2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
64 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
65 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
70 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
76 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
78 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
79 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
80 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
81 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
88 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
94 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
96 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
99 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
100 * ciphersuite or for SRP
102 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
111 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
112 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
113 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
114 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
117 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
118 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
120 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
122 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
125 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
126 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
127 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
128 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
132 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
133 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
134 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
140 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
142 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
143 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
144 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
147 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
148 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
152 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
153 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
155 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
156 && s
->tls_session_secret_cb
!= NULL
157 && s
->session
->tlsext_tick
!= NULL
158 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
160 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
161 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
162 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
163 * the server is resuming.
166 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
168 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
169 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
170 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
171 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
175 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
176 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
178 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
179 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
180 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
181 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
184 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
185 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
186 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
188 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
189 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
198 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
199 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
201 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
202 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
207 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
208 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
209 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
211 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
212 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
213 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
214 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
221 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
222 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
223 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
224 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
231 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
232 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
233 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
238 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
239 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
240 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
241 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
244 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
245 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
250 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
251 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
252 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
257 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
258 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
259 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
269 /* No valid transition found */
270 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
276 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
277 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
279 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
281 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
283 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
285 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
287 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
288 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
290 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
292 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
295 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
297 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
298 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
299 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
301 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
302 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
303 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
305 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
306 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
309 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
310 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
312 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
314 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
315 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
318 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
319 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
320 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
321 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
323 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
324 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
326 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
328 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
329 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
333 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
334 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
335 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
337 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
338 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
339 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
341 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
342 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
346 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
348 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
349 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
350 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
351 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
354 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
356 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
357 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
358 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
360 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
363 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
365 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
366 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
368 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
369 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
370 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
374 /* Shouldn't happen */
375 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
380 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
381 * the client to the server.
383 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
385 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
387 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
388 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
390 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
391 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
392 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
393 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
399 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
400 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
403 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
404 * messages unless we need to.
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
409 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
410 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
413 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
416 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
419 /* No pre work to be done */
423 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
427 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
428 * client to the server.
430 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
432 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
436 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
438 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
441 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
442 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
447 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
448 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
452 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
453 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
454 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
455 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
457 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
458 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
460 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
462 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
465 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
466 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
469 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
473 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
476 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
481 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
485 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
487 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
489 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
492 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
496 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
501 /* No post work to be done */
505 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
509 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
511 * Valid return values are:
515 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
)
517 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
519 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
520 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
521 return tls_construct_client_hello(s
);
524 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s
);
526 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
527 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s
);
529 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
530 return tls_construct_client_verify(s
);
532 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
534 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
536 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
538 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
539 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
540 return tls_construct_next_proto(s
);
542 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
543 return tls_construct_finished(s
,
545 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
547 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
550 /* Shouldn't happen */
558 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
559 * reading. Excludes the message header.
561 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
563 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
565 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
566 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
567 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
569 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
570 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
573 return s
->max_cert_list
;
575 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
576 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
578 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
579 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
581 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
582 /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
583 * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
584 * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
586 return s
->max_cert_list
;
588 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
589 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
591 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
592 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
594 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
595 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
597 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
598 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
601 /* Shouldn't happen */
609 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
611 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
613 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
615 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
616 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
617 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
619 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
620 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
623 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
625 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
626 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
628 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
629 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
631 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
632 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
634 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
635 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
637 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
638 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
640 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
641 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
643 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
644 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
647 /* Shouldn't happen */
651 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
655 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
658 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
660 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
662 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
663 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
664 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
667 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
668 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
669 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
670 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
671 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
672 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
673 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
674 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
677 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
678 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
685 /* Shouldn't happen */
689 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
692 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
701 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
703 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
705 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
706 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
712 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
713 !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
715 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
716 * "ticket" without a session ID.
718 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
719 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
720 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
723 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
725 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
728 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
729 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
731 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
734 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
743 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
744 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
747 /* Do the message type and length last */
748 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
751 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
752 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
753 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
754 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
755 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
756 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
757 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
758 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
761 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
762 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
763 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
764 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
765 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
766 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
767 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
768 * know that is maximum server supports.
769 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
770 * containing version 1.0.
