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Delay flush until after CCS with early_data
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_clnt.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include <stdio.h>
13 #include <time.h>
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
24
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
27
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
31 WPACKET *pkt);
32
33 /*
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
35 *
36 * Return values are:
37 * 1: Yes
38 * 0: No
39 */
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
41 {
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
46 return 0;
47
48 return 1;
49 }
50
51 /*
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
53 *
54 * Return values are:
55 * 1: Yes
56 * 0: No
57 */
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
59 {
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
61
62 /*
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
65 */
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
67 | SSL_kSRP)) {
68 return 1;
69 }
70
71 return 0;
72 }
73
74 /*
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
79 *
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
82 */
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
84 {
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
86
87 /*
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
91 */
92
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
94 default:
95 break;
96
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
98 /*
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
101 */
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
104 return 1;
105 }
106 break;
107
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
111 return 1;
112 }
113 break;
114
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
116 if (s->hit) {
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
119 return 1;
120 }
121 } else {
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
124 return 1;
125 }
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
128 return 1;
129 }
130 }
131 break;
132
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
136 return 1;
137 }
138 break;
139
140 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
143 return 1;
144 }
145 break;
146
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
150 return 1;
151 }
152 break;
153
154 case TLS_ST_OK:
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
157 return 1;
158 }
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
161 return 1;
162 }
163 break;
164 }
165
166 /* No valid transition found */
167 return 0;
168 }
169
170 /*
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
175 *
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
178 */
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
180 {
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
182 int ske_expected;
183
184 /*
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
187 */
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
190 goto err;
191 return 1;
192 }
193
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
195 default:
196 break;
197
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
201 return 1;
202 }
203
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
207 return 1;
208 }
209 }
210 break;
211
212 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
213 /*
214 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
215 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
216 * HelloRetryRequest.
217 */
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
220 return 1;
221 }
222 break;
223
224 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
225 if (s->hit) {
226 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
229 return 1;
230 }
231 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
233 return 1;
234 }
235 } else {
236 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
237 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
238 return 1;
239 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
240 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
241 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
242 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
243 /*
244 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
245 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
246 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
247 * the server is resuming.
248 */
249 s->hit = 1;
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
251 return 1;
252 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
253 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 } else {
259 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
260 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
261 if (ske_expected
262 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
263 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
266 return 1;
267 }
268 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
269 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
271 return 1;
272 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
274 return 1;
275 }
276 }
277 }
278 break;
279
280 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
281 /*
282 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
283 * |ext.status_expected| is set
284 */
285 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
287 return 1;
288 }
289 /* Fall through */
290
291 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
292 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
293 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
294 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
295 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
298 return 1;
299 }
300 goto err;
301 }
302 /* Fall through */
303
304 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
306 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
308 return 1;
309 }
310 goto err;
311 }
312 /* Fall through */
313
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
315 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
317 return 1;
318 }
319 break;
320
321 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
322 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
323 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
325 return 1;
326 }
327 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
329 return 1;
330 }
331 break;
332
333 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
334 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
335 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
336 return 1;
337 }
338 break;
339
340 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
341 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
342 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
343 return 1;
344 }
345 break;
346
347 case TLS_ST_OK:
348 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
350 return 1;
351 }
352 break;
353 }
354
355 err:
356 /* No valid transition found */
357 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
358 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
359 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
360 return 0;
361 }
362
363 /*
364 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
365 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
366 * server.
367 */
368 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
369 {
370 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
371
372 /*
373 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
374 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
375 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
376 */
377 switch (st->hand_state) {
378 default:
379 /* Shouldn't happen */
380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
381 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
384
385 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
386 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
387 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
389 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
390 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
391 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
392 else
393 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
396
397 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
398 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
399 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
401 }
402 /* Fall through */
403
404 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
405 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
406 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
407 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
409
410 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
411 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
412 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
413 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415
416 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
419
420 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
421 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 }
425 /* Fall through */
426
427 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
428 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
429 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432
433 case TLS_ST_OK:
434 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 }
438
439 /* Try to read from the server instead */
440 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
441 }
442 }
443
444 /*
445 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
446 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
447 */
448 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
449 {
450 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
451
452 /*
453 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
454 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
455 * later
456 */
457 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
458 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
459
460 switch (st->hand_state) {
461 default:
462 /* Shouldn't happen */
463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
464 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
467
468 case TLS_ST_OK:
469 if (!s->renegotiate) {
470 /*
471 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
472 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
473 */
474 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
475 }
476 /* Renegotiation */
477 /* fall thru */
478 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481
482 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
483 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
484 /*
485 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
486 * actually selected a version yet.
487 */
488 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
490 else
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
493 }
494 /*
495 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
496 * we will be sent
497 */
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
499
500 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
501 /* We only get here in TLSv1.3 */
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
503 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
504
505 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
506 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
507
508 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511
512 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
513 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
515 else
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518
519 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
520 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
522
523 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
524 /*
525 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
526 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
527 */
528 /*
529 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
530 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
531 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
532 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
533 */
534 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
536 } else {
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
538 }
539 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
540 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
541 }
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
543
544 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
547
548 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
549 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
551 } else {
552 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
554 #else
555 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
557 else
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
559 #endif
560 }
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
562
563 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
564 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
567 #endif
568
569 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
570 if (s->hit) {
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573 } else {
574 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
575 }
576
577 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
578 if (s->hit) {
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581 } else {
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 }
585
586 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
587 /*
588 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
589 * convenient time.
590 */
591 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
592 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
593 /* SSLfatal() already called */
594 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
595 }
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
598 }
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
601 }
602 }
603
604 /*
605 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
606 * the client to the server.
