1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
110 /* ====================================================================
111 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
114 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
117 * license provided above.
119 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
120 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
123 /* ====================================================================
124 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
127 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
130 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
131 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
132 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
135 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
136 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
139 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
140 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
141 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
144 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
145 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
146 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
152 #include "statem_locl.h"
153 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
154 #include <openssl/rand.h>
155 #include <openssl/objects.h>
156 #include <openssl/evp.h>
157 #include <openssl/md5.h>
158 #include <openssl/dh.h>
159 #include <openssl/bn.h>
160 #include <openssl/engine.h>
162 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
163 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
164 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
165 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
170 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
176 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
178 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
179 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
180 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
181 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
188 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
195 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
197 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
200 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
201 * ciphersuite or for SRP
203 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
212 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
213 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
214 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
215 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
218 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
219 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
221 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
223 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
226 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
227 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
228 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
229 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
233 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
234 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
235 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
241 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
243 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
244 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
245 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
248 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
249 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
253 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
254 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
256 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
257 && s
->tls_session_secret_cb
!= NULL
258 && s
->session
->tlsext_tick
!= NULL
259 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
261 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
262 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
263 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
264 * the server is resuming.
267 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
269 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
270 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
271 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
272 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
276 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
277 if (ske_expected
< 0)
279 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
281 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
282 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
283 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
284 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
287 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
288 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
289 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
291 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
292 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
301 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
302 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
304 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
305 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
310 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
311 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
312 if (ske_expected
< 0)
314 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
316 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
317 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
318 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
319 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
326 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
327 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
328 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
329 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
336 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
337 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
338 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
343 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
344 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
&& s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
345 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
347 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
348 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
353 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
354 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
355 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
360 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
361 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
362 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
371 /* No valid transition found */
376 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
377 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
379 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
381 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
383 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
385 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
387 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
388 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
392 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
395 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
397 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
398 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
399 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
401 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
402 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
403 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
405 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
406 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
409 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
412 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
414 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
415 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
418 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
419 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
420 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
421 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
423 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
424 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
426 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
428 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
429 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
433 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
434 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
438 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
439 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
441 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
442 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
444 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
448 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
449 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
450 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
454 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
456 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
457 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
463 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
465 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
466 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
468 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
469 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
474 /* Shouldn't happen */
475 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
480 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
481 * the client to the server.
483 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
485 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
487 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
488 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
490 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
491 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
492 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
497 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
499 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
500 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
503 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
504 * messages unless we need to.
508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
509 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
510 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
513 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
516 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
519 /* No pre work to be done */
523 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
527 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
528 * client to the server.
530 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
532 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
536 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
537 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
538 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->d1
->cookie_len
> 0 && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
541 /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
542 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
545 * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
547 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
548 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
552 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
553 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
558 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
559 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
563 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
564 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
565 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
566 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
568 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
569 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
571 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
573 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
576 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
577 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
580 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
584 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
587 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
592 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
596 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
598 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
600 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
603 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
607 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
612 /* No post work to be done */
616 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
620 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
622 * Valid return values are:
626 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
)
628 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
630 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
631 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
632 return tls_construct_client_hello(s
);
635 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s
);
637 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
638 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s
);
640 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
641 return tls_construct_client_verify(s
);
643 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
645 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
647 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
649 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
650 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
651 return tls_construct_next_proto(s
);
653 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
654 return tls_construct_finished(s
,
656 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
658 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
661 /* Shouldn't happen */
669 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
670 * reading. Excludes the message header.
672 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
674 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
676 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
677 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
678 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
680 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
681 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
684 return s
->max_cert_list
;
686 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
687 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
689 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
690 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
692 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
693 /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
694 * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
695 * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
697 return s
->max_cert_list
;
699 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
700 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
702 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
703 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
705 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
706 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
708 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
709 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
712 /* Shouldn't happen */
720 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
722 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
724 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
726 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
727 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
728 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
730 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
731 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
734 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
736 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
737 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
739 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
740 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
742 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
743 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
745 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
746 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
748 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
749 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
751 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
752 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
754 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
755 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
758 /* Shouldn't happen */
762 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
766 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
769 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
771 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
773 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
775 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
776 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
777 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
778 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
779 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
780 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
781 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
782 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
785 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
786 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
793 /* Shouldn't happen */
797 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
800 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
809 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
811 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
813 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
814 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
820 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
821 !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
823 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
824 * "ticket" without a session ID.
