]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blob - ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blob
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blame | history | raw | HEAD
Collapse ssl3_state_st (s3) into ssl_st
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_clnt.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include <time.h>
14 #include <assert.h>
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include "statem_locl.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
27
28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
29 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
30
31 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
32 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
33 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 WPACKET *pkt);
35
36 /*
37 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
38 *
39 * Return values are:
40 * 1: Yes
41 * 0: No
42 */
43 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
44 {
45 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
46 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
47 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
48 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
49 return 0;
50
51 return 1;
52 }
53
54 /*
55 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
56 *
57 * Return values are:
58 * 1: Yes
59 * 0: No
60 */
61 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
62 {
63 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
64
65 /*
66 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
67 * ciphersuite or for SRP
68 */
69 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
70 | SSL_kSRP)) {
71 return 1;
72 }
73
74 return 0;
75 }
76
77 /*
78 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
79 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
80 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
81 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
82 *
83 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
84 * (transition not allowed)
85 */
86 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
87 {
88 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
89
90 /*
91 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
92 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
93 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
94 */
95
96 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 default:
98 break;
99
100 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
101 /*
102 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
103 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
104 */
105 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
106 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
107 return 1;
108 }
109 break;
110
111 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
112 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
113 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
114 return 1;
115 }
116 break;
117
118 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
119 if (s->hit) {
120 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
121 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 return 1;
123 }
124 } else {
125 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
126 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
127 return 1;
128 }
129 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
130 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
131 return 1;
132 }
133 }
134 break;
135
136 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
137 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
138 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
139 return 1;
140 }
141 break;
142
143 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
145 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
146 return 1;
147 }
148 break;
149
150 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
151 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
152 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
153 return 1;
154 }
155 break;
156
157 case TLS_ST_OK:
158 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
159 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
160 return 1;
161 }
162 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
163 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
164 return 1;
165 }
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
167 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
168 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
169 #endif
170 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
171 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
172 /*
173 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
174 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
175 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
176 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
177 */
178 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
179 /* SSLfatal() already called */
180 return 0;
181 }
182 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
183 return 1;
184 }
185 }
186 break;
187 }
188
189 /* No valid transition found */
190 return 0;
191 }
192
193 /*
194 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
195 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
196 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
197 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
198 *
199 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
200 * (transition not allowed)
201 */
202 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
203 {
204 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
205 int ske_expected;
206
207 /*
208 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
209 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
210 */
211 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
212 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
213 goto err;
214 return 1;
215 }
216
217 switch (st->hand_state) {
218 default:
219 break;
220
221 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
222 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
224 return 1;
225 }
226
227 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
228 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
229 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
230 return 1;
231 }
232 }
233 break;
234
235 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
236 /*
237 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
238 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
239 * HelloRetryRequest.
240 */
241 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
242 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
243 return 1;
244 }
245 break;
246
247 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
248 if (s->hit) {
249 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
250 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
252 return 1;
253 }
254 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 } else {
259 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
260 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
261 return 1;
262 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
263 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
264 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
265 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
266 /*
267 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
268 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
269 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
270 * the server is resuming.
271 */
272 s->hit = 1;
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
274 return 1;
275 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
276 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
279 return 1;
280 }
281 } else {
282 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
283 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
284 if (ske_expected
285 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
286 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
287 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
288 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
289 return 1;
290 }
291 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
292 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
293 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
294 return 1;
295 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
296 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
297 return 1;
298 }
299 }
300 }
301 break;
302
303 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
304 /*
305 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
306 * |ext.status_expected| is set
307 */
308 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
309 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
310 return 1;
311 }
312 /* Fall through */
313
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
315 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
316 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
317 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
318 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
319 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
320 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
321 return 1;
322 }
323 goto err;
324 }
325 /* Fall through */
326
327 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
328 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
329 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
330 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
331 return 1;
332 }
333 goto err;
334 }
335 /* Fall through */
336
337 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
338 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
339 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
340 return 1;
341 }
342 break;
343
344 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
345 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
346 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
348 return 1;
349 }
350 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
352 return 1;
353 }
354 break;
355
356 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
359 return 1;
360 }
361 break;
362
363 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
364 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
366 return 1;
367 }
368 break;
369
370 case TLS_ST_OK:
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
373 return 1;
374 }
375 break;
376 }
377
378 err:
379 /* No valid transition found */
380 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
381 BIO *rbio;
382
383 /*
384 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
385 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
386 */
387 s->init_num = 0;
388 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
389 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
390 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
391 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
392 return 0;
393 }
394 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
395 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
396 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
397 return 0;
398 }
399
400 /*
401 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
402 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
403 * server.
404 */
405 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
406 {
407 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
408
409 /*
410 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
411 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
412 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
413 */
414 switch (st->hand_state) {
415 default:
416 /* Shouldn't happen */
417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
418 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
419 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
421
422 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
423 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 }
427 /*
428 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
429 * we already sent close_notify
430 */
431 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
434 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
437 }
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
440
441 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
442 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
443 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
445 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
446 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
448 else
449 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
450 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452
453 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
454 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457 }
458 /* Fall through */
459
460 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
461 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
462 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
463 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
465
466 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
467 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
468 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
469 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471
472 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
473 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475
476 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
477 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
479 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 }
481 /* Fall through */
482
483 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
484 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
485 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
486 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
487 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488
489 case TLS_ST_OK:
490 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
493 }
494
495 /* Try to read from the server instead */
496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
497 }
498 }
499
500 /*
501 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
502 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
503 */
504 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
505 {
506 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
507
508 /*
509 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
510 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
511 * later
512 */
513 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
514 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
515
516 switch (st->hand_state) {
517 default:
518 /* Shouldn't happen */
519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
520 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
521 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
522 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
523
524 case TLS_ST_OK:
525 if (!s->renegotiate) {
526 /*
527 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
528 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
529 */
530 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
531 }
532 /* Renegotiation */
533 /* fall thru */
534 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
536 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
537
538 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
539 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
540 /*
541 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
542 * actually selected a version yet.