607 */
608 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
609 {
610 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
611
612 switch (st->hand_state) {
613 default:
614 /* No pre work to be done */
615 break;
616
617 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
618 s->shutdown = 0;
619 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
620 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
621 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
622 /* SSLfatal() already called */
623 return WORK_ERROR;
624 }
625 }
626 break;
627
628 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
629 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
630 if (s->hit) {
631 /*
632 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
633 * messages unless we need to.
634 */
635 st->use_timer = 0;
636 }
637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
638 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
639 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
640 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
641 }
642 #endif
643 }
644 break;
645
646 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
647 /*
648 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
649 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
650 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
651 */
652 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
653 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
654 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
655 /* Fall through */
656
657 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
658 case TLS_ST_OK:
659 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
660 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
661 }
662
663 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
664 }
665
666 /*
667 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
668 * client to the server.
669 */
670 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
671 {
672 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
673
674 s->init_num = 0;
675
676 switch (st->hand_state) {
677 default:
678 /* No post work to be done */
679 break;
680
681 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
682 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
683 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
684 /*
685 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
686 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
687 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
688 */
689 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
690 if (!statem_flush(s))
691 return WORK_MORE_A;
692 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
693 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
694 /* SSLfatal() already called */
695 return WORK_ERROR;
696 }
697 }
698 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
699 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
700 return WORK_MORE_A;
701 }
702
703 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
704 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
705 s->first_packet = 1;
706 }
707 break;
708
709 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
710 /*
711 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
712 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
713 */
714 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
715 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
716 break;
717
718 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
719 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
720 /* SSLfatal() already called */
721 return WORK_ERROR;
722 }
723 break;
724
725 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
727 break;
728 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
729 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
730 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
731 return WORK_MORE_A;
732 /*
733 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
734 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
735 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
736 */
737 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
738 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
739 return WORK_ERROR;
740 break;
741 }
742 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
743 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
744 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
745 #else
746 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
747 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
748 else
749 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
750 #endif
751 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
752 /* SSLfatal() already called */
753 return WORK_ERROR;
754 }
755
756 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
757 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
758 /* SSLfatal() already called */
759 return WORK_ERROR;
760 }
761
762 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
764 if (s->hit) {
765 /*
766 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
767 * no SCTP used.
768 */
769 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
770 0, NULL);
771 }
772 #endif
773
774 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
775 }
776 break;
777
778 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
780 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
781 /*
782 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
783 * no SCTP used.
784 */
785 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
786 0, NULL);
787 }
788 #endif
789 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
790 return WORK_MORE_B;
791
792 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
793 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
794 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
795 /* SSLfatal() already called */
796 return WORK_ERROR;
797 }
798 }
799 break;
800
801 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
802 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
803 return WORK_MORE_A;
804 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
806 return WORK_ERROR;
807 }
808 break;
809 }
810
811 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
812 }
813
814 /*
815 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
816 * client
817 *
818 * Valid return values are:
819 * 1: Success
820 * 0: Error
821 */
822 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
823 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
824 {
825 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
826
827 switch (st->hand_state) {
828 default:
829 /* Shouldn't happen */
830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
831 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
832 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
833 return 0;
834
835 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
836 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
837 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
838 else
839 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
841 break;
842
843 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
844 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
845 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
846 break;
847
848 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
849 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
850 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
851 break;
852
853 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
854 *confunc = NULL;
855 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
856 break;
857
858 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
859 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
860 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
861 break;
862
863 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
864 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
865 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
866 break;
867
868 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
869 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
870 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
871 break;
872
873 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
874 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
875 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
876 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
877 break;
878 #endif
879 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
880 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
881 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
882 break;
883
884 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
885 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
886 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
887 break;
888 }
889
890 return 1;
891 }
892
893 /*
894 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
895 * reading. Excludes the message header.
896 */
897 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
898 {
899 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
900
901 switch (st->hand_state) {
902 default:
903 /* Shouldn't happen */
904 return 0;
905
906 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
907 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
908
909 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
910 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
911
912 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
913 return s->max_cert_list;
914
915 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
916 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
917
918 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
919 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
920
921 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
922 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
923
924 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
925 /*
926 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
927 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
928 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
929 */
930 return s->max_cert_list;
931
932 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
933 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
934
935 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
936 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
937 return 3;
938 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
939
940 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
941 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
942
943 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
944 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
945
946 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
947 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
948
949 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
950 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
951 }
952 }
953
954 /*
955 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
956 */
957 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
958 {
959 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
960
961 switch (st->hand_state) {
962 default:
963 /* Shouldn't happen */
964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
965 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
966 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
967 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
968
969 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
970 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
971
972 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
973 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
974
975 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
976 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
977
978 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
979 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
980
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
982 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
983
984 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
985 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
986
987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
988 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
989
990 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
991 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
992
993 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
994 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
995
996 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
997 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
998
999 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1000 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1001
1002 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1003 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1004
1005 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1006 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1007
1008 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1009 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1010 }
1011 }
1012
1013 /*
1014 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1015 * from the server
1016 */
1017 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1018 {
1019 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1020
1021 switch (st->hand_state) {
1022 default:
1023 /* Shouldn't happen */
1024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1025 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1027 return WORK_ERROR;
1028
1029 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1030 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1031 }
1032 }
1033
1034 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1035 {
1036 unsigned char *p;
1037 size_t sess_id_len;
1038 int i, protverr;
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1040 SSL_COMP *comp;
1041 #endif
1042 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1043 unsigned char *session_id;
1044
1045 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1046 /* Should not happen */
1047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1048 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1049 return 0;
1050 }
1051
1052 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1053 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1054 if (protverr != 0) {
1055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1056 protverr);
1057 return 0;
1058 }
1059
1060 if (sess == NULL
1061 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1062 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1063 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1064 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1065 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1066 return 0;
1067 }
1068 }
1069 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1070
1071 p = s->s3->client_random;
1072
1073 /*
1074 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1075 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1076 */
1077 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1078 size_t idx;
1079 i = 1;
1080 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1081 if (p[idx]) {
1082 i = 0;
1083 break;
1084 }
1085 }
1086 } else {
1087 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1088 }
1089
1090 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1091 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1094 return 0;
1095 }
1096
1097 /*-
1098 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1099 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1100 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1101 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1102 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1103 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1104 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1105 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1106 * 1.0.