826 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
827 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
828 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
831 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
833 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
836 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
837 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
839 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
842 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
851 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
852 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
855 /* Do the message type and length last */
856 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
859 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
860 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
861 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
862 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
863 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
864 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
865 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
866 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
869 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
870 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
871 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
872 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
873 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
874 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
875 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
876 * know that is maximum server supports.
877 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
878 * containing version 1.0.
880 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
881 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
882 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
883 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
884 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
885 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
886 * the negotiated version.
888 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
889 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
892 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
893 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
899 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
902 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
906 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
910 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
911 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
912 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
916 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
917 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
918 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
921 /* Ciphers supported */
922 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]));
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
927 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
929 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
930 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
933 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
934 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
935 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
941 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
945 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
948 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
950 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
951 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
955 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
958 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
963 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
965 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
971 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
972 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
979 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
983 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
986 unsigned int cookie_len
;
989 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
990 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
991 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
996 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
997 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
998 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1003 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1004 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1008 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1010 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1012 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1013 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1014 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1017 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1019 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1020 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1022 size_t session_id_len
;
1023 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1024 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1025 unsigned int compression
;
1026 unsigned int sversion
;
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1032 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1033 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1038 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
1039 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1040 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
1045 /* load the server hello data */
1046 /* load the server random */
1047 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1048 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1055 /* Get the session-id. */
1056 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1057 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1061 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1062 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1063 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1064 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1069 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1071 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1076 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1077 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1078 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1079 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1080 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1081 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1082 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1083 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1084 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1085 * server wants to resume.
1087 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
1088 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
1089 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1090 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1091 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1092 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1094 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1095 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1096 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1099 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1104 if (session_id_len
!= 0 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1105 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1106 session_id_len
) == 0) {
1107 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1108 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1109 /* actually a client application bug */
1110 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1112 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1118 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1119 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1120 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1121 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1122 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1124 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1125 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1130 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1131 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1132 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1133 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1137 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1138 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1139 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1142 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1146 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1148 /* unknown cipher */
1149 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1154 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1157 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1158 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1160 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1161 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1163 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1164 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1169 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1170 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1172 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1173 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1179 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1180 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1181 * set and use it for comparison.
1183 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1184 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1185 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1186 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1188 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1191 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1192 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1194 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1196 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1199 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1200 if (compression
!= 0) {
1201 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1203 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1207 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1208 * using compression.
1210 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1215 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1216 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1218 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1221 if (compression
== 0)
1223 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1224 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1228 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1231 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1232 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1234 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1237 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1241 /* TLS extensions */
1242 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
)) {
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1247 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1248 /* wrong packet length */
1249 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1255 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1256 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1257 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1260 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1263 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1264 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1266 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1267 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1269 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
1273 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1274 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1275 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1279 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1281 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1283 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1284 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1287 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1289 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1290 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1292 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1293 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1294 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1296 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1301 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1302 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1303 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1307 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1308 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1309 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1310 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1312 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1316 certstart
= certbytes
;
1317 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1319 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1323 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1324 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1326 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1329 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1336 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1337 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1338 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1340 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1343 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1346 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1350 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1352 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1353 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1355 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1358 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1361 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1363 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1367 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1371 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1376 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1380 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1381 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1382 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1383 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1384 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1386 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1388 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1391 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1393 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1395 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1396 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1399 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1403 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1405 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1408 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1412 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1417 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1418 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1423 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1425 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
1427 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1428 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1429 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1434 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1436 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
1438 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1439 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
1440 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1443 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1445 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1448 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1449 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1450 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1451 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1457 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1458 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1459 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1462 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1463 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1468 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1469 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1470 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1471 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1472 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1473 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1478 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1479 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1481 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1483 * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
1488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1489 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1490 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1491 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1492 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1493 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1494 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1500 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1501 PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1503 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1504 PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1506 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1507 PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1509 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1510 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1515 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1520 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1521 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1522 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1524 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1526 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1527 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1531 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1532 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1533 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1538 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1541 if (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1547 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1553 if ((dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1554 PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1555 || (dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1556 PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1558 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1559 PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1564 if (BN_is_zero(dh
->p
) || BN_is_zero(dh
->g
) || BN_is_zero(dh
->pub_key
)) {
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1569 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1570 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1574 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1575 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1576 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1578 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1581 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1583 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
1587 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1588 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1589 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1591 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1596 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1597 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1599 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1604 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2));
1605 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1606 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1608 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1612 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1613 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
1615 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
1616 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
1617 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
1618 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1622 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1625 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1630 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
),
1631 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1632 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
), NULL
) == 0) {
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1638 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1639 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1643 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1644 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1645 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1647 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1648 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1649 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1651 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1653 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1657 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1659 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1663 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1664 * equals the length of the parameters.
