2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
28 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
45 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
60 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
85 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
103 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
109 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
110 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
117 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
118 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
122 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
123 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
126 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
127 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
134 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
135 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
141 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
142 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
148 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
149 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
155 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
156 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
159 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
160 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
181 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
194 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
199 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
200 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
205 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
206 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
210 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
211 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
217 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
219 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
220 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
223 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
224 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
227 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
228 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
233 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
235 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
236 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
237 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
240 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
241 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
246 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
248 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
249 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
250 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
251 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
253 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
254 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
255 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
256 * the server is resuming.
259 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
261 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
262 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
263 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
264 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
268 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
269 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
271 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
272 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
273 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
274 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
277 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
278 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
279 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
281 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
282 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
291 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
292 * |ext.status_expected| is set
294 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
295 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
300 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
301 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
303 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
304 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
305 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
306 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
314 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
315 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
316 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
323 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
324 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
325 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
330 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
331 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
332 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
333 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
336 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
337 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
343 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
350 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
351 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
357 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
358 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
365 /* No valid transition found */
366 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
367 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
,
368 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
373 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
374 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
377 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
379 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
382 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
383 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
384 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
386 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
388 /* Shouldn't happen */
389 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
390 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
391 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
392 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
394 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
395 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
396 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
398 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
399 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
400 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
401 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
403 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
404 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
407 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
408 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
409 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
414 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
415 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
416 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
420 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
421 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
422 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
425 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
426 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
429 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
430 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
431 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
436 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
437 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
438 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
439 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
443 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
444 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
448 /* Try to read from the server instead */
449 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
454 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
455 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
457 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
459 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
462 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
463 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
467 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
469 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
471 /* Shouldn't happen */
472 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
473 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
474 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
475 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
478 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
480 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
481 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
483 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
488 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
491 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
492 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
494 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
495 * actually selected a version yet.
497 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
498 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
501 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
506 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
507 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
510 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
513 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
514 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
517 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
518 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
519 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
521 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
522 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
525 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
528 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
530 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
531 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
534 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
535 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
536 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
537 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
539 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
540 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
542 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
544 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
545 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
549 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
550 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
553 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
554 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
556 hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
558 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
559 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
561 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
563 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
565 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
566 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
567 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
571 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
573 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
579 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
581 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
584 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
588 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
590 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
593 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
594 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
595 /* SSLfatal() already called */
596 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
598 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
601 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
602 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
607 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
608 * the client to the server.
610 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
612 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
614 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
616 /* No pre work to be done */
619 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
621 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
622 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
623 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
624 /* SSLfatal() already called */
630 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
631 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
634 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
635 * messages unless we need to.
639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
640 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
641 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
642 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
648 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
650 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
651 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
652 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
654 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
655 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
656 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
659 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
661 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
662 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
665 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
669 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
670 * client to the server.
672 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
674 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
678 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
680 /* No post work to be done */
683 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
684 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
687 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
688 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
692 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
693 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
695 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
696 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
697 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
699 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
700 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
707 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
709 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
710 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
712 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
713 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
716 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
717 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
718 /* SSLfatal() already called */
723 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
724 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
725 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
726 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
728 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
729 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
731 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
733 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
734 /* SSLfatal() already called */
738 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
739 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
744 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
748 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
751 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
756 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
760 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
762 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
764 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
767 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
771 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
774 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
775 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
776 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
777 /* SSLfatal() already called */
783 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
784 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
786 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
787 /* SSLfatal() already called */
793 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
797 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
800 * Valid return values are:
804 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
805 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
807 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
809 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
811 /* Shouldn't happen */
812 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
813 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
814 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
817 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
819 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
821 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
822 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
825 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
826 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
827 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
830 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
831 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
832 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
835 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
841 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
842 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
845 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
846 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
847 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
850 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
851 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
852 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
855 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
856 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
857 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
858 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
861 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
862 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
863 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
866 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
867 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
868 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
876 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
877 * reading. Excludes the message header.
