2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
35 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
36 s
->init_num
, &written
);
39 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
45 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
49 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
51 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
52 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
56 s
->init_off
+= written
;
57 s
->init_num
-= written
;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
65 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
69 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
75 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
77 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
))
81 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
82 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
83 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
85 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
87 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
88 * support secure renegotiation.
90 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
91 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
92 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
95 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
97 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
100 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
101 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
103 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
105 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
106 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
109 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
112 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
119 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
120 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
122 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
123 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
125 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
126 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
128 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
129 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
131 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
134 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
135 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
136 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
137 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
138 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
139 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
141 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
144 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
145 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
146 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
148 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
149 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
150 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
151 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
152 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
153 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
154 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
159 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
163 retlen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
172 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
176 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
177 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
178 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
180 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
181 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
182 int pktype
, ispss
= 0;
185 /* Only happens in TLSv1.3 */
187 * TODO(TLS1.3): This needs to change. We should not get this from the
188 * cipher. However, for now, we have not done the work to separate the
189 * certificate type from the ciphersuite
191 pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
);
195 md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
196 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
198 pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
200 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
206 /* Get the data to be signed */
207 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
212 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !tls12_get_sigandhash(s
, pkt
, pkey
, md
, &ispss
)) {
213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
217 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
219 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
220 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
226 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0
227 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
233 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
234 /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
235 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, -1) <= 0) {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
239 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
240 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
241 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
242 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
248 if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
255 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
256 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
257 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
258 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
262 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
267 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
268 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
272 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
276 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
277 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
281 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
283 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
284 const unsigned char *data
;
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
286 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
288 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
289 int type
= 0, j
, pktype
, ispss
= 0;
292 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
295 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
296 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
297 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
304 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
305 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
306 pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
307 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
309 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
311 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
312 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
316 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
318 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
319 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
322 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
323 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
328 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
332 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
333 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
336 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
339 } else if (rv
== 0) {
340 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
343 ispss
= SIGID_IS_PSS(sigalg
);
345 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
348 /* Use default digest for this key type */
349 int idx
= ssl_cert_type(NULL
, pkey
);
351 md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
];
353 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
358 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
360 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
364 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
365 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
366 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
368 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
371 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
373 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
377 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
383 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
385 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0
386 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
392 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
393 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
394 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
395 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
399 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
406 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
407 /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
408 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, -1) <= 0) {
409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
412 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
413 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
414 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
415 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
420 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
421 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
427 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
429 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
432 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
433 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
435 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
436 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
437 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
439 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
444 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
446 size_t finish_md_len
;
451 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
452 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
454 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
455 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
458 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
460 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
461 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
466 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
468 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
473 /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
474 if (!ssl_log_master_secret(s
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
,
475 s
->session
->master_key
,
476 s
->session
->master_key_length
))
480 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
483 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
484 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
486 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
488 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
489 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
491 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
496 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
502 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
505 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
510 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
511 * the appropriate error.
513 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
516 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
517 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
519 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
520 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
523 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
526 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
530 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
535 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
537 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
538 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
539 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
542 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
543 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
544 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
545 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
546 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
547 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
548 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
553 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
555 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
560 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
561 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
562 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
563 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
567 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
568 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
569 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
570 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
574 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
575 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
577 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
578 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
582 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
583 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
586 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
590 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
592 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
593 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
594 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
597 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
599 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
602 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
603 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
604 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
608 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
610 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
612 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
613 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
614 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
618 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
620 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
626 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
629 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
630 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
632 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
634 OPENSSL_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
635 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
637 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
641 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
642 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
644 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
646 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
647 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
652 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
653 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
654 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
658 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
659 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
663 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
668 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
670 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
671 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
672 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
675 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
677 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
679 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
686 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
687 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
,
691 unsigned char *outbytes
;
693 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
696 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
699 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
700 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
702 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
707 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
714 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
715 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
, int *al
)
719 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
720 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
721 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
722 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
724 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
730 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
732 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
733 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
735 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
737 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
739 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
740 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
742 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
744 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
745 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
747 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
751 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
752 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_X509_LIB
);
757 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
758 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
759 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
760 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
762 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
763 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
765 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
766 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
769 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
774 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
778 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
779 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
780 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
782 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
, &tmpal
)) {
783 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
787 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
789 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
794 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0, &tmpal
))
796 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
797 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
798 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1, &tmpal
))
809 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
,
812 int tmpal
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
814 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
815 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, &tmpal
)
816 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
825 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
826 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
829 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
)
831 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
834 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
836 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
837 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
843 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
845 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
846 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
848 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
851 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
855 if (s
->statem
.cleanuphand
) {
856 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
859 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
861 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
864 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
866 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
867 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
869 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
871 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
873 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
874 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
877 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
878 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
879 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
880 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
883 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
885 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
886 /* done with handshaking */
887 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
888 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
889 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
890 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
895 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
899 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
901 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
904 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
906 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
907 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
911 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
914 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
915 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
917 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
920 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
923 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
925 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
926 * in the middle of a handshake message.
928 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
929 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
931 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
934 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
935 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
936 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
937 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
939 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
940 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
944 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
949 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
950 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
952 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
953 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
954 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
957 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
962 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
963 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
964 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
966 } while (skip_message
);
967 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
970 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
972 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
974 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
977 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
978 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
980 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
981 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
982 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
984 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
985 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
988 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
989 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
990 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
994 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
996 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1002 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1006 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1008 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1012 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1013 /* We've already read everything in */
1014 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1019 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1021 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1022 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1024 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1028 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1034 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1035 * Finished verification.