1666 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
1667 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
1668 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
1669 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1674 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1675 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
1677 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sigalgs
, 2)) {
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1681 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sigalgs
, pkey
);
1688 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1690 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
1691 md
= EVP_md5_sha1();
1696 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
1697 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1701 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1708 * Check signature length
1710 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)j
) {
1711 /* wrong packet length */
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1715 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1716 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1717 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1718 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1719 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1720 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
1721 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
1722 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1726 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
1727 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), pkey
) <= 0) {
1729 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1734 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1735 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1736 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1737 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
1738 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1742 /* still data left over */
1743 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1748 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1749 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1751 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1757 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1759 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
1760 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1761 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1764 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1766 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1767 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
1768 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1769 const unsigned char *data
;
1770 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
1771 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1773 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1778 /* get the certificate types */
1779 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
1780 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
1781 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1785 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
1786 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
1787 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
1788 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1789 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
1790 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1794 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
1795 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
1796 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
1798 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
1799 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
1801 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1802 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1803 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, list_len
)) {
1804 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1806 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1810 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1811 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1812 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
1813 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1815 if ((list_len
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, list_len
)) {
1816 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1818 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
1821 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1822 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1827 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
1830 /* get the CA RDNs */
1831 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
1832 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
1833 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1838 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1839 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
1840 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
1841 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1843 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1847 namestart
= namebytes
;
1849 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
1850 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
1851 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1856 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
1857 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
1859 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1862 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1868 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
1869 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
1870 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
1871 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
1872 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
1875 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1878 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1880 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
1884 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
1886 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
1889 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1892 unsigned int ticklen
;
1893 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1895 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
1896 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
1897 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
) {
1898 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1903 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
1905 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1907 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1908 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
1909 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
1911 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
1914 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
1916 * Remove the old session from the cache
1918 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE
) {
1919 if (s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1920 s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb(s
->session_ctx
,
1923 /* We carry on if this fails */
1924 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1928 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
1929 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1934 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
1935 s
->session
= new_sess
;
1938 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
1939 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
1941 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
1942 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
) {
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1946 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
)) {
1947 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1952 s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
1953 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
1955 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
1956 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
1957 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
1958 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
1959 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
1960 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
1961 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
1962 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
1963 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
1965 EVP_Digest(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
,
1966 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
1967 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
1968 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1970 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1972 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1973 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1976 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1979 unsigned long resplen
;
1982 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
1983 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1984 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
1988 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &resplen
)
1989 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
1990 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1994 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
1995 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
== NULL
) {
1996 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2000 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, resplen
)) {
2001 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2005 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2006 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2008 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2009 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2010 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2013 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2015 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2016 /* should contain no data */
2017 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2019 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2020 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2024 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2025 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2027 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2028 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2029 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2035 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2038 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2039 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2040 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2041 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2045 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2046 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2047 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2049 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1 && s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2051 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2053 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
2054 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2056 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2057 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2060 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2062 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2067 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2068 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
)) {
2069 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2070 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2076 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2077 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2078 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2079 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2082 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2085 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2090 size_t pskhdrlen
= 0;
2092 unsigned long alg_k
;
2093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2095 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2096 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2098 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2099 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2101 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2102 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2103 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2105 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2107 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2109 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2113 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2116 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2117 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2120 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2122 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2125 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2127 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2131 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2133 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2134 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2137 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2139 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2141 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2143 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2146 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2147 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2148 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2150 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2151 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2155 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2156 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2157 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2159 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2162 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2163 s
->session
->psk_identity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2164 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2165 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2169 s2n(identitylen
, p
);
2170 memcpy(p
, identity
, identitylen
);
2171 pskhdrlen
= 2 + identitylen
;
2175 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2177 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2181 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2186 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2190 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2192 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2193 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2197 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2199 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2202 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2206 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2207 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2213 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2214 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2215 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2219 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2220 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2222 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2223 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2224 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2229 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, p
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2231 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2235 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2238 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2240 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2244 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2245 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2252 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2254 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2257 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2260 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