879 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
881 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
883 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
885 /* Shouldn't happen */
888 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
889 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
891 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
892 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
894 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
895 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
898 return s
->max_cert_list
;
900 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
901 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
903 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
904 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
906 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
907 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
909 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
911 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
912 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
913 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
915 return s
->max_cert_list
;
917 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
918 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
920 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
921 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
923 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
925 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
926 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
928 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
929 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
931 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
932 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
934 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
935 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
940 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
942 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
944 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
946 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
948 /* Shouldn't happen */
949 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
950 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
951 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
952 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
954 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
955 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
957 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
958 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
960 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
961 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s
, pkt
);
964 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
966 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
967 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
969 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
970 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
972 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
973 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
975 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
976 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
978 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
979 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
982 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
984 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
985 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
987 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
988 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
990 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
991 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
993 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
994 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
996 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
997 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1002 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1005 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1007 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1009 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1011 /* Shouldn't happen */
1012 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1013 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1017 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1018 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1022 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1030 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1032 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
1033 /* Should not happen */
1034 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1035 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1039 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1040 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1041 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1042 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1048 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
)
1049 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1050 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1051 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1055 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1057 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1060 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1061 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1063 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1066 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1073 i
= s
->hello_retry_request
== 0;
1076 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
),
1077 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1078 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1079 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1084 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1085 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1086 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1087 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1088 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1089 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1090 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1091 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1094 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1095 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1096 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1097 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1098 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1099 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1100 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1101 * know that is maximum server supports.
1102 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1103 * containing version 1.0.
1105 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1106 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1107 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1108 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1109 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1110 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1111 * the negotiated version.
1113 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1114 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1116 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1117 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1119 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1124 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1127 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1128 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1130 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
1132 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1133 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1138 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1139 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1140 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1141 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1142 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1143 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1144 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1149 /* Ciphers supported */
1150 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1151 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1152 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1156 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
)) {
1157 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1160 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1161 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1162 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1167 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1168 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1173 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1174 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1175 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1176 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1177 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1178 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1179 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1180 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1181 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1188 /* Add the NULL method */
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1190 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1195 /* TLS extensions */
1196 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1197 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1204 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1209 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1210 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1211 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1212 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1213 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1216 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1217 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1218 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1219 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1220 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1223 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1224 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1225 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1226 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1228 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1230 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1233 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1235 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1236 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1239 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1241 /* unknown cipher */
1242 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1243 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1247 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1248 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1250 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1251 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1252 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1256 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1257 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1259 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1260 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1261 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1265 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1266 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1267 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1268 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1269 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1274 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1275 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1276 * set and use it for comparison.
1278 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1279 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1280 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1281 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1283 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1284 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1286 if (ssl_md(c
->algorithm2
)
1287 != ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1288 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1289 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1290 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1295 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1299 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1303 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1308 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1310 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1311 size_t session_id_len
;
1312 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1313 unsigned int compression
;
1314 unsigned int sversion
;
1315 unsigned int context
;
1317 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1322 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1323 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1324 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1328 /* load the server random */
1329 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1330 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1331 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1336 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1337 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1338 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1340 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, 1)) {
1341 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1346 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1347 * message must be on a record boundary.
1349 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1350 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1351 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1355 /* Get the session-id. */
1356 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1357 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1358 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1359 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1362 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1363 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1364 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1365 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1366 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1367 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1371 PACKET_null_init(&session_id
);
1375 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1376 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1377 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1381 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1382 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1383 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1384 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1391 /* TLS extensions */
1392 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1393 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1394 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1395 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1396 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1401 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1402 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1403 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, context
, &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1404 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1410 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1411 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1412 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1413 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1414 extensions
, NULL
, 0l)) {
1415 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1420 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1421 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1422 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1423 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1424 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1425 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1426 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1427 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1428 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1429 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1431 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1432 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1433 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1435 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1436 * backwards compat reasons
1438 int master_key_length
;
1439 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1440 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1443 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1444 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1445 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1446 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1447 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1449 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1450 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1455 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1456 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1457 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1458 session_id_len
) == 0)
1463 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1464 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1465 /* actually a client application bug */
1466 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1467 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1468 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1473 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1474 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1475 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1476 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1477 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1479 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1481 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1482 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1483 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
, 1, &discard
,
1484 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
1485 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1491 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1492 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1493 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1494 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1495 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1499 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1500 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1501 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1502 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1506 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1509 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1510 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1512 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1513 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1517 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1518 if (compression
!= 0) {
1519 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1520 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1524 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1525 * using compression.
