2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
27 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
40 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
47 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
51 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
52 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
53 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
58 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
59 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
60 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
) {
61 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
68 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
69 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
70 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
71 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
72 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
76 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
77 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
84 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
85 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
86 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
90 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
91 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
97 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
98 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
99 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
106 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
107 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
109 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
)
111 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
112 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
;
118 /* No valid transition found */
123 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
124 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
125 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
126 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
128 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
129 * (transition not allowed)
131 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
133 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
135 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
136 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
141 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
147 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
148 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
149 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
154 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
156 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
157 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
159 * 2) If we did request one then
160 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
162 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
163 * list if we requested a certificate)
165 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
166 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
167 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
168 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
169 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
171 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
172 * not going to accept it because we require a client
175 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
176 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
177 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
178 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
181 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
185 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
188 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
189 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
190 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
197 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
198 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
203 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
205 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
206 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
207 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
208 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
209 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
212 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
213 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
215 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
216 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
217 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
218 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
220 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
224 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
225 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
231 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
232 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
233 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
238 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
240 if (s
->s3
->npn_seen
) {
241 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
242 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
247 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
248 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
257 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
258 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
259 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
265 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
266 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
267 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
274 /* No valid transition found */
275 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
276 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
281 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
283 * Valid return values are:
287 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
289 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
292 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
293 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
294 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
295 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
296 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
299 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
301 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
305 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
306 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
307 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
308 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
309 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
312 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
313 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
323 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
325 * Valid return values are:
329 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
332 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
333 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
335 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
336 * during re-negotiation:
338 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0 ||
339 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
341 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
342 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
345 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
347 * ... except when the application insists on
348 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
351 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
352 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
353 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
355 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
358 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
366 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
367 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
370 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
372 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
375 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
376 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
379 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
381 /* Shouldn't happen */
382 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
385 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
386 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
387 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
389 /* Try to read from the client instead */
390 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
392 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
393 if (s
->hello_retry_request
)
394 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
396 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
397 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
399 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
400 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
402 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
403 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
408 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
409 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
410 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
412 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
416 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
417 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
421 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
424 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
425 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
426 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
428 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
429 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
432 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
433 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
435 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
437 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
438 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
440 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
441 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
444 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
447 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
448 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
449 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
454 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
455 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
456 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
462 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
463 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
465 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
467 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
470 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
471 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
475 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
477 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
479 /* Shouldn't happen */
480 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
483 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
484 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
485 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
486 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
487 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
489 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
490 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
491 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
492 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
497 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
500 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
501 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
504 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
505 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
506 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
507 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
509 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
512 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
513 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
515 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
517 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
518 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
520 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
522 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
523 /* normal PSK or SRP */
524 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
525 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
526 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
527 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
528 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
529 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
530 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
532 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
538 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
539 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
544 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
545 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
546 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
551 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
552 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
553 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
558 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
559 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
562 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
563 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
565 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
567 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
569 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
570 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
572 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
576 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
577 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
580 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
581 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
584 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
586 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
588 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
589 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
594 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
595 * the server to the client.
597 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
599 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
601 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
603 /* No pre work to be done */
606 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
609 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
612 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
614 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
615 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
616 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
621 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
622 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
624 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
625 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
631 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
633 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
634 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
636 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
638 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
639 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
641 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
642 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
643 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
645 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0);
646 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
648 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
649 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
656 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
657 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
658 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
661 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
663 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
664 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
665 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
666 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
670 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
672 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
673 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
)
674 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
678 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
681 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
685 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
686 * server to the client.
688 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
690 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
694 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
696 /* No post work to be done */
699 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
700 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
704 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
705 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
707 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
708 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
713 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
714 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
716 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
717 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
718 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
722 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
723 * treat like it was the first packet
728 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
730 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
731 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
732 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
735 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
738 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
739 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
741 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
742 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
743 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
745 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
749 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
750 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
754 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
755 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
756 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
757 * something clever in the record layer for this.
