]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blob - ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blob
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blame | history | raw | HEAD
Add X509 related libctx changes.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_clnt.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 /* We need to use some engine deprecated APIs */
13 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
14
15 #include <stdio.h>
16 #include <time.h>
17 #include <assert.h>
18 #include "../ssl_local.h"
19 #include "statem_local.h"
20 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
21 #include <openssl/rand.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
25 #include <openssl/dh.h>
26 #include <openssl/bn.h>
27 #include <openssl/engine.h>
28 #include <openssl/trace.h>
29 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
30
31 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
32 DEFINE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
33 DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER)
34
35 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
36 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
37
38 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
39 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
40 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
41 WPACKET *pkt);
42
43 /*
44 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
45 *
46 * Return values are:
47 * 1: Yes
48 * 0: No
49 */
50 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
51 {
52 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
53 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
54 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
55 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
56 return 0;
57
58 return 1;
59 }
60
61 /*
62 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
63 *
64 * Return values are:
65 * 1: Yes
66 * 0: No
67 */
68 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
69 {
70 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
71
72 /*
73 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
74 * ciphersuite or for SRP
75 */
76 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
77 | SSL_kSRP)) {
78 return 1;
79 }
80
81 return 0;
82 }
83
84 /*
85 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
86 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
87 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
88 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
89 *
90 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
91 * (transition not allowed)
92 */
93 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
94 {
95 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
96
97 /*
98 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
99 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
100 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
101 */
102
103 switch (st->hand_state) {
104 default:
105 break;
106
107 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
108 /*
109 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
110 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
111 */
112 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
113 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
114 return 1;
115 }
116 break;
117
118 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
121 return 1;
122 }
123 break;
124
125 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
126 if (s->hit) {
127 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
128 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
129 return 1;
130 }
131 } else {
132 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
133 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
134 return 1;
135 }
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
138 return 1;
139 }
140 }
141 break;
142
143 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
145 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
146 return 1;
147 }
148 break;
149
150 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
151 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
152 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
153 return 1;
154 }
155 break;
156
157 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
158 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
159 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
160 return 1;
161 }
162 break;
163
164 case TLS_ST_OK:
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
167 return 1;
168 }
169 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
170 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
171 return 1;
172 }
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
174 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
175 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
176 #endif
177 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
178 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
179 /*
180 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
181 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
182 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
183 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
184 */
185 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
186 /* SSLfatal() already called */
187 return 0;
188 }
189 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
190 return 1;
191 }
192 }
193 break;
194 }
195
196 /* No valid transition found */
197 return 0;
198 }
199
200 /*
201 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
202 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
203 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
204 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
205 *
206 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
207 * (transition not allowed)
208 */
209 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
210 {
211 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
212 int ske_expected;
213
214 /*
215 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
216 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
217 */
218 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
219 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
220 goto err;
221 return 1;
222 }
223
224 switch (st->hand_state) {
225 default:
226 break;
227
228 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
229 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
231 return 1;
232 }
233
234 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
235 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
236 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
237 return 1;
238 }
239 }
240 break;
241
242 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
243 /*
244 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
245 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
246 * HelloRetryRequest.
247 */
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
250 return 1;
251 }
252 break;
253
254 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
255 if (s->hit) {
256 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
257 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
259 return 1;
260 }
261 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
262 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
263 return 1;
264 }
265 } else {
266 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
267 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
268 return 1;
269 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
270 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
271 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
272 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
273 /*
274 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
275 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
276 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
277 * the server is resuming.
278 */
279 s->hit = 1;
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
281 return 1;
282 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
283 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
284 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
285 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
286 return 1;
287 }
288 } else {
289 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
290 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
291 if (ske_expected
292 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
293 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
294 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
296 return 1;
297 }
298 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
299 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
300 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
301 return 1;
302 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
303 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
304 return 1;
305 }
306 }
307 }
308 break;
309
310 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
311 /*
312 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
313 * |ext.status_expected| is set
314 */
315 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
317 return 1;
318 }
319 /* Fall through */
320
321 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
322 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
323 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
324 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
325 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
326 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
327 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
328 return 1;
329 }
330 goto err;
331 }
332 /* Fall through */
333
334 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
335 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
336 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
338 return 1;
339 }
340 goto err;
341 }
342 /* Fall through */
343
344 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
347 return 1;
348 }
349 break;
350
351 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
352 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
353 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
354 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
355 return 1;
356 }
357 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
359 return 1;
360 }
361 break;
362
363 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
364 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
366 return 1;
367 }
368 break;
369
370 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
373 return 1;
374 }
375 break;
376
377 case TLS_ST_OK:
378 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
379 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
380 return 1;
381 }
382 break;
383 }
384
385 err:
386 /* No valid transition found */
387 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
388 BIO *rbio;
389
390 /*
391 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
392 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
393 */
394 s->init_num = 0;
395 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
396 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
397 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
398 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
399 return 0;
400 }
401 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
402 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
403 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
404 return 0;
405 }
406
407 /*
408 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
409 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
410 * server.
411 */
412 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
413 {
414 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
415
416 /*
417 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
418 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
419 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
420 */
421 switch (st->hand_state) {
422 default:
423 /* Shouldn't happen */
424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
425 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
426 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
427 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
428
429 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
430 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
433 }
434 /*
435 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
436 * we already sent close_notify
437 */
438 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
439 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
441 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
442 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
443 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
444 }
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447
448 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
449 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
450 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
452 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
453 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
455 else
456 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
457 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459
460 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
461 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464 }
465 /* Fall through */
466
467 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
468 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
469 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
470 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
472
473 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
474 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
475 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
476 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
478
479 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482
483 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
484 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
485 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
486 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
489
490 case TLS_ST_OK:
491 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494 }
495
496 /* Try to read from the server instead */
497 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
498 }
499 }
500
501 /*
502 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
503 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
504 */
505 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
506 {
507 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
508
509 /*
510 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
511 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
512 * later
513 */
514 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
515 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
516
517 switch (st->hand_state) {
518 default:
519 /* Shouldn't happen */
520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
521 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
522 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
523 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
524
525 case TLS_ST_OK:
526 if (!s->renegotiate) {
527 /*
528 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
529 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
530 */
531 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
532 }
533 /* Renegotiation */
534 /* fall thru */
535 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
536 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
537 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
538
539 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
540 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
541 /*
542 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
543 * actually selected a version yet.
