2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
65 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
66 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
67 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
68 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
72 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
78 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
80 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
81 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
82 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
83 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
90 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
96 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
98 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
101 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
102 * ciphersuite or for SRP
104 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
113 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
114 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
115 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
116 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
118 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
119 * (transition not allowed)
121 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
123 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
126 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
127 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
131 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
132 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
133 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
136 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
140 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
141 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
142 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
149 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
150 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
154 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
155 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
158 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
159 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
165 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
166 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
167 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
173 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
174 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
179 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
180 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
181 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
187 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
188 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
194 /* No valid transition found */
199 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
200 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
201 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
202 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
204 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
205 * (transition not allowed)
207 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
209 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
213 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
214 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
216 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
217 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
222 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
226 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
227 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
228 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
232 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
233 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
234 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
240 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
242 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
243 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
244 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
247 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
248 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
252 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
253 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
255 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
256 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
257 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
258 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
260 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
261 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
262 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
263 * the server is resuming.
266 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
268 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
269 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
270 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
271 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
275 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
276 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
278 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
279 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
280 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
281 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
284 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
285 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
286 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
288 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
289 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
298 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
299 * |ext.status_expected| is set
301 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
302 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
307 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
308 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
309 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
310 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
311 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
312 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
313 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
320 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
321 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
322 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
323 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
330 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
331 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
332 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
337 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
338 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
339 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
340 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
343 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
350 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
351 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
357 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
358 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
364 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
365 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
372 /* No valid transition found */
373 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
379 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
380 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
383 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
385 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
388 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
389 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
393 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
394 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
395 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
397 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
399 /* Shouldn't happen */
400 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
402 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
403 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
404 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
408 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
409 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
410 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
411 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
413 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
414 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
415 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
417 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
418 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
419 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
420 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
421 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
424 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the server */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
430 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
431 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
433 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
435 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
438 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
439 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
443 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
445 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
447 /* Shouldn't happen */
448 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
451 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
453 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
454 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
456 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
458 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
460 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
465 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
468 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
470 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
471 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
474 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
475 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
476 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
478 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
479 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
482 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
485 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
487 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
488 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
491 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
492 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
493 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
494 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
496 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
497 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
499 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
501 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
502 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
504 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
506 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
507 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
510 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
511 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
512 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
514 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
515 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
517 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
521 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
522 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
523 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
527 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
529 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
530 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
531 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
533 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
536 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
538 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
539 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
541 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
542 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
543 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
546 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
548 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
551 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
552 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
553 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
554 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
556 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
559 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
560 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
566 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
567 * the client to the server.
569 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
571 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
573 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
575 /* No pre work to be done */
578 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
580 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
581 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
582 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
589 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
593 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
594 * messages unless we need to.
598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
599 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
600 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
606 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
609 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
613 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
614 * client to the server.
615 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
616 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
618 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
620 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
624 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
626 /* No post work to be done */
629 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
630 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
633 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
634 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
639 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
640 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
644 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
645 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
646 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
647 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
649 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
650 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
652 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
654 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
657 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
658 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
661 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
665 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
668 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
673 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
677 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
679 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
681 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
684 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
688 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
691 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
692 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
693 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
699 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
703 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
706 * Valid return values are:
710 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
711 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
713 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
715 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
717 /* Shouldn't happen */
720 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
722 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
724 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
725 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
728 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
729 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
730 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
734 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
735 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
738 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
739 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
740 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
743 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
744 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
745 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
748 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
749 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
750 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
751 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
754 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
755 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
756 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
764 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
765 * reading. Excludes the message header.
767 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
769 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
771 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
773 /* Shouldn't happen */
776 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
777 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
779 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
780 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
783 return s
->max_cert_list
;
785 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
786 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
788 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
789 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
791 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
792 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
794 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
796 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
797 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
798 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
800 return s
->max_cert_list
;
802 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
803 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
805 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
806 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
808 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
810 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
811 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
813 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
814 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
816 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
817 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
822 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
824 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
826 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
828 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
830 /* Shouldn't happen */
831 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
833 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
834 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
836 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
837 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
840 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
842 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
843 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
845 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
846 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
848 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
849 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
851 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
852 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
854 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
855 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
857 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
858 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
860 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
861 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
863 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
864 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
866 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
867 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
869 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
870 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
875 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
878 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
880 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
882 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
884 /* Shouldn't happen */
887 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
888 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
891 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
892 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
893 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
894 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
895 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
896 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
897 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
898 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
901 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
902 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
907 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
912 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
916 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
918 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
919 /* Should not happen */
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
924 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
925 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
931 if ((sess
== NULL
) || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
933 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
934 * "ticket" without a session ID.
