2709 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
2716 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2718 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2722 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2723 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
2725 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
2726 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2728 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2732 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2734 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2739 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
2740 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
2741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2742 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
2746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2747 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
2748 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2756 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2761 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
2763 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
2766 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
2767 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
2768 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2770 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
2771 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
2772 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
2773 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
2774 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
2775 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
2782 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
2785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
2786 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
2787 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
2788 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
2789 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
2794 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
2795 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
2799 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
2803 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2805 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
2806 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
2807 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
2813 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
2814 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2815 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2816 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
2818 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, p
);
2822 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
2826 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
2827 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2828 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2830 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);
2833 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
2834 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2835 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2837 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);