759 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
760 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
761 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
762 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
765 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
766 && !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
767 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
))
772 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
774 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
776 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
779 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
783 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
784 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
786 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
791 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
794 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
795 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
799 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
800 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
803 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
805 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
808 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
812 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
813 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
814 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
815 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)
816 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
817 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
822 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
823 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
825 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1))
829 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
830 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
835 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
839 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
842 * Valid return values are:
846 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
847 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
849 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
851 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
853 /* Shouldn't happen */
856 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
858 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
860 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
861 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
864 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
865 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
866 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
869 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
870 /* No construction function needed */
872 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
875 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
876 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
877 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
881 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
882 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
885 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
886 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
887 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
891 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
892 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
893 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
896 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
897 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
898 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
901 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
902 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
903 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
906 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
907 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
908 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
911 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
912 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
913 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
916 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
917 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
918 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
921 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
926 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
927 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
928 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
931 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
932 *confunc
= tls_construct_hello_retry_request
;
933 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
936 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
937 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
938 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
946 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
947 * calculated as follows:
949 * 2 + # client_version
950 * 32 + # only valid length for random
951 * 1 + # length of session_id
952 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
953 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
954 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
955 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
956 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
957 * 2 + # length of extensions
958 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
960 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
962 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
963 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
966 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
967 * reading. Excludes the message header.
969 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
971 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
973 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
975 /* Shouldn't happen */
978 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
979 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
981 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
982 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH
;
985 return s
->max_cert_list
;
987 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
988 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
990 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
991 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
994 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
995 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
998 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
999 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1001 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1002 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1004 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1005 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1010 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1012 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1014 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1016 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1018 /* Shouldn't happen */
1019 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1021 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1022 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
1024 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1025 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s
, pkt
);
1027 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1028 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1030 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1031 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1033 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1034 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1037 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1038 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
1041 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1042 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1044 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1045 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1047 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1048 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1054 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1057 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1059 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1061 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1063 /* Shouldn't happen */
1066 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1067 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1069 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1070 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1072 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1076 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
1078 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
1080 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1082 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1083 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1084 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1086 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1089 ret
= SSL3_AL_FATAL
;
1090 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
1092 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
1099 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1102 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1103 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1104 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1110 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1112 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1113 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1114 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1115 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1116 cookie_leni
> 255) {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1118 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1121 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1123 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1124 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1134 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1135 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1136 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1140 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1142 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1143 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1144 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1145 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1147 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1149 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1150 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1151 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1152 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1153 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1154 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1155 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1157 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1158 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1159 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1160 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1161 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1162 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1163 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1164 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1165 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1166 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1167 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1168 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1169 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1171 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1172 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1177 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1179 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1180 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1181 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1185 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1188 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1189 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1191 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1194 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1196 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1198 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1199 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1200 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1201 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1202 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
;
1204 clienthello
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello
));
1205 if (clienthello
== NULL
) {
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1209 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1210 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1211 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1212 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1220 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1222 clienthello
->isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1223 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1225 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1228 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
) {
1229 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1235 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1236 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1237 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1238 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1240 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1241 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1243 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1244 * 7-8 session_id_length
1245 * 9-10 challenge_length
1249 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1250 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1252 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1253 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1254 * in the first place
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1261 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->legacy_version
)) {
1262 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1267 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1268 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1270 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1271 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1272 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1274 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1277 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1278 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1279 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1281 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1282 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1286 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1287 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1292 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1294 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->session_id
, session_id_len
)
1295 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1296 /* No extensions. */
1297 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1299 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1300 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1303 clienthello
->session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1305 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1306 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1307 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1308 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1310 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1311 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1312 memset(clienthello
->random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1313 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1314 clienthello
->random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1315 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1316 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1317 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1319 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1323 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1325 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1326 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1327 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1328 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
->session_id
,
1329 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1330 &clienthello
->session_id_len
)) {
1331 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1336 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1337 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1338 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1342 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1343 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1344 &clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1345 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1350 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1351 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1352 * So check cookie length...