936 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->ext
.tick
) ||
937 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
938 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
941 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
943 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
944 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
946 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
949 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
950 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
952 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
955 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
964 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
968 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
969 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
970 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
971 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
972 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
973 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
974 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
975 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
978 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
979 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
980 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
981 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
982 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
983 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
984 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
985 * know that is maximum server supports.
986 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
987 * containing version 1.0.
989 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
990 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
991 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
992 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
993 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
994 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
995 * the negotiated version.
997 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
998 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1000 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1001 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1007 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1010 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1011 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1012 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1013 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
1015 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1020 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1021 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1022 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1023 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1024 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1030 /* Ciphers supported */
1031 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1035 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1036 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
))
1038 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1044 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1049 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1050 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1051 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1052 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1053 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1060 /* Add the NULL method */
1061 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1066 /* TLS extensions */
1067 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1068 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1076 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1082 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1083 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1084 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1089 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1090 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1091 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1096 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1097 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1101 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1103 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1105 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1106 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1107 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1110 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1112 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1113 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1114 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1115 size_t session_id_len
;
1116 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1117 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1118 unsigned int compression
;
1119 unsigned int sversion
;
1120 unsigned int context
;
1122 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1127 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1128 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1133 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1134 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
1135 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1136 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
1141 /* load the server hello data */
1142 /* load the server random */
1143 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1144 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1149 /* Get the session-id. */
1150 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1151 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1152 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1156 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1157 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1158 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1159 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1161 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1165 PACKET_null_init(&session_id
);
1169 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1171 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1175 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1176 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1178 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1185 /* TLS extensions */
1186 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1187 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1188 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)) {
1189 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1194 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1195 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1196 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, context
, &extensions
, &al
))
1201 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1202 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1203 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1204 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1205 extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1209 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1210 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1211 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1212 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1213 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1214 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1215 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1216 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1217 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1218 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1220 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1221 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1222 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1224 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1225 * backwards compat reasons
1227 int master_key_length
;
1228 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1229 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1232 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1233 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1234 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1235 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1236 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1239 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1244 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1245 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1246 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1247 session_id_len
) == 0)
1252 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1253 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1254 /* actually a client application bug */
1255 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1257 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1262 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1263 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1264 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1265 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1266 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1268 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1270 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1271 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1272 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1273 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1278 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1279 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1280 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1281 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1282 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1286 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1287 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1288 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1291 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1295 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1297 /* unknown cipher */
1298 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1303 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1306 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1307 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1309 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1310 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1312 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1313 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1318 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1319 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1321 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1322 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1328 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1329 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1330 * set and use it for comparison.
1332 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1333 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1334 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1335 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1337 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1340 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1342 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1343 if (compression
!= 0) {
1344 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1346 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1350 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1351 * using compression.
1353 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1358 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1359 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1361 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1364 if (compression
== 0)
1366 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1367 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1371 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1374 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1375 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1377 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1380 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1384 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1388 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1389 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1390 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1393 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1396 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1397 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1399 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1400 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1402 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
1405 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1406 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1407 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1412 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1413 * we're done with this message
1416 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1417 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1418 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)
1419 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1420 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1421 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
1426 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1427 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1429 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1430 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1431 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1435 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1437 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1438 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1440 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1441 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1442 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1444 unsigned int context
= 0;
1446 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1451 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1453 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1454 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1455 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1459 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1460 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1461 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1462 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1464 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1468 certstart
= certbytes
;
1469 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1471 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1475 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1476 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1478 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1482 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1483 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1486 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1487 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1491 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1493 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1494 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
, &al
)) {
1495 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1498 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1501 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1508 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1510 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1511 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1512 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1513 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1514 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1515 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1516 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1517 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1518 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1519 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1520 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1521 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1523 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1524 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1526 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1529 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1532 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1536 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1538 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1539 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1541 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1544 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1547 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1549 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1553 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1557 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1562 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1566 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1567 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1570 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1571 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1572 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1573 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1574 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1575 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1577 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1579 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1583 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1585 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1587 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1588 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1591 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1593 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1594 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1595 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1596 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1601 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1605 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1607 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1610 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1614 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1617 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1619 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1621 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1622 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1628 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1629 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1630 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1633 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1634 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1639 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1640 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1641 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1642 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1643 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1644 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1651 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1656 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1659 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1661 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1662 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1663 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1664 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1665 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1670 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1672 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1673 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1675 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1676 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1678 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1679 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1681 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1682 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1683 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1688 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1689 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1694 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1695 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1696 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1701 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1706 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1709 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1710 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1713 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1717 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1718 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1719 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1720 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1725 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1728 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1729 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1734 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1735 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1736 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1738 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1739 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