544 */
545 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
547 else
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
549 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
550 }
551 /*
552 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
553 * we will be sent
554 */
555 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
556
557 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
558 /*
559 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
560 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
561 * because we did early data.
562 */
563 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
564 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
566 else
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569
570 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
571 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
572
573 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576
577 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
578 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
580 else
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583
584 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
585 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
586 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
587
588 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
589 /*
590 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
591 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
592 */
593 /*
594 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
595 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
596 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
597 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
598 */
599 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
601 } else {
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
603 }
604 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
606 }
607 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
608
609 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
611 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
612
613 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
614 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
616 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
618 } else {
619 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
620 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
621 #else
622 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
624 else
625 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
626 #endif
627 }
628 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
629
630 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
631 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
632 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
634 #endif
635
636 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
637 if (s->hit) {
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
640 } else {
641 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
642 }
643
644 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
645 if (s->hit) {
646 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
647 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
648 } else {
649 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
650 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
651 }
652
653 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
654 /*
655 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
656 * convenient time.
657 */
658 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
659 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
660 /* SSLfatal() already called */
661 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
662 }
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
665 }
666 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
667 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
668 }
669 }
670
671 /*
672 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
673 * the client to the server.
674 */
675 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
676 {
677 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
678
679 switch (st->hand_state) {
680 default:
681 /* No pre work to be done */
682 break;
683
684 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
685 s->shutdown = 0;
686 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
687 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
688 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
689 /* SSLfatal() already called */
690 return WORK_ERROR;
691 }
692 }
693 break;
694
695 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
696 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
697 if (s->hit) {
698 /*
699 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
700 * messages unless we need to.
701 */
702 st->use_timer = 0;
703 }
704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
705 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
706 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
707 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
708 }
709 #endif
710 }
711 break;
712
713 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
714 /*
715 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
716 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
717 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
718 */
719 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
720 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
721 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
722 /* Fall through */
723
724 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
725 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
726
727 case TLS_ST_OK:
728 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
729 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
730 }
731
732 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
733 }
734
735 /*
736 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
737 * client to the server.
738 */
739 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
740 {
741 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
742
743 s->init_num = 0;
744
745 switch (st->hand_state) {
746 default:
747 /* No post work to be done */
748 break;
749
750 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
751 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
752 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
753 /*
754 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
755 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
756 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
757 */
758 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
759 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
760 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
761 /* SSLfatal() already called */
762 return WORK_ERROR;
763 }
764 }
765 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
766 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
767 return WORK_MORE_A;
768 }
769
770 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
771 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
772 s->first_packet = 1;
773 }
774 break;
775
776 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
777 /*
778 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
779 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
780 */
781 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
782 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
783 break;
784
785 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
786 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
787 /* SSLfatal() already called */
788 return WORK_ERROR;
789 }
790 break;
791
792 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
793 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
794 break;
795 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
796 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
797 /*
798 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
799 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
800 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
801 */
802 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
803 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
804 return WORK_ERROR;
805 break;
806 }
807 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
808 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
809 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
810 #else
811 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
812 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
813 else
814 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
815 #endif
816 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
817 /* SSLfatal() already called */
818 return WORK_ERROR;
819 }
820
821 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
822 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
823 /* SSLfatal() already called */
824 return WORK_ERROR;
825 }
826
827 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
829 if (s->hit) {
830 /*
831 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
832 * no SCTP used.
833 */
834 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
835 0, NULL);
836 }
837 #endif
838
839 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
840 }
841 break;
842
843 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
845 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
846 /*
847 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
848 * no SCTP used.
849 */
850 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
851 0, NULL);
852 }
853 #endif
854 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
855 return WORK_MORE_B;
856
857 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
858 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
859 /* SSLfatal() already called */
860 return WORK_ERROR;
861 }
862 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
863 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
864 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
866 return WORK_ERROR;
867 }
868 }
869 }
870 break;
871
872 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
873 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
874 return WORK_MORE_A;
875 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
876 /* SSLfatal() already called */
877 return WORK_ERROR;
878 }
879 break;
880 }
881
882 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
883 }
884
885 /*
886 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
887 * client
888 *
889 * Valid return values are:
890 * 1: Success
891 * 0: Error
892 */
893 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
894 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
895 {
896 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
897
898 switch (st->hand_state) {
899 default:
900 /* Shouldn't happen */
901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
902 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
903 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
904 return 0;
905
906 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
907 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
908 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
909 else
910 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
911 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
912 break;
913
914 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
915 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
916 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
917 break;
918
919 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
920 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
921 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
922 break;
923
924 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
925 *confunc = NULL;
926 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
927 break;
928
929 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
932 break;
933
934 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
937 break;
938
939 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
942 break;
943
944 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
945 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
946 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
947 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
948 break;
949 #endif
950 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
951 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
952 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
953 break;
954
955 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
956 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
957 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
958 break;
959 }
960
961 return 1;
962 }
963
964 /*
965 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
966 * reading. Excludes the message header.