543 */
544 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
546 else
547 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
549 }
550 /*
551 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
552 * we will be sent
553 */
554 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
555
556 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
557 /*
558 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
559 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
560 * because we did early data.
561 */
562 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
563 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
565 else
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
568
569 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
570 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
571
572 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575
576 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
577 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
579 else
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582
583 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586
587 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
588 /*
589 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
590 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
591 */
592 /*
593 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
594 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
595 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
596 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
597 */
598 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
600 } else {
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
602 }
603 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
605 }
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607
608 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
611
612 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
613 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
615 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
617 } else {
618 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
619 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
620 #else
621 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
623 else
624 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
625 #endif
626 }
627 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
628
629 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
630 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
633 #endif
634
635 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
636 if (s->hit) {
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
638 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
639 } else {
640 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
641 }
642
643 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
644 if (s->hit) {
645 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
646 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
647 } else {
648 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
650 }
651
652 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
653 /*
654 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
655 * convenient time.
656 */
657 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
658 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
659 /* SSLfatal() already called */
660 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
661 }
662 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
663 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
664 }
665 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
666 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
667 }
668 }
669
670 /*
671 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
672 * the client to the server.
673 */
674 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
675 {
676 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
677
678 switch (st->hand_state) {
679 default:
680 /* No pre work to be done */
681 break;
682
683 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
684 s->shutdown = 0;
685 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
687 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
688 /* SSLfatal() already called */
689 return WORK_ERROR;
690 }
691 }
692 break;
693
694 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
695 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
696 if (s->hit) {
697 /*
698 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
699 * messages unless we need to.
700 */
701 st->use_timer = 0;
702 }
703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
704 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
705 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
706 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
707 }
708 #endif
709 }
710 break;
711
712 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
713 /*
714 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
715 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
716 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
717 */
718 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
719 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
720 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
721 /* Fall through */
722
723 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
724 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
725
726 case TLS_ST_OK:
727 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
728 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
729 }
730
731 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
732 }
733
734 /*
735 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
736 * client to the server.
737 */
738 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
739 {
740 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
741
742 s->init_num = 0;
743
744 switch (st->hand_state) {
745 default:
746 /* No post work to be done */
747 break;
748
749 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
750 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
751 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
752 /*
753 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
754 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
755 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
756 */
757 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
758 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
759 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
760 /* SSLfatal() already called */
761 return WORK_ERROR;
762 }
763 }
764 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
765 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
766 return WORK_MORE_A;
767 }
768
769 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
770 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
771 s->first_packet = 1;
772 }
773 break;
774
775 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
776 /*
777 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
778 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
779 */
780 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
781 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
782 break;
783
784 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
785 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
786 /* SSLfatal() already called */
787 return WORK_ERROR;
788 }
789 break;
790
791 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
792 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
793 break;
794 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
795 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
796 /*
797 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
798 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
799 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
800 */
801 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
802 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
803 return WORK_ERROR;
804 break;
805 }
806 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
807 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
808 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
809 #else
810 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
811 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
812 else
813 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
814 #endif
815 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
817 return WORK_ERROR;
818 }
819
820 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
821 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
822 /* SSLfatal() already called */
823 return WORK_ERROR;
824 }
825
826 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
828 if (s->hit) {
829 /*
830 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
831 * no SCTP used.
832 */
833 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
834 0, NULL);
835 }
836 #endif
837
838 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
839 }
840 break;
841
842 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
844 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
845 /*
846 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
847 * no SCTP used.
848 */
849 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
850 0, NULL);
851 }
852 #endif
853 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
854 return WORK_MORE_B;
855
856 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
857 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
858 /* SSLfatal() already called */
859 return WORK_ERROR;
860 }
861 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
862 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
863 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
864 /* SSLfatal() already called */
865 return WORK_ERROR;
866 }
867 }
868 }
869 break;
870
871 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
872 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
873 return WORK_MORE_A;
874 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
875 /* SSLfatal() already called */
876 return WORK_ERROR;
877 }
878 break;
879 }
880
881 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
882 }
883
884 /*
885 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
886 * client
887 *
888 * Valid return values are:
889 * 1: Success
890 * 0: Error
891 */
892 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
893 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
894 {
895 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
896
897 switch (st->hand_state) {
898 default:
899 /* Shouldn't happen */
900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
901 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
902 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
903 return 0;
904
905 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
906 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
907 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
908 else
909 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
910 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
911 break;
912
913 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
914 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
915 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
916 break;
917
918 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
919 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
920 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
921 break;
922
923 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
924 *confunc = NULL;
925 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
926 break;
927
928 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
929 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
930 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
931 break;
932
933 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
934 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
935 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
936 break;
937
938 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
939 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
940 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
941 break;
942
943 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
944 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
945 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
946 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
947 break;
948 #endif
949 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
950 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
951 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
952 break;
953
954 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
955 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
957 break;
958 }
959
960 return 1;
961 }
962
963 /*
964 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
965 * reading. Excludes the message header.
