2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
66 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
68 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
72 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
78 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
80 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
81 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
82 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
83 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
90 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
96 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
98 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
101 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
102 * ciphersuite or for SRP
104 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
113 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
114 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
115 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
116 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
118 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
119 * (transition not allowed)
121 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
123 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
126 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
127 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
128 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
131 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
135 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
137 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
138 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
140 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
141 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
147 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
148 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
153 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
155 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
156 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
160 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
161 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
164 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
165 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
171 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
172 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
173 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
179 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
180 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
185 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
186 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
187 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
193 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
194 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
197 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
198 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
204 /* No valid transition found */
209 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
210 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
211 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
212 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
214 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
215 * (transition not allowed)
217 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
219 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
223 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
224 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
226 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
227 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
232 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
236 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
237 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
238 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
242 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
243 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
244 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
248 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
249 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
255 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
257 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
258 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
261 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
262 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
265 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
266 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
271 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
273 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
274 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
275 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
278 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
279 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
283 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
284 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
286 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
287 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
288 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
289 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
291 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
292 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
293 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
294 * the server is resuming.
297 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
299 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
300 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
301 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
302 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
306 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
307 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
309 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
310 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
311 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
312 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
315 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
316 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
317 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
319 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
320 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
329 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
330 * |ext.status_expected| is set
332 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
333 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
338 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
339 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
340 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
341 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
342 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
343 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
352 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
353 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
354 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
361 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
362 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
363 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
368 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
369 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
370 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
371 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
374 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
375 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
380 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
381 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
382 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
387 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
388 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
389 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
395 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
396 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
403 /* No valid transition found */
404 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
405 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
410 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
411 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
414 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
416 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
419 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
420 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
421 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
423 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
425 /* Shouldn't happen */
426 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
428 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
429 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
430 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
432 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
433 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
436 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
437 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
438 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
439 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
441 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
442 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
445 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
446 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
447 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
452 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
453 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
454 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
458 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
459 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
460 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
464 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
467 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
468 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
469 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
474 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
475 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
476 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
477 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
481 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
482 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
486 /* Try to read from the server instead */
487 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
492 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
493 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
495 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
497 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
500 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
501 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
505 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
507 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
509 /* Shouldn't happen */
510 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
513 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
515 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
516 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
518 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
523 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
526 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
527 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
529 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
530 * actually selected a version yet.
532 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
533 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
536 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
539 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
541 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
542 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
544 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
545 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
548 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
549 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
550 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
552 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
553 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
556 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
559 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
561 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
562 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
565 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
566 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
567 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
568 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
570 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
571 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
573 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
575 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
576 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
580 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
581 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
584 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
585 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
587 hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
589 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
590 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
592 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
596 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
597 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
598 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
602 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
604 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
607 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
610 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
612 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
613 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
615 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
619 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
621 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
624 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
625 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
626 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
627 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
629 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
632 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
638 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
639 * the client to the server.
641 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
643 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
645 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
647 /* No pre work to be done */
650 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
653 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
654 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
655 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
661 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
662 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
665 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
666 * messages unless we need to.
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
677 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
679 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
680 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
681 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
683 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
684 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
685 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
688 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
690 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
693 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
697 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
698 * client to the server.
700 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
702 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
706 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
708 /* No post work to be done */
711 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
712 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
715 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
716 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
720 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
721 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
723 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
724 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
725 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
727 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
728 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
733 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
735 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
736 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
738 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
739 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
742 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
743 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
747 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
748 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
749 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
750 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
752 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
753 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
755 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
757 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
760 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
761 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
764 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
768 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
771 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
776 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
780 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
782 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
784 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
787 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
791 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
794 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
795 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
796 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
801 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
802 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
804 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1))
809 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
813 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
816 * Valid return values are:
820 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
821 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
823 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
825 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
827 /* Shouldn't happen */
830 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
832 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
834 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
835 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
838 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
839 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
840 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
843 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
844 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
845 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
848 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
854 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
855 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
858 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
859 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
860 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
863 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
864 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
865 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
868 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
869 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
870 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
871 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
874 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
875 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
876 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
879 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
880 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
881 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
889 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
890 * reading. Excludes the message header.
