2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
66 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
84 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
99 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
124 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
127 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
128 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
132 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
133 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
134 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
137 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
141 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
143 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
144 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
146 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
147 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
152 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
153 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
154 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
159 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
161 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
162 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
166 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
167 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
170 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
171 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
177 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
178 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
179 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
185 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
186 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
191 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
192 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
193 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
199 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
200 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
203 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
204 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
210 /* No valid transition found */
215 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
216 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
217 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
218 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
220 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
221 * (transition not allowed)
223 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
225 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
229 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
230 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
232 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
233 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
238 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
242 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
243 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
244 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
248 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
249 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
250 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
254 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
255 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
261 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
263 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
264 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
265 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
268 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
269 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
273 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
274 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
276 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
277 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
278 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
279 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
281 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
282 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
283 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
284 * the server is resuming.
287 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
289 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
290 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
291 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
292 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
296 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
297 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
299 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
300 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
301 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
302 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
305 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
306 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
307 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
309 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
310 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
319 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
320 * |ext.status_expected| is set
322 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
323 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
328 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
329 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
330 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
331 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
332 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
333 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
334 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
341 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
342 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
343 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
352 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
353 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
358 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
359 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
360 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
361 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
364 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
365 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
370 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
371 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
372 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
377 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
378 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
379 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
385 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
386 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
393 /* No valid transition found */
394 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
404 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
406 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
413 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
415 /* Shouldn't happen */
416 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
418 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
419 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
422 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
423 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
426 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
427 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
428 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
432 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
433 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
434 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
438 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
441 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
442 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
443 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
448 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
449 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
450 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
451 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
452 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
456 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
457 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
461 /* Try to read from the server instead */
462 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
467 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
468 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
470 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
472 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
475 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
476 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
480 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
482 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
484 /* Shouldn't happen */
485 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
488 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
490 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
491 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
493 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
495 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
497 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
498 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
500 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
502 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
505 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
507 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
508 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
511 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
512 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
513 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
515 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
519 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
520 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
522 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
524 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
525 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
528 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
529 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
530 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
531 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
533 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
534 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
536 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
538 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
539 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
541 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
543 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
544 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
545 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
547 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
548 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
549 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
551 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
552 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
554 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
558 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
559 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
560 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
564 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
566 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
567 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
570 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
573 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
575 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
578 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
579 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
583 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
585 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
588 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
589 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
590 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
591 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
593 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
596 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
597 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
603 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
604 * the client to the server.
606 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
608 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
610 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
612 /* No pre work to be done */
615 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
617 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
618 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
619 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
620 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
626 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
627 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
630 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
631 * messages unless we need to.
635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
636 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
637 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
643 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
646 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
650 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
651 * client to the server.
652 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
653 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
655 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
657 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
661 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
663 /* No post work to be done */
666 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
667 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
670 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
671 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
676 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
677 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
681 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
682 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
683 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
684 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
686 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
687 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
689 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
691 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
694 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
695 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
698 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
702 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
705 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
710 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
714 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
716 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
718 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
721 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
725 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
728 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
729 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
730 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
735 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
736 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
738 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1))
743 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
747 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
750 * Valid return values are:
754 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
755 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
757 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
759 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
761 /* Shouldn't happen */
764 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
766 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
768 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
769 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
772 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
773 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
774 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
778 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
779 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
782 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
783 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
784 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
787 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
788 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
789 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
792 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
793 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
794 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
795 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
798 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
799 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
800 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
803 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
804 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
805 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
813 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
814 * reading. Excludes the message header.
816 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
818 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
820 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
822 /* Shouldn't happen */
825 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
826 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
828 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
829 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
831 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
832 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
835 return s
->max_cert_list
;
837 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
838 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
840 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
841 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
843 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
844 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
846 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
848 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
849 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
850 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
852 return s
->max_cert_list
;
854 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
855 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
857 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
858 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
860 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
862 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
863 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
865 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
866 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
868 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
869 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
871 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
872 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
877 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
879 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
881 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
883 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
885 /* Shouldn't happen */
886 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
888 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
889 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
891 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
892 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
894 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
895 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s
, pkt
);
898 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
900 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
901 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
903 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
904 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
906 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
907 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
909 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
910 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
912 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
913 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
915 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
916 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
918 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
919 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
921 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
922 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
924 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
925 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
927 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
928 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
930 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
931 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
936 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
939 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
941 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
943 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
945 /* Shouldn't happen */
948 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
949 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
952 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
953 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
954 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
955 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
956 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
957 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
958 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
959 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
962 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
963 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
968 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
973 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
977 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
979 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
980 /* Should not happen */
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
985 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
986 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
992 if ((sess
== NULL
) || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
) ||
994 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
995 * "ticket" without a session ID.
