2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
64 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
65 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
69 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
75 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
77 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
78 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
79 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
80 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
87 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
93 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
95 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
98 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
99 * ciphersuite or for SRP
101 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
110 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
111 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
112 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
113 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
116 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
117 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
119 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
121 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
124 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
125 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
126 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
127 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
131 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
132 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
133 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
139 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
141 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
142 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
143 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
146 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
147 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
151 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
152 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
154 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
155 && s
->tls_session_secret_cb
!= NULL
156 && s
->session
->tlsext_tick
!= NULL
157 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
159 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
160 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
161 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
162 * the server is resuming.
165 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
167 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
168 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
169 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
170 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
174 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
175 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
177 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
178 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
179 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
180 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
183 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
184 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
185 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
187 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
188 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
197 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
198 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
200 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
201 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
206 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
207 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
208 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
209 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
210 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
211 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
212 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
219 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
220 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
221 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
222 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
229 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
230 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
231 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
236 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
237 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
238 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
239 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
242 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
243 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
248 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
249 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
250 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
255 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
256 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
257 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
267 /* No valid transition found */
268 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
269 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
274 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
275 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
277 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
279 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
281 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
283 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
285 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
286 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
288 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
290 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
293 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
295 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
296 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
297 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
299 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
300 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
301 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
303 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
304 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
307 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
308 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
310 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
312 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
313 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
316 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
317 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
318 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
319 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
321 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
322 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
324 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
326 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
327 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
329 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
331 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
332 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
333 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
335 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
336 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
337 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
339 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
340 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
342 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
344 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
346 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
347 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
348 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
349 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
352 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
354 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
355 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
356 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
358 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
361 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
363 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
364 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
366 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
367 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
368 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
372 /* Shouldn't happen */
373 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
378 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
379 * the client to the server.
381 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
383 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
385 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
386 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
388 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
389 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
390 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
391 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
397 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
398 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
401 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
402 * messages unless we need to.
406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
407 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
408 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
411 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
414 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
417 /* No pre work to be done */
421 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
425 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
426 * client to the server.
428 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
430 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
434 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
435 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
436 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
439 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
440 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
445 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
446 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
450 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
451 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
452 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
453 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
455 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
456 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
458 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
460 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
463 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
464 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
467 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
471 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
474 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
479 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
483 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
485 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
487 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
490 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
494 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
499 /* No post work to be done */
503 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
507 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
509 * Valid return values are:
513 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
)
515 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
517 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
518 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
519 return tls_construct_client_hello(s
);
522 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s
);
524 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
525 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s
);
527 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
528 return tls_construct_client_verify(s
);
530 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
532 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
534 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
536 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
537 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
538 return tls_construct_next_proto(s
);
540 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
541 return tls_construct_finished(s
,
543 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
545 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
548 /* Shouldn't happen */
556 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
557 * reading. Excludes the message header.
559 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
561 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
563 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
564 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
565 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
567 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
568 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
571 return s
->max_cert_list
;
573 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
574 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
576 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
577 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
579 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
581 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
582 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
583 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
585 return s
->max_cert_list
;
587 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
588 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
590 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
591 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
593 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
595 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
596 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
598 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
599 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
602 /* Shouldn't happen */
610 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
612 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
614 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
616 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
617 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
618 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
620 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
621 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
624 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
626 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
627 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
629 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
630 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
632 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
633 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
635 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
636 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
638 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
639 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
641 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
642 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
644 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
645 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
648 /* Shouldn't happen */
652 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
656 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
659 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
661 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
663 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
664 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
665 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
668 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
669 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
670 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
671 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
672 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
673 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
674 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
675 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
678 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
679 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
686 /* Shouldn't happen */
690 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
693 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
702 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
704 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
706 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
707 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
713 if ((sess
== NULL
) || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
715 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
716 * "ticket" without a session ID.
718 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
719 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
720 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
723 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
725 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
728 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
729 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
731 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
734 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
743 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
746 /* Do the message type and length last */
747 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
750 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
751 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
752 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
753 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
754 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
755 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
756 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
757 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
760 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
761 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
762 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
763 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
764 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
765 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
766 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
767 * know that is maximum server supports.
768 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
769 * containing version 1.0.