1527 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1528 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1529 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1533 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1534 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1535 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1538 if (compression
== 0)
1540 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1541 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1542 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1545 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1548 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1549 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1550 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1553 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1557 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1558 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1563 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1564 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1565 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1568 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1571 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1572 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1574 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1575 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1577 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1578 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1579 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1583 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1584 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1585 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1590 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1591 * we're done with this message
1594 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1595 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1596 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1597 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1601 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1602 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1604 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1605 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1608 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1610 unsigned int sversion
;
1611 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1612 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1615 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1616 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1617 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1621 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT clause before release */
1622 if (sversion
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
&& sversion
!= TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
) {
1623 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1624 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1625 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1629 s
->hello_retry_request
= 1;
1632 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1633 * should not be used.
1635 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1636 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1638 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1639 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1640 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1644 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1645 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1649 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1650 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1651 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt
) == 0
1652 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1653 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1654 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1659 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1660 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1661 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1662 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1663 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1667 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1670 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0
1671 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1672 && s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
1676 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1677 * ClientHello will not change
1679 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1680 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1681 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1686 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1687 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1689 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
)) {
1690 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1695 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1696 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1697 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1700 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1701 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1702 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1706 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1708 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1709 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1712 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1715 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1716 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1718 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1719 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1720 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1721 size_t chainidx
, certidx
;
1722 unsigned int context
= 0;
1723 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1725 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1726 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1727 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1731 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1733 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1734 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1735 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1736 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1737 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1740 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1741 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1742 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1743 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1744 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1745 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1749 certstart
= certbytes
;
1750 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1752 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
,
1753 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1756 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1757 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1758 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1759 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1763 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1764 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1767 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1768 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1769 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1773 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1774 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1775 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1776 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1777 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1778 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1779 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1780 /* SSLfatal already called */
1783 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1786 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1787 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1788 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1789 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1795 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1797 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1798 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1799 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1800 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1801 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1802 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1803 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1804 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1805 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1806 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1807 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1808 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1810 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1811 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
),
1812 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1813 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1816 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1818 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1819 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1823 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1825 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1826 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1828 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1831 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1833 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1835 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1836 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1840 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1842 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1843 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1844 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1848 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1849 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1852 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1853 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1855 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1856 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1857 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1861 s
->session
->peer_type
= certidx
;
1863 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1865 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1866 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1869 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1871 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1872 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1873 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1874 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1878 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1882 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1886 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1889 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1891 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1893 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1894 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1895 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1900 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1901 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1902 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1905 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1906 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1907 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1908 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1912 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1913 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1914 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1915 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1916 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1917 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1918 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1924 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1925 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1930 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
1932 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1933 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1935 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1936 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1937 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1938 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1939 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
1940 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1944 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1946 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1947 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1949 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1950 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1952 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1953 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1955 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1956 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1957 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
1962 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
1963 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1967 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1968 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1969 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1973 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
1974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1979 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
1981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1982 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1983 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1986 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1990 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1991 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1992 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1993 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
1994 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1998 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2001 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
2002 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2003 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2007 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2008 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2009 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2011 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2012 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2013 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2014 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2019 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2020 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
2021 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2022 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2026 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2027 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2033 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2034 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2035 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2039 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2040 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2046 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2047 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2048 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2052 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2053 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2058 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2061 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2062 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2064 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2065 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2066 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2075 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2079 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2080 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2085 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2089 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2092 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2093 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2094 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2096 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2097 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2098 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2102 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2103 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2105 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
|| !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
)) {
2106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2111 if ((s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2112 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2113 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2117 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2119 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2123 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2124 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2125 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2126 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2132 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2133 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2136 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2137 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2138 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2139 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2140 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2144 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2145 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2150 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2153 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2154 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2155 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2156 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2158 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2160 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2162 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2163 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2164 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2167 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2168 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2169 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2174 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2175 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2176 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2177 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2178 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2181 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2182 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2183 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2186 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2187 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2188 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2192 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2193 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2197 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2201 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2207 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2208 * equals the length of the parameters.