1107 *
1108 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1109 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1110 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1111 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1112 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1113 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1114 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1115 * know that is maximum server supports.
1116 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1117 * containing version 1.0.
1118 *
1119 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1120 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1121 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1122 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1123 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1124 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1125 * the negotiated version.
1126 *
1127 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1128 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1129 */
1130 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1131 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1133 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1134 return 0;
1135 }
1136
1137 /* Session ID */
1138 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1139 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1140 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1141 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1142 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1143 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1144 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1145 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1146 && ssl_randbytes(s, s->tmp_session_id,
1147 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1149 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1150 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 return 0;
1152 }
1153 } else {
1154 sess_id_len = 0;
1155 }
1156 } else {
1157 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1158 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1159 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1160 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1161 }
1162 }
1163 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1164 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1165 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1166 sess_id_len))
1167 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 return 0;
1171 }
1172
1173 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1174 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1175 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1176 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1177 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1180 return 0;
1181 }
1182 }
1183
1184 /* Ciphers supported */
1185 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1187 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 return 0;
1189 }
1190
1191 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1192 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1193 return 0;
1194 }
1195 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1197 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 return 0;
1199 }
1200
1201 /* COMPRESSION */
1202 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1205 return 0;
1206 }
1207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1208 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1209 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1210 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1211 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1212 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1213 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1214 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1216 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1217 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1218 return 0;
1219 }
1220 }
1221 }
1222 #endif
1223 /* Add the NULL method */
1224 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1226 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1227 return 0;
1228 }
1229
1230 /* TLS extensions */
1231 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1232 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1233 return 0;
1234 }
1235
1236 return 1;
1237 }
1238
1239 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1240 {
1241 size_t cookie_len;
1242 PACKET cookiepkt;
1243
1244 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1245 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1247 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1248 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1249 }
1250
1251 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1252 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1254 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1255 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1256 }
1257
1258 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1260 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1261 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1262 }
1263 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1264
1265 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1266 }
1267
1268 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1269 {
1270 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1271 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1272 int i;
1273
1274 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1275 if (c == NULL) {
1276 /* unknown cipher */
1277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1278 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1279 return 0;
1280 }
1281 /*
1282 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1283 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1284 */
1285 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1287 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1288 return 0;
1289 }
1290
1291 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1292 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1293 if (i < 0) {
1294 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1296 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1297 return 0;
1298 }
1299
1300 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1301 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1302 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1304 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1305 return 0;
1306 }
1307
1308 /*
1309 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1310 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1311 * set and use it for comparison.
1312 */
1313 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1314 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1315 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1316 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1317 /*
1318 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1319 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1320 */
1321 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1322 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1324 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1325 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1326 return 0;
1327 }
1328 } else {
1329 /*
1330 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1331 * ciphersuite.
1332 */
1333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1334 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1335 return 0;
1336 }
1337 }
1338 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1339
1340 return 1;
1341 }
1342
1343 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1344 {
1345 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1346 size_t session_id_len;
1347 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1348 int hrr = 0;
1349 unsigned int compression;
1350 unsigned int sversion;
1351 unsigned int context;
1352 int discard;
1353 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1355 SSL_COMP *comp;
1356 #endif
1357
1358 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1360 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1361 goto err;
1362 }
1363
1364 /* load the server random */
1365 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1366 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1367 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1368 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1369 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1370 hrr = 1;
1371 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1373 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1374 goto err;
1375 }
1376 } else {
1377 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1379 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1380 goto err;
1381 }
1382 }
1383
1384 /* Get the session-id. */
1385 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1387 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1388 goto err;
1389 }
1390 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1391 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1392 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1394 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1395 goto err;
1396 }
1397
1398 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1400 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1401 goto err;
1402 }
1403
1404 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1406 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1407 goto err;
1408 }
1409
1410 /* TLS extensions */
1411 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1412 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1413 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1414 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1416 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1417 goto err;
1418 }
1419
1420 if (!hrr) {
1421 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1422 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1423 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1424 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1425 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1426 goto err;
1427 }
1428
1429 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1430 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1431 goto err;
1432 }
1433 }
1434
1435 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1436 if (compression != 0) {
1437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1438 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1439 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1440 goto err;
1441 }
1442
1443 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1444 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1445 session_id_len) != 0) {
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1447 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1448 goto err;
1449 }
1450 }
1451
1452 if (hrr) {
1453 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1454 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1455 goto err;
1456 }
1457
1458 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1459 }
1460
1461 /*
1462 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1463 * are appropriate for this version.
