2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
28 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
45 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
60 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
85 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
103 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
109 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
110 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
117 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
118 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
122 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
123 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
126 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
127 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
134 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
135 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
141 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
142 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
148 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
149 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
155 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
156 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
159 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
160 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
181 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
194 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
199 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
200 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
205 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
206 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
210 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
211 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
217 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
219 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
220 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
223 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
224 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
227 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
228 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
233 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
235 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
236 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
237 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
240 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
241 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
246 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
248 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
249 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
250 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
251 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
253 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
254 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
255 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
256 * the server is resuming.
259 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
261 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
262 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
263 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
264 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
268 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
269 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
271 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
272 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
273 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
274 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
277 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
278 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
279 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
281 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
282 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
291 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
292 * |ext.status_expected| is set
294 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
295 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
300 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
301 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
303 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
304 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
305 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
306 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
314 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
315 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
316 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
323 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
324 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
325 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
330 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
331 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
332 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
333 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
336 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
337 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
343 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
350 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
351 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
357 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
358 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
365 /* No valid transition found */
366 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
367 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
,
368 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
373 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
374 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
377 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
379 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
382 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
383 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
384 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
386 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
388 /* Shouldn't happen */
389 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
390 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
391 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
392 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
394 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
395 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
396 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
398 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
399 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
400 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
401 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
403 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
404 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
407 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
408 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
409 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
414 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
415 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
416 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
420 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
421 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
422 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
425 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
426 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
429 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
430 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
431 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
436 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
437 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
438 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
439 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
443 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
444 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
448 /* Try to read from the server instead */
449 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
454 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
455 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
457 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
459 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
462 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
463 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
467 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
469 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
471 /* Shouldn't happen */
472 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
473 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
474 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
475 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
478 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
480 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
481 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
483 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
488 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
491 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
492 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
494 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
495 * actually selected a version yet.
497 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
498 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
501 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
506 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
507 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
510 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
513 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
514 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
517 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
518 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
519 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
521 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
522 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
525 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
528 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
530 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
531 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
534 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
535 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
536 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
537 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
539 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
540 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
542 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
544 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
545 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
549 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
550 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
553 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
554 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
556 hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
558 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
559 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
561 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
563 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
565 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
566 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
567 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
571 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
573 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
579 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
581 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
584 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
588 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
590 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
593 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
594 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
595 /* SSLfatal() already called */
596 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
598 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
601 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
602 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
607 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
608 * the client to the server.
610 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
612 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
614 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
616 /* No pre work to be done */
619 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
621 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
622 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
623 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
624 /* SSLfatal() already called */
630 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
631 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
634 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
635 * messages unless we need to.
639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
640 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
641 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
642 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
648 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
650 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
651 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
652 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
654 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
655 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
656 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
659 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
661 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
662 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
665 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
669 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
670 * client to the server.
672 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
674 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
678 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
680 /* No post work to be done */
683 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
684 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
687 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
688 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
692 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
693 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
695 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
696 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
697 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
699 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
700 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
707 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
709 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
710 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
712 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
713 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
716 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
717 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
718 /* SSLfatal() already called */
723 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
724 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
725 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
726 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
728 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
729 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
731 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
733 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
734 /* SSLfatal() already called */
738 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
739 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
744 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
748 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
751 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
756 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
760 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
762 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
764 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
767 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
771 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
774 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
775 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
776 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
777 /* SSLfatal() already called */
783 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
784 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
786 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
787 /* SSLfatal() already called */
793 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
797 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
800 * Valid return values are:
804 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
805 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
807 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
809 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
811 /* Shouldn't happen */
812 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
813 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
814 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
817 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
819 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
821 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
822 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
825 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
826 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
827 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
830 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
831 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
832 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
835 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
841 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
842 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
845 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
846 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
847 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
850 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
851 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
852 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
855 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
856 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
857 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
858 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
861 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
862 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
863 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
866 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
867 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
868 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
876 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
877 * reading. Excludes the message header.
