2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
25 typedef struct x509err2alert_st
{
30 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
31 const unsigned char hrrrandom
[] = {
32 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
33 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
34 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
38 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
39 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
41 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
46 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
47 s
->init_num
, &written
);
50 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
52 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
53 * ignore the result anyway
54 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
56 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
57 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
58 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
))
59 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
60 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
63 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
65 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
66 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
70 s
->init_off
+= written
;
71 s
->init_num
-= written
;
75 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
79 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
80 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
83 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
89 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
91 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
92 /* SSLfatal() already called */
96 /* Reset any extension flags */
97 memset(s
->ext
.extflags
, 0, sizeof(s
->ext
.extflags
));
100 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
101 int i
, ver_min
, ver_max
, ok
= 0;
104 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
105 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
108 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
) != 0) {
109 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
113 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
114 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
116 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
117 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max
, c
->min_dtls
) &&
118 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, c
->max_dtls
))
120 } else if (ver_max
>= c
->min_tls
&& ver_max
<= c
->max_tls
) {
127 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
128 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
129 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
133 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
134 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
135 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
);
137 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
138 tsan_counter(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
);
140 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
143 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
144 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
);
146 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
);
148 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
149 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
152 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
155 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
162 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
163 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
165 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
166 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
168 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
169 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
171 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
172 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
174 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
177 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
178 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
179 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
180 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
181 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
182 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
184 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
187 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
188 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
189 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
191 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
192 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
193 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
194 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
195 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
196 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
197 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
198 /* SSLfatal() already called */
203 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
207 retlen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
209 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA
,
210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
219 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
221 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
222 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
223 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
224 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
225 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
227 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
228 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
229 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
231 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
232 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
233 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
236 pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
238 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
239 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
244 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
246 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
247 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
251 /* Get the data to be signed */
252 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
253 /* SSLfatal() already called */
257 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
258 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
259 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
262 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
263 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
265 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
266 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
270 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
271 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
276 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
277 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
278 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
279 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
280 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
285 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
286 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
287 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
288 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
289 s
->session
->master_key
)
290 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
292 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
296 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
304 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
306 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
307 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
308 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
309 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
313 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
314 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
315 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
319 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
320 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
321 /* SSLfatal() already called */
326 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
330 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
334 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
336 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
337 const unsigned char *data
;
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
339 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
341 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
345 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
348 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
349 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
350 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
353 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
354 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
358 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
359 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
361 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
362 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
366 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, NULL
) == NULL
) {
367 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
368 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
372 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
375 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
376 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
380 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <= 0) {
381 /* SSLfatal() already called */
384 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
385 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
386 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
390 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
392 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
397 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
398 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
401 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
403 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
404 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
407 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)
408 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
409 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
410 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
))
411 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 128
412 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
))) {
413 len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
416 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
417 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
418 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
422 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
423 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
424 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
425 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
426 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
429 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
430 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
431 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
435 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
436 /* SSLfatal() already called */
441 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
443 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
444 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
450 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
451 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
452 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
453 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
454 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
455 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
456 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
459 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
465 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
466 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
467 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
468 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
469 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
474 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
475 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
476 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
477 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
478 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
483 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
484 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
485 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
489 j
= EVP_DigestVerify(mctx
, data
, len
, hdata
, hdatalen
);
491 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
492 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
497 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
499 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
500 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
501 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
503 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
508 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
510 size_t finish_md_len
;
514 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
515 if (!s
->server
&& s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
516 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
519 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
524 && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 0
525 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
526 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {;
527 /* SSLfatal() already called */
532 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
533 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
535 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
536 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
539 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
541 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
542 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
543 /* SSLfatal() already called */
547 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
549 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
550 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
551 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
556 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
557 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
559 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
560 s
->session
->master_key
,
561 s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
562 /* SSLfatal() already called */
567 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
569 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
570 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
571 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
575 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
577 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
579 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
581 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
587 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
589 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
590 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE
,
591 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
595 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
599 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
601 unsigned int updatetype
;
603 s
->key_update_count
++;
604 if (s
->key_update_count
> MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES
) {
605 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
606 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES
);
607 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
611 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
612 * be on a record boundary.