1037 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
1041 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1042 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1043 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1046 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1050 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1051 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1052 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1054 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1055 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1057 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1061 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1062 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1063 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1064 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1071 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
1073 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
1076 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
1080 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
;
1082 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1085 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
1087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1088 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
1089 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1090 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
1091 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1092 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
1093 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
1098 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
1103 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
1104 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
1105 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
1106 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1108 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
1109 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
1110 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
1111 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
1112 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
1113 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1114 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
1115 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1116 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
1117 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
1118 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
1119 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
1120 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
1121 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
1122 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
1123 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1124 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
1125 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
1126 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1128 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1129 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
1130 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1132 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1133 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
1134 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
1136 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
1137 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
1139 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
1140 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
1141 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
1142 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
1143 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1145 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
1146 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
1147 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
1148 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
1149 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
1150 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
1151 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
1152 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
1154 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
1155 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1157 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
1158 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
1161 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
1167 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1169 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1171 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1174 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1176 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1181 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1182 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1187 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1188 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1191 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1192 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1195 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1197 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1199 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1202 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1204 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1207 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1209 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1212 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1214 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1217 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1219 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1224 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1225 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1228 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1230 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1232 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1235 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1236 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1238 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1239 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1245 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1247 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1248 * @method: the intended method.
1250 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1252 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1254 int version
= method
->version
;
1256 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1257 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1258 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1259 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1261 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1262 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1263 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1265 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1266 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1267 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1268 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1269 else if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS
) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
1270 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE
;
1276 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1279 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1280 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1282 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1284 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
1286 const version_info
*vent
;
1287 const version_info
*table
;
1289 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1291 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1292 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1293 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1294 table
= tls_version_table
;
1296 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1297 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1302 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1304 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
1305 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
1306 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
1314 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1315 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1316 * supported protocol version.
1318 * @s server SSL handle.
1320 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1322 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1324 const version_info
*vent
;
1325 const version_info
*table
;
1328 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1329 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1332 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1336 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1337 * highest protocol version).
1339 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1340 table
= tls_version_table
;
1341 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1342 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1344 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1348 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1349 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1350 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1356 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1357 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1358 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1359 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1361 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1362 * @version: the intended limit.
1363 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1365 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1367 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1375 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1376 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1377 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1379 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1380 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1381 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1382 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1383 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1385 switch (method_version
) {
1388 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1389 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1390 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1391 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1396 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1397 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
1401 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1402 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
1403 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1413 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1414 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1415 * the version specific method.
1417 * @s: server SSL handle.
1419 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1421 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1424 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1426 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1427 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1429 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1432 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1433 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1434 const version_info
*vent
;
1435 const version_info
*table
;
1437 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1439 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1441 switch (server_version
) {
1444 * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
1445 * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
1446 * renegotiation for TLS1.3
1448 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1449 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1451 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1452 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1453 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1454 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1455 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1458 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1459 table
= tls_version_table
;
1461 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1462 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1466 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1468 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1469 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1470 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1471 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1472 PACKET versionslist
;
1474 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1476 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1477 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1478 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1481 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1482 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1483 if (candidate_vers
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1484 candidate_vers
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1486 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1487 * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1488 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1490 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1493 vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->version
!= (int)candidate_vers
;
1496 if (vent
->version
!= 0 && vent
->smeth
!= NULL
) {
1497 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1499 method
= vent
->smeth();
1500 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1501 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1502 best_method
= method
;
1506 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1507 /* Trailing data? */
1508 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1511 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1512 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1513 s
->method
= best_method
;
1516 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1520 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1521 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1523 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1524 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1527 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1530 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1531 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1533 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1534 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1536 method
= vent
->smeth();
1537 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1538 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1544 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1548 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1549 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1550 * the version specific method.
1552 * @s: client SSL handle.
1553 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1555 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1557 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
1559 const version_info
*vent
;
1560 const version_info
*table
;
1562 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1563 if (version
== TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
1564 version
= TLS1_3_VERSION
;
1566 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1568 if (version
!= s
->version
)
1569 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1571 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1572 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1573 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1574 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1575 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1578 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1579 table
= tls_version_table
;
1581 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1582 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1586 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1587 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1590 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
1592 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1594 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1595 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1599 s
->version
= version
;
1603 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1607 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1608 * @s: The SSL connection
1609 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1610 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1612 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1613 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1614 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1615 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1616 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1618 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1619 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1620 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1622 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1623 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1625 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
,
1630 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1631 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1632 const version_info
*table
;
1633 const version_info
*vent
;
1635 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1638 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1639 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1640 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1641 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1642 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1644 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1646 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1647 table
= tls_version_table
;
1649 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1650 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1655 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1656 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1657 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1658 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1660 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1661 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1662 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1664 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1665 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1666 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1668 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1669 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1670 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1671 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1672 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1673 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1675 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1677 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1679 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1680 * "version capability" vector.
1682 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1686 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1687 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1691 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1693 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1694 *min_version
= version
;
1699 *max_version
= version
;
1701 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1703 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1709 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1710 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1712 * @s: client SSL handle.
1714 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1716 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1718 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1720 ret
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1725 s
->version
= ver_max
;
1727 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1728 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1729 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1731 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;