772 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
773 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
774 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
775 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
776 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
777 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
778 * the negotiated version.
780 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
781 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
784 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
785 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
791 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
794 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
798 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
802 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
803 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
804 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
808 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
809 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
810 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
813 /* Ciphers supported */
814 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]));
816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
819 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
821 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
822 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
825 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
826 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
827 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
833 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
837 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
840 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
842 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
843 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
847 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
850 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
855 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
857 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
863 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
864 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
871 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
875 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
878 unsigned int cookie_len
;
881 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
882 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
883 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
884 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
888 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
889 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
890 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
895 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
896 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
900 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
902 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
904 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
905 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
906 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
909 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
911 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
914 size_t session_id_len
;
915 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
916 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
917 unsigned int compression
;
918 unsigned int sversion
;
920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
924 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
925 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
930 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
932 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
937 /* load the server hello data */
938 /* load the server random */
939 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
940 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
947 /* Get the session-id. */
948 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
949 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
953 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
954 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
955 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
956 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
961 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
963 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
968 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
969 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
970 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
971 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
972 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
973 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
974 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
975 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
976 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
977 * server wants to resume.
979 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
980 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
981 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
982 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
983 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
984 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
986 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
987 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
988 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
991 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
996 if (session_id_len
!= 0 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
997 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
998 session_id_len
) == 0) {
999 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1000 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1001 /* actually a client application bug */
1002 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1004 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1010 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1011 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1012 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1013 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1014 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1016 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1017 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1018 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1023 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1024 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1025 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1026 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1030 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1031 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1032 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1035 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1039 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1041 /* unknown cipher */
1042 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1047 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1050 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1051 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1053 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1054 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1056 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1057 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1062 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1063 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1065 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1066 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1072 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1073 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1074 * set and use it for comparison.
1076 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1077 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1078 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1079 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1081 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1084 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1085 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1087 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1089 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1092 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1093 if (compression
!= 0) {
1094 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1096 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1100 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1101 * using compression.
1103 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1108 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1109 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1111 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1114 if (compression
== 0)
1116 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1117 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1121 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1124 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1125 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1127 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1130 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1134 /* TLS extensions */
1135 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1140 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1141 /* wrong packet length */
1142 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1148 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1149 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1150 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1153 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1156 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1157 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1159 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1160 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1162 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
1166 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1167 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1168 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1172 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1174 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1176 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1177 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1180 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1182 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1183 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1185 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1186 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1187 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1189 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1194 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1195 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1196 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1200 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1201 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1202 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1203 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1205 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1209 certstart
= certbytes
;
1210 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1212 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1216 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1217 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1219 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1222 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1229 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1230 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) && i
<= 0) {
1231 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1233 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1236 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1239 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1243 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1245 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1246 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1248 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1251 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1254 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1256 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1260 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1264 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1269 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1273 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1274 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1275 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1276 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1277 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1279 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1281 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1284 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1286 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1288 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1289 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1292 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1296 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1298 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1301 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1305 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1310 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1311 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
1313 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1314 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1315 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1320 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1322 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
1324 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1325 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
1326 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1329 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1331 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1334 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1335 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1336 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1337 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1343 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1344 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1345 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1348 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1349 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1354 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1355 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1356 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1357 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1358 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1359 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1364 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1365 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1367 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1369 * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
1374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1375 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1376 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1377 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1378 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1379 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1380 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1386 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1387 PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1389 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1390 PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1392 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1393 PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1395 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1396 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1401 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1406 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1407 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1408 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1410 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1412 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1413 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1414 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1417 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1419 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1420 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1421 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1426 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1429 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1430 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1431 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1435 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1436 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1438 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
),
1440 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1445 if (BN_is_zero(p
) || BN_is_zero(g
) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1450 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1451 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1457 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
1458 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1464 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1465 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1470 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
1471 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1476 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
1484 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
1488 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1489 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1491 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1492 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1493 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1495 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1498 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1500 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
1502 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1505 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1506 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1507 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1509 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1514 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1515 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1517 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1522 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2));
1523 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1524 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1526 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1530 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1531 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
1533 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
1534 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
1535 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
1536 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1538 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1541 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1544 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1549 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
),
1550 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1551 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
), NULL
) == 0) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1557 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1558 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1562 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1563 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1564 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1566 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1567 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1568 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1570 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1572 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1576 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1578 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1582 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1584 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1585 * equals the length of the parameters.