614 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
615 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
616 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
617 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
620 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
621 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
622 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
623 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
624 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
628 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
631 if (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
632 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
) {
633 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
634 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
635 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
639 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
640 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
641 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
643 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
)
644 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
646 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
647 /* SSLfatal() already called */
648 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
651 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
655 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
658 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
664 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
665 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
667 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
668 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
671 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
=
672 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
, sender
, slen
,
673 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
675 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
== 0) {
676 /* SSLfatal() already called */
683 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
687 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
689 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
690 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
691 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
693 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
694 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
695 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
696 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
697 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
698 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
699 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
700 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
701 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
705 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
706 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
707 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
708 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
712 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
713 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
714 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
715 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
716 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
719 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
720 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
721 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
723 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
726 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
727 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
729 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
730 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
734 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
735 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
738 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
742 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
745 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
750 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
753 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
754 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
757 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_VALID
;
758 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
759 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
760 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
761 /* SSLfatal() already called */
762 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
767 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
768 * message must be on a record boundary.
770 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
771 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
772 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
773 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
776 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
777 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
778 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
779 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
780 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
782 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
784 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
786 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
787 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
788 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
789 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
792 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
794 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
795 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
796 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
800 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
802 if (!ossl_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
803 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
804 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
805 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
808 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
810 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
812 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
814 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
818 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
819 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
821 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
823 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
&&
824 !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
825 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
826 /* SSLfatal() already called */
827 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
830 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
831 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
832 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
833 /* SSLfatal() already called */
834 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
836 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
837 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
838 /* SSLfatal() already called */
839 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
841 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
842 /* SSLfatal() already called */
843 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
848 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
851 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
853 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
854 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
855 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
862 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
863 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
)
866 unsigned char *outbytes
;
868 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
870 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
874 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
875 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
876 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
877 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
882 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
884 /* SSLfatal() already called */
891 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
892 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
896 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
897 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
898 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
900 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
906 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
908 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
909 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
911 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
913 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
915 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
916 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
918 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
920 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
921 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
923 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
924 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
925 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
928 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
929 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
930 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
935 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
936 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
937 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
938 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
940 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
941 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
943 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
944 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
947 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
952 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
953 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
956 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
957 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
958 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
960 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
)) {
961 /* SSLfatal() already called */
962 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
966 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
968 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
970 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
973 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0)) {
974 /* SSLfatal() already called */
977 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
978 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
979 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1)) {
980 /* SSLfatal() already called */
988 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
990 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)) {
991 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
992 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
996 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
))
999 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1000 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
1001 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1009 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1010 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1013 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
, int stop
)
1015 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1018 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1020 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1021 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1023 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
1026 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
)) {
1027 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE
,
1028 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1034 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->server
1035 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
1036 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
;
1039 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1040 * post handshake exchange
1042 if (s
->statem
.cleanuphand
) {
1043 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1046 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
1047 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1049 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
1053 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1056 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1057 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
1059 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1060 tsan_counter(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
);
1061 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
1063 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
1065 * We are finishing after the client. We start the timer going
1066 * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
1069 dtls1_start_timer(s
);
1072 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1074 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1075 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1077 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
1078 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0)
1079 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1082 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1085 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
1088 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
);
1090 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
1091 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
);
1093 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1095 * We are finishing after the server. We start the timer going
1096 * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
1099 dtls1_start_timer(s
);
1103 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1104 /* done with handshaking */
1105 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
1106 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1107 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1108 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
1112 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1113 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1114 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1115 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1117 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1118 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
1121 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
1124 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1125 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1126 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1129 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1132 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
1134 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1135 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
;
1137 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1139 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1142 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1143 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1145 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1148 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1151 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1153 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1154 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1156 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1157 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1158 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1159 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1162 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_BEFORE
1163 && (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) != 0) {
1165 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1166 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1167 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1168 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1169 * with a valid cookie.
1173 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1174 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1175 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1176 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1178 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1179 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1180 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1181 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1184 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1189 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1190 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1192 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1193 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1194 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1197 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1201 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1202 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1203 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1204 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1206 } while (skip_message
);
1207 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1210 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1212 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1214 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1217 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1218 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1220 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
1221 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1222 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1224 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1225 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1228 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1229 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1230 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1231 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1234 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1236 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1243 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1245 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1249 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1250 /* We've already read everything in */
1251 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1256 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1258 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1259 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1261 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1265 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1270 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1271 * Finished verification.