1464 */
1465 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1466 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1467 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1469 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1470 goto err;
1471 }
1472
1473 s->hit = 0;
1474
1475 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1476 /*
1477 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1478 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1479 */
1480 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1482 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1483 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1484 goto err;
1485 }
1486
1487 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1488 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1489 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1490 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1491 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1492 goto err;
1493 }
1494 } else {
1495 /*
1496 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1497 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1498 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1499 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1500 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1501 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1502 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1503 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1504 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1505 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1506 */
1507 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1508 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1509 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1510 /*
1511 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1512 * backwards compat reasons
1513 */
1514 int master_key_length;
1515 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1516 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1517 &master_key_length,
1518 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1519 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1520 && master_key_length > 0) {
1521 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1522 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1523 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1524 } else {
1525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1526 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1527 goto err;
1528 }
1529 }
1530
1531 if (session_id_len != 0
1532 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1533 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1534 session_id_len) == 0)
1535 s->hit = 1;
1536 }
1537
1538 if (s->hit) {
1539 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1540 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1541 /* actually a client application bug */
1542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1543 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1544 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1545 goto err;
1546 }
1547 } else {
1548 /*
1549 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1550 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1551 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1552 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1553 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1554 */
1555 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1556 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1557 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1558 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1559 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
1560 s->session_ctx->lock);
1561 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1562 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1563 goto err;
1564 }
1565 }
1566
1567 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1568 /*
1569 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1570 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1571 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1572 * used for resumption.
1573 */
1574 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1575 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1576 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1577 if (session_id_len > 0)
1578 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1579 session_id_len);
1580 }
1581 }
1582
1583 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1584 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1586 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1587 goto err;
1588 }
1589 /*
1590 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1591 * version.
1592 */
1593 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1594 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1595
1596 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1597 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1598 goto err;
1599 }
1600
1601 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1602 if (compression != 0) {
1603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1604 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1605 goto err;
1606 }
1607 /*
1608 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1609 * using compression.
1610 */
1611 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1612 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1613 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1614 goto err;
1615 }
1616 #else
1617 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1619 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1620 goto err;
1621 }
1622 if (compression == 0)
1623 comp = NULL;
1624 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1626 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1627 goto err;
1628 } else {
1629 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1630 }
1631
1632 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1634 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1635 goto err;
1636 } else {
1637 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1638 }
1639 #endif
1640
1641 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1642 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1643 goto err;
1644 }
1645
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1647 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1648 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1649 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1650
1651 /*
1652 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1653 * no SCTP used.
1654 */
1655 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1656 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1657
1658 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1659 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1660 labelbuffer,
1661 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1663 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1664 goto err;
1665 }
1666
1667 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1668 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1669 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1670 }
1671 #endif
1672
1673 /*
1674 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1675 * we're done with this message
1676 */
1677 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1678 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1679 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1680 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1681 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1682 goto err;
1683 }
1684
1685 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1686 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1687 err:
1688 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1689 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1690 }
1691
1692 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1693 PACKET *extpkt)
1694 {
1695 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1696
1697 /*
1698 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1699 * should not be used.
1700 */
1701 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1702 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1703
1704 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1705 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1706 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1707 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1708 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1709 goto err;
1710 }
1711
1712 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1713 extensions = NULL;
1714
1715 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1716 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1717 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1718 #endif
1719 ) {
1720 /*
1721 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1722 * ClientHello will not change
1723 */
1724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1725 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1726 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1727 goto err;
1728 }
1729
1730 /*
1731 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1732 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1733 */
1734 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1735 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1736 goto err;
1737 }
1738
1739 /*
1740 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1741 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1742 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1743 * for HRR messages.
1744 */
1745 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1746 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1747 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1748 goto err;
1749 }
1750
1751 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1752 err:
1753 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1754 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1755 }
1756
1757 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1758 {
1759 int i;
1760 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1761 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1762 X509 *x = NULL;
1763 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1764 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1765 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1766 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1767 unsigned int context = 0;
1768 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1769
1770 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1772 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1773 goto err;
1774 }
1775
1776 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1777 || context != 0
1778 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1779 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1780 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1782 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1783 goto err;
1784 }
1785 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1786 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1787 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1789 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1790 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1791 goto err;
1792 }
1793
1794 certstart = certbytes;
1795 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1796 if (x == NULL) {
1797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1798 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1799 goto err;
1800 }
1801 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1803 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1804 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1805 goto err;
1806 }
1807
1808 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1809 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1810 PACKET extensions;
1811
1812 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1814 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1815 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1816 goto err;
1817 }
1818 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1819 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1820 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1821 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1822 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1823 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1824 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1825 /* SSLfatal already called */
1826 goto err;
1827 }
1828 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1829 }
1830
1831 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1833 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1834 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1835 goto err;
1836 }
1837 x = NULL;
1838 }
1839
1840 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1841 /*
1842 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1843 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1844 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1845 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1846 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1847 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1848 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1849 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1850 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1851 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1852 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1853 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1854 */
1855 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1856 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
1857 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1858 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1859 goto err;
1860 }
1861 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1862 if (i > 1) {
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1864 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1865 goto err;
1866 }
1867
1868 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1869 /*
1870 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1871 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1872 */
1873 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1874 sk = NULL;
1875
1876 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1877
1878 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1879 x = NULL;
1880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1881 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1882 goto err;
1883 }
1884
1885 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1886 x = NULL;
1887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1888 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1889 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1890 goto err;
1891 }
1892 /*
1893 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1894 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1895 * type.