1354 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1355 if (clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
== 0)
1360 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
)) {
1361 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1366 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1367 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1372 /* Could be empty. */
1373 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1374 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1376 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->extensions
)
1377 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1378 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1385 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
->compressions
,
1386 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1387 &clienthello
->compressions_len
)) {
1388 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1393 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1394 extensions
= clienthello
->extensions
;
1395 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1396 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, &al
,
1397 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts_len
, 1)) {
1398 /* SSLerr already been called */
1401 s
->clienthello
= clienthello
;
1403 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1405 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1407 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1409 if (clienthello
!= NULL
)
1410 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1411 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1413 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1416 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, int *pal
)
1419 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1424 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1426 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1427 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1428 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *scsvs
= NULL
;
1429 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= s
->clienthello
;
1430 DOWNGRADE dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1432 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1433 /* Give the early callback a crack at things */
1434 if (s
->ctx
->early_cb
!= NULL
) {
1436 /* A failure in the early callback terminates the connection. */
1437 code
= s
->ctx
->early_cb(s
, &al
, s
->ctx
->early_cb_arg
);
1441 s
->rwstate
= SSL_EARLY_WORK
;
1446 /* Set up the client_random */
1447 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1449 /* Choose the version */
1451 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1452 if (clienthello
->legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1453 || (clienthello
->legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1454 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1456 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1463 s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1466 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1467 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1469 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1470 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1471 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1472 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
->legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1473 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1480 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1481 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1482 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1484 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1488 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1489 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1490 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1492 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1496 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1497 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1498 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1499 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1500 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1501 clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1502 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1504 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1506 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1508 /* default verification */
1509 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
1510 || memcmp(clienthello
->dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1511 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1512 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1516 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1518 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1519 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1520 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1522 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1523 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1531 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1532 clienthello
->isv2
, &al
) ||
1533 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
, &ciphers
, &scsvs
,
1534 clienthello
->isv2
, &al
)) {
1538 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
1539 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1540 if (scsvs
!= NULL
) {
1541 for(i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs
); i
++) {
1542 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs
, i
);
1543 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
1544 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1545 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1547 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
1548 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1551 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
1552 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
&&
1553 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
1555 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1556 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1557 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1558 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1559 * an insecure downgrade.
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1562 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1563 al
= SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
1569 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1570 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1571 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
=
1572 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1574 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1576 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1577 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1580 if (s
->hello_retry_request
1581 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
1582 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= cipher
->id
)) {
1584 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1585 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1587 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER
);
1591 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1594 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1595 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1596 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1597 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1603 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1604 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1606 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1607 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1608 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1609 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1610 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1611 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1612 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1613 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1614 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1615 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1618 if (clienthello
->isv2
||
1620 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1621 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1624 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, clienthello
, &al
);
1626 /* previous session */
1628 } else if (i
== -1) {
1632 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1638 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1639 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1641 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1643 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1646 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1648 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1649 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1651 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1652 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1661 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1664 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1666 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1671 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1672 if (clienthello
->compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1676 if (loop
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1678 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1684 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1685 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, clienthello
);
1686 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1688 /* TLS extensions */
1689 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1690 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
, 1)) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1696 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1697 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1698 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1699 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1703 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1704 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, dgrd
) <= 0) {
1710 && s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1713 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1714 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1716 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1717 * backwards compat reasons
1719 int master_key_length
;
1721 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1722 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1723 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1725 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1726 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1727 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1729 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1730 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1734 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1735 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1736 pref_cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
,
1737 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1738 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1739 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1744 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1745 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1746 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1747 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1748 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1753 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1754 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1755 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1757 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1758 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1760 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1761 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1762 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1764 if (clienthello
->compressions_len
!= 1) {
1765 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1767 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1772 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1773 else if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1774 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1776 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1777 /* Can't disable compression */
1778 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1780 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1783 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1784 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1785 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1786 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1787 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1791 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1793 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1796 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1797 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; k
++) {
1798 if (clienthello
->compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1801 if (k
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1802 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1804 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1807 } else if (s
->hit
) {
1809 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1810 /* See if we have a match */
1811 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1814 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1815 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1816 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1818 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; o
++) {
1819 if (v
== clienthello
->compressions
[o
]) {
1828 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1834 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1835 * using compression.