879 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
881 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
883 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
885 /* Shouldn't happen */
888 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
889 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
891 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
892 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
894 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
895 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
898 return s
->max_cert_list
;
900 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
901 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
903 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
904 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
906 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
907 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
909 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
911 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
912 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
913 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
915 return s
->max_cert_list
;
917 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
918 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
920 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
921 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
923 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
925 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
926 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
928 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
929 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
931 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
932 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
934 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
935 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
940 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
942 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
944 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
946 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
948 /* Shouldn't happen */
949 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
950 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
951 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
952 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
954 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
955 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
957 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
958 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
960 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
961 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s
, pkt
);
964 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
966 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
967 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
969 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
970 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
972 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
973 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
975 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
976 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
978 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
979 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
982 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
984 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
985 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
987 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
988 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
990 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
991 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
993 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
994 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
996 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
997 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1002 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1005 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1007 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1009 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1011 /* Shouldn't happen */
1012 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1013 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1017 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1018 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1022 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1030 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1032 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
1033 /* Should not happen */
1034 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1035 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1039 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1040 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1041 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1042 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1048 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
)
1049 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1050 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1051 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1055 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1057 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1060 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1061 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1063 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1066 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1073 i
= s
->hello_retry_request
== 0;
1076 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
),
1077 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1078 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1079 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1084 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1085 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1086 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1087 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1088 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1089 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1090 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1091 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1094 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1095 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1096 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1097 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1098 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1099 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1100 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1101 * know that is maximum server supports.
1102 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1103 * containing version 1.0.
1105 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1106 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1107 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1108 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1109 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1110 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1111 * the negotiated version.
1113 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1114 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1116 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1117 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1119 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1124 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1127 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1128 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1130 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
1132 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1133 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1138 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1139 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1140 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1141 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1142 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1143 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1144 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1149 /* Ciphers supported */
1150 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1151 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1152 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1156 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
)) {
1157 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1160 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1161 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1162 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1167 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1168 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1173 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1174 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1175 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1176 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1177 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1178 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1179 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1180 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1181 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1188 /* Add the NULL method */
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1190 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1195 /* TLS extensions */
1196 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1197 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1204 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1209 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1210 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1211 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1212 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1213 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1216 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1217 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1218 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1219 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1220 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1223 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1224 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1225 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1226 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1228 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1230 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1233 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1235 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1236 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1239 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1241 /* unknown cipher */
1242 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1243 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1247 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1248 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1250 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1251 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1252 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1256 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1257 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1259 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1260 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1261 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1265 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1266 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1267 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1268 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1269 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1274 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1275 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1276 * set and use it for comparison.
1278 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1279 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1280 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1281 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1283 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1284 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1286 if (ssl_md(c
->algorithm2
)
1287 != ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1288 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1289 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1290 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1295 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1299 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1303 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1308 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1310 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1311 size_t session_id_len
;
1312 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1313 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1314 unsigned int compression
;
1315 unsigned int sversion
;
1316 unsigned int context
;
1317 int protverr
, discard
;
1318 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1323 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1324 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1325 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1329 /* load the server random */
1330 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1331 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1332 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1337 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1338 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1339 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1341 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, 1, &al
);
1342 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1343 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1349 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1350 * message must be on a record boundary.
1352 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1353 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1354 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1358 /* Get the session-id. */
1359 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1360 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1361 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1362 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1365 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1366 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1367 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1369 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1370 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1374 PACKET_null_init(&session_id
);
1378 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1379 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1380 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1384 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1385 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1386 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1387 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1394 /* TLS extensions */
1395 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1396 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1397 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1398 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1399 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1404 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1405 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1406 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, context
, &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1407 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1413 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1414 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1415 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1416 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1417 extensions
, NULL
, 0l)) {
1418 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1423 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1424 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1425 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1426 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1427 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1428 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1429 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1430 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1431 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1432 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1434 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1435 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1436 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1438 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1439 * backwards compat reasons
1441 int master_key_length
;
1442 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1443 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1446 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1447 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1448 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1449 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1450 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1452 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1453 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1458 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1459 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1460 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1461 session_id_len
) == 0)
1466 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1467 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1468 /* actually a client application bug */
1469 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1470 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1471 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1476 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1477 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1478 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1479 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1480 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1482 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1484 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1485 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1486 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
, 1, &discard
,
1487 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
1488 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1489 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1494 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1495 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1496 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1497 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1498 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1502 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1503 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1504 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1505 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1509 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1512 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1513 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1515 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1516 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1520 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1521 if (compression
!= 0) {
1522 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1523 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1527 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1528 * using compression.