967 */
968 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
969 {
970 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
971
972 switch (st->hand_state) {
973 default:
974 /* Shouldn't happen */
975 return 0;
976
977 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
978 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
979
980 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
981 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
982
983 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
984 return s->max_cert_list;
985
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
987 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
988
989 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
990 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
991
992 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
993 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
994
995 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
996 /*
997 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
998 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
999 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1000 */
1001 return s->max_cert_list;
1002
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1004 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1005
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1007 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1008 return 3;
1009 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1010
1011 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1012 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1013
1014 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1015 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1016
1017 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1018 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1019
1020 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1021 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1022 }
1023 }
1024
1025 /*
1026 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1027 */
1028 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1029 {
1030 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1031
1032 switch (st->hand_state) {
1033 default:
1034 /* Shouldn't happen */
1035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1036 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1037 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1038 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1039
1040 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1041 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1042
1043 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1044 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1045
1046 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1047 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1048
1049 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1050 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1051
1052 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1053 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1054
1055 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1056 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1057
1058 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1059 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1060
1061 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1062 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1063
1064 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1065 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1066
1067 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1068 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1069
1070 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1071 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1072
1073 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1074 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1075
1076 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1077 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1078
1079 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1080 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1081 }
1082 }
1083
1084 /*
1085 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1086 * from the server
1087 */
1088 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1089 {
1090 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1091
1092 switch (st->hand_state) {
1093 default:
1094 /* Shouldn't happen */
1095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1096 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1097 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1098 return WORK_ERROR;
1099
1100 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1101 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1102 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1103 }
1104 }
1105
1106 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1107 {
1108 unsigned char *p;
1109 size_t sess_id_len;
1110 int i, protverr;
1111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1112 SSL_COMP *comp;
1113 #endif
1114 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1115 unsigned char *session_id;
1116
1117 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1118 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1119 if (protverr != 0) {
1120 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1121 protverr);
1122 return 0;
1123 }
1124
1125 if (sess == NULL
1126 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1127 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1128 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1129 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1130 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1131 return 0;
1132 }
1133 }
1134 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1135
1136 p = s->s3.client_random;
1137
1138 /*
1139 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1140 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1141 */
1142 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1143 size_t idx;
1144 i = 1;
1145 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1146 if (p[idx]) {
1147 i = 0;
1148 break;
1149 }
1150 }
1151 } else {
1152 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1153 }
1154
1155 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1156 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1158 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 return 0;
1160 }
1161
1162 /*-
1163 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1164 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1165 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1166 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1167 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1168 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1169 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1170 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1171 * 1.0.
1172 *
1173 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1174 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1175 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1176 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1177 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1178 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1179 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1180 * know that is maximum server supports.
1181 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1182 * containing version 1.0.
1183 *
1184 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1185 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1186 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1187 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1188 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1189 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1190 * the negotiated version.
1191 *
1192 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1193 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1194 */
1195 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1196 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1198 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 return 0;
1200 }
1201
1202 /* Session ID */
1203 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1204 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1205 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1206 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1207 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1208 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1209 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1210 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1211 && RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1212 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1214 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1215 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 return 0;
1217 }
1218 } else {
1219 sess_id_len = 0;
1220 }
1221 } else {
1222 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1223 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1224 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1225 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1226 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1227 }
1228 }
1229 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1230 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1231 sess_id_len))
1232 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1235 return 0;
1236 }
1237
1238 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1239 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1240 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1241 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1242 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1245 return 0;
1246 }
1247 }
1248
1249 /* Ciphers supported */
1250 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1252 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 return 0;
1254 }
1255
1256 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1258 return 0;
1259 }
1260 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1261 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1262 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1263 return 0;
1264 }
1265
1266 /* COMPRESSION */
1267 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1269 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1270 return 0;
1271 }
1272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1273 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1274 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1275 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1276 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1277 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1278 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1279 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1281 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1282 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1283 return 0;
1284 }
1285 }
1286 }
1287 #endif
1288 /* Add the NULL method */
1289 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1290 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1291 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1292 return 0;
1293 }
1294
1295 /* TLS extensions */
1296 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1297 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1298 return 0;
1299 }
1300
1301 return 1;
1302 }
1303
1304 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1305 {
1306 size_t cookie_len;
1307 PACKET cookiepkt;
1308
1309 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1310 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1312 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1313 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1314 }
1315
1316 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1317 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1319 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1320 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1321 }
1322
1323 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1325 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1326 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1327 }
1328 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1329
1330 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1331 }
1332
1333 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1334 {
1335 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1336 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1337 int i;
1338
1339 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1340 if (c == NULL) {
1341 /* unknown cipher */
1342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1343 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1344 return 0;
1345 }
1346 /*
1347 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1348 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1349 */
1350 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1352 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1353 return 0;
1354 }
1355
1356 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1357 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1358 if (i < 0) {
1359 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1361 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1362 return 0;
1363 }
1364
1365 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1366 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1367 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1369 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1370 return 0;
1371 }
1372
1373 /*
1374 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1375 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1376 * set and use it for comparison.
1377 */
1378 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1379 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1380 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1381 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1382 /*
1383 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1384 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1385 */
1386 if (ssl_md(s->ctx, c->algorithm2)
1387 != ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1389 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1390 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1391 return 0;
1392 }
1393 } else {
1394 /*
1395 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1396 * ciphersuite.
1397 */
1398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1399 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1400 return 0;
1401 }
1402 }
1403 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1404
1405 return 1;
1406 }
1407
1408 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1409 {
1410 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1411 size_t session_id_len;
1412 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1413 int hrr = 0;
1414 unsigned int compression;
1415 unsigned int sversion;
1416 unsigned int context;
1417 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1419 SSL_COMP *comp;
1420 #endif
1421
1422 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1424 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1425 goto err;
1426 }
1427
1428 /* load the server random */
1429 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1430 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1431 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1432 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1433 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1434 hrr = 1;
1435 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1437 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1438 goto err;
1439 }
1440 } else {
1441 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1443 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1444 goto err;
1445 }
1446 }
1447
1448 /* Get the session-id. */
1449 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1451 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1452 goto err;
1453 }
1454 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1455 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1456 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1458 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1459 goto err;
1460 }
1461
1462 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1464 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1465 goto err;
1466 }
1467
1468 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1470 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1471 goto err;
1472 }
1473
1474 /* TLS extensions */
1475 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1476 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1477 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1478 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1480 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1481 goto err;
1482 }
1483
1484 if (!hrr) {
1485 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1486 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1487 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1488 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1489 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1490 goto err;
1491 }
1492
1493 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1494 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1495 goto err;
1496 }
1497 }
1498
1499 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1500 if (compression != 0) {
1501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1502 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1503 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1504 goto err;
1505 }
1506
1507 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1508 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1509 session_id_len) != 0) {
1510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1511 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1512 goto err;
1513 }
1514 }
1515
1516 if (hrr) {
1517 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1518 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1519 goto err;
1520 }
1521
1522 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1523 }
1524
1525 /*
1526 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1527 * are appropriate for this version.