1837 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1844 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1847 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1848 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1849 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1850 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1851 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1859 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1860 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1862 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1864 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1870 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1871 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
1872 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1873 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
1874 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
1877 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1880 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1881 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
1882 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1883 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
1884 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
1890 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1891 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1893 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
1895 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1898 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1899 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1900 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1901 * influence which certificate is sent
1903 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
1904 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
1907 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1908 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
!= NULL
) {
1910 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1911 * et al can pick it up.
1913 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
1914 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
1916 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1917 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
1918 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1920 /* status request response should be sent */
1921 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
1922 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
1923 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
1925 /* something bad happened */
1926 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
1928 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1937 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1939 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1940 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
1942 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
1943 int rv
= tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s
, &al
);
1945 /* SSLErr() was already called */
1952 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
1953 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1954 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1955 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
) {
1956 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1958 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1960 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1964 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1967 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1970 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
1971 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1973 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1975 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1977 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1980 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1983 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, &al
))
1985 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1986 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1987 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
1988 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1989 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
1990 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
1991 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1992 /* do not send a session ticket */
1993 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1996 /* Session-id reuse */
1997 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
2001 * we now have the following setup.
2003 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2004 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2005 * compression - basically ignored right now
2006 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2007 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2008 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2009 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2013 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2014 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2016 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
, &al
)) {
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2018 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2025 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_C
) {
2027 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
2029 * callback indicates further work to be done
2031 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2034 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
2036 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
2037 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
2039 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2041 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2044 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2050 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
2052 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2053 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2057 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2059 int compm
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2063 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
2064 version
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
: s
->version
;
2065 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
2067 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2068 * tls_process_client_hello()
2070 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2076 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2077 * back in the server hello:
2078 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2079 * we send back the old session ID.
2080 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2081 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2082 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2083 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2085 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2086 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2087 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2088 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2091 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
2092 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
2094 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
2096 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
2097 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2102 /* set up the compression method */
2103 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2106 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
2109 compm
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
2112 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
2113 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
))
2114 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
2115 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
2116 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
))
2117 || !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2119 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2120 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
,
2122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2126 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
2127 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2128 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2134 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2138 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2140 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
2141 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2142 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2149 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2152 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
2154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2155 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2156 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
2159 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
2160 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, i
;
2163 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2164 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2165 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
2167 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2172 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2177 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2179 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
2180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2181 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2182 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2184 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2186 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2187 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2189 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2192 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2193 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2194 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2195 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2198 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2201 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
2204 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2206 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2207 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
2208 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2216 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2217 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2219 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2222 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2223 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2224 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2226 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2229 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2231 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2235 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
2237 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2242 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2244 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2247 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
2248 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
2251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2252 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2255 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2257 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2261 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2262 nid
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2263 curve_id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid
);
2264 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2266 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2269 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id
);
2270 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2271 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2276 /* Encode the public key. */
2277 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
2279 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2285 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2286 * can set these to NULLs
2293 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2295 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2296 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2297 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2298 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2300 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2303 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2304 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2305 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2306 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2310 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2312 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2316 if (((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) != 0)
2317 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) != 0) {
2319 } else if (lu
== NULL
) {
2320 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2325 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2326 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2327 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2330 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2331 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2333 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2334 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2337 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2343 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2344 unsigned char *binval
;
2347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2348 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2349 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2352 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2356 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2362 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2363 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2366 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2367 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2370 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2372 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2375 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2379 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2380 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2386 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2390 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2392 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2393 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2394 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2397 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2398 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2399 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2400 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2402 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2405 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2406 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2412 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
2413 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
2414 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
;
2417 if (pkey
== NULL
|| md
== NULL
) {
2418 /* Should never happen */
2419 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2421 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2425 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2426 * points to the space at the end.