1740 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1741 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1746 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1747 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1748 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1753 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1754 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1760 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
1761 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1766 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
1767 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1773 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1774 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1779 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
1780 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1785 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
1788 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1789 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1791 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1792 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1793 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1802 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1807 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1812 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1816 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
1818 unsigned int curve_flags
;
1819 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1822 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1823 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1824 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1826 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1827 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1832 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1833 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1835 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1836 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1841 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2), &curve_flags
);
1843 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1844 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
1846 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1850 if ((curve_flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
) {
1851 EVP_PKEY
*key
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1853 if (key
== NULL
|| !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key
, curve_nid
)) {
1854 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1859 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= key
;
1861 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1862 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
1864 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
1865 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
1866 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
1867 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1869 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1872 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1876 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1877 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1882 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
1883 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1884 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
1885 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1891 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1892 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1895 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1896 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1897 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
1898 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1899 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1904 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1909 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1913 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1914 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
1915 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1916 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
1918 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1920 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
1922 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1923 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
1924 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1927 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1928 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
1932 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1933 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1934 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1935 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1937 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1938 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1940 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1941 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1944 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1949 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1953 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1956 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1957 * equals the length of the parameters.
1959 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
1960 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
1961 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
1962 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1967 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1968 unsigned int sigalg
;
1971 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
1972 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1976 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
1978 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1980 } else if (rv
== 0) {
1981 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1984 md
= ssl_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->hash_idx
);
1986 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1988 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
1989 md
= EVP_md5_sha1();
1994 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
1995 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1996 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2000 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2002 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2008 * Check signature length
2010 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2011 /* wrong packet length */
2012 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2014 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2018 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2019 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2020 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2025 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2026 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2030 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2031 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2032 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2033 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2034 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2039 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2040 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2041 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2042 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2043 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2044 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
2045 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2049 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2050 PACKET_remaining(&signature
)) <= 0) {
2052 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2056 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2059 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2060 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2061 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2062 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2063 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2064 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2065 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2068 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2072 /* still data left over */
2073 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2074 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2080 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2083 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2084 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2085 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2086 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2089 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2091 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2092 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
2093 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2094 const unsigned char *data
;
2095 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2096 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2098 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2103 /* get the certificate types */
2104 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
2105 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
2106 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2110 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2111 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2112 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2113 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2114 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2115 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2119 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
2120 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2121 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2123 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2124 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
2126 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2129 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2130 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2132 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2136 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2137 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2138 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
2139 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2141 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
)) {
2142 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2144 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2147 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2148 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2149 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2153 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
2156 /* get the CA RDNs */
2157 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
2158 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
2159 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2164 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
2165 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
2166 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2167 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2169 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2173 namestart
= namebytes
;
2175 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
2176 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2177 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2182 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2183 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2185 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2188 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2195 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2196 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2197 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2198 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2199 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2202 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2205 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2208 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2212 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2214 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2217 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2219 int al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2220 unsigned int ticklen
;
2221 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2222 unsigned int sess_len
;
2223 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2225 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2226 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
))
2227 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2228 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2230 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2236 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2237 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2238 * be 0 here in that instance
2241 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2243 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2244 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2245 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2246 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2248 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2251 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2253 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2255 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2258 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2259 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2264 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2265 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2269 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2270 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2272 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2274 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2275 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2276 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2278 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2279 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2283 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2284 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2289 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2290 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2291 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2293 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2296 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2297 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2298 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2300 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2301 exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
2308 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2309 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2310 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2311 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2312 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2313 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2314 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2315 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2316 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2319 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2320 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2322 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2323 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2324 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2328 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2330 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2331 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2333 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2334 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2337 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2339 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2341 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2343 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2347 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2348 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2349 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2351 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2356 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2357 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2358 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2360 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2363 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2364 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2365 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2369 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2370 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2371 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2375 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2376 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2380 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2386 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2390 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
, &al
)) {
2391 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2392 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2393 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2396 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2400 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2401 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2402 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2405 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
2408 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2411 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2412 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2417 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2418 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2419 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2421 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2422 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2423 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2426 *al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2428 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2432 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2434 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2439 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2440 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2441 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2442 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2451 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2453 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2455 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2456 /* should contain no data */
2457 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2462 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2463 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2471 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2473 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