1528 */
1529 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1530 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1531 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1533 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1534 goto err;
1535 }
1536
1537 s->hit = 0;
1538
1539 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1540 /*
1541 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1542 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1543 */
1544 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1546 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1547 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1548 goto err;
1549 }
1550
1551 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1552 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1553 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1554 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1555 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1556 goto err;
1557 }
1558 } else {
1559 /*
1560 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1561 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1562 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1563 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1564 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1565 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1566 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1567 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1568 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1569 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1570 */
1571 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1572 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1573 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1574 /*
1575 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1576 * backwards compat reasons
1577 */
1578 int master_key_length;
1579 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1580 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1581 &master_key_length,
1582 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1583 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1584 && master_key_length > 0) {
1585 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1586 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1587 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1588 } else {
1589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1590 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1591 goto err;
1592 }
1593 }
1594
1595 if (session_id_len != 0
1596 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1597 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1598 session_id_len) == 0)
1599 s->hit = 1;
1600 }
1601
1602 if (s->hit) {
1603 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1604 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1605 /* actually a client application bug */
1606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1607 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1608 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1609 goto err;
1610 }
1611 } else {
1612 /*
1613 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1614 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1615 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1616 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1617 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1618 */
1619 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1620 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1621 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1622 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1623 goto err;
1624 }
1625 }
1626
1627 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1628 /*
1629 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1630 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1631 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1632 * used for resumption.
1633 */
1634 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1635 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1636 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1637 if (session_id_len > 0)
1638 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1639 session_id_len);
1640 }
1641 }
1642
1643 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1644 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1646 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1647 goto err;
1648 }
1649 /*
1650 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1651 * version.
1652 */
1653 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1654 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1655
1656 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1657 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1658 goto err;
1659 }
1660
1661 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1662 if (compression != 0) {
1663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1664 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1665 goto err;
1666 }
1667 /*
1668 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1669 * using compression.
1670 */
1671 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1673 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1674 goto err;
1675 }
1676 #else
1677 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1679 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1680 goto err;
1681 }
1682 if (compression == 0)
1683 comp = NULL;
1684 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1686 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1687 goto err;
1688 } else {
1689 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1690 }
1691
1692 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1694 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1695 goto err;
1696 } else {
1697 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1698 }
1699 #endif
1700
1701 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1702 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1703 goto err;
1704 }
1705
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1707 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1708 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1709 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1710 size_t labellen;
1711
1712 /*
1713 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1714 * no SCTP used.
1715 */
1716 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1717 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1718
1719 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1720 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1721 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1722 labellen += 1;
1723
1724 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1725 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1726 labelbuffer,
1727 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1730 goto err;
1731 }
1732
1733 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1734 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1735 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1736 }
1737 #endif
1738
1739 /*
1740 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1741 * we're done with this message
1742 */
1743 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1744 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1745 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1746 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1747 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1748 goto err;
1749 }
1750
1751 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1752 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1753 err:
1754 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1755 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1756 }
1757
1758 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1759 PACKET *extpkt)
1760 {
1761 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1762
1763 /*
1764 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1765 * should not be used.
1766 */
1767 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1768 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1769
1770 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1771 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1772 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1773 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1774 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1775 goto err;
1776 }
1777
1778 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1779 extensions = NULL;
1780
1781 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1782 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1783 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL
1784 #endif
1785 ) {
1786 /*
1787 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1788 * ClientHello will not change
1789 */
1790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1791 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1792 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1793 goto err;
1794 }
1795
1796 /*
1797 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1798 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1799 */
1800 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1801 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1802 goto err;
1803 }
1804
1805 /*
1806 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1807 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1808 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1809 * for HRR messages.
1810 */
1811 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1812 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1814 goto err;
1815 }
1816
1817 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1818 err:
1819 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1820 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1821 }
1822
1823 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1824 {
1825 int i;
1826 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1827 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1828 X509 *x = NULL;
1829 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1830 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1831 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1832 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1833 unsigned int context = 0;
1834 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1835
1836 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1838 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1839 goto err;
1840 }
1841
1842 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1843 || context != 0
1844 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1845 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1846 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1848 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1849 goto err;
1850 }
1851 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1852 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1853 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1855 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1856 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1857 goto err;
1858 }
1859
1860 certstart = certbytes;
1861 x = X509_new_with_libctx(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
1862 if (x == NULL) {
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1864 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1865 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1866 goto err;
1867 }
1868 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
1869 cert_len) == NULL) {
1870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1871 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1872 goto err;
1873 }
1874
1875 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1877 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1878 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1879 goto err;
1880 }
1881
1882 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1883 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1884 PACKET extensions;
1885
1886 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1888 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1889 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1890 goto err;
1891 }
1892 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1893 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1894 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1895 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1896 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1897 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1898 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1899 /* SSLfatal already called */
1900 goto err;
1901 }
1902 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1903 }
1904
1905 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1907 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1908 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1909 goto err;
1910 }
1911 x = NULL;
1912 }
1913
1914 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1915 /*
1916 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1917 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1918 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1919 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1920 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1921 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1922 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1923 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1924 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1925 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1926 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1927 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1928 */
1929 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1930 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1931 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1932 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1933 goto err;
1934 }
1935 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1936 if (i > 1) {
1937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1938 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1939 goto err;
1940 }
1941
1942 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1943 /*
1944 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1945 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1946 */
1947 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1948 sk = NULL;
1949
1950 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1951
1952 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1953 x = NULL;
1954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1955 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1956 goto err;
1957 }
1958
1959 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1960 x = NULL;
1961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1962 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1963 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1964 goto err;
1965 }
1966 /*
1967 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1968 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1969 * type.
1970 */
1971 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1972 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1973 x = NULL;
1974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1975 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1976 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1977 goto err;
1978 }
1979 }
1980 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1981
1982 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1983 X509_up_ref(x);
1984 s->session->peer = x;
1985 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1986 x = NULL;
1987
1988 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1989 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1990 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1991 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1992 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1993 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1994 goto err;
1995 }
1996
1997 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1998
1999 err:
2000 X509_free(x);
2001 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2002 return ret;
2003 }
2004
2005 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2006 {
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2008 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
2009
2010 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2011
2012 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
2013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2014 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2015 return 0;
2016 }
2017
2018 /*
2019 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2020 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2021 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2022 * identity.