1587 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
1588 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
1589 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
1590 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1595 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1596 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
1598 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sigalgs
, 2)) {
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1602 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sigalgs
, pkey
);
1609 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1611 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
1612 md
= EVP_md5_sha1();
1617 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
1618 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1622 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1629 * Check signature length
1631 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
1632 /* wrong packet length */
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1636 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1637 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1638 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1639 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1640 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1641 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
1642 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
1643 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1647 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
1648 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), pkey
) <= 0) {
1650 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1655 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1656 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1657 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1658 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
1659 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1663 /* still data left over */
1664 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1669 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1670 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1672 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1674 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1675 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1676 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1679 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1681 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1682 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
1683 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1684 const unsigned char *data
;
1685 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
1686 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1688 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1693 /* get the certificate types */
1694 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
1695 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
1696 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1700 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
1701 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
1702 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
1703 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1704 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
1705 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1709 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
1710 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
1711 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
1713 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
1714 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
1716 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1717 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1718 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, list_len
)) {
1719 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1721 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1725 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1726 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1727 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
1728 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1730 if ((list_len
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, list_len
)) {
1731 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1733 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
1736 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1737 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1742 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
1745 /* get the CA RDNs */
1746 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1747 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
1748 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1753 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1754 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
1755 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
1756 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1758 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1762 namestart
= namebytes
;
1764 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
1765 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
1766 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1771 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
1772 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1774 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1777 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1784 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
1785 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
1786 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
1787 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
1788 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
1791 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1794 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1797 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
1801 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
1803 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
1806 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1809 unsigned int ticklen
;
1810 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1812 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
1813 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
1814 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
) {
1815 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1820 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
1822 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1824 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1825 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
1826 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
1828 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
1831 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
1833 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
1835 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1838 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
1839 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1844 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
1845 s
->session
= new_sess
;
1848 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
1849 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
1851 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
1852 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
) {
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1856 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
)) {
1857 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1862 s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1863 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
1865 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
1866 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
1867 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
1868 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
1869 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
1870 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
1871 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
1872 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
1873 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
1875 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
,
1876 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
1877 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1881 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1883 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1885 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1886 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1889 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1892 unsigned long resplen
;
1895 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
1896 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1897 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
1901 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &resplen
)
1902 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
1903 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1907 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
1908 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
== NULL
) {
1909 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1913 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, resplen
)) {
1914 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1918 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
1919 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1921 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1922 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1923 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1926 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1928 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1929 /* should contain no data */
1930 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1932 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1933 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1937 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1938 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
1939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
1940 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1941 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1942 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1948 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
1951 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
1952 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1953 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1954 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1958 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
1959 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
1960 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
1962 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1 && s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
!= NULL
) {
1964 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
1966 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
1967 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
1969 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
1970 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1973 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1975 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1980 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
1981 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
1982 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1983 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1984 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1990 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
1991 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
1992 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
1993 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1996 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1999 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
,
2000 size_t *pskhdrlen
, int *al
)
2002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2005 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2006 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2009 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2010 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2011 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2012 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2013 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2016 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2018 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2022 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2024 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2025 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2028 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2030 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2032 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2034 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2035 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2039 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2040 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2042 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2046 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2047 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2048 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2050 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2054 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2055 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2056 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2058 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2059 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2061 s2n(identitylen
, *p
);
2062 memcpy(*p
, identity
, identitylen
);
2063 *pskhdrlen
= 2 + identitylen
;
2069 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2070 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2071 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2072 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2077 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2082 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2086 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2087 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2089 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2092 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2094 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2100 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2101 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2106 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2107 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2110 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2114 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2115 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2116 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0) {
2121 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2122 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2124 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2125 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2126 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2130 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, *p
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2135 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2138 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2140 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2144 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2145 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2150 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2151 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2155 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2156 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2161 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2166 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2170 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2171 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2173 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2178 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
, NID_undef
);
2179 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2181 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2183 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2187 /* send off the data */
2188 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2189 *len
= BN_num_bytes(pub_key
);
2191 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, *p
);
2193 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2198 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2203 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2206 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2207 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2208 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2210 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2211 if ((skey