997 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->ext
.tick
) ||
998 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
999 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
1002 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1004 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
1005 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
1007 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1010 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1011 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1013 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1016 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1025 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
1029 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1030 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1031 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1032 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1033 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1034 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1035 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1036 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1039 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1040 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1041 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1042 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1043 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1044 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1045 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1046 * know that is maximum server supports.
1047 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1048 * containing version 1.0.
1050 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1051 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1052 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1053 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1054 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1055 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1056 * the negotiated version.
1058 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1059 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1061 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1062 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1068 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1071 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1072 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1073 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1074 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
1076 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1081 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1082 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1083 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1084 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1085 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1091 /* Ciphers supported */
1092 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1096 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1097 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
))
1099 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1105 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1110 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1111 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1112 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1113 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1114 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1121 /* Add the NULL method */
1122 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1127 /* TLS extensions */
1128 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1129 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1137 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1143 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1144 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1145 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1150 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1151 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1152 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1157 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1158 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1162 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1164 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1166 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1167 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1168 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1171 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1173 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1174 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1175 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1176 size_t session_id_len
;
1177 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1178 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1179 unsigned int compression
;
1180 unsigned int sversion
;
1181 unsigned int context
;
1183 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1188 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1189 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1194 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1195 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
1196 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1197 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
1202 /* load the server hello data */
1203 /* load the server random */
1204 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1205 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1210 /* Get the session-id. */
1211 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1212 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1213 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1217 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1218 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1219 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1220 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1222 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1226 PACKET_null_init(&session_id
);
1230 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1232 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1236 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1237 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1239 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1246 /* TLS extensions */
1247 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1248 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1249 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)) {
1250 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1255 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1256 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1257 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, context
, &extensions
, &al
, NULL
))
1262 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1263 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1264 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1265 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1266 extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1270 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1271 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1272 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1273 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1274 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1275 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1276 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1277 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1278 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1279 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1281 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1282 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1283 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1285 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1286 * backwards compat reasons
1288 int master_key_length
;
1289 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1290 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1293 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1294 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1295 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1296 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1297 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1300 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1305 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1306 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1307 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1308 session_id_len
) == 0)
1313 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1314 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1315 /* actually a client application bug */
1316 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1318 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1323 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1324 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1325 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1326 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1327 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1329 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1331 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1332 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1333 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1334 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1339 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1340 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1341 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1342 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1343 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1347 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1348 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1349 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1352 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1356 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1358 /* unknown cipher */
1359 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1364 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1367 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1368 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1370 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1371 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1373 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1374 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1379 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1380 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1382 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1383 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1389 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1390 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1391 * set and use it for comparison.
1393 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1394 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1395 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1396 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1398 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1401 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1403 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1404 if (compression
!= 0) {
1405 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1407 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1411 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1412 * using compression.
1414 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1419 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1420 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1422 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1425 if (compression
== 0)
1427 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1428 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1432 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1435 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1436 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1438 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1441 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1445 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1449 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1450 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1451 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1454 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1457 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1458 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1460 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1461 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1463 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
1466 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1467 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1468 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1473 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1474 * we're done with this message
1477 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1478 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1479 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)
1480 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1481 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1482 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
1487 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1488 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1490 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1491 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1492 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1493 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1496 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1498 unsigned int sversion
;
1500 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1504 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1505 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1510 s
->hello_retry_request
= 1;
1512 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1513 errorcode
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
);
1514 if (errorcode
!= 0) {
1515 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, errorcode
);
1520 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)) {
1521 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1526 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1527 &extensions
, &al
, NULL
)
1528 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1529 extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1532 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1534 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1536 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1537 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1538 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1539 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1542 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1544 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
, exp_idx
;
1545 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1547 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1548 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1549 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1551 unsigned int context
= 0;
1553 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1558 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1560 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1561 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1562 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1566 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1567 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1568 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1569 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1571 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1575 certstart
= certbytes
;
1576 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1578 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1582 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1583 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1585 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1589 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1590 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1593 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1594 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1598 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1599 &rawexts
, &al
, NULL
)
1600 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1601 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
, &al
)) {
1602 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1605 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1608 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1615 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1617 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1618 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1619 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1620 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1621 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1622 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1623 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1624 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1625 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1626 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1627 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1628 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1630 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1631 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1633 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1636 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1639 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1643 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1645 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1646 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1648 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1651 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1654 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1656 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1660 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1664 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1669 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1673 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1674 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1677 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1678 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1679 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
1680 && (exp_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC
||
1681 (i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
&& i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1682 && i
!= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
))) {
1684 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1686 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1690 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1692 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1694 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1695 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1698 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1700 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1701 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1702 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1703 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1708 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1712 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1714 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1717 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1721 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1724 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1726 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1728 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1729 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1735 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1736 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1737 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1740 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1741 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1746 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1747 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1748 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1749 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1750 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1751 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1758 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1763 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1766 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1768 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1769 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1770 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1771 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1772 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1777 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1779 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1780 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1782 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1783 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1785 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1786 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1788 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1789 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1790 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1795 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1796 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1801 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1802 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1803 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1808 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1813 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1816 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1817 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1820 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1824 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1825 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1826 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1827 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1832 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1835 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1836 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1841 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1842 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1843 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1845 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1846 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
