2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
28 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
45 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
60 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
85 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
103 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
109 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
110 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
117 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
118 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
122 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
123 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
126 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
127 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
134 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
135 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
141 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
142 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
148 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
149 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
155 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
156 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
159 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
160 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
181 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
194 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
199 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
200 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
205 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
206 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
210 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
211 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
217 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
219 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
220 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
223 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
224 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
227 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
228 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
233 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
235 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
236 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
237 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
240 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
241 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
246 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
248 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
249 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
250 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
251 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
253 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
254 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
255 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
256 * the server is resuming.
259 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
261 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
262 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
263 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
264 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
268 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
269 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
271 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
272 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
273 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
274 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
277 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
278 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
279 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
281 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
282 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
291 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
292 * |ext.status_expected| is set
294 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
295 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
300 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
301 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
303 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
304 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
305 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
306 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
314 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
315 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
316 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
323 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
324 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
325 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
330 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
331 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
332 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
333 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
336 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
337 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
343 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
350 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
351 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
357 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
358 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
365 /* No valid transition found */
366 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
367 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
,
368 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
373 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
374 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
377 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
379 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
382 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
383 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
384 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
386 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
388 /* Shouldn't happen */
389 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
391 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
392 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
393 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
395 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
396 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
397 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
398 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
400 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
401 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
402 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
404 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
405 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
406 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
407 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
411 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
412 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
413 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
417 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
418 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
419 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
422 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
423 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
426 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
427 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
428 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
433 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
434 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
435 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
436 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
440 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
441 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
445 /* Try to read from the server instead */
446 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
451 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
452 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
454 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
456 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
459 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
460 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
464 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
466 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
468 /* Shouldn't happen */
469 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
472 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
474 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
475 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
477 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
482 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
485 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
486 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
488 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
489 * actually selected a version yet.
491 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
495 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
500 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
501 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
504 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
505 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
507 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
508 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
511 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
512 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
513 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
515 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
519 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
520 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
522 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
524 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
525 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
528 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
529 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
530 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
531 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
533 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
534 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
536 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
538 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
539 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
541 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
543 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
544 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
545 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
547 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
548 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
550 hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
552 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
553 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
555 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
559 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
560 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
561 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
562 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
565 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
567 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
570 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
573 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
575 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
578 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
582 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
584 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
587 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
588 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
589 /* SSLfatal() already called */
590 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
592 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
593 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
595 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
601 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
602 * the client to the server.
604 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
606 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
608 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
610 /* No pre work to be done */
613 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
615 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
616 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
617 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
618 /* SSLfatal() already called */
624 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
625 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
628 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
629 * messages unless we need to.
633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
634 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
635 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
640 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
642 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
643 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
644 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
646 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
647 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
648 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
651 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
653 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
656 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
660 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
661 * client to the server.
663 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
665 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
669 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
671 /* No post work to be done */
674 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
675 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
678 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
679 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
683 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
684 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
686 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
687 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
688 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
690 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
691 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
696 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
698 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
699 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
701 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
702 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
705 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
706 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
710 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
711 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
712 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
713 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
715 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
716 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
718 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
720 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
723 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
724 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
727 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
731 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
734 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
739 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
743 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
745 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
747 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
750 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
754 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
757 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
758 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
759 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
764 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
765 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
767 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1))
772 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
776 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
779 * Valid return values are:
783 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
784 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
786 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
788 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
790 /* Shouldn't happen */
791 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
792 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
793 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
796 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
798 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
800 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
801 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
804 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
805 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
806 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
809 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
810 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
811 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
814 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
820 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
821 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
824 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
825 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
826 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
829 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
830 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
831 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
834 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
835 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
836 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
837 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
840 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
841 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
842 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
845 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
846 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
847 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
855 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
856 * reading. Excludes the message header.