966 */
967 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
968 {
969 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
970
971 switch (st->hand_state) {
972 default:
973 /* Shouldn't happen */
974 return 0;
975
976 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
977 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
978
979 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
980 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
981
982 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
983 return s->max_cert_list;
984
985 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
986 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
987
988 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
989 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
990
991 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
992 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
993
994 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
995 /*
996 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
997 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
998 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
999 */
1000 return s->max_cert_list;
1001
1002 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1003 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1004
1005 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1006 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1007 return 3;
1008 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1009
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1011 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1012
1013 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1014 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1015
1016 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1017 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1018
1019 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1020 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1021 }
1022 }
1023
1024 /*
1025 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1026 */
1027 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1028 {
1029 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1030
1031 switch (st->hand_state) {
1032 default:
1033 /* Shouldn't happen */
1034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1035 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1036 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1037 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1038
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1040 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1041
1042 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1043 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1044
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1046 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1047
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1049 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1050
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1052 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1053
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1055 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1056
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1058 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1059
1060 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1061 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1062
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1064 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1065
1066 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1067 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1068
1069 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1070 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1071
1072 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1073 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1074
1075 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1076 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1077
1078 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1079 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1080 }
1081 }
1082
1083 /*
1084 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1085 * from the server
1086 */
1087 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1088 {
1089 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1090
1091 switch (st->hand_state) {
1092 default:
1093 /* Shouldn't happen */
1094 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1095 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1096 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 return WORK_ERROR;
1098
1099 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1100 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1101 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1102 }
1103 }
1104
1105 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1106 {
1107 unsigned char *p;
1108 size_t sess_id_len;
1109 int i, protverr;
1110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1111 SSL_COMP *comp;
1112 #endif
1113 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1114 unsigned char *session_id;
1115
1116 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1117 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1118 if (protverr != 0) {
1119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1120 protverr);
1121 return 0;
1122 }
1123
1124 if (sess == NULL
1125 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1126 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1127 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1128 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1129 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1130 return 0;
1131 }
1132 }
1133 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1134
1135 p = s->s3.client_random;
1136
1137 /*
1138 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1139 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1140 */
1141 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1142 size_t idx;
1143 i = 1;
1144 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1145 if (p[idx]) {
1146 i = 0;
1147 break;
1148 }
1149 }
1150 } else {
1151 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1152 }
1153
1154 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1155 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1157 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1158 return 0;
1159 }
1160
1161 /*-
1162 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1163 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1164 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1165 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1166 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1167 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1168 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1169 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1170 * 1.0.
1171 *
1172 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1173 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1174 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1175 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1176 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1177 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1178 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1179 * know that is maximum server supports.
1180 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1181 * containing version 1.0.
1182 *
1183 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1184 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1185 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1186 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1187 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1188 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1189 * the negotiated version.
1190 *
1191 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1192 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1193 */
1194 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1195 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1197 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 return 0;
1199 }
1200
1201 /* Session ID */
1202 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1203 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1204 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1205 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1206 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1207 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1208 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1209 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1210 && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1212 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1213 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 return 0;
1215 }
1216 } else {
1217 sess_id_len = 0;
1218 }
1219 } else {
1220 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1221 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1222 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1223 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1224 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1225 }
1226 }
1227 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1228 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1229 sess_id_len))
1230 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1232 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 return 0;
1234 }
1235
1236 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1237 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1238 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1239 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1240 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 return 0;
1244 }
1245 }
1246
1247 /* Ciphers supported */
1248 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1250 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 return 0;
1252 }
1253
1254 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1255 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1256 return 0;
1257 }
1258 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1260 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 return 0;
1262 }
1263
1264 /* COMPRESSION */
1265 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 return 0;
1269 }
1270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1271 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1272 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1273 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1274 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1275 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1276 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1277 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1279 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1280 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1281 return 0;
1282 }
1283 }
1284 }
1285 #endif
1286 /* Add the NULL method */
1287 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1289 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1290 return 0;
1291 }
1292
1293 /* TLS extensions */
1294 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1295 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1296 return 0;
1297 }
1298
1299 return 1;
1300 }
1301
1302 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1303 {
1304 size_t cookie_len;
1305 PACKET cookiepkt;
1306
1307 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1308 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1310 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1311 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1312 }
1313
1314 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1315 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1317 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1318 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1319 }
1320
1321 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1323 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1324 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1325 }
1326 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1327
1328 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1329 }
1330
1331 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1332 {
1333 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1334 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1335 int i;
1336
1337 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1338 if (c == NULL) {
1339 /* unknown cipher */
1340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1341 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1342 return 0;
1343 }
1344 /*
1345 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1346 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1347 */
1348 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1350 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1351 return 0;
1352 }
1353
1354 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1355 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1356 if (i < 0) {
1357 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1359 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1360 return 0;
1361 }
1362
1363 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1364 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1365 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1367 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1368 return 0;
1369 }
1370
1371 /*
1372 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1373 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1374 * set and use it for comparison.
1375 */
1376 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1377 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1378 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1379 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1380 /*
1381 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1382 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1383 */
1384 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1385 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1387 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1388 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1389 return 0;
1390 }
1391 } else {
1392 /*
1393 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1394 * ciphersuite.
1395 */
1396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1397 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1398 return 0;
1399 }
1400 }
1401 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1402
1403 return 1;
1404 }
1405
1406 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1407 {
1408 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1409 size_t session_id_len;
1410 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1411 int hrr = 0;
1412 unsigned int compression;
1413 unsigned int sversion;
1414 unsigned int context;
1415 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1417 SSL_COMP *comp;
1418 #endif
1419
1420 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1422 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1423 goto err;
1424 }
1425
1426 /* load the server random */
1427 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1428 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1429 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1430 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1431 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1432 hrr = 1;
1433 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1435 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1436 goto err;
1437 }
1438 } else {
1439 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1441 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1442 goto err;
1443 }
1444 }
1445
1446 /* Get the session-id. */
1447 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1449 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1450 goto err;
1451 }
1452 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1453 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1454 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1456 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1457 goto err;
1458 }
1459
1460 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1462 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1463 goto err;
1464 }
1465
1466 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1468 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1469 goto err;
1470 }
1471
1472 /* TLS extensions */
1473 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1474 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1475 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1476 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1478 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1479 goto err;
1480 }
1481
1482 if (!hrr) {
1483 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1484 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1485 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1486 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1487 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1488 goto err;
1489 }
1490
1491 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1492 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1493 goto err;
1494 }
1495 }
1496
1497 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1498 if (compression != 0) {
1499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1500 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1501 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1502 goto err;
1503 }
1504
1505 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1506 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1507 session_id_len) != 0) {
1508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1509 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1510 goto err;
1511 }
1512 }
1513
1514 if (hrr) {
1515 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1516 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1517 goto err;
1518 }
1519
1520 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1521 }
1522
1523 /*
1524 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1525 * are appropriate for this version.