1847 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1848 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1853 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1854 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1855 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1860 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1861 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1867 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
1868 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1873 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
1874 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1880 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1881 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1886 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
1887 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1892 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
1895 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1896 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1898 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1899 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1900 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1909 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1914 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1919 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1923 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
1925 unsigned int curve_flags
;
1926 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1929 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1930 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1931 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1933 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
1934 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1939 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1940 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1942 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
1943 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1948 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2), &curve_flags
);
1950 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
1951 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
1953 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1957 if ((curve_flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
) {
1958 EVP_PKEY
*key
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1960 if (key
== NULL
|| !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key
, curve_nid
)) {
1961 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1966 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= key
;
1968 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1969 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
1971 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
1972 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
1973 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
1974 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1976 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1979 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1983 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
1984 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1989 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
1990 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1991 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
1992 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1998 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1999 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2002 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2003 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2004 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2005 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2006 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2011 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2016 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2020 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2021 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2022 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2023 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2025 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2027 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2029 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2030 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2031 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2034 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2035 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2039 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2040 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2041 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2042 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2044 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2045 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2047 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2048 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2051 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2056 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2060 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2063 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2064 * equals the length of the parameters.
2066 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2067 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2068 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2069 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2074 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2075 unsigned int sigalg
;
2078 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2079 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2083 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
2085 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2087 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2088 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2092 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2094 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2095 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2099 md
= ssl_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->hash_idx
);
2101 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2102 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2103 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2107 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2109 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2115 * Check signature length
2117 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2118 /* wrong packet length */
2119 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2121 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2125 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2126 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2127 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2132 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2133 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2137 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2138 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2139 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2140 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2141 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2146 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2147 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2148 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2149 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2150 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2151 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
)) <= 0) {
2152 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2156 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2157 PACKET_remaining(&signature
)) <= 0) {
2159 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2163 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2166 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2167 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2168 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2169 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2170 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2171 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2172 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2175 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2179 /* still data left over */
2180 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2181 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2187 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2190 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2191 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2192 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2193 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2196 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2198 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2199 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
2200 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2201 const unsigned char *data
;
2202 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2203 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2205 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2210 /* get the certificate types */
2211 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &ctype_num
)
2212 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
2213 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2217 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2218 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2219 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2220 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2221 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2222 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2226 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
2227 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2228 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2230 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2231 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
2233 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2236 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2237 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2239 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2243 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2244 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2245 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2246 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
)) {
2247 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2249 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2252 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2253 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2259 /* get the CA RDNs */
2260 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &list_len
)
2261 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != list_len
) {
2262 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2267 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
2268 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &name_len
)
2269 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2270 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2272 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2276 namestart
= namebytes
;
2278 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
2279 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2280 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2285 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2286 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2288 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2291 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2298 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2299 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2300 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2301 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2302 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2305 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2308 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2311 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2315 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2317 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2320 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2322 int al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2323 unsigned int ticklen
;
2324 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2325 unsigned int sess_len
;
2326 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2328 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2329 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
))
2330 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2331 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2333 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2339 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2340 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2341 * be 0 here in that instance
2344 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2346 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2347 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2348 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2349 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2351 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2354 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2356 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2358 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2361 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2362 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2367 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2368 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2372 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2373 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2375 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2377 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2378 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2379 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2381 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2382 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2386 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2387 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2392 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2393 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2394 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2396 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2399 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2400 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2401 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2403 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2404 exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
2411 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2412 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2413 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2414 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2415 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2416 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2417 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2418 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2419 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2422 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2423 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2425 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2426 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2427 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2431 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2433 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2434 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2436 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2437 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2440 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2442 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2444 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2446 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2450 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2451 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2452 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2454 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2459 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2460 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2461 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2463 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2466 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2467 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2468 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2472 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2473 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2474 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2478 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2479 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2483 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2489 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2493 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
, &al
)) {
2494 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2495 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2496 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2499 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2503 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2504 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2505 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2508 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
2511 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2514 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2515 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2520 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2521 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2522 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2524 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2525 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2526 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2529 *al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2531 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2535 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2537 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2542 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2543 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2544 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2545 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2554 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2556 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2558 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2559 /* should contain no data */
2560 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2565 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2566 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2574 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2576 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2580 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2581 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2582 && s
->renegotiate
!= 0)