2429 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2430 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2432 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2435 /* send signature algorithm */
2436 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
))
2439 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2440 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2441 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2444 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2445 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2446 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2448 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2451 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2452 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2453 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2459 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2460 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2461 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2462 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2463 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx
,
2464 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2466 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
) <= 0
2467 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2468 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2470 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2475 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2478 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2481 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2484 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2486 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2490 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2492 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2494 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2495 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2496 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2498 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2502 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2503 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, NULL
,
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2506 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2512 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2513 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2514 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2519 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2520 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2521 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2523 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2524 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
2525 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2526 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2528 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2533 if (!construct_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2539 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2542 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2546 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2549 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2551 PACKET psk_identity
;
2553 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2554 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2558 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2559 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2563 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2564 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2569 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2570 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2575 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2578 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2579 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2582 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2584 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2586 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2588 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2592 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2593 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2594 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2596 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2597 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2602 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2606 /* Should never happen */
2607 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2613 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2616 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2618 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2619 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2620 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2622 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2625 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA
].privatekey
);
2627 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2632 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2633 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2634 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2636 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2637 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2638 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2645 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2646 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2647 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2648 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2650 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2651 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2656 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2657 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2658 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2664 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2665 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2666 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2667 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2668 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2671 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2675 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2676 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2678 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2679 decrypt_len
= (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2680 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2681 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
2682 if (decrypt_len
< 0)
2685 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2688 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2689 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2690 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2692 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2693 *al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2698 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2699 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
2700 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
2701 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
2702 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
2704 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
2707 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2708 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2709 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2710 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2711 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2712 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2715 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2716 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2718 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2719 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2722 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2723 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2724 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2725 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2726 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2727 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2730 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2731 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2732 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2733 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2735 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2736 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2737 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2741 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2742 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2744 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2747 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2748 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2749 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2750 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2752 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2753 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
2754 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
2755 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
2756 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2759 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
2760 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2761 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2768 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2771 /* Should never happen */
2772 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2778 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2781 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2785 const unsigned char *data
;
2786 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2789 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2790 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2792 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2795 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2797 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2802 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2803 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2807 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2808 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2809 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2813 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2814 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2818 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2819 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2821 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2823 if (pub_key
!= NULL
)
2828 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2829 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2835 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2836 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2838 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2841 /* Should never happen */
2842 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2848 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2851 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2852 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2855 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2856 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2857 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2862 const unsigned char *data
;
2865 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2866 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2869 /* Get encoded point length */
2870 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
2871 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2872 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2876 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2877 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2881 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
2882 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2888 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2889 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2895 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2896 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2898 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2902 /* Should never happen */
2903 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2909 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2913 const unsigned char *data
;
2915 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
2916 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2917 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2918 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2921 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2922 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2926 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2927 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2931 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2932 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2933 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2938 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2945 /* Should never happen */
2946 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2952 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2955 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2956 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2957 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
2958 const unsigned char *start
;
2959 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2960 unsigned long alg_a
;
2963 size_t sess_key_len
;
2964 const unsigned char *data
;
2967 /* Get our certificate private key */
2968 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2969 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
2971 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2973 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
2975 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
2978 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2980 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
2981 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2984 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2985 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2986 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2990 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2991 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2996 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2997 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2998 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2999 * client certificate for authorization only.