858 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
860 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
862 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
864 /* Shouldn't happen */
867 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
868 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
870 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
871 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
873 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
874 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
877 return s
->max_cert_list
;
879 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
880 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
882 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
883 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
885 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
886 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
888 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
890 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
891 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
892 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
894 return s
->max_cert_list
;
896 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
897 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
899 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
900 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
902 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
904 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
905 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
907 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
908 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
910 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
911 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
913 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
914 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
919 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
921 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
923 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
925 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
927 /* Shouldn't happen */
928 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
930 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
931 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
933 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
934 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
936 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
937 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s
, pkt
);
940 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
942 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
943 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
945 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
946 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
948 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
949 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
951 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
952 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
954 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
955 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
957 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
958 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
960 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
961 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
963 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
964 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
966 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
967 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
969 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
970 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
972 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
973 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
978 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
981 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
983 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
985 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
987 /* Shouldn't happen */
990 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
991 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
995 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1003 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1005 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
1006 /* Should not happen */
1007 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1008 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1012 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1013 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1014 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1015 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1021 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
)
1022 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1023 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1024 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1028 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1030 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1033 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1034 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1036 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1039 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1046 i
= s
->hello_retry_request
== 0;
1049 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
),
1050 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1051 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1052 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1057 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1058 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1059 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1060 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1061 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1062 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1063 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1064 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1067 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1068 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1069 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1070 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1071 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1072 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1073 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1074 * know that is maximum server supports.
1075 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1076 * containing version 1.0.
1078 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1079 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1080 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1081 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1082 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1083 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1084 * the negotiated version.
1086 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1087 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1089 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1090 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1091 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1092 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1097 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1100 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1101 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1102 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1103 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
1105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1111 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1112 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1113 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1114 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1115 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1116 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1117 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1122 /* Ciphers supported */
1123 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1124 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1128 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1129 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
)) {
1130 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1133 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1134 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1135 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1140 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1141 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1142 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1146 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1147 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1148 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1149 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1150 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1151 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1152 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1153 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1154 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1155 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1161 /* Add the NULL method */
1162 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1163 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1164 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1168 /* TLS extensions */
1169 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1170 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1177 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1182 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1183 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1184 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1185 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1186 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1189 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1190 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1191 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1192 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1193 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1196 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1197 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1198 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1199 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1201 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1203 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1206 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1208 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1209 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1212 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1214 /* unknown cipher */
1215 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1216 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1220 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1221 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1223 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1224 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1225 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1229 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1230 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1232 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1234 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1238 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1239 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1240 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1241 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1242 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1247 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1248 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1249 * set and use it for comparison.
1251 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1252 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1253 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1254 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1256 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1257 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1259 if (ssl_md(c
->algorithm2
)
1260 != ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1261 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1262 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1263 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1268 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1271 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1272 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1276 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1281 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1283 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1284 size_t session_id_len
;
1285 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1286 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1287 unsigned int compression
;
1288 unsigned int sversion
;
1289 unsigned int context
;
1290 int protverr
, discard
;
1291 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1296 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1298 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1302 /* load the server random */
1303 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1304 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1305 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1310 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1311 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1312 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1314 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, 1, &al
);
1315 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1316 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1322 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1323 * message must be on a record boundary.
1325 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1326 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1327 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1331 /* Get the session-id. */
1332 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1333 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1334 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1335 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1338 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1339 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1340 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1341 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1342 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1343 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1347 PACKET_null_init(&session_id
);
1351 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1352 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1353 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1357 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1358 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1359 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1360 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1367 /* TLS extensions */
1368 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1369 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1370 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1371 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1372 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1377 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1378 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1379 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, context
, &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1380 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1386 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1387 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1388 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1389 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1390 extensions
, NULL
, 0l)) {
1391 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1396 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1397 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1398 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1399 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1400 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1401 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1402 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1403 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1404 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1405 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1407 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1408 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1409 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1411 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1412 * backwards compat reasons
1414 int master_key_length
;
1415 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1416 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1419 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1420 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1421 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1422 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1423 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1425 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1426 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1431 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1432 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1433 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1434 session_id_len
) == 0)
1439 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1440 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1441 /* actually a client application bug */
1442 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1443 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1444 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1449 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1450 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1451 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1452 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1453 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1455 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1457 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1458 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1459 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
, 1, &discard
,
1460 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
1461 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1462 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1467 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1468 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1469 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1470 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1471 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1475 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1476 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1477 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1478 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1482 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1485 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1486 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1488 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1489 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1493 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1494 if (compression
!= 0) {
1495 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1496 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1500 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1501 * using compression.