1530 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1531 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1532 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1536 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1537 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1538 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1541 if (compression
== 0)
1543 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1544 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1545 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1548 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1551 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1552 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1553 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1556 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1560 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1561 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1566 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1567 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1568 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1571 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1574 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1575 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1577 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1578 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1580 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1581 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1582 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1586 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1587 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1588 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1593 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1594 * we're done with this message
1597 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1598 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1599 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1600 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1604 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1605 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1607 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1608 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1611 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1613 unsigned int sversion
;
1614 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1615 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1618 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1619 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1620 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1624 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT clause before release */
1625 if (sversion
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
&& sversion
!= TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
) {
1626 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1627 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1628 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1632 s
->hello_retry_request
= 1;
1635 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1636 * should not be used.
1638 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1639 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1641 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1642 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1643 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1647 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1652 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1653 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1654 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt
) == 0
1655 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1656 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1657 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1662 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1663 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1664 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1665 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1666 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1670 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1673 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0
1674 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1675 && s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
1679 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1680 * ClientHello will not change
1682 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1683 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1684 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1689 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1690 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1692 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
)) {
1693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1698 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1699 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1700 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1703 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1704 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1705 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1709 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1711 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1712 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1715 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1718 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1719 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1721 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1722 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1723 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1724 size_t chainidx
, certidx
;
1725 unsigned int context
= 0;
1726 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1728 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1729 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1730 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1734 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1736 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1737 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1738 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1739 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1740 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1743 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1744 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1745 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1746 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1747 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1748 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1752 certstart
= certbytes
;
1753 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1755 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
,
1756 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1759 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1760 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1761 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1762 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1766 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1767 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1770 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1771 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1772 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1776 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1777 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1778 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1779 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1780 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1781 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1782 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1783 /* SSLfatal already called */
1786 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1789 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1790 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1791 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1792 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1798 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1800 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1801 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1802 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1803 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1804 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1805 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1806 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1807 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1808 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1809 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1810 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1811 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1813 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1814 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
),
1815 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1816 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1819 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1821 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1822 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1826 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1828 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1829 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1831 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1834 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1836 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1838 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1839 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1843 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1845 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1846 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1847 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1851 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1852 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1855 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1856 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1858 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1859 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1860 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1864 s
->session
->peer_type
= certidx
;
1866 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1868 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1869 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1872 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1874 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1875 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1876 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1877 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1881 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1885 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1889 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1892 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1894 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1896 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1897 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1898 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1903 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1904 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1905 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1908 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1909 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1910 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1911 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1915 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1916 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1917 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1918 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1919 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1920 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1921 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1927 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1933 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
1935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1936 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1938 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1939 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1940 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1941 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1942 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
1943 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1947 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1949 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1950 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1952 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1953 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1955 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1956 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1958 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1959 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1960 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
1965 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
1966 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1970 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1971 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1972 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1976 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
1977 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1982 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
1984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1985 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1986 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1989 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1993 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1994 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1995 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1996 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
1997 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2001 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2004 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
2005 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2006 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2010 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2011 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2012 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2014 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2015 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2016 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2017 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2022 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2023 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
2024 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2025 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2029 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2030 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2036 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2037 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2038 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2042 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2043 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2049 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2050 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2051 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2055 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2056 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2061 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2064 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2065 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2067 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2068 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2069 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2078 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2082 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2083 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2088 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2092 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2095 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2096 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2097 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2099 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2100 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2101 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2105 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2106 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2108 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
|| !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
)) {
2109 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2114 if ((s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2115 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2116 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2120 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2121 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2122 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2126 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2127 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2128 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2129 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2135 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2136 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2139 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2140 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2141 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2142 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2143 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2147 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2148 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2153 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2156 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2157 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2158 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2159 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2161 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2163 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2165 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2166 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2167 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2170 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2171 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2172 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2177 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2178 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2179 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2180 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2181 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2184 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2185 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2186 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2189 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2190 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2195 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2196 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2200 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2204 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2210 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2211 * equals the length of the parameters.