2210 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2211 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2212 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2213 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2214 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2218 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2219 unsigned int sigalg
;
2221 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2222 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2223 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2226 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2227 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2231 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2233 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2234 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2239 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2240 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2245 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2246 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2247 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2248 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2251 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2253 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2254 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2259 * Check signature length
2261 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2262 /* wrong packet length */
2263 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2264 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2268 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2269 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2270 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2271 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2275 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2276 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2280 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2281 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2282 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2283 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2284 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2285 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2289 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2290 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2297 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2300 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2301 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2304 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2307 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2308 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2309 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2310 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2311 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2312 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2315 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2318 /* still data left over */
2319 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2320 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2321 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2326 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2328 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2329 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2332 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2336 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2337 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2338 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2340 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2341 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2342 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2344 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2345 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2346 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2347 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2349 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2350 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
)) {
2351 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2352 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2353 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2354 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2357 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2358 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2359 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2361 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2363 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2364 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2366 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2367 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2368 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2369 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2370 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2372 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2373 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2374 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2375 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2377 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2382 /* get the certificate types */
2383 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2384 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2385 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2386 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2387 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2390 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2392 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2394 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2397 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2400 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2401 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2402 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2403 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2404 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2407 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
)) {
2408 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2409 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2410 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2411 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2413 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2414 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2415 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2416 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2417 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2421 /* get the CA RDNs */
2422 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2423 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2424 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2428 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2429 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2430 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2431 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2435 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2436 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2438 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2441 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2443 unsigned int ticklen
;
2444 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2445 unsigned int sess_len
;
2446 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2449 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2451 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2452 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)
2453 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce
, &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
,
2454 &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
)))
2455 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2456 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2458 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2459 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2460 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2465 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2466 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2467 * be 0 here in that instance
2470 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2473 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2474 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2475 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2476 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2477 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2480 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2481 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2482 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2484 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2487 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2488 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2489 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2490 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2494 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2496 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2498 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2501 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2502 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2506 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2507 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2509 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2511 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2512 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2513 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2515 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2516 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2517 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2518 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2521 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2522 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2523 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2527 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2528 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2529 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2531 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2534 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2535 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0
2536 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2537 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2539 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2540 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2541 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2542 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2548 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2549 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2550 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2551 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2552 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2553 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2554 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2555 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2556 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2559 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2560 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2562 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2563 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2564 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2565 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2569 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2571 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2572 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2574 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2575 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2578 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2581 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2585 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2586 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2588 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2593 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2594 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2595 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2596 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2599 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2600 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2601 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2602 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2605 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2606 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2607 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2608 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2611 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2612 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2613 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2616 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2622 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2624 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2625 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2626 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2629 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2633 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2634 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2635 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2638 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
)
2641 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2644 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2645 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2650 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2651 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2652 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2654 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2655 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2656 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2659 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2660 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2661 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2665 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2666 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2667 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2672 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2673 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2674 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2675 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2684 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2686 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2687 /* should contain no data */
2688 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2689 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2690 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2693 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2694 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2695 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2697 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2702 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2703 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2704 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2707 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2710 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2715 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2716 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2719 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2720 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2721 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2722 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2723 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2726 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2727 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2728 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2732 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2734 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2735 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2738 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2739 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2740 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2742 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2743 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2744 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2745 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2749 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2750 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2751 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2752 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2756 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2757 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2758 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2759 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2760 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2764 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2765 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2766 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2768 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2769 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2772 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2773 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2774 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2781 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2782 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2783 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2784 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2788 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2794 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2797 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2798 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2799 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2801 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2804 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2806 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2808 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2809 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2813 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2814 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2815 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2816 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2820 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2821 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2823 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2824 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2828 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2829 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2830 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2831 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2832 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2833 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2837 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2838 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2839 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2840 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2843 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2844 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2845 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2846 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2850 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2851 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2852 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2853 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2856 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2859 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2860 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2861 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2862 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2866 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2867 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