1526 */
1527 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1528 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1529 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1531 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1532 goto err;
1533 }
1534
1535 s->hit = 0;
1536
1537 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1538 /*
1539 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1540 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1541 */
1542 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1544 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1545 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1546 goto err;
1547 }
1548
1549 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1550 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1551 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1552 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1553 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1554 goto err;
1555 }
1556 } else {
1557 /*
1558 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1559 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1560 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1561 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1562 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1563 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1564 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1565 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1566 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1567 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1568 */
1569 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1570 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1571 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1572 /*
1573 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1574 * backwards compat reasons
1575 */
1576 int master_key_length;
1577 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1578 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1579 &master_key_length,
1580 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1581 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1582 && master_key_length > 0) {
1583 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1584 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1585 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1586 } else {
1587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1588 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 goto err;
1590 }
1591 }
1592
1593 if (session_id_len != 0
1594 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1595 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1596 session_id_len) == 0)
1597 s->hit = 1;
1598 }
1599
1600 if (s->hit) {
1601 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1602 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1603 /* actually a client application bug */
1604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1605 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1606 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1607 goto err;
1608 }
1609 } else {
1610 /*
1611 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1612 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1613 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1614 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1615 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1616 */
1617 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1618 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1619 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1620 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1621 goto err;
1622 }
1623 }
1624
1625 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1626 /*
1627 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1628 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1629 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1630 * used for resumption.
1631 */
1632 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1633 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1634 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1635 if (session_id_len > 0)
1636 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1637 session_id_len);
1638 }
1639 }
1640
1641 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1642 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1644 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1645 goto err;
1646 }
1647 /*
1648 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1649 * version.
1650 */
1651 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1652 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1653
1654 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1655 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1656 goto err;
1657 }
1658
1659 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1660 if (compression != 0) {
1661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1662 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1663 goto err;
1664 }
1665 /*
1666 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1667 * using compression.
1668 */
1669 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1671 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1672 goto err;
1673 }
1674 #else
1675 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1677 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1678 goto err;
1679 }
1680 if (compression == 0)
1681 comp = NULL;
1682 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1684 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1685 goto err;
1686 } else {
1687 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1688 }
1689
1690 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1692 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1693 goto err;
1694 } else {
1695 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1696 }
1697 #endif
1698
1699 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1700 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1701 goto err;
1702 }
1703
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1705 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1706 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1707 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1708 size_t labellen;
1709
1710 /*
1711 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1712 * no SCTP used.
1713 */
1714 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1715 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1716
1717 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1718 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1719 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1720 labellen += 1;
1721
1722 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1723 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1724 labelbuffer,
1725 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1726 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1727 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1728 goto err;
1729 }
1730
1731 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1732 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1733 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1734 }
1735 #endif
1736
1737 /*
1738 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1739 * we're done with this message
1740 */
1741 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1742 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1743 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1744 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1745 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1746 goto err;
1747 }
1748
1749 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1750 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1751 err:
1752 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1753 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1754 }
1755
1756 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1757 PACKET *extpkt)
1758 {
1759 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1760
1761 /*
1762 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1763 * should not be used.
1764 */
1765 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1766 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1767
1768 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1769 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1770 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1771 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1772 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1773 goto err;
1774 }
1775
1776 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1777 extensions = NULL;
1778
1779 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1780 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1781 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL
1782 #endif
1783 ) {
1784 /*
1785 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1786 * ClientHello will not change
1787 */
1788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1789 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1790 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1791 goto err;
1792 }
1793
1794 /*
1795 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1796 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1797 */
1798 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1799 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1800 goto err;
1801 }
1802
1803 /*
1804 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1805 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1806 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1807 * for HRR messages.
1808 */
1809 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1810 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1812 goto err;
1813 }
1814
1815 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1816 err:
1817 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1818 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1819 }
1820
1821 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1822 {
1823 int i;
1824 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1825 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1826 X509 *x = NULL;
1827 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1828 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1829 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1830 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1831 unsigned int context = 0;
1832 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1833
1834 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1836 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1837 goto err;
1838 }
1839
1840 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1841 || context != 0
1842 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1843 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1844 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1845 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1846 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1847 goto err;
1848 }
1849 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1850 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1851 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1853 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1854 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1855 goto err;
1856 }
1857
1858 certstart = certbytes;
1859 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1860 if (x == NULL) {
1861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1862 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1863 goto err;
1864 }
1865 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1867 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1868 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1869 goto err;
1870 }
1871
1872 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1873 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1874 PACKET extensions;
1875
1876 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1878 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1879 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1880 goto err;
1881 }
1882 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1883 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1884 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1885 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1886 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1887 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1888 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1889 /* SSLfatal already called */
1890 goto err;
1891 }
1892 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1893 }
1894
1895 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1896 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1897 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1898 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1899 goto err;
1900 }
1901 x = NULL;
1902 }
1903
1904 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1905 /*
1906 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1907 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1908 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1909 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1910 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1911 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1912 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1913 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1914 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1915 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1916 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1917 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1918 */
1919 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1920 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1921 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1922 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1923 goto err;
1924 }
1925 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1926 if (i > 1) {
1927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1928 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1929 goto err;
1930 }
1931
1932 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1933 /*
1934 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1935 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1936 */
1937 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1938 sk = NULL;
1939
1940 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1941
1942 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1943 x = NULL;
1944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1945 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1946 goto err;
1947 }
1948
1949 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1950 x = NULL;
1951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1952 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1953 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1954 goto err;
1955 }
1956 /*
1957 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1958 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1959 * type.