1896 */
1897 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1898 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1899 x = NULL;
1900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1901 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1902 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1903 goto err;
1904 }
1905 }
1906 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1907
1908 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1909 X509_up_ref(x);
1910 s->session->peer = x;
1911 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1912 x = NULL;
1913
1914 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1915 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1916 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1917 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1918 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1919 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1920 goto err;
1921 }
1922
1923 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1924
1925 err:
1926 X509_free(x);
1927 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1928 return ret;
1929 }
1930
1931 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1932 {
1933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1934 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1935
1936 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1937
1938 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1940 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1941 return 0;
1942 }
1943
1944 /*
1945 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1946 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1947 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1948 * identity.
1949 */
1950 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1952 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1953 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1954 return 0;
1955 }
1956
1957 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1958 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1959 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1960 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1961 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1963 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1964 return 0;
1965 }
1966
1967 return 1;
1968 #else
1969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1970 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1971 return 0;
1972 #endif
1973 }
1974
1975 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1976 {
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1978 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1979
1980 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1981 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1982 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1983 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
1985 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1986 return 0;
1987 }
1988
1989 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1990 if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
1991 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1992 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1993 || (s->srp_ctx.g =
1994 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1995 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1996 || (s->srp_ctx.s =
1997 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1998 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1999 || (s->srp_ctx.B =
2000 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2001 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2003 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2004 return 0;
2005 }
2006
2007 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2008 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2009 return 0;
2010 }
2011
2012 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2013 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2014 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2015
2016 return 1;
2017 #else
2018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2020 return 0;
2021 #endif
2022 }
2023
2024 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2025 {
2026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2027 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2028 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2029
2030 DH *dh = NULL;
2031 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2032
2033 int check_bits = 0;
2034
2035 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2036 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2037 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2039 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2040 return 0;
2041 }
2042
2043 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2044 dh = DH_new();
2045
2046 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2048 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2049 goto err;
2050 }
2051
2052 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2053 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2054 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2055 NULL);
2056 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2057 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2058 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2060 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2061 goto err;
2062 }
2063
2064 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2065 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2066 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2067 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2068 goto err;
2069 }
2070
2071 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2073 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2074 goto err;
2075 }
2076 p = g = NULL;
2077
2078 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2080 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2081 goto err;
2082 }
2083
2084 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2086 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2087 goto err;
2088 }
2089 bnpub_key = NULL;
2090
2091 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2093 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2094 goto err;
2095 }
2096
2097 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2099 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2100 goto err;
2101 }
2102
2103 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2104
2105 /*
2106 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2107 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2108 */
2109 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2110 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2111 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2112
2113 return 1;
2114
2115 err:
2116 BN_free(p);
2117 BN_free(g);
2118 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2119 DH_free(dh);
2120 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2121
2122 return 0;
2123 #else
2124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2126 return 0;
2127 #endif
2128 }
2129
2130 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2131 {
2132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2133 PACKET encoded_pt;
2134 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2135
2136 /*
2137 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2138 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2139 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2140 */
2141 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2143 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2144 return 0;
2145 }
2146 /*
2147 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2148 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2149 */
2150 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
2151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2152 SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2153 return 0;
2154 }
2155
2156 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2158 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2159 return 0;
2160 }
2161
2162 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2164 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2165 return 0;
2166 }
2167
2168 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2169 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2170 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2171 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2172 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2173 return 0;
2174 }
2175
2176 /*
2177 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2178 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2179 * and ECDSA.
2180 */
2181 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2182 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2183 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2184 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2185 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2186
2187 return 1;
2188 #else
2189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2190 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2191 return 0;
2192 #endif
2193 }
2194
2195 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2196 {
2197 long alg_k;
2198 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2199 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2200 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2201 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2202
2203 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2204
2205 save_param_start = *pkt;
2206
2207 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2208 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2209 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2210 #endif
2211
2212 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2213 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2214 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2215 goto err;
2216 }
2217 }
2218
2219 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2220 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2221 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2222 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2223 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2224 goto err;
2225 }
2226 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2227 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2228 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2229 goto err;
2230 }
2231 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2232 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2233 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2234 goto err;
2235 }
2236 } else if (alg_k) {
2237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2238 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2239 goto err;
2240 }
2241
2242 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2243 if (pkey != NULL) {
2244 PACKET params;
2245 int maxsig;
2246 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2247 unsigned char *tbs;
2248 size_t tbslen;
2249 int rv;
2250
2251 /*
2252 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2253 * equals the length of the parameters.