2023 */
2024 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2026 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2027 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2028 return 0;
2029 }
2030
2031 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2032 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2033 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2034 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2035 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2037 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2038 return 0;
2039 }
2040
2041 return 1;
2042 #else
2043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2045 return 0;
2046 #endif
2047 }
2048
2049 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2050 {
2051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2052 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2053
2054 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2055 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2056 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2057 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2059 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2060 return 0;
2061 }
2062
2063 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2064 if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
2065 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2066 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2067 || (s->srp_ctx.g =
2068 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2069 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2070 || (s->srp_ctx.s =
2071 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2072 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2073 || (s->srp_ctx.B =
2074 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2075 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2077 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2078 return 0;
2079 }
2080
2081 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2082 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2083 return 0;
2084 }
2085
2086 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2087 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2088 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2089
2090 return 1;
2091 #else
2092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2094 return 0;
2095 #endif
2096 }
2097
2098 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2099 {
2100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2101 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2102 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2103
2104 DH *dh = NULL;
2105 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2106
2107 int check_bits = 0;
2108
2109 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2110 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2111 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2112 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2113 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2114 return 0;
2115 }
2116
2117 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2118 dh = DH_new();
2119
2120 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2122 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2123 goto err;
2124 }
2125
2126 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2127 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2128 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2129 NULL);
2130 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2131 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2132 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2134 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2135 goto err;
2136 }
2137
2138 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2139 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2141 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2142 goto err;
2143 }
2144
2145 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2147 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2148 goto err;
2149 }
2150 p = g = NULL;
2151
2152 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2154 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2155 goto err;
2156 }
2157
2158 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2160 ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2161 goto err;
2162 }
2163 bnpub_key = NULL;
2164
2165 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2167 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2168 goto err;
2169 }
2170 dh = NULL;
2171
2172 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2173 0, EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(peer_tmp))) {
2174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2175 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2176 goto err;
2177 }
2178
2179 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2180
2181 /*
2182 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2183 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2184 */
2185 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2186 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2187 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2188
2189 return 1;
2190
2191 err:
2192 BN_free(p);
2193 BN_free(g);
2194 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2195 DH_free(dh);
2196 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2197
2198 return 0;
2199 #else
2200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2201 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2202 return 0;
2203 #endif
2204 }
2205
2206 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2207 {
2208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2209 PACKET encoded_pt;
2210 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2211
2212 /*
2213 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2214 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2215 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2216 */
2217 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2219 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2220 return 0;
2221 }
2222 /*
2223 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2224 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2225 */
2226 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2227 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2229 SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2230 return 0;
2231 }
2232
2233 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2235 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2236 return 0;
2237 }
2238
2239 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2241 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2242 return 0;
2243 }
2244
2245 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2246 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2247 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2249 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2250 return 0;
2251 }
2252
2253 /*
2254 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2255 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2256 * and ECDSA.
2257 */
2258 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2259 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2260 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2261 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2262 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2263
2264 return 1;
2265 #else
2266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2268 return 0;
2269 #endif
2270 }
2271
2272 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2273 {
2274 long alg_k;
2275 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2276 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2277 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2278 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2279
2280 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2281
2282 save_param_start = *pkt;
2283
2284 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2285 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2286 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2287 #endif
2288
2289 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2290 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2292 goto err;
2293 }
2294 }
2295
2296 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2297 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2298 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2299 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2300 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2301 goto err;
2302 }
2303 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2304 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2305 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2306 goto err;
2307 }
2308 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2309 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2310 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2311 goto err;
2312 }
2313 } else if (alg_k) {
2314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2315 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2316 goto err;
2317 }
2318
2319 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2320 if (pkey != NULL) {
2321 PACKET params;
2322 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2323 unsigned char *tbs;
2324 size_t tbslen;
2325 int rv;
2326
2327 /*
2328 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2329 * equals the length of the parameters.
2330 */
2331 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
2332 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2333 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2335 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2336 goto err;
2337 }
2338
2339 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2340 unsigned int sigalg;
2341
2342 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2344 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2345 goto err;
2346 }
2347 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2349 goto err;
2350 }
2351 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2353 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2354 goto err;
2355 }
2356
2357 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2360 goto err;
2361 }
2362 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2363 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2364 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
2365
2366 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2367 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2369 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2370 goto err;
2371 }
2372
2373 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2374 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2376 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2377 goto err;
2378 }
2379
2380 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2381 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md),
2382 s->ctx->propq, pkey, s->ctx->libctx) <= 0) {
2383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2384 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2385 goto err;
2386 }
2387 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2388 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2389 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2390 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2392 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2393 goto err;
2394 }
2395 }
2396 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(&params),
2397 PACKET_remaining(&params));
2398 if (tbslen == 0) {
2399 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2400 goto err;
2401 }
2402
2403 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2404 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2405 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2406 if (rv <= 0) {
2407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2408 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2409 goto err;
2410 }
2411 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2412 md_ctx = NULL;
2413 } else {
2414 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2415 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2416 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2417 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2418 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2420 SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2421 }
2422 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2423 goto err;
2424 }
2425 /* still data left over */
2426 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2429 goto err;
2430 }
2431 }
2432
2433 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2434 err:
2435 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2436 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2437 }
2438
2439 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2440 {
2441 size_t i;
2442
2443 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2444 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2445 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2446
2447 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2448 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2449 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2450
2451 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2452 /*
2453 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2454 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2455 * we just ignore it
2456 */
2457 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2458 }
2459
2460 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2461 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2462 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2463 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2464 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2465 s->pha_context = NULL;
2466
2467 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2468 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2470 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2471 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2472 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2473 }
2474
2475 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2477 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2478 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2479 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2480 }
2481 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2482 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2483 &rawexts, NULL, 1)
2484 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2485 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2487 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2488 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2489 }
2490 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2491 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2493 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2494 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2495 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2496 }
2497 } else {
2498 PACKET ctypes;
2499
2500 /* get the certificate types */
2501 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2503 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2504 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2505 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2506 }
2507
2508 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2510 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2511 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2512 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2513 }
2514
2515 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2516 PACKET sigalgs;
2517
2518 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2520 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2521 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2522 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2523 }
2524
2525 /*
2526 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2527 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2528 */
2529 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2531 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2532 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2533 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2534 }
2535 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2537 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2538 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2539 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2540 }
2541 }
2542
2543 /* get the CA RDNs */
2544 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2545 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2546 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2547 }
2548 }
2549
2550 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2552 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2553 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2554 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2555 }
2556
2557 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2558 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2559
2560 /*
2561 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2562 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2563 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2564 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2565 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2566 * client_cert_cb.