1960 */
1961 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1962 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1963 x = NULL;
1964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1965 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1966 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1967 goto err;
1968 }
1969 }
1970 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1971
1972 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1973 X509_up_ref(x);
1974 s->session->peer = x;
1975 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1976 x = NULL;
1977
1978 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1979 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1980 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1981 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1982 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1983 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1984 goto err;
1985 }
1986
1987 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1988
1989 err:
1990 X509_free(x);
1991 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1992 return ret;
1993 }
1994
1995 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1996 {
1997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1998 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1999
2000 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2001
2002 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
2003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2004 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2005 return 0;
2006 }
2007
2008 /*
2009 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2010 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2011 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2012 * identity.
2013 */
2014 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2015 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2016 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2017 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2018 return 0;
2019 }
2020
2021 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2022 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2023 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2024 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2025 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2028 return 0;
2029 }
2030
2031 return 1;
2032 #else
2033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2035 return 0;
2036 #endif
2037 }
2038
2039 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2040 {
2041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2042 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2043
2044 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2045 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2046 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2047 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2049 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2050 return 0;
2051 }
2052
2053 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2054 if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
2055 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2056 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2057 || (s->srp_ctx.g =
2058 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2059 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2060 || (s->srp_ctx.s =
2061 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2062 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2063 || (s->srp_ctx.B =
2064 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2065 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2066 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2067 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2068 return 0;
2069 }
2070
2071 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2072 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2073 return 0;
2074 }
2075
2076 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2077 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2078 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2079
2080 return 1;
2081 #else
2082 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2083 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2084 return 0;
2085 #endif
2086 }
2087
2088 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2089 {
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2091 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2092 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2093
2094 DH *dh = NULL;
2095 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2096
2097 int check_bits = 0;
2098
2099 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2100 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2101 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2103 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2104 return 0;
2105 }
2106
2107 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2108 dh = DH_new();
2109
2110 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2112 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2113 goto err;
2114 }
2115
2116 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2117 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2118 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2119 NULL);
2120 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2121 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2122 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2124 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2125 goto err;
2126 }
2127
2128 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2129 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2131 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2132 goto err;
2133 }
2134
2135 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2137 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2138 goto err;
2139 }
2140 p = g = NULL;
2141
2142 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2144 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2145 goto err;
2146 }
2147
2148 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2149 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2150 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2151 goto err;
2152 }
2153 bnpub_key = NULL;
2154
2155 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2157 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2158 goto err;
2159 }
2160
2161 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2163 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2164 goto err;
2165 }
2166
2167 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2168
2169 /*
2170 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2171 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2172 */
2173 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2174 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2175 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2176
2177 return 1;
2178
2179 err:
2180 BN_free(p);
2181 BN_free(g);
2182 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2183 DH_free(dh);
2184 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2185
2186 return 0;
2187 #else
2188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2189 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2190 return 0;
2191 #endif
2192 }
2193
2194 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2195 {
2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2197 PACKET encoded_pt;
2198 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2199
2200 /*
2201 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2202 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2203 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2204 */
2205 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2207 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2208 return 0;
2209 }
2210 /*
2211 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2212 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2213 */
2214 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2215 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2217 SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2218 return 0;
2219 }
2220
2221 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2223 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2224 return 0;
2225 }
2226
2227 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2229 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2230 return 0;
2231 }
2232
2233 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2234 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2235 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2236 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2237 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2238 return 0;
2239 }
2240
2241 /*
2242 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2243 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2244 * and ECDSA.
2245 */
2246 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2247 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2248 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2249 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2250 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2251
2252 return 1;
2253 #else
2254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2255 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2256 return 0;
2257 #endif
2258 }
2259
2260 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2261 {
2262 long alg_k;
2263 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2264 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2265 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2266 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2267
2268 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2269
2270 save_param_start = *pkt;
2271
2272 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2273 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2274 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2275 #endif
2276
2277 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2278 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2279 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2280 goto err;
2281 }
2282 }
2283
2284 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2285 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2286 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2287 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2288 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2289 goto err;
2290 }
2291 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2292 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2293 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2294 goto err;
2295 }
2296 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2297 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2298 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2299 goto err;
2300 }
2301 } else if (alg_k) {
2302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2303 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2304 goto err;
2305 }
2306
2307 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2308 if (pkey != NULL) {
2309 PACKET params;
2310 int maxsig;
2311 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2312 unsigned char *tbs;
2313 size_t tbslen;
2314 int rv;
2315
2316 /*
2317 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2318 * equals the length of the parameters.
