2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
34 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
38 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
40 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
41 * ignore the result anyway
43 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
44 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
48 if (ret
== s
->init_num
) {
50 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
51 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
60 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
64 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
65 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
68 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
74 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, const char *sender
, int slen
)
78 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
80 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
82 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
86 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= i
;
88 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
)) {
89 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
94 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
97 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
98 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
99 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= i
;
101 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
102 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
103 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= i
;
108 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
114 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
117 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
122 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
123 * the appropriate error.
125 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
128 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
129 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
131 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
132 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
135 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
138 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
142 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
147 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
149 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
150 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
151 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
153 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
154 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
155 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
156 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
157 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
158 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
160 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
165 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
167 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
172 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
173 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
174 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
179 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
180 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
181 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
186 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
187 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
189 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
190 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
194 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
195 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
198 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
202 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
204 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
205 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
206 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
209 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
213 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
214 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
215 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
216 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
219 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
221 i
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
223 if ((unsigned long)i
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
224 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
229 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
) != 0) {
230 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
236 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
239 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
240 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
);
241 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= i
;
243 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
244 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
);
245 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= i
;
248 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
250 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
251 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
252 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
255 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
257 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
259 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
266 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
268 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
269 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)
270 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
277 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
279 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
284 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
285 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
290 /* clean a few things up */
291 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
293 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
295 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
296 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
298 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
302 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
306 if (!s
->server
|| s
->renegotiate
== 2) {
307 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
312 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
314 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
315 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
317 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
319 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
321 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
322 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
325 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
326 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
327 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
328 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
331 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
333 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
334 /* done with handshaking */
335 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
336 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
337 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
338 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
342 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
345 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
347 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
348 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
352 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
355 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
356 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
358 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
361 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
364 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
366 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
367 * in the middle of a handshake message.
369 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || i
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
370 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
372 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
375 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
377 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= i
;
379 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
380 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
389 if (p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
391 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
392 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
393 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
396 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
401 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
402 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
403 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
405 } while (skip_message
);
406 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
409 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
411 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
413 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
416 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
417 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
419 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
420 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
421 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
423 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
424 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
427 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
428 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
429 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
433 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
435 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
441 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
445 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, unsigned long *len
)
451 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
452 /* We've already read everything in */
453 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
458 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
460 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
461 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0);
463 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
473 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
474 * Finished verification.
476 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
480 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
481 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
482 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
484 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
485 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
490 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
491 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
493 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
494 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
495 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
496 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
501 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
502 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
503 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
507 * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
510 if (s
->init_num
< 0) {
511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
512 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
516 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
520 int ssl_cert_type(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
522 if (pk
== NULL
&& (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
525 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
529 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
;
531 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
537 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
538 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
539 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
540 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
541 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
542 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
547 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
552 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
553 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
554 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
555 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
557 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
558 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
559 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
560 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
561 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
562 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
563 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
564 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
565 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
566 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
567 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
568 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
569 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
570 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
571 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
572 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
573 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
574 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
575 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
577 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
578 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
579 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
581 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
582 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
583 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
585 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
586 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
588 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
589 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
590 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
591 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
592 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
594 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
595 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
596 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
597 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
598 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
599 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
600 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
601 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
603 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
604 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
606 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
607 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
610 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
616 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
618 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
620 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
623 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
625 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
630 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
631 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
636 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
637 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
640 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
641 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
644 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
646 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
648 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
651 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
653 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
656 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
658 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
661 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
663 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
668 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
669 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
672 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
674 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
676 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
679 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
680 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
682 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
683 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
689 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
691 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
692 * @method: the intended method.
694 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
696 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
698 int version
= method
->version
;
700 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
701 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
702 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
703 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
705 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
706 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
707 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
709 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
710 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
711 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
712 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
713 else if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS
) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
714 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE
;
720 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
723 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
724 * @version: Protocol version to test against
726 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
728 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
730 const version_info
*vent
;
731 const version_info
*table
;
733 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
735 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
736 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
737 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
738 table
= tls_version_table
;
740 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
741 table
= dtls_version_table
;
746 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
748 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
749 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
750 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
758 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
759 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
760 * supported protocol version.
762 * @s server SSL handle.
764 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
766 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
768 const version_info
*vent
;
769 const version_info
*table
;
772 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
773 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
776 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
780 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
781 * highest protocol version).
783 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
784 table
= tls_version_table
;
785 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
786 table
= dtls_version_table
;
788 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
792 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
793 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
794 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
800 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
801 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
802 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
803 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
805 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
806 * @version: the intended limit.
807 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
809 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
811 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
819 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
820 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
821 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
823 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
824 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
825 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
826 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
827 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
829 switch (method_version
) {
832 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
833 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
834 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
835 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
840 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
841 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
845 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
846 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
847 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
857 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
858 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
859 * the version specific method.
861 * @s: server SSL handle.
863 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
865 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
)
868 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
870 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
871 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
873 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
876 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
877 int client_version
= s
->client_version
;
878 const version_info
*vent
;
879 const version_info
*table
;
882 switch (server_version
) {
884 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
885 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
887 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
888 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
889 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
890 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
891 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
894 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
895 table
= tls_version_table
;
897 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
898 table
= dtls_version_table
;
902 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
903 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
905 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
906 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
908 method
= vent
->smeth();
909 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
910 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
916 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
920 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
921 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
922 * the version specific method.
924 * @s: client SSL handle.
925 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
927 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
929 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
931 const version_info
*vent
;
932 const version_info
*table
;
934 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
936 if (version
!= s
->version
)
937 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
939 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
940 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
941 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
942 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
943 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
946 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
947 table
= tls_version_table
;
949 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
950 table
= dtls_version_table
;
954 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
955 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
958 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
960 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
962 method
= vent
->cmeth();
963 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
967 s
->version
= version
;
971 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
975 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
976 * @s: The SSL connection
977 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
978 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
980 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
981 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
982 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
983 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
984 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
986 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
987 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
988 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
990 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
991 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
993 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
,
998 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
999 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1000 const version_info
*table
;
1001 const version_info
*vent
;
1003 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1006 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1007 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1008 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1009 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1010 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1012 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1014 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1015 table
= tls_version_table
;
1017 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1018 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1023 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1024 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1025 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1026 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1028 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1029 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1030 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1032 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1033 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1034 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1036 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1037 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1038 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1039 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1040 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1041 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1043 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1045 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1047 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1048 * "version capability" vector.
1050 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1054 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1055 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1059 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1061 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1062 *min_version
= version
;
1067 *max_version
= version
;
1069 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1071 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1077 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1078 * the initial ClientHello.
1080 * @s: client SSL handle.
1082 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1084 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1086 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1088 ret
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1093 s
->client_version
= s
->version
= ver_max
;