== NULL
) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey
) == NULL
) {
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2216 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
, NID_undef
);
2218 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2223 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2224 encoded_pt_len
= EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey
),
2225 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2226 &encodedPoint
, NULL
);
2228 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2233 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2236 *len
= encoded_pt_len
;
2238 /* length of encoded point */
2241 /* copy the point */
2242 memcpy(*p
, encodedPoint
, *len
);
2243 /* increment len to account for length field */
2246 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2250 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2254 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2259 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2262 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2263 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2266 unsigned int md_len
;
2267 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2268 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2269 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2270 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2273 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2274 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2277 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2279 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2281 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2283 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2287 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2288 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2289 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2294 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2295 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2296 * certificate key for key exchange
2299 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2301 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2303 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2308 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2309 /* Generate session key */
2310 || RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2311 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2316 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2318 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2319 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2320 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2322 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2329 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2332 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2333 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
2334 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2335 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2336 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2337 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2338 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2339 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2340 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2344 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2346 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
2347 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
2348 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2352 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2354 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2356 *((*p
)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2358 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2359 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2363 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2365 *((*p
)++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2368 *((*p
)++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2371 memcpy(*p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2372 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2373 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
2375 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2376 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2378 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2379 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2380 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2384 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2385 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2386 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2390 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2395 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **p
, int *len
, int *al
)
2397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRT
2398 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2399 /* send off the data */
2400 *len
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2402 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, *p
);
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2408 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2409 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2410 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2418 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2423 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2427 size_t pskhdrlen
= 0;
2428 unsigned long alg_k
;
2431 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2433 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2435 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
2436 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, &p
, &pskhdrlen
, &al
))
2439 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2441 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2442 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2444 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2445 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2447 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2448 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2450 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2451 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2453 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2454 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, &p
, &len
, &al
))
2457 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2464 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, len
)) {
2465 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2473 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2474 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
2475 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2477 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2478 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2480 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2484 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
2486 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2489 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2490 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2494 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2495 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
2497 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2504 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2505 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2509 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2510 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2512 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2521 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2522 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2523 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2526 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2529 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2530 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2532 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2533 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2534 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
2537 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2538 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2544 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2545 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2549 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
2553 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
2556 unsigned long n
= 0;
2560 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2566 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2567 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2569 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2570 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2574 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2575 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2583 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2585 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2586 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
2587 || (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2588 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2589 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2590 s
->session
->master_key
))
2591 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2597 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2598 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2599 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2600 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
2601 BUF_reverse(p
+ 2, NULL
, u
);
2607 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2608 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
2610 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2615 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2618 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2623 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2624 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2625 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2627 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2629 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
2631 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2632 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
2635 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2636 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2638 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
2639 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
2644 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2647 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2650 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2651 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2652 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
2653 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2655 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2659 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2660 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2663 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2665 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2666 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2668 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2672 /* We need to get a client cert */
2673 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2675 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2676 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2678 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
2680 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2683 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2684 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
2685 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
2687 } else if (i
== 1) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2690 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
2694 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2695 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2698 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2699 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2700 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
2701 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2703 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
2704 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2705 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2706 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2712 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2715 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2719 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2721 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
2722 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
2723 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2725 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2726 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2733 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2735 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
2738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2742 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2743 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2745 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2746 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2748 /* we don't have a certificate */
2749 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
2752 /* This is the passed certificate */
2754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2755 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
2756 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
2757 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
2764 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2766 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2770 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2771 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
2773 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
2774 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2776 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2780 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2782 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2787 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
2788 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2790 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
2794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2795 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
2796 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2804 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2809 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
2811 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
2814 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
2815 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
2816 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2818 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
2819 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
2820 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
2821 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
2822 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
2823 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
2830 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
2833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
2834 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
2835 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
2836 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
2837 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
2842 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
2843 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
2847 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
2851 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2853 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
2854 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
2855 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
2861 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
2862 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2863 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2864 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
2866 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, p
);
2870 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
2874 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
2875 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2876 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2878 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);
2881 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
2882 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2883 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2885 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);