2319 */
2320 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
2321 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2322 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2324 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2325 goto err;
2326 }
2327
2328 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2329 unsigned int sigalg;
2330
2331 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2333 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2334 goto err;
2335 }
2336 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2337 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2338 goto err;
2339 }
2340 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2342 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2343 goto err;
2344 }
2345
2346 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2349 goto err;
2350 }
2351 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2352 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2353 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
2354
2355 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2356 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2358 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2359 goto err;
2360 }
2361 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2362 if (maxsig < 0) {
2363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2364 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2365 goto err;
2366 }
2367
2368 /*
2369 * Check signature length
2370 */
2371 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2372 /* wrong packet length */
2373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2374 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2375 goto err;
2376 }
2377
2378 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2379 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2381 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2382 goto err;
2383 }
2384
2385 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2387 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2388 goto err;
2389 }
2390 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2391 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2392 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2393 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2395 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2396 goto err;
2397 }
2398 }
2399 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(&params),
2400 PACKET_remaining(&params));
2401 if (tbslen == 0) {
2402 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2403 goto err;
2404 }
2405
2406 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2407 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2408 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2409 if (rv <= 0) {
2410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2411 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2412 goto err;
2413 }
2414 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2415 md_ctx = NULL;
2416 } else {
2417 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2418 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2419 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2420 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2421 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2423 SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2424 }
2425 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2426 goto err;
2427 }
2428 /* still data left over */
2429 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2431 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2432 goto err;
2433 }
2434 }
2435
2436 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2437 err:
2438 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2439 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2440 }
2441
2442 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2443 {
2444 size_t i;
2445
2446 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2447 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2448 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2449
2450 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2451 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2452 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2453
2454 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2455 /*
2456 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2457 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2458 * we just ignore it
2459 */
2460 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2461 }
2462
2463 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2464 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2465 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2466 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2467 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2468 s->pha_context = NULL;
2469
2470 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2471 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2473 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2474 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2475 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2476 }
2477
2478 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2480 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2481 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2482 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2483 }
2484 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2485 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2486 &rawexts, NULL, 1)
2487 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2488 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2489 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2490 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2491 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2492 }
2493 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2494 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2496 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2497 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2498 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2499 }
2500 } else {
2501 PACKET ctypes;
2502
2503 /* get the certificate types */
2504 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2506 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2507 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2508 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2509 }
2510
2511 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2513 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2514 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2515 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2516 }
2517
2518 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2519 PACKET sigalgs;
2520
2521 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2523 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2524 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2525 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2526 }
2527
2528 /*
2529 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2530 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2531 */
2532 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2534 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2535 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2536 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2537 }
2538 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2540 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2541 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2542 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2543 }
2544 }
2545
2546 /* get the CA RDNs */
2547 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2548 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2549 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2550 }
2551 }
2552
2553 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2555 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2556 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2557 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2558 }
2559
2560 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2561 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2562
2563 /*
2564 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2565 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2566 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2567 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2568 * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2569 * client_cert_cb.
2570 */
2571 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2572 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2573
2574 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2575 }
2576
2577 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2578 {
2579 unsigned int ticklen;
2580 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2581 unsigned int sess_len;
2582 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2583 PACKET nonce;
2584
2585 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2586
2587 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2588 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2589 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2590 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2591 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2592 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2593 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2595 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2596 goto err;
2597 }
2598
2599 /*
2600 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2601 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2602 * be 0 here in that instance
2603 */
2604 if (ticklen == 0)
2605 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2606
2607 /*
2608 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2609 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2610 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2611 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2612 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2613 * cache.
2614 */
2615 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2616 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2617
2618 /*
2619 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2620 * one
2621 */
2622 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2624 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2625 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2626 goto err;
2627 }
2628
2629 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2630 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2631 /*
2632 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2633 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2634 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2635 */
2636 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2637 }
2638
2639 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2640 s->session = new_sess;
2641 }
2642
2643 /*
2644 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2645 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2646 */
2647 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2648
2649 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2650 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2651 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2652
2653 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2654 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2656 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2657 goto err;
2658 }
2659 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2661 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2662 goto err;
2663 }
2664
2665 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2666 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2667 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2668
2669 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2670 PACKET extpkt;
2671
2672 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2673 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2675 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2676 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2677 goto err;
2678 }
2679
2680 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2681 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2682 NULL, 1)
2683 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2684 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2685 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2686 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2687 goto err;
2688 }
2689 }
2690
2691 /*
2692 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2693 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2694 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2695 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2696 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2697 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2698 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2699 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2700 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2701 */
2702 /*
2703 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2704 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2705 */
2706 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2707 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2708 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2710 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2711 goto err;
2712 }
2713 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2714 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2715
2716 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2717 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2718 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2719 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2720 size_t hashlen;
2721 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2722
2723 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2724 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2726 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2727 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2728 goto err;
2729 }
2730 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2731
2732 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2733 nonce_label,
2734 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2735 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2736 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2737 s->session->master_key,
2738 hashlen, 1)) {
2739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2740 goto err;
2741 }
2742 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2743
2744 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2745 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2746 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2747 }
2748
2749 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2750 err:
2751 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2752 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2753 }
2754
2755 /*
2756 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2757 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2758 */
2759 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2760 {
2761 size_t resplen;
2762 unsigned int type;
2763
2764 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2765 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2767 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2768 return 0;
2769 }
2770 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2771 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2773 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2774 return 0;
2775 }
2776 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2777 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2779 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2780 return 0;
2781 }
2782 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2784 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2785 return 0;
2786 }
2787 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2788
2789 return 1;
2790 }
2791
2792
2793 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2794 {
2795 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2798 }
2799
2800 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2801 }
2802
2803 /*
2804 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2805 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2806 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2807 * on failure.
2808 */
2809 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2810 {
2811 /*
2812 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2813 * the server
2814 */
2815 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2817 return 0;
2818 }
2819
2820 /*
2821 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2822 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2823 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2824 */
2825 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2826 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2827 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2828
2829 if (ret == 0) {
2830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2831 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2832 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2833 return 0;
2834 }
2835 if (ret < 0) {
2836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2837 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2838 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2839 return 0;
2840 }
2841 }
2842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2843 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2844 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2845 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2846 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2847 return 0;
2848 }
2849 }
2850 #endif
2851
2852 return 1;
2853 }
2854
2855 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2856 {
2857 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2858 /* should contain no data */
2859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2860 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2861 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2862 }
2863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2864 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2865 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2867 SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2868 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2869 }
2870 }
2871 #endif
2872
2873 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2875 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2876 }
2877
2878 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2879 }
2880
2881 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2882 {
2883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2884 int ret = 0;
2885 /*
2886 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2887 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2888 * strnlen.