2213 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2214 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2215 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2216 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2217 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2221 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2222 unsigned int sigalg
;
2224 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2225 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2226 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2229 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2230 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2234 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2236 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2237 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2238 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2242 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2243 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2248 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2249 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2250 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2251 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2254 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2256 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2257 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2262 * Check signature length
2264 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2265 /* wrong packet length */
2266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2267 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2271 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2272 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2273 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2274 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2278 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2279 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2283 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2284 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2285 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2286 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2287 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2288 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2292 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2293 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2295 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2299 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2300 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2303 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2304 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2307 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2310 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2311 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2312 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2313 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2314 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2315 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2318 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2321 /* still data left over */
2322 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2323 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2324 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2329 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2331 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2332 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2335 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2339 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2340 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2341 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2343 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2344 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2345 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2347 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2348 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2349 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2350 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2352 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2353 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
)) {
2354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2355 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2356 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2357 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2360 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2361 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2362 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2364 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2366 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2367 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2369 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2370 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2371 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2372 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2373 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2375 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2376 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2377 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2378 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2380 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2385 /* get the certificate types */
2386 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2387 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2388 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2389 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2390 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2393 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2395 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2396 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2397 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2400 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2403 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2404 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2405 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2406 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2407 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2410 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
)) {
2411 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2412 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2413 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2414 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2416 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2417 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2418 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2419 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2420 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2424 /* get the CA RDNs */
2425 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2426 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2427 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2431 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2432 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2433 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2434 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2435 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2438 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2439 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2441 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2444 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2446 unsigned int ticklen
;
2447 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2448 unsigned int sess_len
;
2449 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2452 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2454 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2455 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)
2456 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce
, &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
,
2457 &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
)))
2458 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2459 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2461 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2462 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2463 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2468 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2469 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2470 * be 0 here in that instance
2473 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2476 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2477 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2478 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2479 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2480 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2483 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2484 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2485 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2487 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2490 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2491 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2492 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2493 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2497 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2499 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2501 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2504 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2505 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2509 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2510 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2512 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2514 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2515 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2516 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2518 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2519 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2520 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2521 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2524 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2525 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2526 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2530 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2531 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2532 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2534 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2537 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2538 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0
2539 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2540 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2542 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2543 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2544 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2545 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2551 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2552 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2553 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2554 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2555 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2556 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2557 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2558 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2559 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2562 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2563 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2565 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2566 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2567 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2568 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2572 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2574 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2575 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2577 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2578 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2581 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2584 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2588 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2589 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2591 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2596 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2597 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2598 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2599 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2602 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2603 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2604 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2605 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2608 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2609 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2610 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2611 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2614 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2615 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2616 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2619 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2625 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2627 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2628 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2629 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2632 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2636 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2637 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2638 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2641 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
)
2644 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2647 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2653 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2654 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2655 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2657 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2658 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2659 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2662 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2663 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2664 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2668 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2669 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2670 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2675 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2676 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2677 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2687 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2689 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2690 /* should contain no data */
2691 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2692 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2693 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2696 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2697 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2698 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2700 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2705 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2706 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2707 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2710 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2713 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2718 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2719 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2722 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2723 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2724 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2725 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2726 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2729 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2730 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2731 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2735 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2737 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2738 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2741 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2742 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2743 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2745 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2746 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2747 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2748 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2752 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2753 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2754 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2755 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2759 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2760 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2761 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2762 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2763 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2767 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2768 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2769 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2771 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2772 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2775 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2776 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2777 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2784 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2785 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2786 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2787 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2791 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2797 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2800 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2801 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2802 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2804 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2807 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2809 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2811 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2812 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2816 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2817 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2818 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2819 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2823 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2824 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2826 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2827 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2831 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2832 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2833 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2834 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2835 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2836 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2840 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2841 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2842 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2846 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2847 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2848 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2849 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2853 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2854 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2855 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2856 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2859 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2862 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2863 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2864 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2865 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2869 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2870 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