892 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
894 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
896 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
898 /* Shouldn't happen */
901 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
902 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
904 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
905 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
907 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
908 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
911 return s
->max_cert_list
;
913 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
914 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
916 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
917 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
919 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
920 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
922 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
924 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
925 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
926 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
928 return s
->max_cert_list
;
930 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
931 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
933 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
934 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
936 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
938 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
939 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
941 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
942 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
944 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
945 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
947 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
948 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
953 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
955 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
957 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
959 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
961 /* Shouldn't happen */
962 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
964 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
965 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
967 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
968 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
970 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
971 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s
, pkt
);
974 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
976 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
977 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
979 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
980 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
982 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
983 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
985 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
986 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
988 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
989 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
991 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
992 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
994 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
995 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
997 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
998 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1000 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1001 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1004 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1007 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1012 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1015 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1017 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1019 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1021 /* Shouldn't happen */
1024 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1025 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1029 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1034 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1038 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1040 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
1041 /* Should not happen */
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1046 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1047 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1048 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1054 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
)
1055 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1056 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
1059 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1061 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1064 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1065 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1067 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1070 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1079 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
),
1080 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0)
1084 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1085 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1086 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1087 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1088 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1089 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1090 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1091 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1094 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1095 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1096 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1097 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1098 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1099 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1100 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1101 * know that is maximum server supports.
1102 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1103 * containing version 1.0.
1105 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1106 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1107 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1108 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1109 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1110 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1111 * the negotiated version.
1113 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1114 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1116 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1117 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1123 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1126 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1127 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1128 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1129 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
1131 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1136 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1137 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1138 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1139 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1140 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1146 /* Ciphers supported */
1147 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1151 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1152 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
))
1154 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1160 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1165 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1166 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1167 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1168 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1169 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1170 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1171 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1178 /* Add the NULL method */
1179 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1184 /* TLS extensions */
1185 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1193 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1199 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1200 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1201 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1206 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1207 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1208 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1213 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1214 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1218 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1220 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1222 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1223 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1224 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1227 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1229 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1230 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1233 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1235 /* unknown cipher */
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1240 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1241 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1243 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1248 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1249 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1251 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1256 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1257 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1258 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1264 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1265 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1266 * set and use it for comparison.
1268 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1269 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1270 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1272 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1275 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1280 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1282 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1283 size_t session_id_len
;
1284 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1285 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1286 unsigned int compression
;
1287 unsigned int sversion
;
1288 unsigned int context
;
1290 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1295 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1296 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1301 /* load the server random */
1302 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1303 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1309 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1310 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1311 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1313 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, 1, &al
);
1314 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
1320 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1321 * message must be on a record boundary.
1323 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1324 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1329 /* Get the session-id. */
1330 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1331 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1332 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1336 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1337 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1338 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1339 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1341 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1345 PACKET_null_init(&session_id
);
1349 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1351 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1355 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1356 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1358 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1365 /* TLS extensions */
1366 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1367 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1368 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1369 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1370 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1375 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1376 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1377 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, context
, &extensions
, &al
, NULL
, 1))
1382 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1383 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1384 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1385 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1386 extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1390 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1391 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1392 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1393 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1394 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1395 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1396 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1397 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1398 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1399 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1401 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1402 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1403 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1405 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1406 * backwards compat reasons
1408 int master_key_length
;
1409 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1410 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1413 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1414 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1415 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1416 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1417 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1420 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1425 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1426 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1427 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1428 session_id_len
) == 0)
1433 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1434 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1435 /* actually a client application bug */
1436 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1438 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1443 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1444 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1445 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1446 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1447 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1449 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1451 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1452 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1453 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1454 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1459 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1460 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1461 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1462 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1463 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1467 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1468 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1469 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1472 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1476 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1479 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1480 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1482 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1483 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1487 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1488 if (compression
!= 0) {
1489 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1491 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1495 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1496 * using compression.
1498 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1503 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1504 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1506 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1509 if (compression
== 0)
1511 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1512 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1516 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1519 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1520 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1522 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1525 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1529 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
, 1))
1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1533 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1534 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1535 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1538 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1541 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1542 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1544 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1545 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1547 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
1550 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1551 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1552 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1557 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1558 * we're done with this message
1561 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1562 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1563 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1564 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
1569 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1570 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1572 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1573 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1574 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1575 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1578 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1580 unsigned int sversion
;
1582 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1583 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1587 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1588 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1593 s
->hello_retry_request
= 1;
1595 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1596 errorcode
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, 0, &al
);
1597 if (errorcode
!= 0) {
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, errorcode
);
1602 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1604 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1608 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1609 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1613 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1614 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1615 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt
) == 0
1616 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1617 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1618 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1623 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1624 &extensions
, &al
, NULL
, 1)
1625 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1626 extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
, 1))
1629 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1632 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0 && s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1634 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1635 * ClientHello will not change
1637 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1639 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1644 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1645 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1647 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
)) {
1648 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1653 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1654 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1655 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1658 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1659 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1660 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1665 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1667 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1668 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1669 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1670 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1673 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1675 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1676 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1678 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1679 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1680 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1682 unsigned int context
= 0;
1684 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1689 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1691 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1692 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1693 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1694 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1698 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1699 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1700 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1701 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1703 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1707 certstart
= certbytes
;
1708 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1710 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1714 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1715 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1717 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1721 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1722 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1725 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1726 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1730 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1731 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1732 &al
, NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1733 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1734 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
, &al
,