2254 */
2255 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
2256 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2257 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2259 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2260 goto err;
2261 }
2262
2263 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2264 unsigned int sigalg;
2265
2266 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2268 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2269 goto err;
2270 }
2271 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2272 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2273 goto err;
2274 }
2275 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2276 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2277 #endif
2278 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2280 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2281 goto err;
2282 }
2283
2284 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2286 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2287 goto err;
2288 }
2289
2290 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2291 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2293 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2294 goto err;
2295 }
2296 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2297 if (maxsig < 0) {
2298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2299 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2300 goto err;
2301 }
2302
2303 /*
2304 * Check signature length
2305 */
2306 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2307 /* wrong packet length */
2308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2309 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2310 goto err;
2311 }
2312
2313 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2314 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2316 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2317 goto err;
2318 }
2319
2320 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2322 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2323 goto err;
2324 }
2325 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2326 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2327 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2328 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2330 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2331 goto err;
2332 }
2333 }
2334 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(&params),
2335 PACKET_remaining(&params));
2336 if (tbslen == 0) {
2337 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2338 goto err;
2339 }
2340
2341 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2342 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2343 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2344 if (rv <= 0) {
2345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2346 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2347 goto err;
2348 }
2349 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2350 md_ctx = NULL;
2351 } else {
2352 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2353 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2354 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2355 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2356 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2358 SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2359 }
2360 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2361 goto err;
2362 }
2363 /* still data left over */
2364 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2366 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2367 goto err;
2368 }
2369 }
2370
2371 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2372 err:
2373 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2374 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2375 }
2376
2377 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2378 {
2379 size_t i;
2380
2381 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2382 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2383 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2384
2385 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2386 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2387 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2388
2389 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2390 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2391 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2392 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2393
2394 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2395 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2397 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2398 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2399 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2400 }
2401
2402 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2404 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2405 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2406 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2407 }
2408 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2409 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2410 &rawexts, NULL, 1)
2411 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2412 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2413 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2414 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2415 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2416 }
2417 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2418 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2420 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2421 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2422 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2423 }
2424 } else {
2425 PACKET ctypes;
2426
2427 /* get the certificate types */
2428 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2430 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2431 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2433 }
2434
2435 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2437 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2438 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2439 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2440 }
2441
2442 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2443 PACKET sigalgs;
2444
2445 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2447 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2448 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2449 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2450 }
2451
2452 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2454 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2455 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2456 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2457 }
2458 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2460 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2461 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2462 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2463 }
2464 }
2465
2466 /* get the CA RDNs */
2467 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2468 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2469 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2470 }
2471 }
2472
2473 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2475 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2476 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2477 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2478 }
2479
2480 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2481 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2482
2483 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2484 }
2485
2486 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2487 {
2488 unsigned int ticklen;
2489 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2490 unsigned int sess_len;
2491 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2492 PACKET nonce;
2493
2494 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2495 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2496 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2497 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2498 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2499 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2500 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2501 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2502 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2503 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2505 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2506 goto err;
2507 }
2508
2509 /*
2510 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2511 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2512 * be 0 here in that instance
2513 */
2514 if (ticklen == 0)
2515 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2516
2517 /*
2518 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2519 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2520 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2521 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2522 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2523 * cache.
2524 */
2525 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2526 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2527 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2528 /*
2529 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2530 * one
2531 */
2532 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2534 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2535 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2536 goto err;
2537 }
2538
2539 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2540 /*
2541 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2542 */
2543 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2544 }
2545
2546 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2547 s->session = new_sess;
2548 }
2549
2550 /*
2551 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2552 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2553 */
2554 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2555
2556 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2557 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2558 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2559
2560 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2561 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2563 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2564 goto err;
2565 }
2566 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2568 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2569 goto err;
2570 }
2571
2572 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2573 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2574 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2575
2576 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2577 PACKET extpkt;
2578
2579 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2580 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2581 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2582 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2583 &exts, NULL, 1)
2584 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2585 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2586 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2587 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2588 goto err;
2589 }
2590 }
2591
2592 /*
2593 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2594 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2595 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2596 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2597 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2598 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2599 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2600 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2601 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2602 */
2603 /*
2604 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2605 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2606 */
2607 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2608 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2609 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2611 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2612 goto err;
2613 }
2614 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2615
2616 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2617 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2618 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2619 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2620 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2621 }
2622
2623 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2624 err:
2625 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2626 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2627 }
2628
2629 /*
2630 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2631 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2632 */
2633 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2634 {
2635 size_t resplen;
2636 unsigned int type;
2637
2638 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2639 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2641 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2642 return 0;
2643 }
2644 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2645 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2647 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2648 return 0;
2649 }
2650 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2651 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2653 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2654 return 0;
2655 }
2656 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2658 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2659 return 0;
2660 }
2661 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2662
2663 return 1;
2664 }
2665
2666
2667 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2668 {
2669 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2670 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2671 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2672 }
2673
2674 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2675 }
2676
2677 /*
2678 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2679 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2680 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2681 * on failure.
2682 */
2683 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2684 {
2685 /*
2686 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2687 * the server
2688 */
2689 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2690 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2691 return 0;
2692 }
2693
2694 /*
2695 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2696 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2697 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2698 */
2699 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2700 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2701 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2702
2703 if (ret == 0) {
2704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2705 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2706 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2707 return 0;
2708 }
2709 if (ret < 0) {
2710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2711 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2712 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2713 return 0;
2714 }
2715 }
2716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2717 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2718 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2719 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2720 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2721 return 0;
2722 }
2723 }
2724 #endif
2725
2726 return 1;
2727 }
2728
2729 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2730 {
2731 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2732 /* should contain no data */
2733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2734 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2735 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2736 }
2737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2738 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2739 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2741 SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2742 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2743 }
2744 }
2745 #endif
2746
2747 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2748 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2749 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2750 }
2751
2752 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2753 }
2754
2755 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2756 {
2757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2758 int ret = 0;
2759 /*
2760 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2761 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2762 * strnlen.