3001 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3002 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
3003 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
3006 /* Decrypt session key */
3007 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
3008 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
3009 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3013 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3014 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
3015 &Tclass
, (long)sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3016 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
3017 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3023 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
3024 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
3025 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3029 /* Generate master secret */
3030 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3031 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3032 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3036 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3037 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
3038 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
3039 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
3043 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3046 /* Should never happen */
3047 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3053 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3056 unsigned long alg_k
;
3058 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3060 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3061 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3064 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
3065 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3066 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3067 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3069 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3072 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3073 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
3074 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3078 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3079 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3081 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3082 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3084 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3085 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3087 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3088 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3090 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3091 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3094 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3096 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3100 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3103 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3105 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3106 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3108 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3109 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3112 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3115 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3116 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3117 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3118 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3120 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3123 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3124 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3126 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3127 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3128 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
3130 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3134 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3135 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3140 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
3142 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3143 * the handshake_buffer
3145 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3146 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3149 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3151 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3153 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3154 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3158 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3159 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3161 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3162 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3167 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3170 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3172 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3174 unsigned long l
, llen
;
3175 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3176 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3177 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3180 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3185 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3186 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
))
3187 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
3188 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
3189 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3190 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3195 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3196 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3197 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3198 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3200 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3204 certstart
= certbytes
;
3205 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3210 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3211 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3213 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3217 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3218 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3221 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3222 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
3226 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3227 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
3228 &al
, NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
3229 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3230 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
, &al
,
3231 PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) == 0)) {
3232 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3235 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3238 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3245 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3246 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3247 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3248 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3250 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3253 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3254 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3255 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3257 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3258 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
;
3261 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3262 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3267 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3269 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3271 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3276 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3279 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3281 al
= SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3283 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3288 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3289 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3290 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3292 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3293 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3296 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3299 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3300 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3306 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3307 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3311 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3313 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3314 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3315 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3316 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3317 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3321 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3325 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3326 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3329 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3333 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3335 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
3336 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3344 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3345 * for the server Certificate message
3347 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0))
3348 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, &al
)) {
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3350 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3357 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3359 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3360 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3361 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
3362 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3363 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3364 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3367 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3368 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3369 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3370 int iv_len
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3371 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3373 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3377 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3378 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u
.age_add_c
, sizeof(age_add_u
)) <= 0)
3380 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
3381 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
3382 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
3383 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
);
3384 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
3385 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
);
3386 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
3387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3388 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3391 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
;
3393 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= s
->max_early_data
;
3396 /* get session encoding length */
3397 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3399 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3402 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3406 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3412 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3413 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3414 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3420 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3424 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3427 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3430 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3432 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3433 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3434 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3438 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3439 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3442 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3445 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3446 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3448 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
3449 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3450 int ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3455 /* Put timeout and length */
3456 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3457 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3459 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3463 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3464 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3469 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3471 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3473 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3474 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, iv_len
) <= 0)
3476 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3477 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3479 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
3480 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
3481 EVP_sha256(), NULL
))
3483 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3484 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3488 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3489 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3490 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3493 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
,
3494 (s
->hit
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
3495 ? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)
3497 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
))
3498 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3499 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
3500 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3501 /* Output key name */
3502 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3504 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3505 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3507 /* Encrypt session data */
3508 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3509 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3510 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3511 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3512 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3513 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3514 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3515 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3516 || !HMAC_Update(hctx
,
3517 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3518 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3519 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3520 || !HMAC_Final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
)
3521 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3522 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3523 || macdata1
!= macdata2
3524 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
3526 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
3527 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3532 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3533 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3538 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3540 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3541 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3542 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3547 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3548 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3550 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3552 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
3553 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
3554 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
3555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3562 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3564 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
3565 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3574 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3575 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3577 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3579 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3580 size_t next_proto_len
;
3581 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3584 * The payload looks like:
3586 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3587 * uint8 padding_len;
3588 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3590 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3591 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3592 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3593 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3594 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3598 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
3603 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3605 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3607 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3608 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3609 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3613 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3617 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3619 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3627 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3629 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3633 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3634 * (should be s->version)
3636 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
3637 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
3638 || !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
3639 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
3641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3645 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3646 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3651 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3652 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3654 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
))
3659 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3663 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3665 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3667 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3668 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3670 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3671 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3674 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3675 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY
) {
3676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3681 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3682 * a record boundary.
3684 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
3685 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3687 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
3691 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
;
3692 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3693 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
3694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3698 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3700 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3701 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3702 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;