2871 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2875 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2876 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2880 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2881 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2885 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2886 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2891 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2895 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2896 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2897 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2899 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2901 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2902 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2906 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2908 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2909 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2913 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2915 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2916 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2917 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2921 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2922 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2926 /* send off the data */
2927 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2928 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
),
2930 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2931 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2935 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2936 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2940 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2943 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2944 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2949 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2952 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2953 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2954 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2957 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
2960 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2964 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2966 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
2967 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2971 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2972 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2976 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2977 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2979 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2980 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
2985 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2986 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
2987 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2993 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2994 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2997 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
2998 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3003 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3006 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3007 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3010 unsigned int md_len
;
3011 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3012 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3013 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3014 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3017 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3018 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3021 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3023 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3025 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3026 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3030 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
3031 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3032 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3033 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3037 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3038 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3039 * certificate key for key exchange
3042 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3044 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3046 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3047 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3051 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3052 /* Generate session key
3053 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3055 || ssl_randbytes(s
, pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3056 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3057 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3061 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3064 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3065 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3066 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3067 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3068 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3069 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3070 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3071 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3072 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3073 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3076 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3078 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3079 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3080 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3084 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3086 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3089 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3090 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3095 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3096 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3097 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3098 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3099 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3103 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3104 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3105 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3109 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3110 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3111 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3114 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3115 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3120 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3123 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3125 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3126 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3128 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3129 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3132 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3134 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3135 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3136 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3137 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3138 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3144 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3145 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3150 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3152 unsigned long alg_k
;
3154 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3157 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3158 * no need to do so here.
3160 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3161 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3164 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3165 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3167 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3168 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3170 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3171 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3173 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3174 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3176 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3177 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3179 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3180 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3181 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3187 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3188 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3190 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3191 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3196 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3198 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3201 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3202 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3206 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3207 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3208 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3215 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3216 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3217 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3220 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3221 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3222 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3231 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3232 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3233 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3236 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3239 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3240 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3242 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3243 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3244 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3245 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3246 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3250 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3251 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3257 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3258 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3263 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3264 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3265 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3267 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3269 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3270 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3273 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3274 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3276 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3277 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3282 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3285 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3288 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3289 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3290 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3291 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3293 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3298 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3299 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3302 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3304 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3305 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3307 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3311 /* We need to get a client cert */
3312 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3314 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3315 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3317 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3319 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3322 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3323 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3324 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3326 } else if (i
== 1) {
3328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3329 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3333 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3334 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3337 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3338 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3339 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3340 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3342 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3343 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3344 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3350 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3353 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3355 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3359 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3362 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3365 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3366 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3367 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3370 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3371 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3373 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3378 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3379 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3380 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3382 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3383 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3385 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3386 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3393 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3395 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3399 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3400 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3402 /* we don't have a certificate */
3403 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3406 /* This is the passed certificate */
3407 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3409 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3410 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3411 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3412 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3413 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3418 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3419 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3421 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3422 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3427 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3428 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3429 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3430 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3435 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3436 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3437 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3446 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3448 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3449 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3451 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3452 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3454 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3455 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3456 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
,
3457 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3461 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3467 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3469 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3470 /* should contain no data */
3471 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
,
3472 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3473 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3476 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3477 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3478 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3482 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3483 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3484 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3485 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3486 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3491 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3493 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3496 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3499 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3501 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3502 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3503 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3504 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3508 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3509 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3511 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3512 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3513 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3517 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3518 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3521 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3522 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3525 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3529 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3530 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3531 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3532 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3537 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3538 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3542 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3545 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3546 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3547 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3548 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3551 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3552 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3556 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3557 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3558 # error Max cipher length too short
3561 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3562 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3565 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3566 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3569 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3572 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3574 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3577 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3578 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3580 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3581 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3582 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3585 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3586 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3587 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3591 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3593 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3594 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3595 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
))
3598 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
3599 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3607 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3608 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3609 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3612 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3619 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3620 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3621 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3623 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3624 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3625 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3629 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3630 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3631 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3633 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3634 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3635 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3644 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3646 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3647 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3648 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3649 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3650 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3654 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;