2567 */
2568 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2569 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2570
2571 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2572 }
2573
2574 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2575 {
2576 unsigned int ticklen;
2577 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2578 unsigned int sess_len;
2579 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2580 PACKET nonce;
2581 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2582
2583 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2584
2585 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2586 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2587 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2588 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2589 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2590 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2591 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2593 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2594 goto err;
2595 }
2596
2597 /*
2598 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2599 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2600 * be 0 here in that instance
2601 */
2602 if (ticklen == 0)
2603 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2604
2605 /*
2606 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2607 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2608 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2609 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2610 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2611 * cache.
2612 */
2613 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2614 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2615
2616 /*
2617 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2618 * one
2619 */
2620 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2622 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2623 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2624 goto err;
2625 }
2626
2627 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2628 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2629 /*
2630 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2631 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2632 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2633 */
2634 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2635 }
2636
2637 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2638 s->session = new_sess;
2639 }
2640
2641 /*
2642 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2643 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2644 */
2645 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2646
2647 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2648 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2649 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2650
2651 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2652 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2654 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2655 goto err;
2656 }
2657 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2659 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2660 goto err;
2661 }
2662
2663 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2664 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2665 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2666
2667 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2668 PACKET extpkt;
2669
2670 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2671 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2673 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2674 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2675 goto err;
2676 }
2677
2678 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2679 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2680 NULL, 1)
2681 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2682 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2683 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2684 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2685 goto err;
2686 }
2687 }
2688
2689 /*
2690 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2691 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2692 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2693 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2694 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2695 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2696 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2697 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2698 * ticket.
2699 */
2700 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq);
2701 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2703 SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED);
2704 goto err;
2705 }
2706 /*
2707 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2708 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2709 */
2710 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2711 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2712 sha256, NULL)) {
2713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2714 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2715 goto err;
2716 }
2717 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2718 sha256 = NULL;
2719 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2720 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2721
2722 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2723 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2724 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2725 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2726 size_t hashlen;
2727 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2728
2729 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2730 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2732 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2733 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2734 goto err;
2735 }
2736 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2737
2738 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2739 nonce_label,
2740 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2741 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2742 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2743 s->session->master_key,
2744 hashlen, 1)) {
2745 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2746 goto err;
2747 }
2748 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2749
2750 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2751 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2752 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2753 }
2754
2755 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2756 err:
2757 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2758 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2759 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2760 }
2761
2762 /*
2763 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2764 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2765 */
2766 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2767 {
2768 size_t resplen;
2769 unsigned int type;
2770
2771 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2772 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2774 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2775 return 0;
2776 }
2777 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2778 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2780 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2781 return 0;
2782 }
2783 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2784 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2786 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2787 return 0;
2788 }
2789 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2791 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2792 return 0;
2793 }
2794 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2795
2796 return 1;
2797 }
2798
2799
2800 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2801 {
2802 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2804 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2805 }
2806
2807 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2808 }
2809
2810 /*
2811 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2812 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2813 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2814 * on failure.
2815 */
2816 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2817 {
2818 /*
2819 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2820 * the server
2821 */
2822 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2823 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2824 return 0;
2825 }
2826
2827 /*
2828 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2829 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2830 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2831 */
2832 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2833 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2834 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2835
2836 if (ret == 0) {
2837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2838 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2839 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2840 return 0;
2841 }
2842 if (ret < 0) {
2843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2844 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2845 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2846 return 0;
2847 }
2848 }
2849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2850 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2851 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2852 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2853 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2854 return 0;
2855 }
2856 }
2857 #endif
2858
2859 return 1;
2860 }
2861
2862 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2863 {
2864 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2865 /* should contain no data */
2866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2867 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2868 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2869 }
2870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2871 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2872 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2874 SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2875 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2876 }
2877 }
2878 #endif
2879
2880 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2881 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2882 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2883 }
2884
2885 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2886 }
2887
2888 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2889 {
2890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2891 int ret = 0;
2892 /*
2893 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2894 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2895 * strnlen.