1273 if (*(s
->init_buf
->data
) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED
&& !ssl3_take_mac(s
)) {
1274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1279 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1280 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1281 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1283 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1287 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1288 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1289 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1292 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1293 * processing the message
1294 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1297 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1298 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1299 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1300 && s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
)) {
1301 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1302 || s
->init_num
< SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1303 || memcmp(hrrrandom
,
1304 s
->init_buf
->data
+ SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
,
1305 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) != 0) {
1306 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1307 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1308 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1314 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1315 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1316 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1317 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1324 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table
[] = {
1325 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
},
1326 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1327 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1328 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1329 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1330 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1331 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1332 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
},
1333 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1334 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1335 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1336 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1337 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1338 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1339 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1340 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1341 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1342 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1343 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1344 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1345 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1346 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1347 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1348 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1349 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
},
1350 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1351 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1352 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1353 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1354 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1355 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1356 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1357 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1358 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1359 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1360 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1361 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1362 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1363 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1365 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1366 {X509_V_OK
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
}
1369 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err
)
1371 const X509ERR2ALERT
*tp
;
1373 for (tp
= x509table
; tp
->x509err
!= X509_V_OK
; ++tp
)
1374 if (tp
->x509err
== x509err
)
1379 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1381 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1383 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1386 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1388 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1393 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1394 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1399 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1400 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1403 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1404 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1407 /* Must be in order high to low */
1408 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1410 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1412 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1415 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1417 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1420 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1422 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1425 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1427 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1430 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1432 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1437 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1438 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1441 /* Must be in order high to low */
1442 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1444 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1446 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1449 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1450 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1452 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1453 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1459 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1461 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1462 * @method: the intended method.
1464 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1466 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1468 int version
= method
->version
;
1470 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1471 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1472 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1473 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1475 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1476 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1477 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1479 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1480 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1481 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1482 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1488 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1489 * certificate type, or has PSK configured. Otherwise returns 0.
1491 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL
*s
)
1495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1496 if (s
->psk_server_callback
!= NULL
)
1500 if (s
->psk_find_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1503 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1504 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1506 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
1507 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
1508 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
1509 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
1514 if (ssl_has_cert(s
, i
))
1522 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1525 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1526 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1528 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1530 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
, const SSL_METHOD
**meth
)
1532 const version_info
*vent
;
1533 const version_info
*table
;
1535 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1537 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1538 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1539 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1540 table
= tls_version_table
;
1542 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1543 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1548 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1550 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
1551 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0
1552 && ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0
1554 || version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
1555 || is_tls13_capable(s
))) {
1557 *meth
= vent
->cmeth();
1565 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1566 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1567 * supported protocol version.
1569 * @s server SSL handle.
1571 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1573 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1575 const version_info
*vent
;
1576 const version_info
*table
;
1579 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1580 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1583 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1587 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1588 * highest protocol version).
1590 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1591 table
= tls_version_table
;
1592 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1593 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1595 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1599 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1600 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1601 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1607 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1608 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1609 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1610 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1612 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1613 * @version: the intended limit.
1614 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1616 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1618 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1626 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1627 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1628 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1630 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1631 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1632 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1633 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1634 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1636 switch (method_version
) {
1639 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1640 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1641 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1642 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1647 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1648 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
1652 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1653 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
1654 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1663 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL
*s
, int vers
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1665 if (vers
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1666 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
)) {
1667 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2
;
1668 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && vers
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1669 && (ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
)
1670 || ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
))) {
1671 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
;
1673 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1678 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1679 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1680 * the version specific method.
1682 * @s: server SSL handle.
1684 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1686 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1689 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1691 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1692 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1694 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1697 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1698 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1699 const version_info
*vent
;
1700 const version_info
*table
;
1702 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1704 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1706 switch (server_version
) {
1708 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1709 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1710 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1711 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1713 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1714 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1715 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1716 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1717 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1722 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1723 * a HelloRetryRequest
1726 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1727 table
= tls_version_table
;
1729 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1730 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1734 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1736 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1737 if (!suppversions
->present
&& s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
)
1738 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1740 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1741 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1742 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1743 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1744 PACKET versionslist
;
1746 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1748 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1749 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1750 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1754 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1755 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1756 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1757 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1758 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1759 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1760 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1762 if (client_version
<= SSL3_VERSION
)
1763 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION
;
1765 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1766 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1768 if (ssl_version_supported(s
, candidate_vers
, &best_method
))
1769 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1771 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1772 /* Trailing data? */
1773 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1776 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1777 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1779 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1780 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1782 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1783 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1786 check_for_downgrade(s
, best_vers
, dgrd
);
1787 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1788 s
->method
= best_method
;
1791 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1795 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1796 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1798 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1799 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1802 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1805 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1806 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1808 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1809 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1811 method
= vent
->smeth();
1812 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1813 check_for_downgrade(s
, vent
->version
, dgrd
);
1814 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1820 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1824 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1825 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1826 * the version specific method.
1828 * @s: client SSL handle.