771 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
772 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
773 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
774 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
775 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
776 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
777 * the negotiated version.
779 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
780 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
783 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
784 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
790 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
793 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
794 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
797 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
801 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
802 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
803 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
807 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
808 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
809 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
812 /* Ciphers supported */
813 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]));
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
818 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
820 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
821 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
824 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
825 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
826 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
832 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
836 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
839 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
841 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
842 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
846 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
849 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
854 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
856 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
862 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
863 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
870 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
874 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
877 unsigned int cookie_len
;
880 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
881 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
882 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
887 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
888 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
889 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
894 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
895 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
899 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
901 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
903 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
904 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
905 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
908 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
910 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
913 size_t session_id_len
;
914 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
915 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
916 unsigned int compression
;
917 unsigned int sversion
;
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
923 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
924 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
929 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
931 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
936 /* load the server hello data */
937 /* load the server random */
938 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
939 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
946 /* Get the session-id. */
947 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
948 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
952 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
953 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
954 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
955 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
960 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
962 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
967 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
968 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
969 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
970 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
971 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
972 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
973 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
974 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
975 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
976 * server wants to resume.
978 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
979 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
980 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
981 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
982 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
983 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
985 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
986 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
987 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
990 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
995 if (session_id_len
!= 0 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
996 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
997 session_id_len
) == 0) {
998 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
999 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1000 /* actually a client application bug */
1001 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1003 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1009 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1010 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1011 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1012 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1013 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1015 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1016 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1017 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1022 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1023 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1024 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1025 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1029 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1030 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1031 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1034 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1038 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1040 /* unknown cipher */
1041 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1046 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1049 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1050 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1052 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1053 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1055 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1056 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1061 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1062 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1064 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1065 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1071 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1072 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1073 * set and use it for comparison.
1075 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1076 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1077 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1078 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1080 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1083 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1084 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1086 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1088 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1091 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1092 if (compression
!= 0) {
1093 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1095 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1099 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1100 * using compression.
1102 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1107 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1108 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1110 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1113 if (compression
== 0)
1115 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1116 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1120 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1123 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1124 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1126 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1129 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1133 /* TLS extensions */
1134 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
)) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1139 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1140 /* wrong packet length */
1141 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1146 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1147 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1148 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1151 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1154 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1155 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1157 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1158 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1160 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
1163 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1164 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1165 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1169 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1171 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1173 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1174 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1177 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1179 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1180 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1182 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1183 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1184 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1186 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1191 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1192 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1193 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1197 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1198 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1199 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1200 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1202 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1206 certstart
= certbytes
;
1207 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1209 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1213 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1214 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1216 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1219 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1226 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1227 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) && i
<= 0) {
1228 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1230 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1233 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1236 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1240 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1242 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1243 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1245 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1248 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1251 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1253 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1257 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1261 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1266 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1270 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1271 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1272 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1273 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1274 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1276 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1278 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1281 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1283 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1285 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1286 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1289 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1293 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1295 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1298 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1302 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1305 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1307 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1309 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1310 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1316 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1317 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1318 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1321 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1322 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1327 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1328 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1329 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1330 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1331 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1332 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1339 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1344 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1347 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1349 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1350 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1351 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1352 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1353 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1359 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1360 PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1362 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1363 PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1365 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1366 PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1368 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1369 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1370 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1375 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1376 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1381 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1382 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1383 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1388 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1393 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1396 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1397 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1400 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1402 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1403 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1404 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1405 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1410 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1413 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1414 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1419 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1420 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
);
1421 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
),
1423 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1424 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1429 if (BN_is_zero(p
) || BN_is_zero(g
) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1430 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1431 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1435 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1436 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1442 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
1443 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1449 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1450 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1455 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
1456 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1461 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
1464 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1465 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1467 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1468 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1469 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1478 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1483 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1488 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1492 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
1494 unsigned int curve_flags
;
1495 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1498 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1499 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1500 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1502 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1503 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1508 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1509 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1511 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1512 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1517 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2), &curve_flags
);
1519 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1520 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
1522 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1526 if ((curve_flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
) {
1527 EVP_PKEY
*key
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1529 if (key
== NULL
|| !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key
, curve_nid
)) {
1530 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1535 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= key
;
1537 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1538 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
1540 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
1541 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
1542 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
1543 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1545 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1548 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1552 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1553 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1558 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
1559 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1560 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
1561 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1567 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1568 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1571 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1572 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1573 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
1574 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1575 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1580 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1585 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1589 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1590 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
1592 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1594 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
1596 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1597 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
1598 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1601 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1602 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
1606 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1607 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1608 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1609 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1611 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1612 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1614 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1615 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
1618 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1623 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1627 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1631 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1632 * equals the length of the parameters.