2896 */
2897 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2898 size_t identitylen = 0;
2899 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2900 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2901 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2902 size_t psklen = 0;
2903
2904 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2906 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2907 goto err;
2908 }
2909
2910 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2911
2912 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2913 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2914 psk, sizeof(psk));
2915
2916 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2918 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2919 goto err;
2920 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2922 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2923 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2924 goto err;
2925 }
2926
2927 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2928 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2930 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2931 goto err;
2932 }
2933
2934 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2935 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2936 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2938 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2939 goto err;
2940 }
2941
2942 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2943 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2944 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2945 tmppsk = NULL;
2946 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2947 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2948 tmpidentity = NULL;
2949
2950 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2952 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2953 goto err;
2954 }
2955
2956 ret = 1;
2957
2958 err:
2959 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2960 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2961 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2962 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2963
2964 return ret;
2965 #else
2966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2967 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2968 return 0;
2969 #endif
2970 }
2971
2972 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2973 {
2974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2975 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2976 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2977 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2978 size_t enclen;
2979 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2980 size_t pmslen = 0;
2981
2982 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2983 /*
2984 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2985 */
2986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2987 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2988 return 0;
2989 }
2990
2991 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2992 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2994 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2995 return 0;
2996 }
2997
2998 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2999 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3000 if (pms == NULL) {
3001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3002 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3003 return 0;
3004 }
3005
3006 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
3007 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
3008 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3009 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
3010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3011 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3012 goto err;
3013 }
3014
3015 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3016 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3019 goto err;
3020 }
3021
3022 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq);
3023 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3024 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3026 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3027 goto err;
3028 }
3029 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3030 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3032 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3033 goto err;
3034 }
3035 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3036 pctx = NULL;
3037
3038 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3039 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3041 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3042 goto err;
3043 }
3044
3045 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3046 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3047 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3048 goto err;
3049 }
3050
3051 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3052 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3053
3054 return 1;
3055 err:
3056 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3057 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3058
3059 return 0;
3060 #else
3061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3062 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3063 return 0;
3064 #endif
3065 }
3066
3067 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3068 {
3069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3070 DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
3071 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
3072 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3073 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3074
3075 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3076 if (skey == NULL) {
3077 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3078 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3079 goto err;
3080 }
3081
3082 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3083 if (ckey == NULL) {
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 goto err;
3087 }
3088
3089 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3090
3091 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3094 goto err;
3095 }
3096
3097 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3098 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3099 goto err;
3100 }
3101
3102 /* send off the data */
3103 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3104 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3105 &keybytes)) {
3106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3108 goto err;
3109 }
3110
3111 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3112 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3113
3114 return 1;
3115 err:
3116 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3117 return 0;
3118 #else
3119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3120 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3121 return 0;
3122 #endif
3123 }
3124
3125 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3126 {
3127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3128 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3129 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3130 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3131 int ret = 0;
3132
3133 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3134 if (skey == NULL) {
3135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3136 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3137 return 0;
3138 }
3139
3140 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3141 if (ckey == NULL) {
3142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3143 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3144 goto err;
3145 }
3146
3147 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3148 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3149 goto err;
3150 }
3151
3152 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3153 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3154
3155 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3157 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3158 goto err;
3159 }
3160
3161 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3163 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3164 goto err;
3165 }
3166
3167 ret = 1;
3168 err:
3169 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3170 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3171 return ret;
3172 #else
3173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3174 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3175 return 0;
3176 #endif
3177 }
3178
3179 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3180 {
3181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3182 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3183 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3184 X509 *peer_cert;
3185 size_t msglen;
3186 unsigned int md_len;
3187 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3188 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3189 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3190 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3191 size_t pmslen = 0;
3192
3193 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3194 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3195
3196 /*
3197 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3198 */
3199 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3200 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3202 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3203 return 0;
3204 }
3205
3206 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
3207 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3208 s->ctx->propq);
3209 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3211 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3212 return 0;
3213 }
3214 /*
3215 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3216 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3217 * certificate key for key exchange
3218 */
3219
3220 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3221 pmslen = 32;
3222 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3223 if (pms == NULL) {
3224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3225 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3226 goto err;
3227 }
3228
3229 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3230 /* Generate session key
3231 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3232 */
3233 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3236 goto err;
3237 };
3238 /*
3239 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3240 * data
3241 */
3242 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3243 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3244 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3245 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3246 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3247 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3248 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3249 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3251 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3252 goto err;
3253 }
3254 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3255 ukm_hash = NULL;
3256 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3257 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3259 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3260 goto err;
3261 }
3262 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3263 /*
3264 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3265 */
3266 msglen = 255;
3267 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3269 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3270 goto err;
3271 }
3272
3273 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3274 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3275 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3277 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3278 goto err;
3279 }
3280
3281 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3282 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3283 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3284
3285 return 1;
3286 err:
3287 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3288 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3289 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3290 return 0;
3291 #else
3292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3293 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3294 return 0;
3295 #endif
3296 }
3297
3298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3299 int gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL *s)
3300 {
3301 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3302 return NID_magma_ctr;
3303 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3304 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3305
3306 return NID_undef;
3307 }
3308
3309 int gost_ukm(const SSL *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3310 {
3311 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3312 unsigned int md_len;
3313 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, s->ctx->propq);
3314
3315 if (md == NULL)
3316 return 0;
3317
3318 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3319 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3320 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3321 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3322 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3323 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3324 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3325 return 0;
3326 }
3327
3328 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3329 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3330 return 1;
3331 }
3332 #endif
3333
3334 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3335 {
3336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3337 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3338 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32], tmp[255];
3339 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3340 X509 *peer_cert;
3341 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3342 size_t pmslen = 0;
3343 size_t msglen;
3344 int cipher_nid = gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3345
3346 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3349 return 0;
3350 }
3351
3352 if (gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3354 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3355 goto err;
3356 }
3357
3358 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3359 pmslen = 32;
3360 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3361 if (pms == NULL) {
3362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3363 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3364 goto err;
3365 }
3366
3367 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3369 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3370 goto err;
3371 }
3372
3373 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3374 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3375 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3377 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3378 return 0;
3379 }
3380
3381 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), s->ctx->propq);
3382 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3384 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3385 return 0;
3386 }
3387
3388 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 ) {
3389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3390 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3391 goto err;
3392 };
3393
3394 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3395 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3396 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) {
3397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3398 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3399 goto err;
3400 }
3401
3402 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3403 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) {
3404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3405 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3406 goto err;
3407 }
3408
3409 msglen = 255;
3410 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3412 SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3413 goto err;
3414 }
3415
3416 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3419 goto err;
3420 }
3421
3422 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3423 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3424 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3425
3426 return 1;
3427 err:
3428 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3429 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3430 return 0;
3431 #else
3432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3433 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3434 return 0;
3435 #endif
3436 }
3437
3438 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3439 {
3440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3441 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3442
3443 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3444 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3445 &abytes)) {
3446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3447 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3448 return 0;
3449 }
3450 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3451
3452 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3453 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3454 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3456 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3457 return 0;
3458 }
3459
3460 return 1;
3461 #else
3462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3463 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3464 return 0;
3465 #endif
3466 }
3467
3468 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3469 {
3470 unsigned long alg_k;
3471
3472 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3473
3474 /*
3475 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3476 * no need to do so here.
3477 */
3478 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3479 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3480 goto err;
3481
3482 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3483 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3484 goto err;
3485 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3486 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3487 goto err;
3488 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3489 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3490 goto err;
3491 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3492 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3493 goto err;
3494 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3495 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3496 goto err;
3497 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3498 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3499 goto err;
3500 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3502 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3503 goto err;
3504 }
3505
3506 return 1;
3507 err:
3508 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3509 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3511 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3512 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3513 #endif
3514 return 0;
3515 }
3516
3517 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3518 {
3519 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3520 size_t pmslen = 0;
3521
3522 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3523 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3524
3525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3526 /* Check for SRP */
3527 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3528 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3529 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3530 goto err;
3531 }
3532 return 1;
3533 }
3534 #endif
3535
3536 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3538 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3539 goto err;
3540 }
3541 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3542 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3543 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3544 pms = NULL;
3545 pmslen = 0;
3546 goto err;
3547 }
3548 pms = NULL;
3549 pmslen = 0;
3550
3551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3552 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3553 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3554 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3555 size_t labellen;
3556
3557 /*
3558 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3559 * used.