2868 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2872 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2873 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2877 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2878 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2882 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2888 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2892 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2893 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2894 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2896 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2898 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2899 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2903 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2905 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2906 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2910 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2912 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2913 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2918 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2919 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2923 /* send off the data */
2924 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2925 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
),
2927 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2932 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2933 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2937 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2940 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2941 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2946 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2949 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2950 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2951 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2954 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2956 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
2957 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2961 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2963 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
2964 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2968 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2969 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2973 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2974 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2976 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2977 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
2982 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2983 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
2984 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2990 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2991 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2994 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
2995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3000 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3003 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3004 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3007 unsigned int md_len
;
3008 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3009 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3010 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3011 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3014 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3015 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3018 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3020 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3022 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3023 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3027 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
3028 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3029 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3030 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3034 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3035 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3036 * certificate key for key exchange
3039 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3041 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3043 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3044 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3048 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3049 /* Generate session key
3050 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3052 || ssl_randbytes(s
, pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3053 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3054 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3058 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3061 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3062 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3063 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3064 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3065 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3066 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3067 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3068 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3069 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3070 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3073 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3075 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3076 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3077 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3081 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3083 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3086 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3087 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3092 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3093 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3094 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3095 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3096 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3100 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3101 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3102 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3106 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3107 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3108 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3111 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3112 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3117 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3120 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3122 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3123 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3125 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3126 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3129 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3131 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3132 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3133 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3134 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3135 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3141 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3142 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3147 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3149 unsigned long alg_k
;
3151 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3154 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3155 * no need to do so here.
3157 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3158 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3161 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3162 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3164 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3165 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3167 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3168 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3170 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3171 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3173 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3174 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3176 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3177 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3178 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3184 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3185 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3187 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3188 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3193 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3195 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3198 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3199 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3203 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3204 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3205 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3212 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3213 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3214 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3217 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3218 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3219 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3228 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3229 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3230 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3233 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3236 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3237 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3239 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3240 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3241 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3242 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3243 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3248 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3249 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3255 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3256 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3261 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3262 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3263 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3265 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3267 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3268 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3271 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3272 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3274 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3275 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3280 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3283 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3286 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3287 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3288 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3289 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3291 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3295 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3296 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3297 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3300 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3302 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3303 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3305 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3309 /* We need to get a client cert */
3310 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3312 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3313 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3315 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3317 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3320 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3321 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3322 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3324 } else if (i
== 1) {
3326 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3327 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3331 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3332 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3335 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3336 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3337 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3338 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3340 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3341 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3342 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3348 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3351 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3352 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3353 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3357 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3360 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3363 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3364 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3365 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3368 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3369 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3371 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3376 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3377 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3378 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3380 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3381 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3383 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3384 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3391 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3393 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3397 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3398 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3400 /* we don't have a certificate */
3401 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3404 /* This is the passed certificate */
3405 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3407 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3408 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3409 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3410 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3411 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3416 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3417 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3419 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3420 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3425 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3426 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3427 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3428 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3433 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3434 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3444 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3446 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3447 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3449 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3450 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3452 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3453 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
,
3455 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3459 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3465 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3467 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3468 /* should contain no data */
3469 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
,
3470 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3471 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3474 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3475 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3476 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3480 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3481 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3482 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3483 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3484 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3489 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3491 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3494 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3497 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3499 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3500 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3501 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3502 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3506 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3507 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3509 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3510 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3511 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3515 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3516 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3519 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3520 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3523 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3527 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3528 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3529 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3530 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3535 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3536 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3540 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3543 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3544 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3545 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3546 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3549 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3554 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3555 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3556 # error Max cipher length too short
3559 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3560 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3563 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3564 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3567 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3570 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3572 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3575 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3576 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3578 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3579 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3580 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3583 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3584 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3585 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3589 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3591 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3592 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3593 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
))
3596 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
3597 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3605 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3606 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3607 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3610 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3617 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3618 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3619 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3621 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3622 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3623 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3627 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3628 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3629 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3631 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3632 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3633 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3642 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3644 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3645 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3646 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3647 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3648 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3652 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;