2583 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2586 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2589 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2590 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2591 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2594 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2599 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2600 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2603 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2604 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2605 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2606 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2607 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2610 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2612 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2616 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2618 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2619 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2622 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2624 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2626 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2628 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2629 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2633 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2634 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2636 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2640 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2641 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2642 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2644 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2648 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2649 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2650 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2652 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2653 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2656 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2658 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2665 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2666 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2667 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2668 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2673 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2678 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2681 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2682 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2683 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2685 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2688 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2690 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2696 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2697 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2702 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2703 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2706 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2710 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2711 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2712 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2713 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2717 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2718 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2722 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2723 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2724 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2728 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2729 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2733 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2736 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2738 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2742 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2743 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2748 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2749 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2751 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2752 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
))
2757 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2758 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2763 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2768 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2772 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2773 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2774 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2776 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2780 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2784 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2786 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0)
2789 /* send off the data */
2790 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2791 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
), &keybytes
))
2794 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2795 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2799 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2802 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2806 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2809 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2810 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2811 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2814 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2820 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2826 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2831 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2832 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2834 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2839 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2846 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2847 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2851 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2856 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2859 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2860 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2863 unsigned int md_len
;
2864 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2865 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2866 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2867 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2870 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2871 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2874 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2876 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2878 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2880 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2884 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2885 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2886 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2891 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2892 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2893 * certificate key for key exchange
2896 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2898 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2900 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2905 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2906 /* Generate session key
2907 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2909 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
2910 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2915 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2918 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2919 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
2920 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
2921 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2922 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2923 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2924 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2925 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
2926 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2930 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2932 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
2933 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
2934 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2938 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2940 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2943 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2944 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
2949 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
2950 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
2951 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
2952 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2957 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2958 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2959 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2963 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2964 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2965 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2969 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2974 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2977 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
2979 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
2980 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2985 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
2987 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2988 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2989 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2997 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3002 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3004 unsigned long alg_k
;
3007 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3009 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3010 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3013 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3014 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3016 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3017 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3019 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3020 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3022 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3023 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3025 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3026 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3028 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3029 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3037 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3038 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3039 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3041 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3042 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3047 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3049 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3052 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3053 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3055 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3057 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3058 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3060 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3067 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3068 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3072 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3073 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3075 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3084 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3085 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3086 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3089 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3092 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3093 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3095 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3096 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3097 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
3100 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3101 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3107 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3108 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3113 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3114 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3115 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3117 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3119 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3120 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, NULL
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3123 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3124 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3126 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3127 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3132 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3135 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3138 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3139 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3140 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3141 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3143 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3147 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3148 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3151 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3153 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3154 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3156 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3160 /* We need to get a client cert */
3161 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3163 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3164 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3166 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3168 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3171 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3172 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3173 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3175 } else if (i
== 1) {
3177 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3178 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3182 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3183 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3186 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3187 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3188 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3189 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3191 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3192 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3193 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3194 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3200 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3203 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3207 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3209 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3212 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3215 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0))
3216 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3217 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3221 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3228 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3230 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3237 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3238 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3240 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3241 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3243 /* we don't have a certificate */
3244 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3247 /* This is the passed certificate */
3249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3250 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
3251 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3252 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
3254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3259 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3261 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3265 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3266 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
3268 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3269 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3271 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3275 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3277 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3282 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) &&
3283 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3285 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3290 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3291 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3299 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3304 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3306 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3307 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3309 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3310 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3312 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3313 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3318 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3322 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3327 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3329 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3330 /* should contain no data */
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3332 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
3333 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3334 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3338 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3339 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3340 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3341 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3342 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3347 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3349 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3352 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3354 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3356 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3358 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
3359 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3364 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3365 &rawexts
, &al
, NULL
)
3366 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3367 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
3370 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3371 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3374 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3375 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3376 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3377 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3380 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3384 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3385 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3386 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3387 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3392 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3393 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3397 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3400 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
;
3401 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3402 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3403 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3408 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3409 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3410 # error Max cipher length too short
3413 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3414 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3417 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3418 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3421 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3424 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3426 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3429 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3430 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3432 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3433 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3434 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
3437 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3451 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3452 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3453 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3455 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3460 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3461 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3462 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3464 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);