2763 */
2764 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2765 size_t identitylen = 0;
2766 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2767 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2768 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2769 size_t psklen = 0;
2770
2771 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2773 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2774 goto err;
2775 }
2776
2777 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2778
2779 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2780 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2781 psk, sizeof(psk));
2782
2783 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2785 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2786 goto err;
2787 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2789 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2790 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2791 goto err;
2792 }
2793
2794 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2795 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2796 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2797 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2798 goto err;
2799 }
2800
2801 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2802 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2803 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2805 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2806 goto err;
2807 }
2808
2809 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2810 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2811 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2812 tmppsk = NULL;
2813 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2814 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2815 tmpidentity = NULL;
2816
2817 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2819 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2820 goto err;
2821 }
2822
2823 ret = 1;
2824
2825 err:
2826 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2827 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2828 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2829 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2830
2831 return ret;
2832 #else
2833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2834 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2835 return 0;
2836 #endif
2837 }
2838
2839 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2840 {
2841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2842 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2843 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2844 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2845 size_t enclen;
2846 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2847 size_t pmslen = 0;
2848
2849 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2850 /*
2851 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2852 */
2853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2854 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2855 return 0;
2856 }
2857
2858 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2859 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2861 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2862 return 0;
2863 }
2864
2865 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2866 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2867 if (pms == NULL) {
2868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2869 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2870 return 0;
2871 }
2872
2873 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2874 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2875 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2876 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2878 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2879 goto err;
2880 }
2881
2882 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2883 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2886 goto err;
2887 }
2888 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2889 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2890 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2892 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2893 goto err;
2894 }
2895 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2896 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2898 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2899 goto err;
2900 }
2901 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2902 pctx = NULL;
2903
2904 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2905 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2907 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2908 goto err;
2909 }
2910
2911 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2912 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2913 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2914 goto err;
2915 }
2916
2917 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2918 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2919
2920 return 1;
2921 err:
2922 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2923 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2924
2925 return 0;
2926 #else
2927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2929 return 0;
2930 #endif
2931 }
2932
2933 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2934 {
2935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2936 DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
2937 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2938 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2939 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2940
2941 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2942 if (skey == NULL) {
2943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2944 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2945 goto err;
2946 }
2947
2948 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2949 if (ckey == NULL) {
2950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2951 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2952 goto err;
2953 }
2954
2955 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2956
2957 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2959 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2960 goto err;
2961 }
2962
2963 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2964 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2965 goto err;
2966 }
2967
2968 /* send off the data */
2969 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2970 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
2971 &keybytes)) {
2972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2973 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2974 goto err;
2975 }
2976
2977 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2978 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2979
2980 return 1;
2981 err:
2982 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2983 return 0;
2984 #else
2985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2986 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2987 return 0;
2988 #endif
2989 }
2990
2991 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2992 {
2993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2994 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2995 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2996 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2997 int ret = 0;
2998
2999 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3000 if (skey == NULL) {
3001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3002 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3003 return 0;
3004 }
3005
3006 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3007 if (ckey == NULL) {
3008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3009 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3010 goto err;
3011 }
3012
3013 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3014 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3015 goto err;
3016 }
3017
3018 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3019 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3020
3021 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3023 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3024 goto err;
3025 }
3026
3027 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3030 goto err;
3031 }
3032
3033 ret = 1;
3034 err:
3035 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3036 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3037 return ret;
3038 #else
3039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3040 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3041 return 0;
3042 #endif
3043 }
3044
3045 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3046 {
3047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3048 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3049 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3050 X509 *peer_cert;
3051 size_t msglen;
3052 unsigned int md_len;
3053 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3054 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3055 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3056 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3057 size_t pmslen = 0;
3058
3059 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3060 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3061
3062 /*
3063 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3064 */
3065 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3066 if (!peer_cert) {
3067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3068 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3069 return 0;
3070 }
3071
3072 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3073 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3075 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3076 return 0;
3077 }
3078 /*
3079 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3080 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3081 * certificate key for key exchange
3082 */
3083
3084 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3085 pmslen = 32;
3086 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3087 if (pms == NULL) {
3088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3089 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3090 goto err;
3091 }
3092
3093 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3094 /* Generate session key
3095 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3096 */
3097 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3099 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3100 goto err;
3101 };
3102 /*
3103 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3104 * data
3105 */
3106 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3107 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3108 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3109 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3110 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3111 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3112 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3113 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3114 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3115 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3116 goto err;
3117 }
3118 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3119 ukm_hash = NULL;
3120 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3121 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3123 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3124 goto err;
3125 }
3126 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3127 /*
3128 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3129 */
3130 msglen = 255;
3131 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3133 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3134 goto err;
3135 }
3136
3137 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3138 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3139 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3142 goto err;
3143 }
3144
3145 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3146 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3147 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3148
3149 return 1;
3150 err:
3151 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3152 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3153 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3154 return 0;
3155 #else
3156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3157 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3158 return 0;
3159 #endif
3160 }
3161
3162 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3163 {
3164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3165 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3166
3167 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3168 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3169 &abytes)) {
3170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3171 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3172 return 0;
3173 }
3174 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3175
3176 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3177 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3178 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3179 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3180 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3181 return 0;
3182 }
3183
3184 return 1;
3185 #else
3186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3187 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3188 return 0;
3189 #endif
3190 }
3191
3192 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3193 {
3194 unsigned long alg_k;
3195
3196 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3197
3198 /*
3199 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3200 * no need to do so here.
3201 */
3202 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3203 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3204 goto err;
3205
3206 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3207 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3208 goto err;
3209 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3210 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3211 goto err;
3212 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3213 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3214 goto err;
3215 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3216 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3217 goto err;
3218 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3219 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3220 goto err;
3221 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3223 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3224 goto err;
3225 }
3226
3227 return 1;
3228 err:
3229 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3230 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3232 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3233 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3234 #endif
3235 return 0;
3236 }
3237
3238 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3239 {
3240 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3241 size_t pmslen = 0;
3242
3243 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3244 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3245
3246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3247 /* Check for SRP */
3248 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3249 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3251 goto err;
3252 }
3253 return 1;
3254 }
3255 #endif
3256
3257 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3259 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3260 goto err;
3261 }
3262 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3263 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3264 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3265 pms = NULL;
3266 pmslen = 0;
3267 goto err;
3268 }
3269 pms = NULL;
3270 pmslen = 0;
3271
3272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3273 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3274 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3275 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3276
3277 /*
3278 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3279 * used.