2889 */
2890 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2891 size_t identitylen = 0;
2892 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2893 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2894 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2895 size_t psklen = 0;
2896
2897 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2899 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2900 goto err;
2901 }
2902
2903 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2904
2905 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2906 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2907 psk, sizeof(psk));
2908
2909 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2911 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2912 goto err;
2913 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2915 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2916 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2917 goto err;
2918 }
2919
2920 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2921 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2923 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2924 goto err;
2925 }
2926
2927 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2928 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2929 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2931 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2932 goto err;
2933 }
2934
2935 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2936 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2937 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2938 tmppsk = NULL;
2939 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2940 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2941 tmpidentity = NULL;
2942
2943 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2945 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2946 goto err;
2947 }
2948
2949 ret = 1;
2950
2951 err:
2952 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2953 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2954 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2955 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2956
2957 return ret;
2958 #else
2959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2960 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2961 return 0;
2962 #endif
2963 }
2964
2965 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2966 {
2967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2968 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2969 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2970 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2971 size_t enclen;
2972 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2973 size_t pmslen = 0;
2974
2975 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2976 /*
2977 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2978 */
2979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2980 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2981 return 0;
2982 }
2983
2984 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2985 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2987 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2988 return 0;
2989 }
2990
2991 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2992 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2993 if (pms == NULL) {
2994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2995 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2996 return 0;
2997 }
2998
2999 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
3000 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
3001 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3002 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
3003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3004 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3005 goto err;
3006 }
3007
3008 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3009 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3012 goto err;
3013 }
3014 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3015 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3016 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3018 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3019 goto err;
3020 }
3021 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3022 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3023 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3024 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3025 goto err;
3026 }
3027 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3028 pctx = NULL;
3029
3030 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3031 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3033 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3034 goto err;
3035 }
3036
3037 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3038 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3039 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3040 goto err;
3041 }
3042
3043 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3044 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3045
3046 return 1;
3047 err:
3048 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3049 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3050
3051 return 0;
3052 #else
3053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3054 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3055 return 0;
3056 #endif
3057 }
3058
3059 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3060 {
3061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3062 DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
3063 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
3064 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3065 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3066
3067 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3068 if (skey == NULL) {
3069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3070 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 goto err;
3072 }
3073
3074 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3075 if (ckey == NULL) {
3076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3078 goto err;
3079 }
3080
3081 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3082
3083 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 goto err;
3087 }
3088
3089 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3090 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3091 goto err;
3092 }
3093
3094 /* send off the data */
3095 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3096 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3097 &keybytes)) {
3098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3099 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3100 goto err;
3101 }
3102
3103 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3104 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3105
3106 return 1;
3107 err:
3108 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3109 return 0;
3110 #else
3111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3112 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3113 return 0;
3114 #endif
3115 }
3116
3117 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3118 {
3119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3120 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3121 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3122 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3123 int ret = 0;
3124
3125 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3126 if (skey == NULL) {
3127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3128 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3129 return 0;
3130 }
3131
3132 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3133 if (ckey == NULL) {
3134 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3135 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3136 goto err;
3137 }
3138
3139 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3140 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3141 goto err;
3142 }
3143
3144 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3145 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3146
3147 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3149 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3150 goto err;
3151 }
3152
3153 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3155 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3156 goto err;
3157 }
3158
3159 ret = 1;
3160 err:
3161 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3162 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3163 return ret;
3164 #else
3165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3167 return 0;
3168 #endif
3169 }
3170
3171 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3172 {
3173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3174 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3175 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3176 X509 *peer_cert;
3177 size_t msglen;
3178 unsigned int md_len;
3179 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3180 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3181 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3182 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3183 size_t pmslen = 0;
3184
3185 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3186 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3187
3188 /*
3189 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3190 */
3191 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3192 if (!peer_cert) {
3193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3194 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3195 return 0;
3196 }
3197
3198 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3199 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3201 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3202 return 0;
3203 }
3204 /*
3205 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3206 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3207 * certificate key for key exchange
3208 */
3209
3210 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3211 pmslen = 32;
3212 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3213 if (pms == NULL) {
3214 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3215 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3216 goto err;
3217 }
3218
3219 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3220 /* Generate session key
3221 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3222 */
3223 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3225 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3226 goto err;
3227 };
3228 /*
3229 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3230 * data
3231 */
3232 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3233 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3234 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3235 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3236 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3237 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3238 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3239 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3242 goto err;
3243 }
3244 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3245 ukm_hash = NULL;
3246 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3247 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3249 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3250 goto err;
3251 }
3252 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3253 /*
3254 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3255 */
3256 msglen = 255;
3257 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3259 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3260 goto err;
3261 }
3262
3263 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3264 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3265 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3268 goto err;
3269 }
3270
3271 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3272 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3273 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3274
3275 return 1;
3276 err:
3277 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3278 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3279 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3280 return 0;
3281 #else
3282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3283 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3284 return 0;
3285 #endif
3286 }
3287
3288 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3289 {
3290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3291 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3292
3293 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3294 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3295 &abytes)) {
3296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3297 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3298 return 0;
3299 }
3300 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3301
3302 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3303 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3304 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3306 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3307 return 0;
3308 }
3309
3310 return 1;
3311 #else
3312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3314 return 0;
3315 #endif
3316 }
3317
3318 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3319 {
3320 unsigned long alg_k;
3321
3322 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3323
3324 /*
3325 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3326 * no need to do so here.
3327 */
3328 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3329 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3330 goto err;
3331
3332 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3333 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3334 goto err;
3335 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3336 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3337 goto err;
3338 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3339 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3340 goto err;
3341 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3342 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3343 goto err;
3344 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3345 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3346 goto err;
3347 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3349 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3350 goto err;
3351 }
3352
3353 return 1;
3354 err:
3355 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3356 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3358 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3359 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3360 #endif
3361 return 0;
3362 }
3363
3364 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3365 {
3366 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3367 size_t pmslen = 0;
3368
3369 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3370 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3371
3372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3373 /* Check for SRP */
3374 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3375 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3376 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3377 goto err;
3378 }
3379 return 1;
3380 }
3381 #endif
3382
3383 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3385 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3386 goto err;
3387 }
3388 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3389 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3390 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3391 pms = NULL;
3392 pmslen = 0;
3393 goto err;
3394 }
3395 pms = NULL;
3396 pmslen = 0;
3397
3398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3399 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3400 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3401 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3402 size_t labellen;
3403
3404 /*
3405 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3406 * used.