1634 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
1635 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
1636 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
1637 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1642 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1643 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
1645 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sigalgs
, 2)) {
1646 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1650 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sigalgs
, pkey
);
1652 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1654 } else if (rv
== 0) {
1655 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1659 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1661 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
1662 md
= EVP_md5_sha1();
1667 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
1668 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1669 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1673 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1675 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1681 * Check signature length
1683 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
1684 /* wrong packet length */
1685 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1687 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1691 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1692 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1693 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1698 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1699 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1700 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1701 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1702 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1703 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
1704 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
1705 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1706 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1710 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
1711 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), pkey
) <= 0) {
1713 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1714 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1718 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1720 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1721 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1722 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1723 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1724 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
1725 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1726 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1729 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1733 /* still data left over */
1734 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1735 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1741 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1744 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1745 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1746 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1749 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1751 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1752 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
1753 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1754 const unsigned char *data
;
1755 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
1756 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1758 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1763 /* get the certificate types */
1764 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
1765 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
1766 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1770 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
1771 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
1772 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
1773 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1774 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
1775 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1779 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
1780 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
1781 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
1783 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
1784 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
1786 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1787 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1788 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, list_len
)) {
1789 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1791 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1795 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1796 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1797 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
1798 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1800 if ((list_len
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, list_len
)) {
1801 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1803 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
1806 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1807 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1812 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
1815 /* get the CA RDNs */
1816 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1817 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
1818 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1823 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1824 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
1825 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
1826 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1828 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1832 namestart
= namebytes
;
1834 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
1835 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
1836 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1841 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
1842 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1844 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1847 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1854 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
1855 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
1856 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
1857 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
1858 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
1861 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1864 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1867 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
1871 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
1873 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
1876 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1879 unsigned int ticklen
;
1880 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1882 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
1883 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
1884 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
) {
1885 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1890 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
1892 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1894 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1895 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
1896 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
1898 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
1901 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
1903 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
1905 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1908 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
1909 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1914 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
1915 s
->session
= new_sess
;
1918 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
1919 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
1921 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
1922 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
) {
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1926 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
)) {
1927 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1932 s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1933 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
1935 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
1936 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
1937 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
1938 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
1939 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
1940 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
1941 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
1942 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
1943 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
1945 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
,
1946 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
1947 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1951 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1953 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1955 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1956 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1959 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1962 unsigned long resplen
;
1965 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
1966 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1967 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
1971 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &resplen
)
1972 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
1973 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1977 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
1978 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
== NULL
) {
1979 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1983 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, resplen
)) {
1984 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1988 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
1989 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1991 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1992 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1993 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1996 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1998 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1999 /* should contain no data */
2000 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2002 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2003 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2006 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2007 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2009 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2010 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2011 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2017 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2020 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2021 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2022 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2023 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2027 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2028 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2029 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2031 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1 && s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2033 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2035 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
2036 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2038 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2039 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2042 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2044 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2048 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2049 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2050 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2051 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2052 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2057 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2058 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2059 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2060 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2061 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2064 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2067 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
,
2068 size_t *pskhdrlen
, int *al
)
2070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2073 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2074 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2077 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2078 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2079 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2080 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2081 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2084 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2086 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2090 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2092 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2093 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2096 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2098 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2100 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2102 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2103 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2107 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2108 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2110 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2114 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2115 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2116 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2118 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2122 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2123 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2124 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2126 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2127 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2129 s2n(identitylen
, *p
);
2130 memcpy(*p
, identity
, identitylen
);
2131 *pskhdrlen
= 2 + identitylen
;
2137 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2138 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2139 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2140 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2144 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2145 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2150 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2154 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2155 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2157 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2160 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2162 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2164 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2168 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2169 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2174 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2175 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2178 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2182 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2183 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2184 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0) {
2189 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2190 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2192 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2193 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2194 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2198 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, *p
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2203 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2206 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2208 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2212 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2213 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2218 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2219 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2223 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2224 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2229 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2234 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2238 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2239 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2241 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2246 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2247 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2249 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2251 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2255 /* send off the data */