1503 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1504 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1505 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1509 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1510 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1511 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1514 if (compression
== 0)
1516 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1517 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1518 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1521 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1524 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1525 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1526 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1529 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1533 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1534 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1539 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1540 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1541 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1544 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1547 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1548 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1550 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1551 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1553 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1554 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1555 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1559 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1560 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1561 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1566 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1567 * we're done with this message
1570 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1571 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1572 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1573 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1577 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1578 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1580 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1581 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1584 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1586 unsigned int sversion
;
1587 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1588 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1591 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1592 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1593 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1597 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT clause before release */
1598 if (sversion
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
&& sversion
!= TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
) {
1599 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1600 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1601 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1605 s
->hello_retry_request
= 1;
1608 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1609 * should not be used.
1611 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1612 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1614 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1615 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1616 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1620 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1621 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1625 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1626 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1627 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt
) == 0
1628 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1629 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1630 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1635 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1636 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1637 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1638 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1639 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1643 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1646 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0
1647 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1648 && s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
1652 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1653 * ClientHello will not change
1655 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1656 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1657 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1662 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1663 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1665 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
)) {
1666 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1671 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1672 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1673 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1676 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1677 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1682 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1684 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1685 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1688 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1691 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1692 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1694 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1695 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1696 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1697 size_t chainidx
, certidx
;
1698 unsigned int context
= 0;
1699 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1701 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1702 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1703 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1707 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1709 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1710 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1711 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1712 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1713 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1716 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1717 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1718 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1719 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1720 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1721 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1725 certstart
= certbytes
;
1726 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1728 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
,
1729 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1732 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1733 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1734 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1735 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1739 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1740 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1743 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1744 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1745 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1749 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1750 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1751 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1752 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1753 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1754 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1755 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1756 /* SSLfatal already called */
1759 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1762 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1763 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1764 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1765 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1771 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1773 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1774 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1775 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1776 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1777 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1778 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1779 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1780 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1781 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1782 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1783 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1784 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1786 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1787 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
),
1788 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1789 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1792 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1794 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1795 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1799 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1801 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1802 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1804 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1807 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1809 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1811 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1812 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1816 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1818 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1819 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1820 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1824 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1825 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1828 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1829 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1831 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1832 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1833 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1837 s
->session
->peer_type
= certidx
;
1839 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1841 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1842 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1845 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1847 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1848 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1849 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1850 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1854 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1858 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1862 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1865 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1867 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1869 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1870 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1876 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1877 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1878 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1881 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1882 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1887 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1888 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1889 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1890 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1891 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1892 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1899 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1904 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1907 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1909 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1910 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1911 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1912 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1913 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1918 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1920 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1921 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1923 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1924 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1926 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1927 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1929 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1930 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1931 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1936 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1941 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1942 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1943 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1948 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1953 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1956 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1957 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1960 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1964 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1965 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1966 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1967 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1972 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1975 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1976 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1981 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1982 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1983 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1985 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1986 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
1987 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1988 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1993 /* test non-zero pubkey */
1994 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1995 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2000 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2001 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2007 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2008 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2013 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2014 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2020 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2021 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2026 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2027 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2032 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2035 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2036 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2038 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2039 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2040 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2049 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2054 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2059 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
2061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2063 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2066 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2067 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2068 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2070 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2071 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2076 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2077 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2079 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
|| !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
)) {
2080 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
2085 if ((s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2086 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2088 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2092 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2093 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2098 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2099 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2100 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2101 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
2107 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2108 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2111 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2112 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2113 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2114 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2115 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2120 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2125 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2129 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2130 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2131 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2132 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2134 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2136 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2138 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2139 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2140 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2143 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2144 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2148 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2149 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2150 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2151 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2153 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2154 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2156 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2157 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2160 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2165 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2169 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2175 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2176 * equals the length of the parameters.