3407 */
3408 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3409 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3410
3411 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3412 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3413 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3414 labellen += 1;
3415
3416 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3417 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3418 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3420 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3421 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3422 goto err;
3423 }
3424
3425 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3426 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3427 }
3428 #endif
3429
3430 return 1;
3431 err:
3432 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3433 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3434 return 0;
3435 }
3436
3437 /*
3438 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3439 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3440 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3441 */
3442 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3443 {
3444 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3445 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3446 return 0;
3447 /*
3448 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3449 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3450 */
3451 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3452 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3453 return 0;
3454 return 1;
3455 }
3456
3457 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3458 {
3459 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3460 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3461 int i;
3462
3463 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3464 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3465 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3466 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3467 if (i < 0) {
3468 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3469 return WORK_MORE_A;
3470 }
3471 if (i == 0) {
3472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3473 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3474 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3475 return WORK_ERROR;
3476 }
3477 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3478 }
3479 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3480 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3481 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3482 }
3483 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3484 }
3485
3486 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3487 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3488 }
3489
3490 /* We need to get a client cert */
3491 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3492 /*
3493 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3494 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3495 */
3496 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3497 if (i < 0) {
3498 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3499 return WORK_MORE_B;
3500 }
3501 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3502 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3503 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3504 i = 0;
3505 } else if (i == 1) {
3506 i = 0;
3507 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3508 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3509 }
3510
3511 X509_free(x509);
3512 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3513 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3514 i = 0;
3515 if (i == 0) {
3516 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3517 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3518 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3519 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3520 } else {
3521 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3522 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3523 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3524 return WORK_ERROR;
3525 }
3526 }
3527 }
3528
3529 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3530 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3531 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3532 }
3533
3534 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3536 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3537 return WORK_ERROR;
3538 }
3539
3540 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3541 {
3542 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3543 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3544 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3545 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3547 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3548 return 0;
3549 }
3550 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3552 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3553 return 0;
3554 }
3555 }
3556 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3557 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3558 : s->cert->key)) {
3559 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3560 return 0;
3561 }
3562
3563 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3564 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3565 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3566 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3567 /*
3568 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3569 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3570 */
3571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3572 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3573 return 0;
3574 }
3575
3576 return 1;
3577 }
3578
3579 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3580 {
3581 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3582 size_t idx;
3583 long alg_k, alg_a;
3584
3585 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3586 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3587
3588 /* we don't have a certificate */
3589 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3590 return 1;
3591
3592 /* This is the passed certificate */
3593 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3594
3595 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3596 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3597 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3598 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3599 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3600 return 0;
3601 }
3602
3603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3604 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3605 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3606 return 1;
3607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3608 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3609 return 0;
3610 }
3611 #endif
3612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3613 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3615 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3616 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3617 return 0;
3618 }
3619 #endif
3620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3621 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3623 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3624 return 0;
3625 }
3626 #endif
3627
3628 return 1;
3629 }
3630
3631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3632 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3633 {
3634 size_t len, padding_len;
3635 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3636
3637 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3638 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3639
3640 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3641 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3643 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3644 return 0;
3645 }
3646
3647 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3648
3649 return 1;
3650 }
3651 #endif
3652
3653 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3654 {
3655 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3656 /* should contain no data */
3657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3658 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3659 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3660 }
3661
3662 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3663 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3664 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3665 }
3666
3667 /*
3668 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3669 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3670 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3671 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3672 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3673 */
3674 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3675 SSL_renegotiate(s);
3676 else
3677 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3678
3679 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3680 }
3681
3682 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3683 {
3684 PACKET extensions;
3685 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3686
3687 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3688 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3690 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3691 goto err;
3692 }
3693
3694 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3695 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3696 NULL, 1)
3697 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3698 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3699 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3700 goto err;
3701 }
3702
3703 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3704 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3705
3706 err:
3707 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3708 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3709 }
3710
3711 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3712 {
3713 int i = 0;
3714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3715 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3716 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3717 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3718 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3719 if (i != 0)
3720 return i;
3721 }
3722 #endif
3723 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3724 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3725 return i;
3726 }
3727
3728 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3729 {
3730 int i;
3731 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3732 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3733
3734 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3735 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3736 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3737 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3738 return 0;
3739 }
3740
3741 if (sk == NULL) {
3742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3743 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3744 return 0;
3745 }
3746
3747 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3748 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3749 # error Max cipher length too short
3750 # endif
3751 /*
3752 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3753 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3754 * use TLS v1.2
3755 */
3756 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3757 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3758 else
3759 #endif
3760 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3761 maxlen = 0xfffe;
3762
3763 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3764 maxlen -= 2;
3765 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3766 maxlen -= 2;
3767
3768 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3769 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3770
3771 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3772 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3773 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3774 continue;
3775
3776 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3778 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3779 return 0;
3780 }
3781
3782 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3783 if (!maxverok) {
3784 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3785 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3786 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3787 maxverok = 1;
3788 } else {
3789 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3790 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3791 maxverok = 1;
3792 }
3793 }
3794
3795 totlen += len;
3796 }
3797
3798 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3800 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3801
3802 if (!maxverok)
3803 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3804 "SSL/TLS version");
3805
3806 return 0;
3807 }
3808
3809 if (totlen != 0) {
3810 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3811 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3812 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3813 };
3814 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3816 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3817 return 0;
3818 }
3819 }
3820 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3821 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3822 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3823 };
3824 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3826 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3827 return 0;
3828 }
3829 }
3830 }
3831
3832 return 1;
3833 }
3834
3835 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3836 {
3837 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3838 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3840 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3841 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3842 return 0;
3843 }
3844
3845 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3846 return 1;
3847 }
A mirror of the official openssl repository