3560 */
3561 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3562 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3563
3564 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3565 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3566 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3567 labellen += 1;
3568
3569 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3570 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3571 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3573 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3574 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3575 goto err;
3576 }
3577
3578 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3579 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3580 }
3581 #endif
3582
3583 return 1;
3584 err:
3585 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3586 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3587 return 0;
3588 }
3589
3590 /*
3591 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3592 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3593 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3594 */
3595 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3596 {
3597 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3598 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3599 return 0;
3600 /*
3601 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3602 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3603 */
3604 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3605 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3606 return 0;
3607 return 1;
3608 }
3609
3610 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3611 {
3612 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3613 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3614 int i;
3615
3616 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3617 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3618 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3619 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3620 if (i < 0) {
3621 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3622 return WORK_MORE_A;
3623 }
3624 if (i == 0) {
3625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3626 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3627 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3628 return WORK_ERROR;
3629 }
3630 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3631 }
3632 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3633 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3634 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3635 }
3636 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3637 }
3638
3639 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3640 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3641 }
3642
3643 /* We need to get a client cert */
3644 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3645 /*
3646 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3647 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3648 */
3649 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3650 if (i < 0) {
3651 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3652 return WORK_MORE_B;
3653 }
3654 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3655 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3656 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3657 i = 0;
3658 } else if (i == 1) {
3659 i = 0;
3660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3661 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3662 }
3663
3664 X509_free(x509);
3665 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3666 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3667 i = 0;
3668 if (i == 0) {
3669 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3670 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3671 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3672 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3673 } else {
3674 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3675 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3676 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3677 return WORK_ERROR;
3678 }
3679 }
3680 }
3681
3682 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3683 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3684 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3685 }
3686
3687 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3689 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3690 return WORK_ERROR;
3691 }
3692
3693 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3694 {
3695 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3696 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3697 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3698 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3700 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3701 return 0;
3702 }
3703 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3705 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3706 return 0;
3707 }
3708 }
3709 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3710 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3711 : s->cert->key)) {
3712 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3713 return 0;
3714 }
3715
3716 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3717 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3718 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3719 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3720 /*
3721 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3722 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3723 */
3724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3725 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3726 return 0;
3727 }
3728
3729 return 1;
3730 }
3731
3732 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3733 {
3734 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3735 size_t idx;
3736 long alg_k, alg_a;
3737
3738 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3739 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3740
3741 /* we don't have a certificate */
3742 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3743 return 1;
3744
3745 /* This is the passed certificate */
3746 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3747
3748 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3749 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3751 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3752 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3753 return 0;
3754 }
3755
3756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3757 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3758 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3759 return 1;
3760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3761 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3762 return 0;
3763 }
3764 #endif
3765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3766 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3768 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3769 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3770 return 0;
3771 }
3772 #endif
3773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3774 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3776 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3777 return 0;
3778 }
3779 #endif
3780
3781 return 1;
3782 }
3783
3784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3785 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3786 {
3787 size_t len, padding_len;
3788 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3789
3790 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3791 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3792
3793 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3794 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3796 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3797 return 0;
3798 }
3799
3800 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3801
3802 return 1;
3803 }
3804 #endif
3805
3806 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3807 {
3808 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3809 /* should contain no data */
3810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3811 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3812 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3813 }
3814
3815 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3816 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3817 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3818 }
3819
3820 /*
3821 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3822 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3823 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3824 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3825 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3826 */
3827 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3828 SSL_renegotiate(s);
3829 else
3830 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3831
3832 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3833 }
3834
3835 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3836 {
3837 PACKET extensions;
3838 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3839
3840 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3841 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3843 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3844 goto err;
3845 }
3846
3847 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3848 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3849 NULL, 1)
3850 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3851 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3853 goto err;
3854 }
3855
3856 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3857 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3858
3859 err:
3860 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3861 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3862 }
3863
3864 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3865 {
3866 int i = 0;
3867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3868 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3869 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3870 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3871 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3872 if (i != 0)
3873 return i;
3874 }
3875 #endif
3876 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3877 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3878 return i;
3879 }
3880
3881 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3882 {
3883 int i;
3884 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3885 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3886
3887 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3888 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3890 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3891 return 0;
3892 }
3893
3894 if (sk == NULL) {
3895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3896 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3897 return 0;
3898 }
3899
3900 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3901 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3902 # error Max cipher length too short
3903 # endif
3904 /*
3905 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3906 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3907 * use TLS v1.2
3908 */
3909 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3910 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3911 else
3912 #endif
3913 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3914 maxlen = 0xfffe;
3915
3916 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3917 maxlen -= 2;
3918 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3919 maxlen -= 2;
3920
3921 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3922 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3923
3924 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3925 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3926 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3927 continue;
3928
3929 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3931 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3932 return 0;
3933 }
3934
3935 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3936 if (!maxverok) {
3937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3938 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3939 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3940 maxverok = 1;
3941 } else {
3942 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3943 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3944 maxverok = 1;
3945 }
3946 }
3947
3948 totlen += len;
3949 }
3950
3951 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3953 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3954
3955 if (!maxverok)
3956 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3957 "SSL/TLS version");
3958
3959 return 0;
3960 }
3961
3962 if (totlen != 0) {
3963 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3964 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3965 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3966 };
3967 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3969 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3970 return 0;
3971 }
3972 }
3973 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3974 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3975 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3976 };
3977 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3979 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3980 return 0;
3981 }
3982 }
3983 }
3984
3985 return 1;
3986 }
3987
3988 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3989 {
3990 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3991 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3993 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3994 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3995 return 0;
3996 }
3997
3998 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3999 return 1;
4000 }
A mirror of the official openssl repository