1735 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1736 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1739 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1742 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1749 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1751 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1752 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1753 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1754 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1755 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1756 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1757 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1758 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1759 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1760 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1761 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1762 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1764 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1765 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1767 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1770 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1773 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1777 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1779 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1780 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1782 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1785 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1788 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1790 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1792 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1794 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1798 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1803 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1807 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1808 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1811 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1812 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1813 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1814 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1815 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1816 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1818 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1820 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1824 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1826 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1828 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1829 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1832 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1834 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1835 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1836 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1837 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1842 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1846 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1848 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1851 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1855 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1858 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1860 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1862 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1863 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1869 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1870 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1871 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1874 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1875 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1880 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1881 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1882 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1883 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1884 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1885 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1892 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1897 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1900 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1902 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1903 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1904 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1905 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1906 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1911 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1913 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1914 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1916 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1917 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1919 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1920 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1922 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1923 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1924 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1929 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1934 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1935 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1936 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1941 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1946 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1949 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1950 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1953 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1957 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1958 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1959 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1960 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1965 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1968 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1969 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1974 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1975 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1976 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1978 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1979 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
1980 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1981 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1986 /* test non-zero pubkey */
1987 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1988 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1993 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1994 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2000 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2001 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2006 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2007 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2013 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2014 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2019 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2020 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2025 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2028 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2029 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2031 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2032 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2033 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2042 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2047 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2052 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
2054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2056 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
2058 unsigned int curve_flags
;
2059 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2062 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2063 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
2064 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2066 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
2067 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2072 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
2073 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
2075 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
2076 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
2081 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2), &curve_flags
);
2083 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
2084 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2086 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2090 if ((curve_flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
) {
2091 EVP_PKEY
*key
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2093 if (key
== NULL
|| !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key
, curve_nid
)) {
2094 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2099 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= key
;
2101 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2102 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
2104 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
2105 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
2106 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
2107 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2109 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2112 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2116 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2117 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2122 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2123 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2124 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2125 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
2131 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2132 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2135 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2136 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2137 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2138 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2139 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2144 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2149 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2153 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2154 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2155 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2156 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2158 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2160 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2162 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2163 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2164 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2167 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2168 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2172 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2173 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2174 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2175 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2177 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2178 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2180 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2181 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2184 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2189 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2193 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2196 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2197 * equals the length of the parameters.
2199 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2200 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2201 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2202 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2207 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2208 unsigned int sigalg
;
2211 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2212 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2216 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
2218 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2220 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2221 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2225 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2227 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2228 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2232 md
= ssl_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->hash_idx
);
2234 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2235 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2236 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2240 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2242 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2248 * Check signature length
2250 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2251 /* wrong packet length */
2252 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2254 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2258 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2259 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2260 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2265 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2266 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2270 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2271 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2272 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2273 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2274 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2279 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2280 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2281 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2282 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2283 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2284 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
2285 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2289 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2290 PACKET_remaining(&signature
)) <= 0) {
2292 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2296 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2299 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2300 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2301 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2302 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2303 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2304 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2305 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2308 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2312 /* still data left over */
2313 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2314 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2320 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2323 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2324 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2325 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2326 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2329 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2331 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2332 int al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2335 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2336 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2337 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2339 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2340 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2341 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2343 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2344 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2345 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2346 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2348 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2349 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
)) {
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2351 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2355 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2359 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2360 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2361 &rawexts
, &al
, NULL
, 1)
2362 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2363 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, &al
, 1)) {
2364 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2367 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2368 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2369 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2376 /* get the certificate types */
2377 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2379 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2383 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2384 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2389 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2392 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2394 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2398 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
)) {
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2400 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2403 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2404 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2406 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2411 /* get the CA RDNs */
2412 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2416 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2421 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2422 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2424 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2427 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2428 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2433 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2435 int al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2436 unsigned int ticklen
;
2437 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2438 unsigned int sess_len
;
2439 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2441 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2442 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
))
2443 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2444 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2446 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2452 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2453 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2454 * be 0 here in that instance
2457 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2460 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2461 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2462 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2463 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2464 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2467 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2468 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2469 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2471 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2474 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2476 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2478 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2481 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2482 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2483 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2487 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2488 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2492 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2493 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2495 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2497 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2498 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2499 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2501 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2502 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2506 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2507 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2512 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2513 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2514 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2516 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2519 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2520 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0
2521 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2522 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2523 &exts
, &al
, NULL
, 1)
2524 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2525 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2526 exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
, 1)) {
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
2533 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2534 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2535 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2536 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2537 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2538 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2539 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2540 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2541 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2544 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2545 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2547 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2548 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2549 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2553 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2555 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2556 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2558 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2559 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2562 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2564 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2566 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2568 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2572 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2573 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2574 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2576 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2581 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2582 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2583 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2585 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2588 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2589 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2590 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2594 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2595 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2596 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2600 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2601 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2605 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2611 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2615 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
, &al
)) {
2616 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2617 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2618 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2621 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2625 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2626 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2627 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2630 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