2178 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2179 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2180 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2181 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2186 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2187 unsigned int sigalg
;
2189 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2190 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2194 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2195 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2199 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2201 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2202 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2206 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2207 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2211 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2212 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2213 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2217 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2219 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2225 * Check signature length
2227 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2228 /* wrong packet length */
2229 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2231 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2235 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2236 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2237 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2242 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2243 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2247 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2248 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2249 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2250 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2251 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2256 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2257 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2259 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2263 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2264 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2267 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2271 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2274 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2275 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2276 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2277 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2278 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2279 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2280 /* SSLfatal() already called TODO: Fix this */
2281 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2284 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2288 /* still data left over */
2289 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2290 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2296 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2298 /* TODO: Remove this SSLfatal call and convert the rest of this function */
2299 SSLfatal(s
, al
!= -1 ? al
: SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2300 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2301 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2302 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2305 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2309 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2310 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2311 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2313 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2314 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2315 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2317 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2318 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2319 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2320 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2322 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2323 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
)) {
2324 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2325 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2326 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2327 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2330 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2331 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2332 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2334 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2336 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2337 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2339 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2340 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2341 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2342 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2343 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2345 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2346 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2347 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2348 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2350 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2355 /* get the certificate types */
2356 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2357 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2358 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2359 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2360 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2363 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2364 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2365 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2366 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2367 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2370 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2373 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2374 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2375 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2376 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2377 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2380 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
)) {
2381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2382 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2383 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2384 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2386 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2387 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2388 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2389 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2390 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2394 /* get the CA RDNs */
2395 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2396 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2397 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2401 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2402 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2403 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2404 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2405 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2408 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2409 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2411 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2414 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2416 unsigned int ticklen
;
2417 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2418 unsigned int sess_len
;
2419 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2422 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2424 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2425 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)
2426 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce
, &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
,
2427 &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
)))
2428 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2429 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2431 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2432 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2433 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2438 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2439 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2440 * be 0 here in that instance
2443 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2446 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2447 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2448 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2449 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2450 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2453 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2454 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2455 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2457 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2460 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2461 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2462 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2463 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2467 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2469 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2471 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2474 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2475 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2479 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2480 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2482 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2484 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2485 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2486 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2488 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2489 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2490 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2491 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2494 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2495 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2496 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2500 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2501 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2502 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2504 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2507 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2508 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0
2509 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2510 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2512 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2513 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2514 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2515 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2521 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2522 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2523 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2524 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2525 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2526 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2527 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2528 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2529 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2532 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2533 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2535 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2536 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2537 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2538 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2542 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2544 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2545 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2547 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2548 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2551 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2554 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2558 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2559 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2561 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2566 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2567 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2568 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2569 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2572 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2573 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2574 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2575 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2578 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2579 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2580 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2581 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2584 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2585 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2586 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2589 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2595 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2597 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2598 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2599 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2602 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2606 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2607 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2608 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2611 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
)
2614 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2617 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2618 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2623 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2624 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2625 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2627 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2628 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2629 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2632 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2633 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2634 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2639 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2640 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2645 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2646 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2647 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2657 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2659 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2660 /* should contain no data */
2661 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2662 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2663 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2666 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2667 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2668 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2670 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2675 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2676 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2677 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2680 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2683 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2688 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2689 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2692 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2693 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2694 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2695 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2696 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2699 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2701 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2705 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2707 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2708 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2711 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2713 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2715 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2717 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2718 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2722 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2723 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2725 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2729 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2730 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2731 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2733 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2737 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2738 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2739 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2741 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2742 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2745 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2747 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2754 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2755 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2756 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2757 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2762 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2767 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2770 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2771 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2772 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2774 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2777 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2779 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2785 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2786 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2791 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2792 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2794 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2795 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2799 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2800 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2801 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2802 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2806 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2807 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2811 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2812 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2813 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2817 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2818 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2822 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2825 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2826 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2831 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2832 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