2476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2477 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2478 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2479 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2480 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2483 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2486 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2487 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2488 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2491 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2496 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2497 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2500 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2501 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2502 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2503 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2504 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2507 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2509 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2513 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2515 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2516 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2519 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2521 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2523 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2525 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2526 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2530 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2531 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2533 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2537 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2538 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2539 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2541 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2545 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2546 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2547 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2549 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2550 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2553 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2555 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2562 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2563 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2564 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2565 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2570 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2575 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2578 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2579 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2580 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2582 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2585 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2587 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2593 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2594 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2599 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2600 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2603 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2607 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2608 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2609 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2610 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2614 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2615 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2619 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2620 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2621 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2625 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2626 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2630 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2633 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2635 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2639 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2640 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2645 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2646 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2648 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2649 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
))
2654 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2655 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2660 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2665 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2669 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2670 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2671 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2673 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2677 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2681 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2683 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0)
2686 /* send off the data */
2687 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2688 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
), &keybytes
))
2691 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2692 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2696 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2699 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2703 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2706 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2707 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2708 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2711 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2717 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2723 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2728 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2729 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2731 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2736 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2743 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2744 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2748 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2753 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2756 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2757 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2760 unsigned int md_len
;
2761 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2762 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2763 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2764 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2767 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2768 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2771 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2773 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2775 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2777 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2781 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2782 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2783 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2788 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2789 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2790 * certificate key for key exchange
2793 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2795 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2797 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2802 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2803 /* Generate session key
2804 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2806 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
2807 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2812 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2815 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2816 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
2817 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2818 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2819 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2820 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2821 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2822 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2823 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2827 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2829 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
2830 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
2831 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2835 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2837 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2840 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2841 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2846 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
2847 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
2848 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
2849 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2854 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2855 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2856 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2860 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2861 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2862 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2866 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2871 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2874 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
2876 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
2877 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2882 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
2884 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2885 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2886 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2894 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2899 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2901 unsigned long alg_k
;
2904 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2906 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
2907 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2910 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2911 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2913 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2914 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2916 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2917 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2919 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2920 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2922 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2923 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2925 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2926 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2934 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2935 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
2936 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2938 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2939 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2944 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
2946 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2949 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2950 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2954 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2955 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
2957 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2964 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2965 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2969 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2970 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2972 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2981 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2982 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2983 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2986 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2989 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2990 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2992 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2993 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2994 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
2997 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2998 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3004 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3005 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3010 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3011 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3012 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3014 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3016 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3018 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3019 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
3022 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3023 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3025 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3026 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3031 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3034 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3037 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3038 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3039 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3040 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3042 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3046 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3047 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3050 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3052 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3053 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3055 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3059 /* We need to get a client cert */
3060 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3062 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3063 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3065 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3067 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3070 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3071 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3072 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3074 } else if (i
== 1) {
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3077 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3081 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3082 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3085 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3086 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3087 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3088 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3090 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3091 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3092 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3093 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3099 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3102 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3106 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3108 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3111 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3114 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0))
3115 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3116 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3120 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3127 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3129 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3136 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3137 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3139 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3140 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3142 /* we don't have a certificate */
3143 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3146 /* This is the passed certificate */
3148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3149 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
3150 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3151 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3158 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3160 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3164 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3165 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
3167 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3168 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3170 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3174 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3176 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3181 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
3182 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3184 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3189 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3190 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3198 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3203 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3205 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3206 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3208 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3209 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3211 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3212 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3217 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3221 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3226 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3228 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3229 /* should contain no data */
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3231 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
3232 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3233 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3237 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3238 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3239 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3240 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3241 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3246 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3248 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3251 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3253 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3255 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3257 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
3258 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3263 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3265 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3266 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
3269 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3270 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3273 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3274 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3275 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3276 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3279 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3283 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3284 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3285 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3286 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3291 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3292 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3296 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3299 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
;
3300 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3301 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3302 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3307 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3308 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3309 # error Max cipher length too short
3312 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3313 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3316 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3317 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3320 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3323 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3325 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3328 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3329 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3331 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3332 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3333 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
3336 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3350 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3351 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3352 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3354 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3359 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3360 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3361 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3363 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);