3280 */
3281 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3282 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3283
3284 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3285 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3286 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3288 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3289 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3290 goto err;
3291 }
3292
3293 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3294 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3295 }
3296 #endif
3297
3298 return 1;
3299 err:
3300 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3301 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3302 return 0;
3303 }
3304
3305 /*
3306 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3307 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3308 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3309 */
3310 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3311 {
3312 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3313 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3314 return 0;
3315 /*
3316 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3317 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3318 */
3319 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3320 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3321 return 0;
3322 return 1;
3323 }
3324
3325 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3326 {
3327 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3328 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3329 int i;
3330
3331 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3332 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3333 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3334 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3335 if (i < 0) {
3336 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3337 return WORK_MORE_A;
3338 }
3339 if (i == 0) {
3340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3341 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3342 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3343 return WORK_ERROR;
3344 }
3345 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3346 }
3347 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3348 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3349
3350 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3351 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3352 }
3353
3354 /* We need to get a client cert */
3355 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3356 /*
3357 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3358 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3359 */
3360 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3361 if (i < 0) {
3362 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3363 return WORK_MORE_B;
3364 }
3365 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3366 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3367 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3368 i = 0;
3369 } else if (i == 1) {
3370 i = 0;
3371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3372 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3373 }
3374
3375 X509_free(x509);
3376 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3377 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3378 i = 0;
3379 if (i == 0) {
3380 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3381 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3382 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3383 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3384 } else {
3385 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3386 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3387 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3388 return WORK_ERROR;
3389 }
3390 }
3391 }
3392
3393 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3394 }
3395
3396 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3398 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3399 return WORK_ERROR;
3400 }
3401
3402 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3403 {
3404 /*
3405 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3406 * later
3407 */
3408 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3410 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3411 return 0;
3412 }
3413 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3414 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3415 : s->cert->key)) {
3416 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3417 return 0;
3418 }
3419
3420 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3421 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3422 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3423 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3424 /*
3425 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3426 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3427 */
3428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3429 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3430 return 0;
3431 }
3432
3433 return 1;
3434 }
3435
3436 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3437 {
3438 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3439 size_t idx;
3440 long alg_k, alg_a;
3441
3442 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3443 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3444
3445 /* we don't have a certificate */
3446 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3447 return 1;
3448
3449 /* This is the passed certificate */
3450 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3451
3452 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3453 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3455 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3456 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3457 return 0;
3458 }
3459
3460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3461 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3462 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3463 return 1;
3464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3465 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3466 return 0;
3467 }
3468 #endif
3469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3470 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3472 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3473 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3474 return 0;
3475 }
3476 #endif
3477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3478 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3480 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3481 return 0;
3482 }
3483 #endif
3484
3485 return 1;
3486 }
3487
3488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3489 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3490 {
3491 size_t len, padding_len;
3492 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3493
3494 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3495 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3496
3497 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3498 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3500 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3501 return 0;
3502 }
3503
3504 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3505
3506 return 1;
3507 }
3508 #endif
3509
3510 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3511 {
3512 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3513 /* should contain no data */
3514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3515 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3516 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3517 }
3518
3519 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3520 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3521 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3522 }
3523
3524 /*
3525 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3526 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3527 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3528 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3529 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3530 */
3531 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3532 SSL_renegotiate(s);
3533 else
3534 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3535
3536 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3537 }
3538
3539 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3540 {
3541 PACKET extensions;
3542 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3543
3544 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3545 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3547 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3548 goto err;
3549 }
3550
3551 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3552 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3553 NULL, 1)
3554 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3555 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3556 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3557 goto err;
3558 }
3559
3560 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3561 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3562
3563 err:
3564 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3565 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3566 }
3567
3568 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3569 {
3570 int i = 0;
3571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3572 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3573 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3574 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3575 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3576 if (i != 0)
3577 return i;
3578 }
3579 #endif
3580 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3581 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3582 return i;
3583 }
3584
3585 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3586 {
3587 int i;
3588 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3589 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3590 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3591 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3592
3593 if (sk == NULL) {
3594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3595 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3596 return 0;
3597 }
3598
3599 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3600 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3601 # error Max cipher length too short
3602 # endif
3603 /*
3604 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3605 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3606 * use TLS v1.2
3607 */
3608 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3609 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3610 else
3611 #endif
3612 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3613 maxlen = 0xfffe;
3614
3615 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3616 maxlen -= 2;
3617 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3618 maxlen -= 2;
3619
3620 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3621 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3622
3623 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3624 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3625 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3626 continue;
3627
3628 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3630 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3631 return 0;
3632 }
3633
3634 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3635 if (!maxverok) {
3636 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3637 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3638 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3639 maxverok = 1;
3640 } else {
3641 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3642 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3643 maxverok = 1;
3644 }
3645 }
3646
3647 totlen += len;
3648 }
3649
3650 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3652 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3653
3654 if (!maxverok)
3655 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3656 "SSL/TLS version");
3657
3658 return 0;
3659 }
3660
3661 if (totlen != 0) {
3662 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3663 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3664 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3665 };
3666 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3668 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3669 return 0;
3670 }
3671 }
3672 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3673 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3674 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3675 };
3676 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3678 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3679 return 0;
3680 }
3681 }
3682 }
3683
3684 return 1;
3685 }
3686
3687 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3688 {
3689 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3690 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3692 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3693 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3694 return 0;
3695 }
3696
3697 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3698 return 1;
3699 }
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