1829 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1830 * @extensions: The extensions received
1832 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1834 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
, RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
)
1836 const version_info
*vent
;
1837 const version_info
*table
;
1842 s
->version
= version
;
1844 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1845 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
,
1846 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1847 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
, extensions
,
1853 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
1854 && s
->version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1856 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1857 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1861 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1863 if (s
->version
!= s
->method
->version
) {
1865 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1866 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1867 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1871 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1872 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1873 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1874 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1875 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1878 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1879 table
= tls_version_table
;
1881 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1882 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1886 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1887 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1890 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
1893 if (highver
!= 0 && s
->version
!= vent
->version
)
1896 if (highver
== 0 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) != 0)
1897 highver
= vent
->version
;
1899 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1900 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
1902 if (s
->version
== vent
->version
) {
1904 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1905 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
, err
);
1912 highver
= vent
->version
;
1914 if (s
->version
!= vent
->version
)
1917 /* Check for downgrades */
1918 if (s
->version
== TLS1_2_VERSION
&& highver
> s
->version
) {
1919 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade
,
1920 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1921 - sizeof(tls12downgrade
),
1922 sizeof(tls12downgrade
)) == 0) {
1924 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1925 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1926 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1929 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)
1930 && s
->version
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1931 && highver
> s
->version
) {
1932 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade
,
1933 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1934 - sizeof(tls11downgrade
),
1935 sizeof(tls11downgrade
)) == 0) {
1937 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1938 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1939 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1949 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1950 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1955 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1956 * @s: The SSL connection
1957 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1958 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1960 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1961 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1962 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1963 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1964 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1966 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1967 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1968 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1970 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1971 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1973 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
, int *max_version
)
1977 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1978 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1979 const version_info
*table
;
1980 const version_info
*vent
;
1982 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1985 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1986 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1987 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1988 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1989 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1991 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1993 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1994 table
= tls_version_table
;
1996 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1997 table
= dtls_version_table
;
2002 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2003 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2004 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2005 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2007 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2008 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2009 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2011 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2012 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2013 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2015 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2016 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2017 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2018 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2019 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2020 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2022 *min_version
= version
= 0;
2024 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
2026 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2027 * "version capability" vector.
2029 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
2033 method
= vent
->cmeth();
2034 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
2038 *min_version
= method
->version
;
2040 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
2041 *min_version
= version
;
2046 *max_version
= version
;
2048 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2050 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
2056 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2057 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2059 * @s: client SSL handle.
2061 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2063 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
2065 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
2068 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2069 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2071 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
2074 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
2079 s
->version
= ver_max
;
2081 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2082 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2083 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
2085 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
2090 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2091 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2092 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2093 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2096 int check_in_list(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, const uint16_t *groups
,
2097 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
2101 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
2104 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
2105 uint16_t group
= groups
[i
];
2107 if (group_id
== group
2109 || tls_curve_allowed(s
, group
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
2118 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2119 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *hashval
,
2120 size_t hashlen
, const unsigned char *hrr
,
2123 unsigned char hashvaltmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2124 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
2126 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
2128 if (hashval
== NULL
) {
2129 hashval
= hashvaltmp
;
2131 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2132 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
2133 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashvaltmp
, sizeof(hashvaltmp
),
2135 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2140 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2141 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
2142 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2146 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2147 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
2148 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen
;
2149 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
2150 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
2151 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2156 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2157 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2158 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2161 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hrr
, hrrlen
)
2162 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
2163 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
2164 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
))) {
2165 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2172 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2174 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
2177 int parse_ca_names(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2179 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
2180 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2183 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
2184 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2185 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2188 /* get the CA RDNs */
2189 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2190 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2191 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2195 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2196 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2197 unsigned int name_len
;
2199 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2200 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2202 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2206 namestart
= namebytes
;
2207 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2208 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2212 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2213 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2214 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2218 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2219 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2220 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2226 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2227 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2232 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2237 int construct_ca_names(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2239 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= SSL_get0_CA_list(s
);
2241 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2242 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2243 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2248 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
) {
2251 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
2252 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2253 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
2257 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2258 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2260 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2261 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2262 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2268 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2269 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2270 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2277 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2278 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **ptbs
,
2279 const void *param
, size_t paramlen
)
2281 size_t tbslen
= 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ paramlen
;
2282 unsigned char *tbs
= OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen
);
2285 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS
,
2286 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2289 memcpy(tbs
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2290 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2292 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
* 2, param
, paramlen
);
2299 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2300 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2302 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL
*s
)
2304 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2305 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1))
2306 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2309 s
->pha_dgst
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2310 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2311 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2312 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2316 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->pha_dgst
,
2317 s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
)) {
2318 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2319 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2320 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2328 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2329 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2331 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL
*s
)
2333 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2334 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2335 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2339 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
,
2341 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2342 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);