))
2835 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2836 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2840 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2841 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2846 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2851 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2855 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2856 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2857 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2859 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2863 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2867 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2869 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0)
2872 /* send off the data */
2873 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2874 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
), &keybytes
))
2877 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2878 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2882 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2885 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2889 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2892 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2893 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2894 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2897 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2903 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2909 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2914 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2915 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2917 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2918 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2922 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2929 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2930 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2934 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2939 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2942 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2943 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2946 unsigned int md_len
;
2947 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2948 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2949 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2950 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2953 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2954 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2957 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2959 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2961 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2963 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2967 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2968 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2969 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2974 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2975 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2976 * certificate key for key exchange
2979 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2981 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2983 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2988 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2989 /* Generate session key
2990 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2992 || ssl_randbytes(s
, pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
2993 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2998 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3001 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3002 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3003 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3004 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3005 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3006 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3007 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3008 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3009 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3013 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3015 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3016 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3017 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3021 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3023 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3026 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3027 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3032 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3033 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3034 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3035 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3040 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3041 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3042 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3046 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3047 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3048 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3052 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3057 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
3059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3060 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3062 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3063 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3068 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3070 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3071 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3072 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3080 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3085 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3087 unsigned long alg_k
;
3090 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3092 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3093 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3096 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3097 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3099 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3100 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3102 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3103 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3105 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3106 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3108 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3109 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3111 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3112 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3120 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3121 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3122 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3124 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3125 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3130 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3132 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3135 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3136 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3140 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3141 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3143 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3150 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3151 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3155 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3156 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3158 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3167 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3168 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3169 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3172 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3175 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3176 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3178 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3179 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3180 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
3183 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3184 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3190 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3191 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3196 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3197 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3198 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3200 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3202 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3203 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3206 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3207 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3209 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3210 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3215 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3218 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3221 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3222 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3223 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3224 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3226 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3230 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3231 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3232 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3235 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3237 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3238 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3240 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3244 /* We need to get a client cert */
3245 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3247 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3248 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3250 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3252 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3255 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3256 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3257 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3259 } else if (i
== 1) {
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3262 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3266 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3267 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3270 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3271 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3272 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3273 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3275 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3276 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3277 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3283 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3286 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3290 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3293 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3296 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3298 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3301 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3302 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3304 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3309 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3310 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3311 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3313 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsisten
3314 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3316 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3317 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3324 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3326 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3330 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3331 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3333 /* we don't have a certificate */
3334 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3337 /* This is the passed certificate */
3338 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3340 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3341 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3343 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3344 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3349 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3350 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3352 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3353 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3358 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3359 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3360 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3361 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3366 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3367 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3368 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3377 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3379 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3380 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3382 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3383 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3385 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3386 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3391 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3395 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3400 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3402 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3403 /* should contain no data */
3404 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
,
3405 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3406 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3409 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3410 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3411 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3415 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3416 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3417 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3418 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3419 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3424 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3426 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3429 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3432 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3434 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3435 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3436 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3437 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3441 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3442 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3444 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3445 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3446 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3450 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3451 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3454 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3455 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3458 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3462 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3463 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3464 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3465 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3470 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3471 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3475 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3478 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3479 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3480 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3481 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3484 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3485 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3489 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3490 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3491 # error Max cipher length too short
3494 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3495 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3498 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3499 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3502 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3505 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3507 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3510 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3511 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3513 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3514 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3515 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3518 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3519 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3520 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3524 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3526 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3527 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3528 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
))
3531 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
3532 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3540 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3541 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3542 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3545 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3552 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3553 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3554 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3556 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3557 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3558 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3562 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3563 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3564 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3566 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3567 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3568 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3577 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3579 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3580 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3582 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3586 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;