2256 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2257 *len
= BN_num_bytes(pub_key
);
2259 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, *p
);
2261 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2266 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2271 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2274 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2275 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2276 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2278 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2284 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2286 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2291 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2292 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2294 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2299 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2302 *len
= encoded_pt_len
;
2304 /* length of encoded point */
2307 /* copy the point */
2308 memcpy(*p
, encodedPoint
, *len
);
2309 /* increment len to account for length field */
2312 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2316 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2320 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2325 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2328 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2329 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2332 unsigned int md_len
;
2333 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2334 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2335 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2336 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2339 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2340 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2343 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2345 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2347 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2349 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2353 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2354 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2355 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2360 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2361 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2362 * certificate key for key exchange
2365 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2367 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2369 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2374 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2375 /* Generate session key */
2376 || RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2377 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2382 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2384 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2385 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2387 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2394 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2397 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2398 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
2399 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2400 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2401 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2402 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2403 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2404 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2405 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2409 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2411 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
2412 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
2413 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2417 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2419 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2421 *((*p
)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2423 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2424 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2428 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2430 *((*p
)++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2433 *((*p
)++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2436 memcpy(*p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2437 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2438 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
2440 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2441 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2443 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2444 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2445 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2449 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2450 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2451 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2455 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2460 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2463 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2464 /* send off the data */
2465 *len
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2467 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, *p
);
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2473 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2474 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2475 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2483 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2488 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2492 size_t pskhdrlen
= 0;
2493 unsigned long alg_k
;
2496 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2498 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2500 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
2501 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, &p
, &pskhdrlen
, &al
))
2504 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2506 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2507 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2509 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2510 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2512 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2513 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2515 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2516 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2518 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2519 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2522 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2529 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, len
)) {
2530 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2538 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2539 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
2540 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2542 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2543 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2545 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2549 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
2551 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2554 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2555 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2559 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2560 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
2562 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2569 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2570 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2574 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2575 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2577 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2586 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2587 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2588 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2591 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2594 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2595 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2597 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2598 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2599 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
2602 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2603 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2609 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2610 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2614 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
2618 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
2621 unsigned long n
= 0;
2625 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2631 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2632 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2634 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2635 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2639 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2640 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2648 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2650 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2651 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
2652 || (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2653 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2654 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2655 s
->session
->master_key
))
2656 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2662 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2663 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2664 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2665 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
2666 BUF_reverse(p
+ 2, NULL
, u
);
2672 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2673 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
2675 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2680 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2683 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2688 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2689 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2690 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2692 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2694 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
2696 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2697 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
2700 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2701 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2703 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
2704 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
2709 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2712 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2715 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2716 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2717 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
2718 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2720 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2724 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2725 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2728 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2730 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2731 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2733 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2737 /* We need to get a client cert */
2738 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2740 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2741 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2743 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
2745 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2748 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2749 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
2750 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
2752 } else if (i
== 1) {
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2755 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
2759 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2760 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2763 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2764 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2765 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
2766 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2768 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
2769 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2770 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2771 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2777 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2780 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2784 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2786 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
2787 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
2788 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2790 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2791 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2798 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2800 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
2803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2807 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2808 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2810 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2811 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2813 /* we don't have a certificate */
2814 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
2817 /* This is the passed certificate */
2819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2820 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
2821 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
2822 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
2829 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2831 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2835 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2836 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
2838 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
2839 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2841 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2845 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2847 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2852 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
2853 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2855 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
2859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2860 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
2861 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2869 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2874 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
2876 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
2879 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
2880 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
2881 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2883 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
2884 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
2885 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
2886 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
2887 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
2888 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
2895 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
2898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
2899 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
2900 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
2901 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
2902 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
2907 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
2908 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
2912 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, unsigned char *p
)
2915 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2917 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
2918 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
2919 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
2925 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
2926 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2927 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2928 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
2930 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, p
);
2934 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
2938 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
2939 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2940 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2942 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);
2945 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
2946 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2947 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2949 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);