, NID_undef
);
2261 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2263 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2265 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2270 /* send off the data */
2271 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2273 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2275 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2281 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2283 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2284 if ((skey
== NULL
) || EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(skey
) == NULL
) {
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2286 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2290 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
, NID_undef
);
2292 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2297 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2298 encoded_pt_len
= EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey
),
2299 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2300 &encodedPoint
, NULL
);
2302 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2307 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2312 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2313 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2315 /* copy the point */
2316 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2317 /* increment n to account for length field */
2320 /* Free allocated memory */
2321 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2323 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2325 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2326 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2327 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2330 unsigned int md_len
;
2331 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2332 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2333 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2334 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2335 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2339 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2344 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2346 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2349 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2353 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2354 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2356 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2360 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2361 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2362 * certificate key for key exchange
2365 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2367 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
2368 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2369 /* Generate session key */
2370 || RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2371 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2373 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2377 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2379 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2380 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2381 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2383 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2390 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2393 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2394 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2395 EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2396 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2397 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2398 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2399 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2400 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2401 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2403 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2406 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2407 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2408 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2414 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2416 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2418 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2420 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2425 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2427 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2430 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2433 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2434 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2435 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2436 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2437 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2438 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2440 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2445 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2446 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2447 /* send off the data */
2448 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2450 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2454 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2457 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2458 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2459 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2461 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2467 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2476 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
2477 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2483 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2484 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2489 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2492 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2493 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2495 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2498 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2500 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2501 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2504 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2505 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2507 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2511 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
2513 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2518 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2519 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
2521 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2527 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2528 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2530 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2531 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2535 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2536 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2542 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2543 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2544 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2547 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2550 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2551 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2553 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2554 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2555 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
2558 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2559 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2565 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2566 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2570 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
2574 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
2577 unsigned long n
= 0;
2581 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2587 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2588 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2590 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2591 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2595 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2596 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2604 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2606 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2607 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
2608 || (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2609 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2610 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2611 s
->session
->master_key
))
2612 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2618 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2619 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2620 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2621 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
2622 BUF_reverse(p
+ 2, NULL
, u
);
2628 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2629 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
2631 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2636 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2639 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2644 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2645 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2646 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2648 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2650 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
2652 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2653 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
2656 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2657 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2659 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
2660 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
2665 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2668 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2671 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2672 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2673 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
2674 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2676 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2680 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2681 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2684 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2686 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2687 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2689 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2693 /* We need to get a client cert */
2694 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2696 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2697 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2699 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
2701 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2704 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2705 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
2706 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
2708 } else if (i
== 1) {
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2711 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
2715 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2716 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
2719 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2720 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2721 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
2722 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2724 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
2725 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2726 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2727 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2733 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2736 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2740 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2742 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
2743 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
2744 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2746 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2747 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2754 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2756 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
2759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2763 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2764 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2766 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2767 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2769 /* we don't have a certificate */
2770 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
2773 /* This is the passed certificate */
2775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2776 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
2777 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
2778 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
2785 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2787 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2791 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2792 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
2794 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
2795 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2797 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2801 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2803 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
2807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2808 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
2809 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
2811 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
2815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2816 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
2817 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2825 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2830 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
2832 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
2835 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
2836 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
2837 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2839 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
2840 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
2841 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
2842 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
2843 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
2844 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
2851 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
2854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
2855 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
2856 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
2857 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
2858 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
2863 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
2864 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
2868 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
2872 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2874 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
2875 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
2876 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
2882 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
2883 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2884 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2885 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
2887 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, p
);
2891 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
2895 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
2896 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2897 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2899 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);
2902 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
2903 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
2904 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2906 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);