2633 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2636 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2637 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2642 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2643 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2644 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2646 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2647 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2648 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2651 *al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2653 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2657 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2659 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2664 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2665 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2666 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2667 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2676 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2678 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2680 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2681 /* should contain no data */
2682 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2687 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2688 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2696 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2698 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
2701 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2704 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2705 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2706 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2709 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2714 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2715 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2718 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2719 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2720 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2721 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2722 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2725 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2727 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2731 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2733 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2734 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2737 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2739 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2741 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2743 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2744 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2748 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2749 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2751 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2755 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2756 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2757 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2759 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2763 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2764 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2765 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2767 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2768 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2771 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2773 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2780 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2781 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2782 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2783 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2788 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2793 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2796 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2797 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2798 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2800 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2803 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2805 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2811 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2812 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2817 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2818 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2821 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2825 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2826 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2827 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2828 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2832 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2833 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2837 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2838 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2839 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2843 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2844 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2848 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2851 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2852 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2857 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2858 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
))
2861 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2862 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2866 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2867 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2872 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2877 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2881 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2882 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2883 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2885 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2889 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2893 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2895 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0)
2898 /* send off the data */
2899 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2900 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
), &keybytes
))
2903 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2904 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2908 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2911 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2915 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2918 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2919 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2920 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2923 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2929 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2935 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2940 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2941 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2943 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2948 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2955 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2956 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2960 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2965 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2968 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2969 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2972 unsigned int md_len
;
2973 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2974 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2975 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2976 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2979 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2980 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2983 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2985 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2987 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2989 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2993 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2994 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2995 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3000 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3001 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3002 * certificate key for key exchange
3005 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3007 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3009 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3014 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3015 /* Generate session key
3016 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3018 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3019 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3024 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3027 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3028 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3029 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3030 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3031 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3032 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3033 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3034 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3035 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3039 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3041 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3042 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3043 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3047 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3049 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3052 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3053 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3058 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3059 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3060 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3061 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3066 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3067 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3068 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3072 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3073 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3074 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3078 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3083 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
3085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3086 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3088 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3089 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3094 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3096 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3097 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3098 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3106 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3111 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3113 unsigned long alg_k
;
3116 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3118 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3119 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3122 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3123 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3125 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3126 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3128 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3129 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3131 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3132 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3134 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3135 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3137 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3138 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3146 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3147 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3148 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3150 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3151 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3156 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3158 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3161 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3162 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3166 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3167 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3176 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3177 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3181 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3182 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3184 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3193 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3194 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3195 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3198 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3201 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3202 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3204 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3205 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3206 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
3209 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3210 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3216 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3217 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3222 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3223 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3224 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3226 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3228 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3229 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, NULL
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3232 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3233 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3235 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3236 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3241 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3244 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3247 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3248 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3249 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3250 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3252 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3256 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3257 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3260 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3262 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3263 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3265 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3269 /* We need to get a client cert */
3270 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3272 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3273 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3275 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3277 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3280 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3281 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3282 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3284 } else if (i
== 1) {
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3287 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3291 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3292 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3295 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3296 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3297 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3298 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3300 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3301 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3302 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3303 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3309 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3312 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3316 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3318 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3321 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3324 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0))
3325 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3326 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3334 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3335 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3336 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3338 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3344 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3348 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3350 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3357 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3358 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3360 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3361 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3363 /* we don't have a certificate */
3364 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3367 /* This is the passed certificate */
3369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3370 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
3371 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3372 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3379 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3381 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3385 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3386 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
3388 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3389 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3391 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3395 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3397 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3402 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
3403 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3405 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3410 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3411 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3419 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3424 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3426 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3427 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3429 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3430 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3432 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3433 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3438 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3442 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3447 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3449 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3450 /* should contain no data */
3451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3452 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
3453 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3454 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3458 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3459 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3460 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3461 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3462 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3467 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3469 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3472 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3474 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3476 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3478 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3479 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3480 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3485 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3486 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3488 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3489 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, &al
, 1))
3492 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3493 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3496 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3497 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3498 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3499 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3502 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3506 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3507 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3508 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3509 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3514 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3515 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3519 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3522 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3523 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3524 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3525 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3530 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3531 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3532 # error Max cipher length too short
3535 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3536 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3539 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3540 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3543 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3546 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3548 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3551 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3552 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3554 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3555 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3556 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3559 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3564 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3566 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3567 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3568 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
))
3571 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
3572 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3580 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3584 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3591 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3592 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3593 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3595 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3600 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3601 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3602 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3604 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3614 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3616 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3617 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3619 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3623 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;